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 ABSTRACT 
Infectious diseases are the current leading cause of human death and within this 
category nosocomial infections remain the most frequent complication of 
hospitalization.  A range of infection prevention and control activities are employed to 
combat the selection and spread of these organisms.  The principle components of 
which are: early identification of carriage/infection, patient isolation, improved hand 
hygiene, environmental control and good antimicrobial stewardship.  In order to 
properly focus these interventions, it is essential to know how and when cross 
transmission has occurred.   
There is an ongoing debate about the role of the environment in the spread of 
healthcare associated infections and to what extent if any it acts as a potential vector 
for transmission.  Within the healthcare setting patients spend a substantial amount of 
time surrounded by equipment and environmental surfaces that may be contaminated 
with microorganisms.   In order to establish what role the environment could play, 
tracking the spread of organisms by molecular typing is key.  The current methods 
used to do this are complex and often are only available at reference laboratories. This 
means that turnaround times are slow and only provide retrospective confirmation of 
cross-transmission events.   
Infection control interventions that can be used prior to receiving results play an 
important role.  The selection and effectiveness of these interventions are often poorly 
supported by research studies, leading to problems with the introduction of evidence 
based practice and thus difficulty in selecting the most appropriate response to 
suspected cross transmission. 
This thesis aims to explore the role of the environment in cross transmission of 
infection by developing sampling methodologies to permit environmental surveillance, 
validating and developing typing techniques in order to establish epidemiological links 
between patients and environmental contamination and to evaluate infection control 
interventions to aid in prevention of cross transmission events. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1   THE IMPORTANCE OF HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATED 
INFECTIONS 
Infectious diseases are the current leading cause of human death and within this 
category nosocomial infections remain the most frequent complication of 
hospitalization.(1)  The United Kingdom (UK)  Department of Health (DoH) defines 
healthcare associated infection (HCAI) as “any infection by any infectious agent 
acquired as a consequence of a person’s treatment by the UK National Health Service 
(NHS) or which is acquired by a health care worker in the course of their NHS duties”.(2)    
HCAI may lead to poor clinical outcomes and death.(3)  In high income countries HCAI 
affects  approximately 5 – 15% of patients, whereas figures from low income countries 
indicates that prevalence rates are in the region of 15 – 19%.(4)  Within the United 
States (US) in 2002 there were ~1.7 million HCAIs of which ~100000 resulted in death, 
of which a significant proportion were antimicrobially resistant.(5)  Within the United 
Kingdom (UK) HCAI affect >6% of hospitalised patients, with those patients in intensive 
care units (ITUs) being fourfold more likely to develop an infection.(6) Therefore different 
ward types and specialities differ in the associated risk of HCAI.(7)   
Microbes within the healthcare environment can be transmitted by inhalation, 
contaminated hands or surfaces, faecal-oral routes or bodily fluids.(7)   Patients that are 
particularly susceptible to HCAI include those with severe underlying disease, long 
hospital stays, old age, and admission to ITU.(7)  It is estimated that of the HCAIs 
developed within the ITU, 40 – 60% are due to endogenous flora, 20 – 40% are due to 
the hands of contaminated healthcare workers (HCW), 20 - 25% are due to antibiotic 
driven change and 20% is potentially due to environmental contamination.(8)  However 
the role of the environment in these figures is contentious.(8) 
Despite a range of infection prevention and control activities being employed to combat 
HCAI, the overall prevalence estimation within England has only fallen from 8.2% to 
6.4% from 2006-2011.(1)   Yet up to a third of HCAIs are believed to be preventable, with 
only 37% of HCAIs the result of directly attributable transmission from other patients.(9, 
10) It is however difficult to differentiate a true nosocomial transmission from unrelated 
cases and without epidemiological typing assumptions about outbreaks may be falsely 
drawn.(11) This is partly because HCAIs present a unique challenge due to the 
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difficulties in establishing when patients are asymptomatically colonised, not just 
symptomatically infected; which complicates determining transmission dynamics.(11) 
1.1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF PAEDIATRIC INFECTION CONTROL 
Infection control is particularly important within the paediatric environment due to the 
diverse needs and susceptibilities of these patients.(12) HCAI among children differ from 
those observed in adult populations, by both the sites and patterns of distribution.(12) 
Children interact closely with their environment, through toys and other objects, and so 
environmental contamination poses a unique risk. (12), (13)  They also utilise shared ward 
areas more frequently than adult patients and due to the movement of both patients 
and their families through hospital environments, it is postulated that they are much 
more likely to be involved in person to person transmission of infection.(14) 
Many viral infections are first acquired in childhood and may be associated with 
prolonged infectivity and increased viral load.(12)  It was recently demonstrated that 
12.2% of paediatric patients developed HCAIs with respiratory or gastrointestinal 
viruses.(15) Additionally children who become colonised with multi-drug resistant (MDR) 
bacteria may be colonised for prolonged periods with continuous self-contamination.  
Both cases act as a means by which children become an important source of 
environmental contamination and a reservoir for other forms of transmission.   
1.2 ORGANISMS COMMONLY RESPONSIBLE FOR HEALTHCARE 
ASSOCIATED INFECTION 
1.2.1 STAPHYLOCOCCAL SPECIES 
Staphylococcal species (spp.), which are Gram-positive cocci belonging to the 
Staphylococcaceae, were first described in 1882 by Sir Alexander Ogstoni.(16)  
Staphylococcus epidemidis in a normal constituent of skin flora and is predominantly a 
cause of nosocomial infection in catheterized patients, as well causing infective 
endocarditis.(17)  Staphylococcus aureus, which was named for its golden pigment by 
Friedrich J. Rosenbach, is a common human pathogen and causes skin and soft tissue 
infections, and pneumonia, as well as infections linked to invasive devices within all 
age groups.(16, 18, 19) In addition to infection it can also cause toxin related illness, such 
as toxic shock and food intoxications.(18) 
Staphylococcus aureus is a leading human pathogen associated with HCAI worldwide, 
and can cause both colonisation and infection.(18)   Staphylococcus aureus is isolated 
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from the anterior nares in about 30% of the population and nasal carriage often 
precedes infection.(18)  It also colonises other sites such as the throat, perineum and 
axillae, but the anterior nares is the site most commonly associated with 
colonisation.(19, 20)  Children are thought to act as vectors for Staphylococcus aureus 
spread both within the community and hospital setting.(19)  Within the UK there were 
8767 reported incidents of Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia in 2012 with an 
associated mortality rate of 50% in patients with complicated infection, and 30% in 
other groups.(21) Staphylococcus aureus can survive for long periods within the 
environment, but the main source of transmission within the healthcare setting is 
believed to be person to person via the hands of HCW, although it is believed the 
environment may play a role.(22) 
The main form of clinically significant resistance in Staphylococcus aureus is resistance 
to β-lactam agents including methicillin.  The mechanism for this resistance resulting in 
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) was first identified in 1981 and 
involves the expression of transpeptidase (PBP2a) encoded for by the chromosomal 
mecA gene, which is located on a mobile genetic element known as the Staphylococcal 
cassette chromosome (SCC).(16) This resistance has led to MRSA being identified as a 
major cause of preventable nosocomial infections, with a mortality from bacteraemia of 
20% at seven days and 38% at 30 days.(23, 24)  
MRSA infection is a leading cause of morbidity and mortality in inpatients, with the 
incidence of infections increasing twofold/threefold since the late 2000s worldwide.(25)    
MRSA prevalence rates in the US increased from 46.3/1000 inpatients in 2006 to 
66.4/1000 inpatients in 2010, and within the EU there were ~170000 patients detected 
as MRSA positive annually.(26, 27) MRSA strains now account for 20% - 40% of 
Staphylococcus. aureus detected in hospitals where strains are endemic, such as 
those within the UK.(28)  
Transmission of MRSA, similar to methicillin sensitive Staphylococcus aureus, is via 
the hands of HCWs, although other modes  of spread, such aerial dispersal, have been 
noted in the literature.(29)   MRSA environmental contamination has been demonstrated 
to be linked with the level of nasal carriage in patients.(20, 30, 31)  5% of HCWs caring for 
MRSA positive patients become long term colonised with MRSA of which 5% go onto 
develop clinical infection.  Short term colonisation is thought to be much more frequent, 
however HCWs carrying MRSA have rarely been demonstrated to be the source of 
outbreaks.(7) The exact mode of acquisition is therefore unknown but there have also 
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been links to seasonality in Staphylococcus aureus infections, with more being 
detected in summer months.(25) 
Legislation and national infection control interventions were introduced within England 
in an effort to decrease rates of MRSA within hospitals.  These included targeted 
screening of at risk patients in 2006 and active surveillance of all patients in 2010 (as 
discussed in section 1.5.2.).(32)  These were introduced as it was acknowledged that the 
spread of MRSA presented a significant threat to public health.(33)  This has led to a 
reduction in rates of MRSA by 85% between April 2003 and March 2011.(32)  However 
the focus has been on MRSA rather than sensitive Staphylococcus aureus, due to the 
associated treatment complications. The spread of Staphylococcus aureus is clonal, 
whether sensitive or resistant, and in recent years there has been an increase in 
community infections with both sensitive and resistant Staphylococcus aureus leading 
to skin and soft tissue infections in otherwise healthy young adults.(34) 
1.2.2 CLOSTRIDIUM DIFFICILE 
Clostridium difficile is a Gram-positive anaerobe that was first isolated in stool in 
1935.(35)  Clostridium difficile causes disease through the production of enterotoxin A 
and cytotoxin B which represent the major virulence factors for Clostridium difficile.(35, 
36)    However not all strains of Clostridium difficile carry the toxin genes.  Clostridium 
difficile infection (CDI) is due to the presence of a toxin competent strain of Clostridium 
difficile in faeces.  CDI may be associated with no disease (colonisation) or  with a 
spectrum of Clostridium difficile associated disease, ranging from mild diarrhoea to 
pseudomembranous colitis and toxic megacolon.(37)     
Within the US a fourfold increase in rates of CDI has been observed since 1993, with 
levels reaching 346,800 cases and ~30,000 deaths in 2010.  Within the US CDI is 21% 
more common than MRSA infections (not including colonisation).(35)  In 2009 the rate of 
CDI in Scotland was 0.71/1000 occupied bed days in those aged over 65.(37)  Mortality 
rates depend on whether the infecting Clostridium difficile strain is a toxin hyper 
producer or not, but can be as high as 30%.(36, 38)  Mortality rates are highest amongst 
elderly patients who have underlying medical conditions.(39, 40)  Risk factors for 
developing CDI include prior antibiotic use, especially clindamycin, cephalosporins 
and/or fluoroquinolones.(37)  25% of cases of CDI occur in paediatric patients; the 
majority of cases occur in haematology/oncology patients, but the source of these 
infections is unclear.(14) 
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Patients with CDI excrete between 10*104 and 10*107 of Clostridium difficile/gram of 
faeces.(39)  Contamination of the environment is common due to aerosolization of 
spores during diarrhoeal episodes.(39)  This can lead to high levels of environmental 
contamination, especially in areas such as toilets and side rooms, as well as on pieces 
of equipment.(39, 41)  Clostridium difficile spores are resistant to disinfectants and can 
survive for months or years on surfaces.(39)  This has led to the opinion that while the 
main route of transmission is via the hands of HCW,  the environment acts as a 
possible  reservoir.(35) 
Within the NHS a surveillance system was established in 1990, with mandatory 
surveillance instigated in 2004.  Clinical interventions were also introduced in the form 
of high impact interventions or care bundles.(42) Strategies for controlling CDI have 
focussed on hand hygiene compliance, antimicrobial stewardship and environmental 
control.(43)  This has led to a decrease in cases in the >64 age group, however the 
incidence in the 2 – 64 age group only decreased by 9%.(42)  Other strategies to control 
CDI have included early diagnosis, staff education and use of appropriate isolation 
strategies.(36) 
1.2.3 KLEBSIELLA SPECIES 
Klebsiella spp. are Gram-negative non-motile organisms first described in 1882 and 
belonging to the Enterobacteriaceae.(44-46) A distinguishing feature of the genus is 
production of a thick polysaccharide coat which when hyperproduced, and along with 
the megA gene, is thought to be associated with virulence.(47, 48)  The genus occupies a 
diverse range of ecological niches including: soil, water and warm blooded 
mammals.(44)  In 1984 the genus Klebsiella was classified as containing five species:  
K. pneumoniae, K. oxytoca, K. terrigena, K. ornithinolytica and K. planticola.  K. 
pneumoniae is comprised of three subspecies: K. pneumoniae sub sp pneumoniae, K. 
pneumoniae sub sp. ozenae and K. pneumoniae sub sp. rhinoscleromatis.(45)   
Klebsiella pneumoniae is the most important of the species and accounts for 95% of all 
Klebsiella spp. isolated from clinical samples.(49)  The species is characterised by its 
inability to grow at 10oC or failure to utilize L-sorbose as a carbon source unlike the 
other Klebsiella spp.(45) Klebsiella pneumoniae is an important nosocomial pathogen, 
causing 15% of Gram-negative infections within intensive care units (ITUs) and is the 
second most frequent cause of Gram-negative sepsis, and is also known to cause 
pneumonia, urinary tract and wound infections.(50-54) Klebsiella pneumoniae infections 
primarily affect immunocompromised patients and have an associated mortality rate of 
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>50%. This is in part due to the capsule; which is considered to be  a significant 
virulence factor, with certain capsular types being linked to invasive disease e.g. K1, 
K2, K45 and K57.(51, 55)  
Klebsiella spp. are frequently found within the human gastrointestinal tract, but have 
also been found to colonise both the skin and upper respiratory tract of hospitalised 
patients.(54)  Colonisation with microorganisms is known to be a potential source for 
cross transmission and Klebsiella pneumoniae is capable of causing asymptomatic 
colonisation of patients; this can lead to an unrecognised reservoir.(51, 56, 57)  
Colonisation with Klebsiella pneumoniae and/or Escherichia coli has been noted to be 
more likely in patients that are also colonised with MRSA.  This is likely due to similar 
risk factors for colonisation.(57)  For infants the median length of colonisation after 
discharge from hospital was 12.5 months and in adults the longest length of carriage 
was 40 months, meaning that these patients continue to act as reservoirs in the 
community after they have left the healthcare environment.(58-60)  Carriage length was 
extended with prior or further antibiotic use, and four negative samples were required 
before a patient could be considered clear of colonisation.(58-60) 
Isolates associated with nosocomial infection are often linked with antibiotic resistance 
including carbapenemases such as Klebsiella pneumoniae carbapenemase (KPC) and 
Oxacillinase-type β-lactamas.(55)  These antibiotic resistance mechanisms combined 
with other virulence factors such as siderophores and adhesins, mean that Klebsiella 
pneumoniae is capable of causing outbreaks both in children and adult hospital 
units.(44)  Worldwide the non-uniform spread of extended spectrum β-lactamase (ESBL) 
positive Klebsiella pneumoniae has led to prevalence rates as high as 45.4%.(44, 61, 62)  
ESBLs are plasmid borne and result in resistance to broad spectrum cephalosporins 
and other antibiotics, meaning they are more difficult and expensive to treat.(52, 63)   As 
Klebsiella spp. are closely related to other members of the Enterobacteriaceae 
horizontal exchange of plasmids and insertion elements is facilitated.  This means that 
the intra species strain variation within Klebsiella pneumoniae strains is considerable, 
with many strain specific genes and genomic arrangements.(47) 
It is believed that Klebsiella spp. are primarily acquired from environmental sources in 
addition to other patients.(64)  Klebsiella spp. are particularly problematic within 
paediatric environments where 77%  of children are reported to be colonised in their 
stool, 19% in the pharynx and 42% have contamination on their hands.(65)  
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1.2.4 ENTEROBACTER SPP. 
Enterobacter spp. are Gram-negative Proteobacterium belonging to the 
Enterobacteriaceae.(66)  The genus forms a sub-clade with Klebsiella spp.  and 
represent saprophytic organisms that constitute a normal part of the human digestive 
tract.(67)  The main pathogenic species within this genus are Enterobacter cloacae, 
Enterobacter aerogenes and Chronobacter sakazakii (formerly Enterobacter 
sakazakii).(68) Within the Enterobacter spp., Enterobacter cloacae actually consists of a 
large complex consisting of 12 genetic clusters, including E. asburiae, E. 
cancerogenius, E. hormaechei, E. ludwigii, E. kobei.(69, 70)  The Enterobacter cloacae 
complex includes an extremely diverse group of bacteria that are associated with 
plants, soil and humans.(66)  All members of the complex can reproduce rapidly at room 
temperature and remain viable for several days on surfaces.(71) 
Enterobacter cloacae rarely causes primary disease in healthy adults; however it is 
frequently isolated from non-stool samples in hospitalised patients.(72)   Within 
hospitalised patients it is an important opportunistic pathogen that has been 
responsible for urinary tract infections (UTIs), sepsis, pneumoniae and 
bronchopneumonary dysplasia in hospitalised neonates.(66, 67, 73, 74)  Increasingly 
outbreaks have been detected associated with Enterobacter cloacae mortality rates of 
27% - 61%.  These have been linked to equipment such as contaminated infusions, 
door knobs improperly disinfected digital thermometers, and contaminated blood gas 
machines.(69, 71, 75-77)  Outbreaks often continue for months and require interventions 
such as improvements in hand hygiene practices, admission restriction and ward 
closures or changes in antibiotic policy to bring them under control.(72, 78)  Due to the 
genetic diversity within the Enterobacter cloacae complex it is often difficult to know 
whether outbreaks are due to a single source or whether the situation is actually due to 
polyclonal endemic infections, due to different isolates within the Enterobacter cloacae 
complex.(69) 
Infections due to Enterobacter cloacae are complicated due to the presence of intrinsic 
resistance to: penicillins, first, second and third generation cephalosporins and 
amoxicillin/clavulanic acid, as they produce a chromosomal AmpC β-lactamase.(75-77)  
Centre for Disease Control (CDC) ITU surveillance data demonstrates that within this 
setting 31% of Enterobacter infections were caused by Enterobacter spp. resistant to 
third generation cephalosporins.(79)  These resistant species have been associated with 
increased mortality, hospital stays and hospital charges.(80) 
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Cronobacter sakazakii (formerly Enterobacter sakazakii) is mostly associated with 
outbreaks due to contaminated infant formulae.(81-86)  It is also an opportunistic 
pathogen and a rare cause of meningitis, necrotizing enterocolitis and sepsis. (85, 87)  
Most Enterobacter cloacae infections are thought to be endogenous, but when 
exogenous acquisition occurs it is thought to be via contaminated equipment or 
associated with transmission by hand carriage and hand transfer.(88) 
1.2.5 ESCHERICHIA COLI 
Escherichia coli (E. coli) is the major constituent of the resident facultative anaerobic 
microbiota in the healthy human digestive tract.(89-91) It is a Gram-negative bacillus and 
member of the Enterobacteriaceae with the population composed of five major 
phylogenetic groups designated A, B1, B2, D and E.(89, 92, 93)   Up until the 1940s it was 
considered that E. coli was non-pathogenic.  However phenotypic and genotypic 
studies have now demonstrated that pathogenic E. coli strains exist and belong to only 
a few subgroups or clonal groups and these have been divided into pathotypes.  
Pathotypes are based upon the diseases they cause and the virulence factors they 
possess, as well as their host of isolation.(94, 95) 
• Enterotoxigenic pathogenic E. coli (ETEC) – common cause of travellers’ 
diarrhoea and is estimated to cause ~40,000 cases a year worldwide.(96)   In 
addition it causes diarrhoea in neonates and young children within developing 
countries causing ~1 billion episodes per year, and is an important cause of 
diarrheal deaths in developing countries.(94, 97)  Disease is facilitated by the 
production of both heat labile toxin and heat-stable toxin, and toxin detection is 
required for disease confirmation.(94, 98, 99)  
• Enteropathogenic pathogenic E. coli (EPEC) – causes persistent diarrhoea in 
children under five years of age in developing countries and is characterised by 
the ability to attach to intestinal epithelial cells and create lesions.(94, 100) 
• Enterohemorrhagic pathogenic E. coli (EHEC) – results in haemorrhagic colitis 
and haemolytic uremic syndrome.(94) 
• Enteroaggregative E. coli (EAEC) - emergent diarrhoeal pathotype implicated in 
travellers’ diarrhoea and infection in immunocompromised children in 
developing countries.(94) 
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• Extraintestinal pathogenic E. coli (ExPEC) - colonises the extraintestinal 
compartment of animals and humans, and can result in UTIs, meningitis, 
peritonitis and sepsis.(94) Most extra-intestinal infections are caused by 
pylogenetic groups B2 and D.(101) 
In contrast to commensal strains, different pathotypes contain specific virulence genes, 
these virulence factors include: adhesins and fimbriae, toxins, siderophores, 
polysaccharide coatings and invasins.(89, 94, 102)   
Pathogenic E. coli infections are responsible for significant social and economic costs 
for both community and hospital healthcare.(103, 104) E. coli is the most common 
aetiological agent causing UTI infection and is believed to be responsible for 90% of 
community UTIs and 50% of nosocomial UTIs with infection especially common within 
elderly patients.(105-108)  It has been estimated that 150 million cases of E. coli UTI occur 
globally per year, and cost about 6 billion dollars for national health resources.(103)  
Within the US alone UTI treatments in 2000 amounted to costs of ~$2.47 billion.(109) 
In addition to causing UTIs, E. coli is a frequent cause of other infections including 
intra-abdominal infection, meningitis and sepsis.(50, 54, 107, 110, 111)  It is the leading cause 
of Gram-negative bacteraemia and is a serious threat in immunocompromised patients, 
with a case fatality of 5 – 30%.(90, 108, 110-116)14  
E. coli is the leading cause of bacteraemia within the UK.(117)  Between 2002 and 2009 
reported bloodstream infections caused by E. coli have increased by 71% (from 688 to 
18240), over the same time period a significant decline in antimicrobial susceptibility 
has also been noted.(54) The most appropriate therapeutic options for E. coli are usually 
β-lactams or fluoroquinolones; however increased resistance has been reported in both 
invasive and non-invasive isolates.(118, 119)  MDR CTX-M-15 producing strains of E. coli 
have emerged worldwide as an important community and hospital pathogen, 
constituting a serious public health concern.(103, 120) 
The mechanism of spread within healthcare settings is not fully understood, especially 
outside of outbreak situations, although person-person spread is believed to be most 
likely.(107, 121)  It is possible to be colonised with more than one strain of E. coli and the 
levels of colonisation in healthy patients with resistant isolates is increasing, with one 
study finding a tenfold increase between 2006 and 2010.(108, 122)  This is significant as 
E. coli is known for its propensity to exchange genetic material and for its mobile 
genome, despite its clonal population structure, with its accessory genome being 
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extremely heterogeneous.(123, 124)  Therefore plasmids and other resistance 
determinants could be exchanged, especially as colonisation with resistant strains can 
last for up to 178 days.(125) 
1.2.6 ACINETOBACTER SPP. 
 The genus Acinetobacter consists of 33 organisms of which 18 have been named and 
described as species.(126, 127)  All Acinetobacter spp. are non-fermentative Gram-
negative coccobacilli belonging to the family Moraxellaceae, and with the exception of 
Acinetobacter baumannii, they are widely distributed in soil and water.(128-130)  
Acinetobacter baumannii species is actually a complex comprised of Acinetobacter 
baumannii and its close genomic relatives species 2 and 13TU.(126) The members of 
this complex are very difficult to distinguish accurately and therefore reports both within 
this thesis and the literature should be assumed to refer to the complex.(126) 
Acinetobacter baumannii is rarely detected from natural environments whereas it is 
frequently identified in healthcare environments.(127, 131) 
Infections caused by non Acinetobacter baumannii species are relatively unusual and 
are usually linked to catheter related sepsis.(126)  Acinetobacter baumannii in contrast is 
becoming increasingly recognised as a cause of nosocomial infections, including 
pneumonia, sepsis, wound infections, UTIs and post neurosurgery meningitis.(132)  
Outbreaks often implicate the hospital environment, where Acinetobacter baumannii 
can survive for long periods on surfaces and survive desiccation and spread via 
contaminated hands.(128, 132-135)   Acinetobacter spp. were the 7th most common isolates 
recovered from critically ill patients during the European Prevalence of Infection in 
Intensive Care (EPIC) study, accounting for between 8 and 10% of all cases of 
bacteraemia and pneumoniae respectively.(133, 136)  Outside of the ITUs, burns and high 
dependency units experience the highest rates of infection, infections are associated 
with adverse clinical outcomes including: high rates of morbidity and mortality, 
prolonged hospital stay and substantial healthcare expense.(126, 128, 131) 
Infections with antibiotic resistant Acinetobacter baumannii have been reported, 
including organisms resistant to all available antimicrobials.(128) UK surveillance data 
show that resistance to carbapenems within Acinetobacter baumannii has increased 
from <0.5% in 1990 – 24% in 2007.(126)  Carbapenem antibiotics are usually the therapy 
of choice and carbapenemases resistance is associated with high levels of morbidity 
and mortality.  Accordingly controlling dissemination of resistant Acinetobacter 
baumannii is an infection control priority.(132, 134) Carbapenemase resistance in 
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Acinetobacter baumannii is mainly due to the expression of OXA-β-lactamases, whilst 
non-OXA meditated carbapenemase resistance is rare.(137)  Risk factors for infection 
with resistant Acinetobacter baumannii include: prior antibiotic exposure, length of stay 
in an ITU, mechanical ventilation, trauma.(132) 
1.2.7 ADENOVIRUS 
Adenovirus is a double stranded DNA virus that is associated with respiratory, ocular 
and gastrointestinal disease, especially in children.  Adenoviruses consist of a linear 
DNA genome, which is 30-38kbp.  The genome codes for between 30 and 40 genes 
and there is 70-95% homology within adenovirus species and 5-20% homology 
between species.(138, 139)  Genes inherited by all modern adenovirus from their common 
ancestor are centrally located in the genome, consisting of 16 shared genes, that are 
termed genus defining. Additional niche-specific genes in each lineage are located 
mostly near the genome termini E1, and E4.(138)   
There are seven species of adenovirus (A through G) with 52 serotypes or subgroups, 
roughly one third of which are associated with human diseases.(111)  Historically, 
species definition has been based on a complex range of immunological, biological and 
biochemical characteristics (e.g. haemaglutination patterns, tissue tropism or 
oncogenicity in newborn hampsters).(139)   Serotype (subgroup) is defined by 
quantitative neutralization with hyperimmune sera.  Certain species of the virus, mainly 
species C, have demonstrated the ability to become latent post primary infection; this is 
significant as it can allow the virus to reactivate in a host with a lowered immune 
system.(140)  
Adenovirus infection is common, causing between 2 and 8% of childhood respiratory 
infections.(140)  It has a worldwide distribution and is endemic in paediatric populations, 
with most primary infection occurring between the ages of 6 months and 5 years.(139, 141)  
However  adenovirus is a cause of infection in all age groups and is often transmitted 
from children to adult household contacts.(142, 143)  Infection is normally self-limiting and 
presentations include: upper and lower respiratory tract infection, gastroenteritis and 
acute conjunctivitis.(139)  Site of disease is linked to the adenovirus subgroup causing 
the infection and route of transmission i.e. respiratory, faecal-oral or conjunctival 
routes.(144)   
Severe infection can occur in both immunocompetent and immunocompromised 
patients, leading to hospitalization, with infection being more severe the younger the 
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patient.(139, 140)  The most prevalent cause of adenovirus infection is species C within 
the civilian population (which is important for reactivation) and species B and E in 
military outbreaks.  Acquisition or reactivation of adenovirus during hematopoietic stem 
cell transplantation (HSCT) can lead to high morbidity and mortality in this patient 
group. Presentations include pneumonia, hepatitis, hemorrhagic cystitis, colitis, 
pancreatitis, meningoencephalitis and disseminated disease, although asymptomatic 
infection has also been recorded.  The rate of adenovirus infection in this patient group 
ranges from 5 to 47%, with the number being highest within the paediatric setting and 
mortality rates of 76% recorded in disseminated disease.(140, 145)  Co-infection with more 
than one species or subgroup is known to be much more likely in immunocompromised 
patients than immunocompetent ones, 30% compared to 5% in immunocompetent.(139)   
However beyond this little is known about the specific disease association of individual 
adenovirus subgroups in terms of disease severity or initial presentation.(146)  Children 
with underlying diseases who undergo prolonged inpatient stays are at high risk of 
severe adenovirus infection and represent a source for nosocomial transmission.(141)   
Adenovirus is a hardy virus that is likely to survive well in the environment with 
sustained infectivity on a nonporous surface having been demonstrated for up to 35 
days after inoculation.(142)  Nosocomial outbreaks have high secondary attack and 
mortality rates requiring rapid infection control measures.(141)  In one paediatric 
outbreak study secondary attack rates were 46% with 53% of contacts having severe 
clinical outcomes.(141)  Not only do adenovirus outbreaks have significant clinical 
impacts, they also have substantial financial ones.(147)   
1.2.8 NOROVIRUS 
Norovirus (formerly known as Norwalk like virus) belongs to the family Caliciviridae.(148)  
Norovirus has a positive sense RNA genome with an average length of 7.5kbp.  The 
genome is highly variable and is classified into five groups GI GII GIII GIV and GV, 
three of which are found in humans (GI, GII and GIV).(148)  Gastric flu was first 
described in 1928 and norovirus is the single most common cause of gastroentertitis 
with an estimated 21 million cases annually worldwide.(149)  Within the period 2002 – 
2003 alone it cost the NHS an estimated £115 million through lost bed days, cancelled 
operations and staff absence.(150-152)   
Norovirus gastroenteritis is typically a mild self-resolving illness with an incubation 
period of 24 - 48 hours and a symptomatic period 12 – 60 hours, although they can be 
longer in children, the immunocompromised and the elderly.(149, 153, 154)  Symptoms start 
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with sudden onset nausea, followed by projectile vomiting and watery diarrhoea.(154)  
Within nosocomial cases there can be additional sequelae, which include gastro-
intestinal bleeding, protein malnutrition and higher than expected cause related 
mortality.(149, 155)  
Patients with norovirus infection can excrete viral loads of 108 viral copies/g in stools 
and projectile vomiting is associated with 3*107 virus particles emitted as an 
aerosol.(156, 157)  The infectious dose for norovirus is between 10 and 100 viral copies 
and exposure can be due to contaminated fomites or inhalation of infectious particles 
from vomitus aerosols.(150, 158)   
Norovirus particles retain infectivity on surfaces and are resistant to a variety of 
disinfectants.(159)  Due to this stability and infectivity, environmental contamination has 
been implicated in successional outbreaks in numerous scenarios; this is purportedly 
responsible for the 30% attack rates seen in close contacts of norovirus patients.(148, 160-
162)  Norovirus outbreaks are also difficult to control, and management is based up on 
rapid identification of cases and isolation or cohorting infected patients and sometimes 
ward closures.(153)  Norovirus outbreaks are seasonal with the peak occurring in the 
winter months.  Due to the number of community cases, it is almost impossible 
therefore to prevent cases being introduced into the hospital environment within the 
winter months.(153, 163, 164)  Management of norovirus outbreaks is further complicated by 
a lack of herd immunity due to the antigentic diversity present in norovirus isolates and 
the fact that norovirus can be shed for a prolonged period after symptoms have 
ceased, up to 182 days. In one study it was found that in 30% of volunteers virus was 
shed without symptoms ever being present, indicating that a subclinical reservoir within 
the clinical environment is possible.(154, 165) 
Infection control measures that have been used to try to control outbreaks include:   
emphasising the need for hand washing with soap and water both before and after 
contact with ill patients, affected staff remaining off work until 48 hours after their 
symptoms have resolved, restricting staff movements between affected and unaffected 
patients and restricting visitors.  However evidence that these measures are effective is 
poor.(165) 
1.2.9 PSEUDOMONAS AERUGINOSA 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa are Gram-negative aerobic coccobacilli, which are 
ubiquitous, inhabiting water, soil, plants and humans.(166, 167)  The growth of 
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Pseudomonas aeruginosa in water is not directly linked to the organic content of that 
water and therefore it can exist, reaching relatively high numbers, within the clinical 
environment in water and on moist surfaces.(167)  It is an opportunistic pathogen, 
causing 10 – 20% of nosocomial infections.  It is particularly in the cystic fibrosis 
population where it can lead to a steady decline in lung function.(168)  Other patients at 
risk of Pseudomonas aeruginosa infection are neutropenic patients and those with 
severe burns or foreign devices.(167, 169)  Pseudomonas aeruginosa outbreaks have 
been linked to contaminated tap water and contaminated medical devices and 
equipment.(169) 
1.2.10 VANCOMYCIN RESISTANT ENTEROCOCCI 
Enterococcal spp. are Gram-positive organisms, two of which are common 
commensals of the human digestive tract, E. faecalis and E. faecium.  Vancomycin 
resistant enterococci (VRE) was first described in 1988 and has gone on to become an 
important nosocomial pathogen worldwide.(170)   During a survey of the National 
Healthcare Safety Network in 2009 – 2010 Enterococcal spp. and VRE caused (13%) 
and (3%) respectively of HCAI.(171)  Within the US in 2003 30% of Enterococcal spp. 
isolates were resistant to vancomycin, up from 0.3% in 1989.(170, 172)  Asymptomatic 
colonisation exceeds infection tenfold, but VRE infection are linked to increased 
morbidity, mortality and healthcare costs.(170)   
Risk factors for VRE acquisition include: disease severity, length of hospital stay, and 
prior antibiotic exposure.  Vancomycin resistance does not arise de novo in 
vancomycin susceptible Enterococcal spp. isolates via spontaneous mutation; instead 
susceptible patients acquire VRE exogenously, in the context of antibiotic selective 
pressure.(170)  It is thought therefore that VRE acquisition is often via the hands of 
HCW.  However it is difficult to separate the risk of hand transfer from that of 
environmental contamination, because of this controversies remain about the most 
efficacious ways to reduce the rate of spread.(170, 171)  
1.3 THE IMPACT OF THE ENVIRONMENT ON HEALTHCARE 
ASSOCIATED INFECTION 
There is an ongoing debate about the role of the environment in HCAI and to what 
extent, if any, it acts as a potential vector for transmission.(1)  In 1987 the CDC stated 
that nosocomial infections were not related to environmental contamination.(161)  
However within the acute healthcare setting patients spend a substantial amount of 
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time surrounded by equipment, devices and environmental surfaces that may be 
contaminated with microorganisms.(1)  This is because microorganisms are ubiquitous 
within the environment including indoor air, outdoor air and surface contamination.  
Contamination does not necessarily represent a health hazard as non-critical 
equipment is not required to be sterile, and detection of organisms does not 
necessarily indicate a significant finding.(88, 173)  Some of the controversy may depend 
upon the number of variables involved in both detection and interpretation as most data 
is not collected in a systematic way and whether organisms present a hazard is likely to 
depend upon: individual patients, the nature of the pathogen, and the concentration of 
that pathogen.  Cut-offs for all of these data are hard to establish.(88)   
1.3.1 PREVIOUS STUDIES ON THE ROLE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN HEALTHCARE 
ASSOCIATED INFECTION 
A number of studies have been undertaken examining contamination within the clinical 
environment.  Most of them have looked for the presence of a single organism during a 
snap shot study, often linked to an outbreak or the introduction of an infection control 
intervention.  Long term environmental sampling studies are rare, especially any that 
focus jointly on viruses, and bacteria.  The findings of these studies are discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 3. 
1.3.2 ORGANISM ENVIRONMENTAL SURVIVAL 
Reports of bacterial and viral survival on surfaces are inconsistent, with a wide range 
reported (see Table 1-1).  Survival may depend on the state of the organism within the 
environment i.e. whether in spore form, vegetative state, biofilm, or in organic matter.(8)  
Other variations are likely to be due to the test conditions (as discussed further in 
Chapter 3) and may be due to variations in: species and strain, inoculum size, 
humidity, suspension medium and surface material tested.(174-176) 
What is important for determining HCAI risk is that the longer an organism can persist 
on a surface the longer it can present a risk, and the more of an organism that is 
present the greater the chance of survival and reaching a susceptible host.(177, 178)  
Even if environmental survival is poor, low infectious doses for some organisms may 
mean that they are present in sufficient numbers to still cause infection.(179) 
Organism 
Infectious Dose 
(if known) 
Length of Survival on 
Surfaces 
Staphylococcus aureus <15CFU/106 (oral dose) 7 days – >1 year 
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Clostridium difficile 
1CFU (in mouse 
models)(174) 
 
5 months 
 
Klebsiella spp. No experimental evidence 
<1 hour – 30 months 
 
E. coli 
10 CFU(180) 
 
<1 hour – 16 months 
 
Acinetobacter spp. No experimental evidence 
3 days  - 5 months 
 
Adenovirus 
<150 viral copies 
 
7 days – 3 months 
Norovirus 
10 – 100 viral copies 
 
Norovirus (including Feline 
Calicivrus) 8 hours – 14 
days 
Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa 
108 (oral dose) 
 
6 hours – 16 months 
 
VRE No experimental evidence 
5 days – 4 months 
 
Table 1-1 Length of survival of common nosocomial pathogens on surfaces and 
associated infectious dose, where known.(175, 181) 
1.4 MONITORING OF ORGANISMS WITHIN THE HEALTHCARE 
ENVIRONMENT 
Historically, environmental contamination by infectious organisms was thought to have 
a negligible impact on the incidence of nosocomial infection.(182) This view is now 
challenged with opinion growing that the environment may act as an intermediary 
reservoir for pathogens, resulting in HCAI.(183, 184)   Screening of both patients and the 
environment may play an important role in controlling HCAI as prompt recognition of 
outbreaks, in order to instigate interventions, is key to controlling cross transmission of 
infection.(185)   This recognition requires both efficient environmental and patient 
sampling techniques as well as epidemiological typing in order to determine whether 
the cases are from a common source, and therefore whether infections are linked to 
cross transmission.(185)   
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1.4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SCREENING APPROACHES  
Monitoring of the environment can be undertaken for two main reasons: to monitor 
hygiene standards or to detect specific pathogens.(186)  However cleanliness is difficult 
to define and there is little consensus about what constitutes a ‘clean’ surface.(187)   
The selection of methods for sampling the environment may therefore be affected by 
the reason for undertaking sampling.  Decisions linked to sampling method may be 
affected by the surfaces that require sampling.  Optimal methods for performing either 
microbial hygiene monitoring or specific pathogen detection have not been agreed.(188, 
189)   
Most hospital centres currently use a visually clean assessment, meaning that surfaces 
are free of dirt, dust and debris.  However a recent study using this method 
demonstrated that when 82% of ward sites were visually clean, only 30% of sites were 
considered bacteriologically clean.(184)  Consequently it has been proposed that 
hospitals should monitor the level of microbial contamination within the environment 
either through aerobic colony counts, using adenylpyrophosphatase triphosphatase 
(ATPase) as a surrogate for microbial contamination or the presence of indicator 
organisms such as MRSA.(8, 190, 191)  Another alternative cleaning monitoring method is 
to use fluorescent markers which are applied to surfaces prior to cleaning, and then 
checking whether those markers are removed.(8)  When this method has been used to 
monitor cleaning in healthcare settings 50% of rooms were considered ‘clean’, a level 
that rose to 82% post education intervention with cleaning staff.(192) 
Three main methods of sampling for viable bacteria are available within the healthcare 
setting: 
• Contact plates 
• Swabbing with direct plating 
• Swabbing with enrichment 
Contact Plates 
Contact plates provide a quantitative method for detection of bacteria from the 
environment.  They can be placed on any flat surface and allow rapid recovery of 
bacteria.(190)  Contact plates can underestimate bacterial counts on surfaces and have 
been demonstrated to have a recovery sensitivity of between 10.5% – 54% of 
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Staphylococcal spp. from a surface.(190, 193, 194)  Recovery limits for contact plates have 
been recorded as 27.6 colony forming units (CFU)/100 cm2 for adsorbed cells and 31.4 
CFU/cm2 for unadsorbed cells.(188) 
Contact plates can underestimate the number of bacteria upon a surface due to 
clumping of bacteria cells. In addition, they can be ineffective when high levels of 
contamination on surfaces mean that individual colonies cannot be counted or when 
sampling wet surfaces where individual colonies are not distinct.(190)  
Variability in detection by contact plates may be linked to variation in surface pressure 
during sampling. A surface pressure of 20-25g/cm2 is recommended, but this is difficult 
to monitor when sampling in a clinical environment and as such is subject to 
interpretation.(195)  Further variation in contact plate sensitivity may be due to the length 
of time the plate is held on the surface.  Optimal contact time to recover 100% of E. coli 
from a stainless steel surface was 4hours; however this duration allows for bacteria 
multiplication.(196)  Other studies have suggested a contact time of 60 seconds.(197)  
Swab Sampling 
Swab samples allow for recovery from hard to reach surfaces such as bed rails, taps, 
and drains.(188, 198)   Swab sampling sensitivity has been shown to be affected by a 
number of factors including: pre-moistening of the swab, swab type, swabbing 
technique, swabbing area and use of enrichment.   
Recovery limits for swab samples using direct sampling onto blood agar for adsorbed 
cells has been demonstrated as 26CFU/100cm2 and for unadsorbed cells 8.8 
CFU/100cm2.(188)  Sensitivity of swab sampling has been shown to be anywhere 
between 1.5% and 87% although surface areas sampled in these studies are not 
consistent.(174, 199-206)  Swab sampling provides a qualitative result as release from the 
swab onto the plate may not be consistent.  Release of microorganisms from the swab 
is dependent upon the type of swab utilised.  A number of different swabs have been 
evaluated and utilised in published studies with the main ones being cotton, rayon, and 
flocked swabs.  
The recovery from surfaces using nylon swabs has been shown to be 58%.(207) The 
design of flocked nylon swabs, where each individual fibre is inserted into a plastic 
shaft, has increased the yield of bacteria from a surface by up to 60% compared to a 
standard nylon swab with a release rate into the sampling fluid of >80%.(208)  Cotton 
swabs have a recovery sensitivity of 1.1*103/cm2 MRSA, if the swab is moistened 
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before sampling.(186)  Other studies have demonstrated that cotton swabs have a 
recovery of 71.2%.(209)  Rayon swabs have a similar sensitivity to cotton swabs at 
71.9%.(209) 
Enrichment of swabs has demonstrated increased sensitivity from 61.3% to 80% in one 
study and from 70% - 74% in another.(209, 210) Pre-moistening of the swab before 
sampling has been demonstrated to increase recovery from 57.5 – 83.4%.(209)  When 
pre-moistening and enrichment were combined, one study demonstrated 100% 
recovery.(209) 
When using swab sampling, it is important to sample a sufficient area. This varies 
considerably in the literature from 5cm2 – 25cm2.(207, 211)  Sampling technique is also a 
factor with sensitivity increased with consistent application and swab rotation.(190)  One 
study had recommended that initial swabbing should be undertaken with a pre-
moistened dry flocked swab followed by swabbing the same area again with a dry 
flocked swab in order to soak up any residual fluid. 
Swab/Contact Plate Comparison 
Studies comparing the use of swabs and contact plates for recovery of bacteria from 
the environment have found conflicting results.  Obee et al. (2007) found that contact 
plates demonstrated higher recovery for adsorbed cells than swabbing.(188)  Other 
studies have found that swabbing techniques and contact plates offered comparable 
levels of recovery.(212)  Finally, studies using enrichment found that swabbing was more 
sensitive for detection than the use of contact plates.(213)  
Decisions about whether to use contact plates or swabs may depend upon the 
organism that is the target for recovery.  Lemmen et al. (2001) detected 94/174 (54%) 
clinical surfaces positive for Gram-positive cocci using swabs vs 121/174 (69.5%) using 
contact plates.(197)  In the same study they recovered Gram-negative rods from 66/89 
(74.2%) of clinical surfaces screened using swabs vs 38/89 (42.7%) screened using 
contact plates.  This indicates that contact plates may be more sensitive for Gram-
positive bacteria than Gram-negative surfaces from clinical environments, but that 
swabs may be better for Gram-negative bacteria.  This may be linked to how bacteria 
survive within the environment, as Gram-negative organisms are more likely to be 
present within biofilms and therefore require agitation to remove from the surface.   
One of the key advantages of using swabs is that they can be used for the recovery of 
viruses as well as bacteria and that the sample can be used for molecular techniques 
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as well as culture methods.  Swabs are also cheaper than using contact plates and are 
less likely to leave residue on surfaces.  For these reasons swabbing techniques are 
more appropriate than contact plates.(199)  
1.4.2 WATER SCREENING 
Several factors make hospital buildings a suitable site for colonisation by bacteria and 
moulds.  They contain large and complex water systems with low flow, which 
predisposes them to biofilm formation, and water temperatures are often optimal for 
bacterial growth.(214)  Although these conditions exist in other buildings, the occupants 
of hospitals are more susceptible  to infection and or colonisation caused by exposure 
to microorganisms within the healthcare environment.(214)  The mode of transmission 
for waterborne infection include: direct contact, indirect contact, inhalation of dispersed 
aerosols from water sources such as sinks, and aspiration of contaminated water.(88)  
Healthcare environments within the UK undertake regular sampling for the presence of 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa on wards where high risk patients are located, such as ITUs.  
Healthcare centres in both the US and UK screen for Legionella spp. as part of routine 
infection control. 
1.4.3 TYPING STRATEGIES 
Identifying colonised and or infected patients is a key factor in limiting HCAI.(215)  There 
is no standard definition to assess when patient to patient transmission has occurred; 
however cross-transmission of bacteria is suspected when isolates are found to be of 
identical species and have the same antibiotic sensitivity pattern.(216)  Viral cross-
transmission is suspected when in-patients develop symptoms after being within the 
hospital environment for over 48 hours and test positive for the same virus.(216) In order 
to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of infection control measures, rapid 
identification and typing of organisms is essential.(185, 217) 
Bacterial diversity is exploited across typing schemes in order to investigate 
isolates.(218)  Both phenotypic and molecular typing techniques are widely used, but 
they are based on different principles.(219)  It is assumed that phenotype correlates to 
genotype, but it is possible that there is little correlation between these two and that 
additional differences exist due to the typing methods themselves.(219)  Whichever 
methods are used they need to offer a suitable level of discrimination for the setting, 
with higher levels of discrimination required for single outbreak investigations, than is 
needed for country wide surveillance.(219)  Additionally typing techniques should be 
reproducible, rapid and easy to use.(108)  Many typing techniques require that samples 
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are sent away for typing; this results in retrospective typing occurring and delays of 
days to weeks.(185, 220)  Rapid and portable in-house typing techniques are required in 
order to determine relatedness and enable organism containment.(69, 185, 216, 220-222)   
1.4.3.1 PHENOTYPIC TYPING 
Primary typing of cultured bacterial isolates is undertaken by phenotypic typing 
techniques.(223, 224)  This initial typing takes into account colony morphology, Gram-
staining and macroscopic features.(185, 224, 225)   For viruses grown in cell culture primary 
phenotypic typing to determine species is based upon cytopathic effect observed in cell 
line, in conjunction with time taken to grow (see Figure 1-1 A – Monolayer within Vero 
cell line B - adenovirus cytopathic effect in Vero cell lines.Figure 1-1). 
 
Figure 1-1 A – Monolayer within Vero cell line B - adenovirus cytopathic effect in 
Vero cell lines.(226) 
Selected bacterial isolates then undergo a panel of biochemical reactions which are 
used to identify commonly isolated bacteria.(224) These panels have good discriminatory 
power for most clinical isolates but are often less discriminatory for environmental 
bacteria and they cannot differentiate beyond the species level.  The major 
disadvantage of these techniques is that both culture and biochemical tests require 
time.(185) 
Bacterial identification utilising biochemical means may be imprecise for some genera 
in assigning species, and molecular techniques for identification are expensive.(224)  For 
some Gram-negative species such as Enterobacter cloacae and Klebsiella spp. 
identification even to species level can be problematic using biochemical techniques.(69, 
227)  Increasingly matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization time-of-flight mass 
spectrometry (MALDI-ToF MS) is being used to for identification of bacteria using 
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spectral fingerprints, that are based upon the molecular weight of protein components, 
and demonstrate increasing discrimination for some of these species.(224)   
Antimicrobial Resistance 
Antimicrobial resistance is a global issue and is linked to public health.(228)   
Antimicrobial resistance testing is one the main typing methods that permits 
discrimination within species within routine laboratory settings.  However it is limited 
due to its dependence on the diversity, stability and detectability of acquired resistance 
mechanisms.(225)   
The most widely utilised methods for characterising isolates are: disc diffusion 
methods, antimicrobial gradient methods (Etest strips) (BioMerieux, Mary I’Etoile, 
France) and commercially available automated systems, such as the Phoenix and 
Vitek.(229)  These systems are all highly standardized, but the process although more 
rapid than sending isolates away for reference laboratory typing, still takes 24 – 72 
hours.(229) 
Errors can occur in phenotypic resistance testing linked to inoculum preparation and 
culture conditions.  Errors occur at between 0 and 8% depending upon the laboratory 
and testing systems.(230)  Phenotypic typing  using antimicrobial resistance remains 
important even in light of the use of molecular typing techniques, as in a recent study 
Acinetobacter baumanii genotypic resistance was in discordance with phenotypic 
resistance profiles in 79% of isolates.(231)   This has implications for clinical therapy. 
Phenotypic Subtyping 
The accurate identification of pathogens beyond the species level is crucial to the 
facilitation of epidemiological investigations.(52)  Viral isolates undergo further 
phenotypic typing to determine viral subtype via serotyping.  Serotyping is also used 
along with biotyping for bacterial sub-typing of organisms such as Klebsiella 
pneumoniae and E. coli.(55, 218, 224, 232) Serotype is defined by quantitative neutralization 
with hyperimmune sera.  Serotyping is frequently not available as it requires the use of 
culture and supply of neutralizing antibodies, usually raised in rabbits, and often of low 
titre.(233)  Serotyping is also slow, laborious, expensive and species assignments can be 
imprecise, with non-typable results in 30% of cases and cross reactivity in 18%.(224, 233-
235) For this reason serotyping is usually now undertaken using molecular means based 
on the genes responsible for differences in serotype.(55) 
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One of the main issues with using phenotypic sub-typing is that it is assumed that 
phenotypic characterization is a true expression of the organisms genotype, and there 
is an increasing recognition that is not the case.(236)  It has been observed for E. coli 
that phenotypically indistinguishable isolates are genetically divergent.(237)  In addition it 
is has been noted that virulence is not a uniform property of any given pathogen and its 
expression is dependent upon a number of factors, and is likely to differ during the 
course of infection, between hosts and dependent on the environment.  As a result 
testing at different points could yield different results.(238) Phenotypic typing therefore 
cannot reliably discriminate between isolates.(239) 
1.4.3.2 GENOTYPIC TYPING 
Rapid and discriminatory genotypic methods are useful for undertaking source 
identification and epidemiology.(223)  They are especially useful for undertaking typing 
when outbreaks are clonal and isolates cannot be distinguished using phenotypic 
techniques.(11, 63)  The role of genotypic typing techniques is to render a judgement 
about whether isolates of an infectious agent are epidemiologically linked.(236)  
Genotypic methods assess these epidemiological links using variation in organism 
genomes, rather than variation in expression.  Variation is brought about by genome 
composition i.e. the presence or absence of plasmids, overall structure, or nucleotide 
variation.(225)  As these differ between bacteria the same typing scheme may not be 
suitable for all organisms.(236) 
The evolution of DNA sequences in natural populations that leads to this variation is 
described by parameters such as recombination, mutation, growth and selection 
rates.(221)  Most typing techniques utilise loci under neutral genetic variation to track 
organisms, and so the selection of loci depends upon the biology of individual 
species.(221, 238, 240, 241)  The resolution of typing methods is determined by the quality 
and quantity of mutation events they are able to detect.(242)  Every genome from every 
isolate is unique due to the errors made by DNA polymerase during replication.(225)    
Mutations in non-coding DNA regions may not effect phenotype or be detected using 
low resolution approaches.(242)  However the level of discrimination provided by 
detection of these single nucleotide errors is not always necessary.(225)   
Knowledge of the frequency and relative weight of mutations and recombination events 
in evolution is essential for understanding microorganisms and interpreting typing 
data.(243)  Genetic diversity within a species is usually estimated in relation to the 
recombination rate.(244)  Organisms range from truly clonal such as Mycobacterium spp. 
or Staphylococcus aureus to organisms where recombination is typical such as 
49 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Neisseria gonorrheae.(243)   However this view is becoming increasingly challenged with 
the increasing use of whole genome sequencing (WGS).  This is apparent for 
organisms like E. coli that have previously been considered clonal with little 
recombination.  Instead of clonality the situation is now understood to be that although 
recombination affects ~10% of the core genome, recombination within the accessory 
genome is frequent, though often under 2kb in size.(95) 
Epidemiological time periods must also be considered when analysing genotypic 
results, especially where the evolutionary mutation rate of the species is known.(225)  In 
outbreaks that occur within healthcare for limited time periods, small amounts of 
detected variation may prove significant.  If the same results are found when 
comparing against a library with isolates over a six month period the same result may 
be less significant.(245, 246) Results can only be interpreted taking clinical and infection 
control information into consideration and this must be done locally. 
1.4.3.3 PULSE FIELD GEL ELECTROPHORESIS  
Pulse field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) represents the current gold standard for most 
bacterial typing and it is widely used within reference centres.(247, 248) PFGE uses 
restriction endonucleases to create macro restriction fragments from the whole genome 
that are then separated using electrophoresis.  Separation of these large fragments is 
possible due to periodic alteration of the direction of the electric field during the running 
of an agarose gel.   
The choice of restriction enzyme is a critical variable in the PFGE process.(236) In 
general there is an inverse relationship between the length of recognition sequence of 
the restriction enzyme and the frequency of their occurrence in the genome.(236)  The 
number of restriction sites is also affected by the G+C content of the bacterial 
genome.(236)  Macro restriction fragments are made with a rare cutter enzyme that 
recognise between 10 and 30 sites, ranging in size between 20 and 600kpb.(225)  
Four main categories of change are involved in genomic evolution leading to bacterial 
diversity: insertions, deletions, re-arrangements and substitutions.(236)  Theoretically 
insertions and deletions would both affect migration of restriction fragments, depending 
on the size of the alteration.(236)  Substitutions and re-arrangements outside of a 
restriction site would not necessarily be detectable using PFGE.(236)  If a genetic event 
occurred that directly affected the restriction site this might have a greater effect on the 
PFGE fingerprint than a similar change that did not affect the restriction site.(236)  For 
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this reason isolates with the same banding pattern are referred to as indistinguishable 
rather than identical.   
PFGE fingerprint interpretation is as follows: isolates with 0 band differences are 
considered to be indistinguishable, isolates with between 1 and 3 band differences are 
interpreted as closely related and are usually thought to represent a single mutational 
change (usually consider 95 – 100% similarity).  4 - 6 band differences are considered 
to be linked to 2 genomic changes and are considered to be possibly related and 
potentially part of the outbreak (80 – 95% similarity).  ≥7 band differences equate to 
more than three mutational events and are considered to not be part of the 
outbreak.(225, 246)  
Decisions linked to interpretation of PFGE fingerprints are due to the expectation that 
during patient to patient spread a single genetic mutation event leading to a change in 
banding pattern could occur and it is possible for two mutation events to happen and 
for the isolates to still be part of the same outbreak.(236)  Although the criteria are based 
upon predicting band differences from mutational events there are circumstances were 
single genetic events could lead to a four band pattern difference whereas two genetic 
events could theoretically lead to maintaining identical PFGE fingerprints (see Figure 
1-2.). 
 
Figure 1-2 PFGE restriction-fragment patterns resulting from different genetic 
events.(236) 
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PFGE despite its popularity as a typing method does have some limitations.  It is very 
labour intensive and cannot provide results in real time as the results take 2 - 4 days 
and the process also requires expensive equipment.(108, 225, 249)    In order for PFGE to 
be reproducible both within and between laboratories requires computational analysis 
to prevent subjectivity and intensive quality control.(248, 250, 251)   
PFGE is able to discriminate macroscopic genomic changes within the genome, but as 
no specific DNA sequence information is collected, discrimination can be limited.(252) 
Plasmids might appear on a PFGE analysis as a single difference in band pattern.(236)    
As the process depends upon gel electrophoresis it is subject to the limitations 
associated with that process.  Artefacts can be mis-identified as bands, and fragments 
differing by less than 5 – 10% in size co-migrate.  Finally fragments less than 50bp in 
size cannot be visualised using gel electrophoresis.(109, 236)  
PFGE is the most widespread typing approach for enteric pathogens.  However PFGE 
does not always provide maximum discrimination for closely related clonal isolates 
within this group.(253-255)  XbaI is used as the restriction endonuclease for E. coli and 
Enterobacter spp. and SmaI used for Klebsiella spp.(87, 256)  It therefore remains to be 
determined if PFGE is the most appropriate method, given recent molecular typing 
developments in terms of both discrimination and reproducibility.(257)  
1.4.3.4 SINGLE LOCUS SEQUENCE TYPING 
Fredrick Sanger developed DNA sequencing technologies in 1977 based on the chain 
termination method.(258)  Sanger sequencing techniques are the most commonly used 
methods of sequence based typing.(223)  Analysis of a single locus provides limited 
information compared to that provided by schemes that examine the entire genome, 
however if a suitably variable locus is selected then typing can be discriminatory. 
Single locus sequencing requires a defined target and data quality is affected if there is 
either too much or too little DNA present.  Read lengths are limited to ~1000 bases and 
so to sequence an entire genome in order to find single nucleotide variants from the 
whole genome (SNV’s) or other information requires months if not years of work.(223) 
DNA sequencing based methods have important advantages over PFGE as they have 
shorter assay times and permit fully comparable data between sites but they are 
expensive to use routinely.(259)  The most common single locus sequence type methods 
are genotyping of Streptococcus pyogenes using the emm locus, and typing of 
Staphylococcus aureus using the spa gene.  Single locus sequencing typing is also 
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used for multi-locus sequence typing (MLST), where housekeeping genes are 
individually sequenced and the results then combined to provide typing information.(223)  
Multi-locus Sequence Typing  
Multi-locus sequence typing (MLST) was first introduced in 1998 and detects variation 
within housekeeping genes, each usually 400 – 500bp.  The use of seven 
housekeeping genes is suggested as a minimum and they should be evenly distributed 
across the genome, in order to provide sufficient coverage and to reduce the influence 
of hot spots for mutation and recombination.(218, 260, 261)  Although seven loci are 
suggested, some schemes use between five and eight loci.(217)  Housekeeping genes 
are selected as targets for sequencing as they are considered to be under neutral 
pressure selection.(262)  Each locus is given a number in relation to other isolates at that 
loci within a database and the combination of numbers forms a numerical code for a 
sequence type (ST).(103)  The use of a numerical code permits the genetic relatedness 
of isolates to be compared across sites, as it is both portable and reproducible.(103, 249)   
MLST is a reliable typing method, but it is expensive, time consuming and requires a 
high level of technical skill.(219)  MLST although highly discriminatory for establishing 
patterns of long term evolution, is not sufficiently discriminatory to distinguish closely 
related isolates that come from single centre outbreaks.(248, 263)  It also does not give 
much insight into recent genetic history or acquisition of mobile genetic elements.(263)   
The routine use of MLST is considered to be the reference standard for examining E. 
coli isolates; however despite reproducibility there is little consensus on processing 
methodology, which could affect sequencing results and there are three different 
databases for analysing E. coli alone.(89)   
Spa Typing 
The population structure of Staphylococcus aureus is dominated by a few prevalent 
clones, with clonal complexes CC20 and CC30 accounting for >95% of UK hospital 
MRSA cases.(264)  Spa types are based upon a single gene and are usually genetically 
distinct, a single base pair change can produce two different but highly related spa 
types.(264, 265)  Spa typing has a low discriminatory power compared to PFGE but is 
more portable, it has comparative resolution to that seen with MLST.(21)  
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Adenovirus Typing 
The hexon gene encodes for the adenovirus capsid and is the source of viral serotype 
as the capsid determines reaction in neutralisation assays.  Molecular typing is 
targeted at the hexon gene, within which there are 7 hyper variable regions, 6 lying in 
loop 1 and 1 lying in loop 2.(266)  Little is known of the level of divergence within 
subgroups outside of the 7 hypervariable regions within the hexon gene.(146) 
Sequencing of the entire Adenovirus genome where available suggests that if typing is 
carried out outside of the hexon gene the genetic split of the virus may no longer relate 
to its current acknowledged serotype/subgroup.  However whole genome sequence is 
not available for all adenovirus species.   
1.4.3.5 MULTIPLE-LOCUS VARIABLE NUMBER TANDEM REPEAT TYPING  
Multiple-locus variable number tandem repeats (VNTRs) were discovered in 1982 in 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis and represent genetic polymorphisms that can be used for 
species specific typing.(87)  Most VNTR loci are <200bp and are evenly distributed 
throughout bacterial genomes.(225)   VNTR loci represent some of the most diverse 
genomic loci within bacterial populations and are therefore suitable markers for 
assessing genome diversity.(218)  Each repeat unit or motif consists of DNA elements 
that are repeated in tandem, the sequence of which is maintained within species. (87, 267)  
Repeats vary between strains in copy number due to indel mutations, resulting from 
DNA polymerase slippage or unequal cross over events, leading to slipped strand 
mispairing.(267)  These events lead to the loss or insertion of repeats at a locus, 
depending upon whether the error occurs on the nascent strand (insertion) or template 
strand (deletion).(87, 141, 267)  Recombination can also play a role, especially if mutations 
involve large numbers of repeat units.(267) 
Most VNTRs have no phenotypic effect and for the most part are undergoing neutral 
genetic selection, however some VNTR loci can alter important biological function.(267)  
In Neisseria meningitidis, Haemophilus influenza and Mycoplasma hyorhinis,  
homopolymeric or dinucleotide repeats located between – 35 and – 10 regions of the 
promoter differentially affect transcription of downstream genes, dependent upon the 
number of repeated sequence units.  In other cases VNTR sites affect the actual amino 
acid sequence of proteins, rather than affecting transcription levels.(267)  If a decision is 
made to use VNTR loci that are located within or near a gene then validation must 
include assessing the locus for signs of altered phenotypic or selective effects.(267) 
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Designing of VNTR schemes requires the availability of whole genome sequence data 
for the target species, in order to identify the repeat motifs.  Primers are then designed 
to target the flanking sequence of the motifs of interest and amplification is undertaken 
using PCR.(268)  Amplicons are separated utilising electrophoresis and the repeats 
sized and given a score for each locus.  Differences in amplicon size are assumed to 
be due to variation in repeat copy number at the target loci.(141)   VNTR analysis can 
resolve otherwise indistinguishable isolates and is particularly good for distinguishing 
between recently evolved isolates.(251, 253) 
Six to ten loci are usually suggested for developing VNTR schemes, which should be 
distributed across the genome and ideally be located within non-coding regions of the 
chromosome.  The advantage of utilising VNTR schemes is that they are fast, non-
labour intensive and offer discrimination that may make them a suitable alternative to 
both PFGE and MLST.(269, 270) 
1.4.3.6 REPETITIVE EXTRAGENIC PALINDROMIC BASED PCR TYPING 
Repetitive extragenic palindromic based PCR (REP-PCR) is based on PCR 
amplification of non-coding repetitive extragenic palindrome (REP) DNA sequences 
that are located throughout the genome.(239, 271)  REPs comprise a distinct group of 
genomic repeats that occur in a high abundance (>100 copies) within enteric 
bacteria.(272)  These sequences are highly conserved inverted repeats that contain 
palindromes within their sequence and are thought to be involved in binding of DNA 
polymerase and chromosome organisation, although their true function is unknown.(272, 
273)  In some cases REP sequences appear as targets for transposition and 
recombination events.   ISKpn1 insertion sequences insert into the REP sequence of 
Klebsiella pneumoniae and IS1397 and IS621 insert into REP sequences of E. coli. (274) 
REP-PCR utilises primers that target these non-coding REP sequences and the PCR 
produces multiple amplicons of different sizes that form a DNA fingerprint when 
separated by gel electrophoresis.  The fragment sizes are then processed to generate 
REP-PCR profiles for each isolate and can then be used for strain delineation.(89, 275)  
Analysis of REP-PCR typing results is complicated by the subjectivity of the analysis 
parameters and the need to decide on those parameters for different bacteria.(260)  
Diversilab (BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France) is a commercial system that utilises REP-
PCR amplification, followed by a microfluidics detection system using the Agilent 2100 
bioanalyzer and computational analysis.  The sequences of the actual primers used are 
not supplied with this commercial assay.  However the advantage of using a 
commercial system is that it is rapid and semi-automated.(120)   
55 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.4.3.7 WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING AND HIGH THROUGHPUT SEQUENCING 
High throughput sequencing (HTS) technologies are different from Sanger sequencing 
in the fact that they undertake massively parallel sequencing, permitting high 
throughput.(258)  In comparison to single locus sequencing the basic steps of HTS solid 
phase sequencing are: library production, bridge/emulsion PCR, pyro sequencing and 
data analysis.  Both the bridge/emulsion PCR and pyro sequencing steps have 
similarities to conventional single locus sequencing, although the volumes and 
chemistries per reaction are significantly altered. Library production enables PCR to be 
undertaken with no defined target, DNA is sheared and adapters ligated onto the ends 
enabling PCR to be undertaken of de novo targets.   
HTS technology is rapidly evolving and new platforms are frequently being released, 
there are nearly 20 different HTS platforms on the market and each of them has their 
own advantages and disadvantages (see Table 1-2).(223, 276)  There are four commonly 
used systems: Ion torrent Personal Genome Machine (PGM) (Life Technologies, 
Paisley, UK), Illumina Systems (Ilumina, San Diego, US) SOLiD system (Applied 
Biosystems, Warrington, UK) and 454 System (Roche, Burgess Hill, UK).(277)  One of 
the major differences between platforms is in their read lengths, ranging between 35bp 
and 700bp.(278)  Sequencing runs range in time from two hours on the Ion Torrent PGM 
(Life Technologies, Paisley, UK) to 14 days on the Genome Analyzer IIx (Ilumina, San 
Diego, US).(223)   
HTS allows acquisition of Gigabases of data by producing millions of  >35bp segments 
from a single input, with over 100fold redundancy in the number of segments 
generated.(223, 258)  When applied to bacteria whole genomes these segments or contigs 
are then overlaid using sequence analysis technology to form intact whole genome 
sequences.  The sequencing error rate using this type of system can be <1% because 
many versions of the whole genome sequence are produced, giving a high level of 
redundancy (see Table 1-2.).(223)  The accuracy of whole genome sequencing (WGS) 
therefore using high throughput platforms is comparable to Sanger sequencing (error 
rates of 0.03 – 0.07%) when assembling multiple overlapping reads.(223) These whole 
genome sequences can then be compared further preventing errors.(279)    
Unlike other none total chromosome methods WGS can provide a considerably more in 
depth genomic view rather than a genomic snapshot.(280) Emerging data about the 
differences between core and accessory genomes indicates that they may still not 
provide a complete genomic data set.(236, 280)   
56 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The declining cost of HTS has led to a number of studies being undertaken to explore 
the application of sequencing entire bacterial genomes for epidemiological typing.(281)  
E.coli is second only to Staphylococcus aureus in the number of sequences that have 
been undertaken.  Even so this represents only a small fraction of available genomic 
information as the data on its accessory genome is still being accumulated.(281)  Other 
organisms that have undergone WGS in order to begin collecting data for 
epidemiological typing include Clostridium difficile that was used to demonstrate that 
45% of cases which had been presumed to be cases of cross transmission were in fact 
independently acquired.(282)  Ramos et al. (2014) utilised WGS to demonstrate that 
genome plasticity occurred at all levels of Klebsiella pneumoniae from whole genome 
to individual nucleotide levels, and that this might be important due to Klebsiella 
pneumoniaes’ diverse lifestyle.(44)  Finally Petty et al. (2014) utilised WGS to show that 
the global E. coli clone ST131 possesses both shared clonal attributes and a variable 
complement of virulence genes.(283) 
Use of high throughput sequencing platforms for typing requires information on 
genomic features linked to specific organism such as; polymorphism distribution, 
intergenic region sizes and positively selected loci ratios, since these will impact on 
mutation and recombination rates differently, and could result in non-convergent and 
incongruent phylogenies.(281)  Although standard typing techniques suffer from not 
having the resolution of WGS, it is possible that WGS may provide a level of 
information that makes it difficult to interpret typing data without a greater 
understanding of the bacterial genomics.(215, 216) 
SNVs are either synonymous or nonsynonymous and can occur in genes that encode 
proteins.  Non synonymous SNVs result in amino acid replacement and provide a 
substrate for evolutionary selection.  Synonymous SNVs do not alter the structure of 
proteins and are therefore functionally neutral.  SNVS are easy to detect and can be 
used for phylogenetic studies.  WGS has been utilised to study the mutation rates 
using SNVs within Staphylococcus aureus and it was determined that mutation rates 
vary between 2 and 3.4*10-6 mutations per site per year.  This equates to 5.6 – 9.5 
mutations per year across the genome or 1 SNV every five weeks.(264)  This represents 
the number of changes in a highly clonal organism where recombination events are 
thought to be rare and it is therefore unlikely to represent the situation found in more 
diverse organisms, such as Klebsiella spp.(281)  
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HTS for targeted genomic sequencing represents a single, potentially rapid, approach 
as it can provide epidemiological, virulence and resistance information based upon a 
single test.(230)  In order to provide it in a more accessible format for clinical use 
companies are making commercial kits that will provide information on organism 
identification, virulence and resistance.  One of these is the Pathogenica HAI 
Biodetection kit (Pathogenica, Boston, US) run on the Ion Torrent PGM (Life 
Technologies, Paisley, UK).(280) Limitations of both whole genome and targeted 
genome sequencing on high throughput platforms are currently linked to the cost of 
each genome to be sequenced and the amount of data produced, analysis of which 
requires significant bioinformatics input.(258, 276, 284) 
Platform 
Illumina 
MiSeq 
Ion Torrent PGM Illumina GAIIx Illumina HiSeq 2000 
Instrument 
cost 
$128 k $80 k $256 k $654 k 
Sequence 
yield/run 
1.5-2Gb 
20-50Mb (314 chip) 
100-200Mb (316 
chip) 
1Gb (318 chip) 
30Gb 600Gb 
Run time 27 hours 2 hours 10 days 11 days 
Reported 
accuracy 
Mostly 
>Q30 
Mostly Q20 Mostly >Q30 Mostly >Q30 
Observed raw 
error rate 
0.8% 1.71% 0.76% 0.26% 
Read length 
Up to 150 
bases 
~200 bases 
Up to 150 
bases 
Up to 150 
bases 
Paired reads Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Insert size 
Up to 700 
bases 
Up to 250 bases 
Up to 700 
bases 
Up to 700 
bases 
Typical DNA 
requirement 
50 – 
1000ng 
100 – 1000ng 50 – 1000ng 50 – 1000ng 
Sequencing 
cost per Gb 
$502 $1000 (318 chip) $148 $41 
Table 1-2 Technical specifications of high throughput sequencing platforms.(276) 
HTS is a term that refers to the collection of data on all high throughput platforms.  
Collection of this data can include both whole genome sequences (WGS) and targeted 
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genomic sequence collection. Within Chapter 4 of this thesis in order to differentiate, 
the term WGS is used to refer to sequencing undertaken on the MiSeq platform 
(Ilumina, San Diego, US), after which the whole genome sequence of the bacteria was 
analysed.  Whereas HTS refers to targeted genomic sequencing, where although data 
representing the whole genome may have been collected, data analysis was only 
undertaken on targeted genomic sections,   
1.5 APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATED 
INFECTION        
For many organisms carriage and colonisation precedes infection.  It is important 
therefore to prevent not only infection with microorganism but also carriage and 
colonisation.(264)  The principle components of infection prevention and control 
interventions are: early identification of carriage/infection, patient isolation, eradication 
of carriage if appropriate, improved hand hygiene, environmental control and good 
antimicrobial stewardship.(29)  All of these interventions aim to control the spread of 
organisms reducing the risk of individual patient acquisition or endogenous infection 
and have been shown to be useful in ending outbreaks.(30, 285)  However the 
effectiveness of these policies varies significantly across hospital settings, and when 
interventions are introduced they are rarely introduced singly, leading to challenges in 
pursuing evidence based practice.(24) 
One example of this was the bundle of infection control interventions brought in within 
the NHS in order to reduce MRSA transmission.  The bundle included: hand hygiene, 
isolation of MRSA positive patients, suppression/decolonisation therapy and screening 
for asymptomatic carriers.(286)  A similar bundle was introduced in order to control 
Clostridium difficile rates.(287)  The lack of evidence base in this area makes it difficult to 
assess the success of individual intervention components and in establishing which 
component of the bundle is the most effective.  Despite the need to improve the 
evidence base within infection control, prospective head to head comparison studies 
are both prohibitively expensive and represent ethical challenges and are thus rarely 
undertaken.(287)   
1.5.1 HAND HYGIENE 
The importance of hand hygiene has been recognised since Semmelweis in the 
1840s.(288)   Within the modern healthcare environment it is still considered one of the 
most efficient and cost effective ways of preventing cross transmission of 
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microorganisms, to remove contaminants from the hands of HCWs.(289, 290)  HCWs 
contaminate their hands by touching the environment and patients during routine care 
activities, and thus if hand hygiene practices are sub-optimal then microbial 
transmission can occur.(291)  Effective hand hygiene includes the application of 
adequate amounts of hand hygiene agent, be that soap or alcohol gel, adequate 
duration of hand hygiene with suitable mechanical action, coverage of all hand 
surfaces, and adequate drying.(292) 
A methodology for prompting hand hygiene at critical points was developed to support 
the undertaking of hand hygiene within clinical areas.(6)  The ‘Clean Care is Safer Care’ 
initiative was launched in 2005 by the World Health Organisation (WHO) with the aim 
of reducing HCAI and a consensus guideline on hand hygiene was published in 2009, 
which outlined the WHO ‘Five Moments for Hand Hygiene’ (see Figure 1-3.).(293, 294)   A 
hand hygiene compliance of 90% when auditing 200 observations is commonly used 
for determining compliance with hand hygiene guidance.(295) 
 
 
Figure 1-3 WHO ‘Five Moments for Hand Hygiene’.(296) 
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Hand Hygiene Compliance 
Despite widespread agreement with the principle that effective control of HCAI requires 
both regular hand hygiene and decontamination of high touch sites within the clinical 
environment, compliance varies widely with both components.(21, 295)  Compliance for 
hand hygiene varies widely even within groups of HCWs, and the average observed 
compliance was only 50%.(7, 295, 297)   Mathematical modelling has demonstrated that 
hand hygiene compliance of >50% is required to interrupt VRE transmission.(298)  In 
another clinical modelling study a compliance of >70% was suggested as the 
threshold.(299) 
Hand hygiene compliance is often therefore seen to be a key issue when attempting to 
reduce HCAI, however compliance may be influenced by the number of episodes 
required.  For instance within ITU environments, which are complex, with multiple 
patient-nurse interactions throughout the day, hand hygiene is required on up to 60 
occasions throughout the shift for nursing staff.(300)  There are therefore many occasions 
during which failure to undertake hand hygiene could potentially lead to patient harm, 
however undertaking that number of hand hygiene activities requires a substantial 
resource input from HCWs. 
Measurement of Hand Hygiene Compliance 
Although it is acknowledged that hand hygiene compliance is essential the 
measurement of that compliance is difficult to achieve.(301)  Direct observation is the 
most common method, although other methods such as product utilization surveys 
have been assessed.(301)  All methods have issues with either practicality or validity, an 
issue that is only made more difficult by the increasing use of single rooms within the 
NHS inhibiting lines of sight.(301)  However direct observation in itself could alter results, 
due to the Hawthorne effect, where an individuals behaviour changes when 
observed.(301) Despite the issues with direct observation it is still considered the 
reference standard, but it is highly labour intensive and subject to observer bias.(295)  
Observation validity is affected by the work load of the unit, physical factors linked to 
the unit and where the observations are undertaken.(295)  The largest flaw with most 
observational audit tools is that they do not audit the WHO ‘Five Moments for Hand 
Hygiene’ which is the standard that is actually being set for clinical members of staff 
and thus compliance may be overestimated.(301) 
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Evidence for Hand Hygiene Impact on HCAI 
It is intuitive that hand hygiene should affect transmission rates as studies have shown 
that 44% of nurses have yielded Gram-negative bacteria using finger imprinting 
methods.(302)  Hand hygiene is effective at reducing microbial load as one study has 
shown that the average CFU count on HCWs hands were higher on those not 
undertaking patient care than those in direct patient contact, indicating that increased 
hand hygiene was managing their microbial loads.(303) 
The introduction of the ‘Cleanyourhands’ campaign within the UK in 2004 was followed 
by a decline in both MRSA and Clostridium difficile rates over the next four years, 
however as previously mentioned this was introduced in concert with other intervention 
measures.(293)  The one prospective study that has investigated the rate of improved 
hand hygiene compliance on Clostridium difficile acquisition also found that it 
substantially affected Clostridium difficile acquisition rates.(287)   
Alcohol Gel vs Soap and Water 
The use of alcohol gel instead of hand washing results in less damage to hands, saves 
time and for most bacteria and viruses is as efficacious.(304, 305)  The time required to 
undertake hand hygiene with alcohol gel is less than that with soap and water, 12.7 
seconds (s) vs 21.1s respectively.(305)  Alcohol gel solutions containing 70 – 80% 
alcohol are preferred, although solutions with alcohol content as low as 50% can be 
efficacious.(305)   The placement of alcohol gel is a key factor in its use, but education is 
also important so that when dealing with organisms such as norovirus and Clostridium 
difficile, hand hygiene is undertaken with soap and water instead.(306)  
Issues with Hand Hygiene  
There is some evidence that the law of diminishing returns applies to hand hygiene 
with the greatest benefits occurring in the first 20% of compliance.(288, 307)  Therefore 
solely focussing on hand hygiene may reach the point where it has little further effect 
on decreasing HCAI rates.  In addition as only roughly 4% of hand hygiene 
opportunities are observed using the direct observation method, it is possible audit 
results could potentially bear little resemblance to actual compliance.(288)  
Even when hand hygiene is appropriately undertaken one study has demonstrated that 
4.4% of bacteria loaded onto hands can still be recovered from hands post hand 
hygiene activity, emphasising the importance of undertaking efficient hand hygiene.(308)   
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In another study (with students) who washed their hands with soap and water, higher 
levels of microbial loads were recovered after hand washing than before, indicating that 
hand washing when undertaken must also be undertaken appropriately to be 
effective.(309) 
1.5.2 ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE                           
Active surveillance of patients in order to detect ‘silent’ colonisation with nosocomial 
pathogens is championed in both the UK and the US for specific organisms.(299, 310)  
The CDC recommends active screening for detection of carbapenemase resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae and it was recently advised for high risk patients in the UK.(310, 311)  
Within the UK active surveillance is undertaken for MRSA, whereas targeted 
surveillance based on certain patient groups is undertaken for Clostridium difficile.  
However the evidence for active surveillance is not always straight forward, and there 
are drawbacks to this approach which include: financial burden, nursing and laboratory 
workload, and delayed patient throughput.(299) 
Active screening as an approach is based upon the concept that for control of target 
(usually antibiotic resistant) organisms early identification and isolation of infected or 
colonized patients is key, with asymptomatic carriage being a reservoir for ongoing 
transmission.(312) However even when undertaking active screening optimal testing 
strategies are not well defined and the implementation of such screening varies 
between centres.(313) 
This may be why the evidence to support active screening is mixed.  Within the UK 
targeted screening used to be undertaken for MRSA.  This was introduced in 2006 and 
mandatory screening was undertaken in ‘high risk’ areas such as haematology 
oncology.  In 2010 active screening was introduced for all elective admissions apart 
from paediatrics, maternity and some day cases, on the basis of reduction observed 
through screening and other interventions that had previously been introduced.(286)   
Although it is hard to weigh the impact of each intervention due to this bundled 
approach, one study examining the change in screening approaches found that by 
using active screening rather than targeted screening, they identified 45% more MRSA 
carriers.(314)  This contrasts with another study that found that the introduction of active 
surveillance had no effect on MRSA rates, however they were looking at infection 
rather than colonisation.(315) 
63 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Screening policies for both patients and HCWs are likely to depend upon the organism 
and whether the situation is endemic or epidemic; it has been suggested that a lack of 
active surveillance may be the reason for the growing numbers of circulating ESBLs 
now detected.(7, 316)  Finally this approach relies on the presence of sufficient isolation 
or cohorting facilities to allow for patient isolation.   
1.5.3 CONTACT PRECAUTIONS 
The principle behind contact precautions is that they are a group of procedures that 
reduce the risk of transmission of infection through direct and indirect patient contact. It 
includes the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) (masks, gloves, 
gowns/aprons and eye protection) as well as the use of single rooms for isolation of 
patients, to provide a physical barrier.(317)  These are applied in addition to standard 
(initially called universal) precautions; which are a way of reducing the risk of blood 
borne pathogens and those infections linked to bodily secretions.(10)   The introduction 
of standard precautions was important for infection prevention and control as it 
introduced the widespread routine use of gloves.(6) 
Contact precautions require HCWs to adhere to hand hygiene upon entering and 
exiting patient rooms as well as prior to donning of PPE and after removal of PPE.  It 
also requires staff to either use patient designated equipment or to undertake 
equipment cleaning between patients.(5)  This can lead to perceptions of decreased 
time with patients.(5) 
Personal Protective Equipment 
There is little controversy within the literature related to the use of gloves, 
gowns/aprons and masks when undertaking contact precautions.(215)  This does not 
however mean that their use is without issue.  
Gowns are used as it has been found that contamination can be recovered on 63% of 
HCWs uniforms, and there is a correlation between levels of uniform contamination and 
the level of hand contamination.(10)  The use of gowns/apron attempts to control this 
transfer of contamination from patients to clothing and interrupt the potential spread of 
contamination from that clothing back onto other patients.(10, 318) The wearing of gowns 
has been demonstrated to be protective against VRE transmission in a study that 
examined interventions.(319) 
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As gowns/aprons also become contaminated during use their regular change and the 
use of gloves to do so is key in controlling spread, however incorrect glove use 
increases the risk of cross transmission.(6, 7)  Gloves become rapidly contaminated and 
compliance for appropriate use of gloves and gowns is between 22 – 79% as some 
HCWs believe that the benefits have not been proven and correct use of PPE takes 
time.(5)  Compliance with PPE use can also be limited by availability; one study found 
that depending on the size of glove needed availability of gloves in isolation rooms was 
between 49.4% - 72.1%.(320)  Potentially of greater concern is that, in a study examining 
the removal of gloves, 78% of participants contaminate their hands with whatever 
contamination is present on the gloves, which reaffirms the need to undertake hand 
hygiene post glove removal.(321)  Unfortunately the use of gloves has been observed to 
decrease compliance with hand hygiene.(322) 
Isolation 
Isolation precautions are used to disrupt the chain of transmission by separating 
infectious patients from those who are neither colonised or infected.(323) The most 
effective form of isolation is the use of private rooms, where along with geographical 
isolation staff are also cohorted to deal with either infected or uninfected patients.(215)  
In addition to reducing the risk of cross transmission, single occupancy rooms can 
result in an increase in patients comfort through increased privacy and fewer room to 
room transfers.(324)  
A systematic review of practices for MRSA control recommends that isolation of 
patients with MRSA should be a priority as it can have a substantial effect on MRSA 
acquisition rates.(315)  There is also evidence that the use of isolation rooms reduces 
Clostridium difficile acquisition.(39)  However two studies found that no conclusions 
could be drawn about the effectiveness of isolation precautions for preventing the 
transmission of MRSA and ESBLs.(315, 316)   
Within the NHS three quarters of patient isolation requirements are due to either MRSA 
or Clostridium difficile.(325)  Failure to isolate patients can be because of the fact that 
single rooms are taken up by patients for non-infectious reasons, no isolation rooms 
being available or specific patient factors, such as dependency requirements.(325)  In 
hospitals where isolation facilities constituted >30% of the available bed spaces, only 1 
isolation failure was recorded across sites.(325)  For MRSA a correlation has been 
shown linking isolation failures to MRSA incidence.(325)  This reinforces the concept that 
sufficient isolation facilities should be available at all times.(326) 
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Within the US the CDC recommends contact precautions for MRSA as well as 
carbapenemase producing Enterobacteriaceae; however for other organisms such as 
VRE and other multidrug resistant Gram-negatives individual judgement is advised.(327)  
This results in variation across centres as when to isolate, with most centre isolating for 
MRSA, VRE and carbapenemase producing Enterobacteriaceae, but only 20% 
isolation for multiply drug resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Acinetobacter 
spp.(327)  In addition decisions about when to end isolation and contact precautions 
varied with no consensus available.(327) 
Recently it has been demonstrated that 12.2% of paediatric patients developed HCAIs 
with respiratory or gastrointestinal viruses.(328)  Another factor with isolation in the 
paediatric setting is that isolation can be a problem for young children as in long term 
inpatients it can affect developmental milestones.(329)  In adults in the United States 
isolation has also been associated with increased levels of anxiety and depression 
whilst not found to be effectively preventing the spread of MRSA.(329)  Other 
consequences for patients are a decrease in staff time, increased perceived concerns 
over care and an increase in both pharmacy and prescribing errors.(215, 293, 323)  Patients 
undergoing barrier precaution in a single room average 39% fewer interactions per 
hour than non-isolated patients and those contacts are not extended in order to 
compensate for the reduction in visitation numbers.(330) 
In terms of staffing negative consequences of isolation can be decreased staff 
satisfaction due to the strain of dealing with high acuity illness and being isolated from 
colleagues who are not caring for infectious patients.(215, 323)  Compliance with all 
components of contact precautions is on average 28.9%, but as the number of patients 
in contact precautions increases the compliance decreases, with 40% of patient being 
in contact precautions representing the tipping point.(5)  Finally isolation has significant 
associated costs and failure to discontinue isolation when appropriate in one hospital 
was found to cost $141,000 dollars for one year.(323) 
1.5.4 VENTILATION  
Ventilation refers to the process of introducing and distributing outdoor and properly 
treated air into a building or room.(331)  The amount of that air circulated per hour in 
relation to the room volume is the ventilation rate (in air changes per hour).  The air 
changes per hour affects dilution of infectious agents within isolation rooms as well as 
the movement of air within a physical space.(331)  Air movement can be affected by both 
physical barriers within a building space and or the movement of people.(331)  Most 
66 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
ventilation is designed for the comfort of building inhabitants, and therefore maintaining 
temperature and minimise odours.(331) 
Airborne transmission refers to the passage of microorganisms through aerosols or 
droplets, resulting in the infection or colonisation of a person.  Different particle sizes 
present different risks to those in the vicinity patients.(332)  Aerosols are a suspension of 
solid or liquid particles in a gas with a particle size from 0.001 to over 100 µm.  
Aerosols remain in suspension and may travel far from the patient.  A droplet nucleus 
is the airborne residue of a potentially infectious aerosol from which most of the liquid 
has evaporated.(331)  Particles of different sizes pose different risks.(332, 333)  Airborne 
aerosols require additional measures to reduce cross transmission compared to larger 
droplets. 
To prevent transmission of airborne infection masks are utilised, primarily to prevent 
the transmission of viruses, especially during aerosol generating procedures.  However 
data has shown that mask use alone does not prevent viral transmission and that eye 
protection must be used in addition.  Incorrect mask removal can present a 
contamination risk to the HCWs face as well as gloves.(334)  All of these factors mean 
that ventilation plays an important role in prevention of airborne transmission. 
Natural cross ventilation was popular in many hospitals to control infection until the 
1970s.  In modern day hospitals mechanical ventilation is used to control air changes 
and air flow.(332)  Negative pressure isolation rooms are required to house patients with 
aerosol transmissible agents and work to prevent aerosol escape using air pressure 
differentials combined with a high air change rate to rapidly remove airborne 
contaminants.(335)  Positive pressure rooms combined with the use high efficiency 
particulate air (HEPA) filters, on the incoming outdoor air, are designed to protect 
immunocompromised patients.(335)  This is because 1 CFU of Aspergillus spp. can 
result in infection.(336) 
 Certain organisms such as Mycobacterium tuberculosis, varicella zoster virus, and 
measles are transmitted by aerosol and therefore mechanically ventilated negative 
pressure rooms are necessary to prevent cross transmission.(7)  For other organisms 
such as viral haemorrhagic fevers and pandemic influenza, although not transmitted by 
true aerosol, the need for containment is such that mechanical ventilation is considered 
necessary.  There is little evidence for many conditions about when airborne contact 
precautions can be stopped and in addition to placing patient within mechanically 
ventilated rooms, contact precautions must be undertaken.(332) 
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Despite the obvious need for these rooms the design of mechanically ventilated 
isolation rooms is not evidence based, and if badly designed can place HCWs at 
risk.(335)  There is also evidence that the equipment associated with mechanical 
ventilation, such as ventilation grills, can themselves be the source of outbreaks and so 
must be closely monitored.(331, 337, 338)  
1.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL   
In 1968 E. H. Spaulding proposed three categories of cleaning requirements in relation 
to clinical risk.(339)  Surfaces were divided into noncritical, semi critical and critical.  
Environmental surfaces within clinical environments are considered to be non-critical 
items, as they only come into contact with intact skin, which is a barrier to disease 
acquisition, and are thus considered at low risk of transmitting disease to patients.(339)  
The impact of the role of environmental disinfection in reducing infection rates remains 
a controversial issue despite many reports suggesting a link between the environment 
and specific microbial outbreaks.(340)   
Despite this, in recent years both the CDC and DoH have issued guidance on the 
frequency of cleaning and the standard that that cleaning must reach.(341)  This is 
because the types of contamination present on a surface are unknown, and in contrast 
to the 1960s when the guidelines were first established,  pathogens now vary widely in 
their susceptibility to antimicrobials.(21)  Guidelines for the cleaning of surfaces within 
hospitals need to take into account parameters that are relevant to prevention of 
transmission of nosocomial pathogens; such as ward type (likelihood of patients being 
carriers etc), expected frequency of hand contact with the surface and susceptibility of 
the patients population.(88)  
Biofilms 
In nature most microorganisms exist primarily within biofilms, attaching to both living 
and inanimate surfaces.(342) The development of biofilms is recognised as an important 
driver for persistent infections linked to clinical equipment, such as central venous 
catheters.(343) There is an increasing recognition that biofilms also play an important 
role within the clinical environment and on surfaces.(342, 343)  This is because the 
adaption of lifestyle within biofilms permits survival within hostile environments.(343) 
The first stage of biofilm formation is adherence to the surface, within Gram-negative 
bacteria this is facilitated by flagella and pili and within Gram-positive bacteria by 
surface proteins.(343)  Once attachment has occurred the biofilm proliferates and 
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extracellular polymeric substances (EPS) are produced, forming a three dimensional 
structure.  EPS contains extracellular DNA (eDNA), polysaccharides and proteins.(344)  
eDNA facilitates the initial stage of binding to biomaterials and forms the structural 
backbone of the biofilm promoting aggregation.(344)  eDNA is formed by the release of 
bacterial genomic DNA, mostly by cell lysis, but also by active excretion into the 
matrix.(344)  Twitching motility then mediates biofilm expansion and active colonisation 
of surfaces.(345)  Finally a dispersion phase occurs, where bacteria are released from 
the biofilm to permit colonisation of new clinical surfaces by hand or other transfer (see 
Figure 1-4.).(343)  
 
Figure 1-4 Five stages of Biofilm Development - Stage 1, initial attachment; Stage 
2, irreversible attachment; Stage 3, maturation I; Stage 4, maturation II; Stage 5, 
dispersion.(346) 
1.5.5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANING 
Cleaning of all surfaces should aim to remove epidemiologically important 
pathogens.(347) It has been estimated that between 5 – 70% of microorganisms in 
patients rooms are there as a result of ineffective surface disinfection, mainly because 
the disinfectant has not reached all areas.(348)  Environmental cleaning to control this 
contamination is considered an underutilized intervention in order to prevent HCAI.(288)  
This argument is countered by those who say that whilst expenditure on cleaning is 
justified from an aesthetic point of view, it is far from clear that disinfection of the 
environment is an important infection control intervention.(349)  
Throughout healthcare, guidance exists that governs the cleanliness of healthcare 
premises in order to try and deliver both a suitable aesthetic and control risk.(350)  
However guidance for when routine cleaning should occur is often confusing, stating 
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that, depending on risk, cleaning should be undertaken either daily/ three times a week/ 
or when surfaces are visibly soiled as well as after the patient is discharged.(351)  Part of 
the reason for this is that governmental guidance on disinfection lags behind scientific 
evidence and the role of nosocomial pathogens is changing.(352)  Interpreting this 
guidance means that cleaning should be tailored to clinical risk and targeted cleaning 
may be an important factor for controlling HCAI.(189, 341)   
Cleaning guidance does not cover division of labour; however in general routine 
hospital cleaning is undertaken by cleaners who manually apply either disinfectant or 
detergent to surfaces, whereas additional intermittent cleaning is undertaken by 
nursing staff.(288)  In order to undertake thorough cleaning education and training in the 
correct protocols has been shown to improve both cleaning performance and infection 
rates.(189)  
In addition there are many biocide specific factors to consider when examining 
environmental cleaning including: disinfectant efficacy, environmental impact, correct 
and practical use, safety, effects of the presence of soil and compatibility with surfaces.  
Product Efficacy 
Minimum efficacy of products used for environmental disinfection are determined by 
European Test standards, based upon International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) 5725-Parts 1-3 (1994).(353)  Testing situations and minimum 
efficacy requirements are described in Table 1-3.  Most tests are suspension based 
tests, where organisms specified are suspended within the test solution. 
 European 
Test 
standards 
(EN) 
Test Organism Test Conditions 
Test 
Requirements 
EN 1040 
Staphylococcus aureus 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
Suspension-based study 
used as a presumptive 
test  
5 log10 
reduction in 
≤5 minutes 
EN 1275 
Candida albicans 
Aspergillus brasiliensis 
Suspension-based study 
used as a presumptive 
test  
4 log10 
reduction in 
≤15 minute 
EN 1276 
Staphylococcus aureus 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
Suspension-based study 
used to formally 
5 log10 
reduction in 
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Enterococcus hirae 
Escherichia coli 
evaluate bactericidal 
activity 
≤5 minutes 
EN 13697 
Staphylococcus aureus 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
Enterococcus hirae 
Escherichia coli 
Candida albicans 
Aspergillus brasiliensis 
Carrier-based study 
used to formally 
evaluate bactericidal 
and fungicidal activity 
on non-porous surfaces 
4 log10 
reduction of 
bacteria in ≤5 
minutes and 3 
log reduction 
of fungi in 
≤15 minutes 
EN 1650 
Candida albicans 
Aspergillus brasiliensis 
Suspension-based study 
used to formally 
evaluate fungicidal 
activity 
4 log10 
reduction in 
≤15 minutes 
EN 13624 
Candida albicans 
Aspergillus brasiliensis 
Suspension-based study 
used to formally 
evaluate fungicidal 
activity of products that 
are used in the medical 
area for disinfecting 
instruments by 
immersion 
4 log10 
reduction in 
≤60 minutes 
EN 13727 
Staphylococcus aureus 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
Enterococcus hirae 
Suspension-based study 
used to formally 
evaluate bactericidal 
activity of products that 
are used in the medical 
area (e.g. hygienic 
handrub) 
3-5 log10 
reduction in 
1-5 minutes 
depending on 
claim 
EN 14347 
Bacillus subtilis 
Bacillus cereus 
Suspension-based study 
used as a presumptive 
test  
4 log10 
reduction in 
≤120 minutes 
EN 14348 
Mycobacterium avium 
Mycobacterium terrae 
Suspension-based study 
used to formally 
evaluate 
mycobactericidal 
activity  
4 log10 
reduction in 
≤60 minutes 
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Table 1-3 European Test standards for testing of chemicals to be used in surface 
and equipment decontamination, based upon ISO 5725-Parts 1-3.(353) 
Surface Decontamination 
The aim of disinfection is to eliminate most microbes and typically involves the use of 
disinfecting agents, rather than detergent.  The degree of organism destruction is 
based upon their sensitivity to chemical agents, with spores and Mycobacteria being 
the most resistant, followed by Gram-negative organisms, Gram-positive organisms 
and fungal organisms.(181, 354)   
Biocides at high concentrations cause massive cellular damage, but they have different 
modes of action and therefore although the physiological outcomes are similar the 
biochemical actions may be quite different.(355)  This is only true at high concentrations 
of the biocide and so the concentration within the product formulation is key.(354)  As 
high concentrations of biocide can impact upon both user health and surfaces integrity, 
efficacy must be balanced against toxicity and environmental degradation.(354) 
Three types of solutions are used for cleaning: detergents which remove organic matter 
and suspend grease and oil, disinfectants which rapidly kill or inactivate infectious 
particles and detergent-disinfectants which achieve both organic matter removal and 
organism kill.(181)  Traditional cleaning methods use either detergents or disinfectants 
plus detergents.(347) 
Within disinfectants there are three classifications of action.  High level disinfectants 
are capable of inactivating/destroying spores while intermediate level disinfectants are 
able to inactivate resistant viruses, such as adenovirus and poliovirus, as well as 
Mycobacterial spp.  Finally low level disinfectants are able to destroy vegetative 
bacteria.(356)   Disinfectants active at intermediate and low levels are not capable of 
inactivating spores.(356) 
No specific guidance on which of these cleaning solutions should be used within the 
clinical environment for routine cleaning is given in guidance.(181)  However DoH 
guidance indicates that sporicidal or chlorine releasing agents should be used for 
terminal cleaning post discharge of a patient infected with Clostridium difficile.(357)  
Detergents vs Chlorine 
Surface detergents containing aldehydes or quaternary ammonium compounds are 
used much more frequently in Germany and other European countries outside of 
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England and Italy.    They are also used less widely than chlorine based compounds in 
the US.(358)  However such compounds are not active against either spores or resistant 
viruses such as adenovirus and norovirus.(8)  Within countries where 
aldehydes/quaternary ammonium compounds are not frequently used chlorine 
releasing agents are considered the gold standard.(35)   
The bactericidal activity of disinfectants is inversely proportional to the degree of soiling 
upon surfaces and therefore including a detergent within the solution is important for 
full activity.(352)  Hypochlorites are the most common chlorine disinfectants as they 
possess broad spectrum high level disinfectant activity, do not leave toxic residues, are 
unaffected by water hardness, comparatively inexpensive, fast acting, and capable of 
removing both dried or fixed organisms biofilms from surfaces.(359)  However some 
professionals believe that the indiscriminate use of disinfectants within the healthcare 
environment is not justified due to the fact that they are expensive, corrosive to the 
local environment and potentially toxic to the wider environment when disposed of in 
waste water.(341, 357, 360)  
Evidence for Disinfection over Detergents 
Detergents have been shown to become contaminated during the cleaning process 
and thus in themselves pose a contamination risk.  In one study 22 detergents used for 
cleaning of floors were sampled prior during and post use, Gram-negative bacteria 
were found in 10/22 freshly prepared samples, 20/22 samples after 30 minutes of 
cleaning and 21/22 samples at discard.(361)  Another study on cleaning solutions for 
floors found that CFU/ml counts rose to 24,000 in detergent solutions vs 20CFU in 
disinfectant solutions.(339)  Finally Barker et al. (2004) found that cleaning with detergent 
instead of disinfectant resulted in an increase in norovirus cases.(157, 361, 362) 
Problems with Chlorine Cleaning Chemistries  
In addition to surface degradation chlorine based products can produce irritation in 
skin, nose and lungs and may act a sensitizer, resulting in a potential increases in 
occupational risk of asthma and respiratory disease.(363, 364)  Despite this many nurses 
and cleaners are unaware of the exposure risk; which can continue for up to 20 
minutes after the completion of cleaning tasks.  This can also result in patient and 
visitor exposure if chlorine based agents are used for routine cleaning as well as 
terminal disinfection.(363)    Additionally chlorine gas can be produced by accidental 
combination of cleaning products, resulting in potential staff illness.(365) 
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1.5.5.2 EQUIPMENT CLEANING 
Regular cleaning by domestic staff needs to be supported by intermittent cleaning 
based on clinical activity within bed spaces.(341)  In addition to intermittent cleaning 
most equipment cleaning, especially within ITUs, is undertaken by nursing staff using 
wipes.(189)  Use of wipes is important because equipment and other sites can become 
rapidly contaminated without being linked to high numbers of interactions.  
There are a number of factors that can affect the efficiency of cleaning with wipes.  
Contact times between wipes and surfaces should be at least 60 seconds in order to 
optimize bacterial killing.(354)  Even if this contact time is adhered to it is substantially 
less than the contact time that is usually required between a biocide and a surface due 
to the decreased level of biocide remaining on the surface post wipe.(360)   
Nurses unlike cleaners are often not educated about the most appropriate way to 
undertake cleaning, in terms of contact times, surface differences and the need for 
appropriate mechanical action.(21, 288)  As a result the cleaning is often not undertaken 
as per protocol.(366)  Despite issues with cleaning being undertaken in real life 
situations, a simulation has shown that the use of intermittent decontamination using 
wipes is more effective than routine cleaning once a day at maintaining decreased 
levels of surface contamination.(288)  
Surface contamination is rarely uniform and if sufficient decontamination does not 
rapidly occur then residual organisms can be moved from the initial location of high 
contamination across a wider surface area, especially if wipes are used to clean more 
than a single object.(21, 288)  Pathogens can also be transferred between wipes and 
hands, and also potentially onto wipe containers.(21) 
Although decontamination of equipment and appropriate clinical surfaces is a nursing 
responsibility their main priority will always be patient care.  Accordingly cleaning will 
be reduced when nursing staff are busy, this is exactly the time when microbial 
contamination is likely to increase, due to increases in workload and additional traffic 
and so cleaning is required more than during less busy periods.(367)    
1.5.5.3 NOVEL DECONTAMINATION TECHNOLOGIES 
Effective cleaning relies upon operators to correctly distribute and apply cleaning 
agents.(368)  In order to aid terminal disinfection of rooms a number of new automated 
decontamination technologies have been developed in order to support the cleaning 
process.(368) All non-touch automated systems require cleaning prior to their use, to 
bring rooms to a suitable aesthetically clean standard.(368)  
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The two main types of technologies are those using ultra violet (UV) light and those 
using hydrogen peroxide technologies.   
UV is virucidal and bactericidal and acts by targeting the nucleic acids as well as 
modifying capsid and proteins.  Single stranded RNA and DNA viruses are more 
susceptible than bacteria and double stranded DNA viruses.(369-372)  
H2O2 (hydrogen peroxide) was first discovered by Louis Thénard in 1818, decomposes 
into non-toxic bi-products of water and oxygen.  Vaporised H2O2 is typically used at 
lower concentrations compared to its use as a liquid disinfectant and it has been 
suggested that the disinfectant properties of the gaseous form may be distinct from 
those of the liquid.  H2O2 is an oxidising agent that reacts with proteins, lipids and 
nucleic acids.(373, 374) 
Two platforms are currently available for use of hydrogen peroxide (HP) in room 
decontamination.  One (Glossair) uses aerosolized H2O2 delivered via a pressure 
generated aerosol.  Aerosolized droplets are introduced via a unidirectional nozzle with 
a particle size of 8-10um.  It delivers a solution of 5-6% H2O2 and <50ppm silver.  
Following exposure the aerosol decomposes naturally without active aeration of the 
room being necessary.(368)  The other platform (Bioquell) delivers a heat generated 
vapour of 30-35% w/w aqueous H2O2 through a high velocity air stream, to achieve a 
homogeneous distribution. HP is delivered until the air is saturated and then the 
aeration unit catalyses the breakdown into oxygen and water.(368) 
The one study that has utilised HP routinely as part of the terminal cleaning process 
notes that the risk of acquisition of MDR organisms in rooms where patients were 
admitted post HP treatment was 64% less than in those rooms that had been terminally 
cleaned with detergent. For rooms that had been occupied by a previous patient with 
VRE acquisition rates were reduced by 80% in rooms treated by HP compared to those 
rooms that were untreated.(375)     
1.5.6 THE ROLE OF DESIGN  
Establishing a reliable evidence base to inform approaches to infection control has 
been problematic. This is due to the multitude and complexity of factors influencing the 
spread of infection, and particularly those that affect patient interactions with people 
and the environment.(376)  
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Buildings are complex ecosystems that house trillions of microorganisms that interact 
with each other and the humans occupying the environment.  Building attributes such 
as sources of ventilation, airflow rates, and relative humidity correlate with microbiome 
composition.(376)  Despite this acknowledged impact, architects use a comfort model for 
designing indoor spaces, with little understanding of how these affect human health 
and microbial transmission.(332, 376) The built environment can therefore play an equal 
role in either supporting or inhibiting efficient, high quality healthcare.(324) 
There is an increasing focus on the need for a scientific evidence base to be introduced 
into hospital design.(376)  Within the US the build environment is recognised as having a 
profound effect on human health, and there is a requirement in healthcare facility 
design that building should ‘first do no harm’.(336)  Within the UK the health benefits of 
well-planned architecture have been recognised since Florence Nightingale, who 
introduced the concept of natural ventilation into hospital premises.(376)  This meant that 
for many years hospitals were designed with south facing windows to allow sunlight in 
and cross ventilation to dilute airborne infection.(332)  
Infection control measures in modern hospitals can be supported by architecture i.e. 
the provision of sufficient space to treat patients, sufficient isolation rooms and hand 
hygiene facilities.(326, 336)  However many infection control requirements of the built 
environment are expensive, non-evidence based and not based in regulation, and it 
can accordingly be difficult for hospitals to support the investment.(326, 377)  Inappropriate 
hospital design can result in increasing in HCAI, especially when ventilation is 
inappropriate, or washing of equipment leads to exposure of patients, due to 
inappropriate sink location or water contamination.(324)  
Due to the very different healthcare facilities that are available worldwide it is very 
difficult to make comparisons between them.(326)  Two studies that observed changes in 
HCAI when moving to new hospitals, which were supposed to be better designed in 
order to support infection control, found that this on its own was not sufficient to result 
in improvement of HCAI levels.(326, 378)  
1.5.7 ENVIRONMENT COMPOSITION 
There is a need to support infection control within hospitals by designing surfaces that 
are easy to clean, resistant to moisture, safe for patients, capable of resisting 
degradation due to cleaning products and if possible have a topography that is 
resistant to the formation of biofilms.(336, 342, 348)  A lot of focus has recently been placed 
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upon environmental sustainability both for entire building systems, such as ventilation, 
but also for individual surface components, such as avoiding the use of volatile organic 
compounds in materials.(336) 
Surfaces should be made of non-porous material, free from fissures and crevices that 
prevent removal of dirt, have rounded corners, and not be made from cloth.(336, 352)  The 
use of stainless steel should be carefully considered as although good for avoiding 
microbial growth; they can also be difficult to clean with many disinfectants.(336, 359) 
In addition to these requirements there are now hundreds of products on the market 
that contain low concentration biocides: including fabrics and surfaces.(354)  Among 
these are surfaces that contain heavy metals, such as silver and copper, and surfaces 
that are impregnated with germicides such as quaternary ammonium compounds, or 
triclosan.(379)  For all of these surfaces the presence of organic matter and 
contamination can inhibit any antimicrobial activity and so routine cleaning is still 
required.  Their use is also associated with an increase in financial resource 
requirements.(359)  
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1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The specific objectives were as follows: 
Chapter 3:  
Work undertaken as part of Chapter 3 aims to develop sampling methodologies for the 
detection of both bacteria and viruses within the clinical environment.  These sampling 
methodologies will then be applied to a number of units within both adult and paediatric 
settings in order to determine levels of environmental contamination outside of infection 
control outbreaks.  
Chapter 4:  
To facilitate infection control investigations typing techniques will be developed and 
validated against the current reference standard for Gram-negative bacteria 
(Enterobacter species, E. coli and Klebsiella species).   These typing techniques will 
then be applied to isolates detected within Great Ormond Street Hospital over a two 
year period (2011 – 2012), some of which will be linked to outbreak investigations, in 
order to determine if there was a link between those organisms found within the 
environment, and those found within patients. 
Chapter 5: 
This chapter evaluates the use of available infection control interventions that could 
prevent either the accumulation of potentially pathogenic organisms within the clinical 
environment, or aim to prevent transfer of those organisms from the environment to 
patients.  These interventions include both cleaning and environmental 
decontamination and the role of design. 
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1.7 FLOW DIAGRAM OF THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
Figure 1-5 Flow diagram of thesis structure. 
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Chapter 2 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
All laboratory work within this thesis was undertaken using good laboratory practice, 
aseptic techniques and in accordance with localised health and safety protocols, risk 
assessment and following Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) 
regulations. 
2.1 CELL CULTURE METHODS 
2.1.1 CONTINUOUS CELL CULTURES 
Cell culture was undertaken in green African monkey cell line (VERO) (European 
Collection of Cell Culture, Salisbury, UK) for adenovirus serotypes.  All cells were 
maintained at 37°C with 5% CO2.   
VERO cells were grown in Dulbecco's modified Eagle's medium (DMEM) (Sigma-
Aldrich, Gillingham, UK) supplemented with 10% (v/v) foetal bovine serum (FBS) 
(Sigma-Aldrich, Gillingham, UK), 1% (v/v) Hepes buffer (Sigma-Aldrich, Gillingham, 
UK), 0.05% (v/v) ciprofloxacin and 0.2% (v/v) penicillin. 
Cell lines were passaged using trypsin EDTA (Sigma-Aldrich, Gillingham, UK) for 
normal cell maintenance.   
2.1.2 CELL CULTURE FROM INOCULATION EXPERIMENTS  
VERO cells were cells were transferred into inoculation media for sample culture 
containing Dulbecco's modified Eagle's medium (DMEM) (Sigma-Aldrich, Gillingham, 
UK) supplemented with 2% (v/v) foetal bovine serum (FBS) (Sigma-Aldrich, Gillingham, 
UK), 1% (v/v) Hepes buffer (Sigma-Aldrich, Gillingham, UK), 0.05% (v/v) ciprofloxacin 
and 0.2% (v/v) penicillin. 
250µl of adenovirus type strains (C1 NCTC 0011051v/C2 NCTC 0108051v/A31 NCTC 
0011265v) or inoculation test sample was inoculated into VERO cell culture and grown 
for up to 7 days, and checked daily.  Positive results were detected when cells 
demonstrate a characteristic cytopathic effect, visualised using a light microscope.  If 
an indeterminate cytopathic effect was noted the sample was passaged after the initial 
7 day period.  Viral quantification was undertaken using methods described in 2.2.5.4. 
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2.2 MOLECULAR BIOLOGICAL METHODS 
2.2.1 EXTRACTION 
2.2.1.1 DEOXYRIBONUCLEIC ACID EXTRACTION 
 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) extractions were undertaken using kits where the 
following stages were undertaken: 
• Chemical lysis and protein removal  
• Mechanical lysis 
• Ethanol precipitation 
• Binding of DNA to a silica membrane under high salt conditions 
• Removal of residual contaminants 
• Elution of bound DNA, under low salt conditions and elution in a DNA stabilising 
buffer 
For clinical virology samples; 10µl of internal positive control (IPC) was added to 
200μl of the sample.  The deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) was extracted using the Qiagen 
mini kit (Qiagen, Crawley, UK) and eluted in 100µl of buffer AE, as described in the 
manufacturer’s instructions.   
For clinical bacteriology samples; Suspensions were heated to 95oC for 10 minutes 
and bead beated with lysing matrix B for 40 seconds at 6.5m/s in the FastPrep 
instrument (MP Biomedicals, Illkirch, France), The DNA was extracted using the 
Qiagen mini kit (Qiagen, Crawley, UK) and eluted in 100µl of buffer AE, as described in 
the manufacturer’s instructions.   
For environmental samples; swabs were vortexed for 30 seconds within the vials to 
release virus particles and 200µl of the solution transferred to a clean tube containing 
10µl of IPC. The DNA was extracted using the Qiagen mini kit (Qiagen, Crawley, UK) 
and eluted in 100µl of buffer AE, as described in the manufacturer’s instructions.   
For bacterial isolates; Suspensions were heated to 95oC for 10 minutes and a tenfold 
dilution in buffer AE was bead beated with lysing matrix B (MP Biomedicals, Illkirch, 
France) for 40 seconds at 6.5m/s in the FastPrep instrument (MP Biomedicals, Illkirch, 
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France), centrifuged at 20,000 * g for 2 minutes and supernatant removed to a fresh 
tube.  
For bacterial isolates (Enterobacter cloacae multi-locus variable number tandem 
repeat typing); suspensions were heated to 95oC for 10 minutes and a tenfold dilution 
in buffer AE was centrifuged at 20,000 * g for 2 minutes and supernatant removed to a 
fresh tube. 
For bacterial isolates (Repetitive extragenic palindromic based polymerase chain 
reaction); 1µl loop of a fresh overnight culture suspended in 300µl of microbead 
solution was extracted using the Mo Bio extraction kit (Mo Bio Laboratories, Carlsbad, 
America) following the manufacturer’s instructions, eluting in 35µl of buffer MD5.  The 
DNA was quantified using the Nanodrop (Thermo Scientific Waltham, UK) and adjusted 
to a concentration of 35ng/µl (see section 2.2.4.). 
For bacterial isolates (High Throughput Sequencing): Suspensions were heated to 
95oC for 10 minutes and bead beated with lysing matrix B for 40 seconds at 6.5m/s in 
the FastPrep instrument (MP Biomedicals, Illkirch, France), The DNA was extracted 
using the Qiagen mini kit (Qiagen, Crawley, UK) and eluted in 100µl of buffer AE, as 
described in the manufacturer’s instructions.  The DNA was quantified using the Qubitt 
(Life Technologies, Paisley, UK) and adjusted to a concentration of 0.5ng/µl or 0.2ng/µl 
depending upon the needs of further processing (see section 2.2.4.). 
2.2.1.2 RIBONUCLEIC ACID EXTRACTION 
Swabs were vortexed within the vials for 30 seconds and 200µL was aliquoted into 
clean vials for nucleic acid extraction. 10µL of mouse genomic DNA was added as an 
internal control. Nucleic acids were extracted using the Qiagen RNeasy mini kit 
(Qiagen, UK) as per the manufacturer’s instructions using the following stages: 
• Cell lysis in the presence of RNase inhibitors and RNA stabilization  
• RNA binding to a silica membrane under high salt conditions 
• Contaminant removal 
• Elution under low salt conditions and elution in a RNA stabilising buffer 
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2.2.2 CO-EXTRACTION (DNA/RNA) 
Swabs were vortexed within the vials for 30 seconds and 200µL was aliquoted into 
clean vials for nucleic acid extraction. 10µL of mouse genomic DNA was added as an 
internal control. Nucleic acids were extracted using the Qiagen RNeasy mini kit 
(Qiagen, UK) with the addition of a 56°C 10 minute heat step prior to extraction; 
subsequent procedures were carried out according to the manufacturers protocol.   
2.2.3 FIRST-STRAND COMPLEMENTARY DNA SYNTHESIS 
Samples extracted for ribonucleic acid (RNA) were subject to a complementary DNA 
(cDNA) step. 21.2μL of nucleic acid extract was added to 0.24µg/μL random primers 
(Life Technologies, UK), and 0.02mM deoxynucleotide triphosphates (dNTPs) (Bioline, 
UK), heated at 65°C for 5 minutes then 4°C for 2 minutes. 1× First strand buffer (Life 
Technologies, UK), 0.05mM DL-Dithiothreitol (DTT) (Life Technologies, UK), 2 units/μL 
of RNase out (Life Technologies, UK), and 15 units/μL of Moloney Murine Leukemia 
Virus Reverse Transcriptase (MMLV) (Life Technologies, UK) were added per sample 
and the mixture heated at 37°C for 30 minutes then 70°C for 15 minutes. Samples 
were stored at -80°C until semi-quantitative polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was 
performed as described in section 2.2.5.3.  
2.2.4 MEASUREMENT OF DNA CONCENTRATION & PURITY 
The concentration of DNA used for use in repetitive extragenic palindromic based PCR 
(REP-PCR) was estimated using a NanoDrop1000 spectrophotometer (Thermo 
Scientific, Waltham, UK) where Abs. 1.0 at 260nm = 50mg/ml. The purity of DNA used 
in this study was indicated by the ratio of OD260/280 lay between 1.7 and 2.0. 
The purity of DNA for use with whole genome sequencing (WGS) and high throughput 
sequencing (HTS) was assessed using fluorometric-based methods on the Qubit (Life 
Technologies, Paisley, UK) and was indicated by the ratio of OD260/280 and lay 
between 1.7 and 2.0.  The DNA concentration for use with HTS was estimated by using 
either the High Sensitivity dsDNA assay (Life Technologies, Paisley, UK) or the Broad 
Range dsDNA assay (Life Technologies, Paisley, UK) dependent on predicted DNA 
concentration.  
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2.2.5 REAL-TIME PCR 
All samples were extracted with an inhibition control (10ul of mouse muscle cell 
culture).  Real-time PCR was run in parallel with the target PCR using the primers 
listed in Table 2-1 to determine the presence of sample inhibition.  Samples identified 
as inhibited were diluted 1:10 and re-tested. 
Primer 
Name 
Primer 
Type 
Sequence Reference 
Mus-F Forward 5’ – GGA CAC TAT GCC CCT CCT TAG A – 3’ (380) 
Mus-R Reverse 5’ – AGC TCC AAA CTC CGT CTC TGT AA – 3’ (380) 
Mus-
Probe 
Probe 5’ NED – TTG GGA ACA AAA CAC CCA – MGBNFQ 
3’ 
(380) 
Table 2-1 Mouse muscle cell (Mus) internal positive control primers and probe. 
2.2.5.1 STAPHYLOCOCCUS AUREUS PCR 
Real-time PCR detection of Staphylococcus aureus coa gene was carried out in the 
following reaction  mixture: 14μl 2X QuantiTect multiplex mastermix (Qiagen, Crawley, 
UK), 0.1μM primer Sa-3-f, 0.1μM primer Sa-3-r, 0.1μM coa-probe, 0.1μl Mus-F, 0.1μl 
Mus-R, 0.1μl Mus-Probe, 10μl DNA extract and molecular grade water to give a final 
volume of 28μl (see Table 2-1 and Table 2-2).  
The reactions were cycled on the ABI prism 7300 real-time PCR system (Applied 
Biosystems, Warrington, UK) as follows: 95˚C for 10 minutes followed by 45 cycles of 
95˚C for 15 seconds and 60˚C for 60 seconds.  
Or: 
Real-time PCR detection of Enterobacteriaceae dnaK gene was carried out in the 
following reaction  mixture: 14μl 2X QuantiFast multiplex mastermix (Qiagen, Crawley, 
UK), 0.1μM primer Sa-3-f, 0.1μM primer Sa-3-r, 0.1μM coa-probe, 0.1μl Mus-F, 0.1μl 
Mus-R, 0.1μl Mus-Probe, 10μl DNA extract and molecular grade water to give a final 
volume of 28μl (see Table 2-1 and Table 2-2).  
The reactions were cycled on the ABI prism 7500 real-time PCR system (Applied 
Biosystems, Warrington, UK) as follows: 95˚C for 20 seconds followed by 45 cycles of 
95˚C for 3 seconds and 60˚C for 30 seconds. 
Primer 
Name 
Primer 
Type 
Sequence 
Sa-3-f Forward 5’ – GTA GAT TGG GCA ATT ACA TTT TGA AGG – 3’ 
Sa-3-r Reverse 5’ – CGC ATC TGC TTT GTT ATC CCA TGT A – 3’ 
coa-probe Probe 5’ FAM – TAG GCG CAT TAG CAG TTG CAT A – BHQ1 5’ 
Table 2-2 Staphylococcus aureus coa gene real-time PCR primers and probe. 
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2.2.5.2 ENTEROBACTERIACEAE PCR 
Real-time PCR detection of Enterobacteriaceae dnaK gene was carried out in the 
following reaction  mixture: 14μl 2X QuantiTect multiplex mastermix (Qiagen, Crawley, 
UK), 0.2μM primer Ent-dnak-f, 0.2μM primer Ent-dnak-r, 0.2μM Ent-dnak-probe, 0.1μl 
Mus-F, 0.1μl Mus-R, 0.1μl Mus-Probe, 10μl DNA extract and molecular grade water to 
give a final volume of 28μl (see Table 2-1 and Table 2-3).  
The reactions were cycled on the ABI prism 7300 real-time PCR system (Applied 
Biosystems, Warrington, UK) as follows: 95˚C for 10 minutes followed by 45 cycles of 
95˚C for 15 seconds and 60˚C for 60 seconds. 
Or: 
Real-time PCR detection of Enterobacteriaceae dnaK gene was carried out in the 
following reaction  mixture: 14μl 2X QuantiFast multiplex mastermix (Qiagen, Crawley, 
UK), 0.2μM primer Ent-dnak-f, 0.2μM primer Ent-dnak-r, 0.2μM Ent-dnak-probe, 0.1μl 
Mus-F, 0.1μl Mus-R, 0.1μl Mus-Probe, 10μl DNA extract and molecular grade water to 
give a final volume of 28μl (see Table 2-1 and Table 2-3).  
The reactions were cycled on the ABI prism 7500 real-time PCR system (Applied 
Biosystems, Warrington, UK) as follows: 95˚C for 20 seconds followed by 45 cycles of 
95˚C for 3 seconds and 60˚C for 30 seconds. 
Primer 
Name 
Primer 
Type 
Sequence 
Ent-dnak-F Forward 5’ – ACC TGG GTA CWA CCA ACT CTT GTG T – 3’ 
Ent-dnak-R Reverse 5’ – GTC ACT GCC TGA CGT TTA GC – 3’ 
Ent-dnaK-
Probe 
Probe 5’ FAM – AGG ATG GTG AAA CTC TGG TWG GTC AGC 
C – BHQ1 3’ 
Table 2-3 Enterobacteriaceae dnaK gene real-time PCR primers and probe. 
2.2.5.3 NOROVIRUS PCR 
Real-time PCR detection of the norovirus GI and GII open reading frame genes was 
performed.  The reaction was as follows: 10μL 2X Fast Universal PCR mastermix 
(Applied Biosystems, Warrington, UK), 0.1μM of COG1F, 0.1μM COG1R, 0.05μM 
RING1(a)-TP, 0.05μM RING1(b)-TP, 0.1μM QNIF2, 0.1μM COG2R, 0.1μM QNIFS, 
10μL cDNA and molecular grade water to give a final volume of 25 μl (see Table 2-4).  
The reactions were cycled on the ABI prism 7500 real-time PCR system (Applied 
Biosystems, Warrington, UK) as follows: 95˚C for 20 seconds followed by 45 cycles of 
95˚C for 3 seconds and 60˚C for 30 seconds. 
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Primer 
Name 
Primer 
Type 
Sequence Reference 
COG1F Forward 5’–CGYTGGATGCGNTTYCATGA–3’ (381) 
COG1R Reverse 5’–CTTAGACGCCATCATCATTYAC–3’ (381) 
RING1(a)-
TP 
Probe 5’-FAM-AGATYGCGATCYCCTGTCCA-BHQ1-3’ (381) 
RING1(b)-
TP 
Probe 5’-FAM-AGATCGCGGTCTCCTGTCCA-BHQ1-3’ (381) 
QNIF2 Forward 5‘–ATGTTCAGRTGGATGAGRTTCTCWGA–3’ (382) 
COG2R Reverse 5’–TCGACGCCATCTTCATTCACA–3’ (381) 
QNIFS Probe 5’-JOE–AGCACGTGGGAGGGCGATCG–BHQ1-
3’ 
(382) 
Table 2-4 Norovirus GI and GII open reading frame gene real-time PCR primers 
and probes. 
2.2.5.4 ADENOVIRUS PCR  
Real-time PCR detection of the adenovirus hexon gene was carried out in the following 
mixture: 10μl 2X QuantiFast multiplex mastermix (Qiagen, Crawley, UK), 0.1μM of 
Adeno Forward, 0.1μM Adeno Reverse, 0.1μM Adeno probe, 0.1μl Mus-F, 0.1μl Mus-
R, 0.1μl Mus-Probe, 10μl DNA extract and molecular grade water to give a final volume 
of 25μl (see Table 2-1 and Table 2-5).  
The reactions were cycled on the ABI prism 7300 real-time PCR system (Applied 
Biosystems, Warrington, UK) as follows: 95˚C for 10 minutes followed by 45 cycles of 
95˚C for 15 seconds and 60˚C for 60 seconds. 
Or: 
Real-time PCR detection of the adenovirus hexon gene was carried out in the following 
mixture: 10μl 2X Fast Universal PCR mastermix (Applied Biosystems, Warrington, UK), 
0.1μM of Adeno Forward, 0.1μM Adeno Reverse, 0.1μM Adeno probe, 0.1μl Mus-F, 
0.1μl Mus-R, 0.1μl Mus-Probe, 10μl DNA extract and molecular grade water to give a 
final volume of 25μl (see Table 2-1 and Table 2-5).  
The reactions were cycled on the ABI prism 7500 real-time PCR system (Applied 
Biosystems, Warrington, UK) as follows: 95˚C for 20 seconds followed by 45 cycles of 
95˚C for 3 seconds and 60˚C for 30 seconds. 
Primer 
Name 
Primer 
Type 
Sequence Reference 
Adeno 
Forward 
Forward 5’ – GCC ACG GTG GGG TTT CTA AAC TT – 3’ (383) 
Adeno 
Reverse 
Reverse 5’ – GCC CCA GTG GTC TTA CAT GCA CAT C -3’ (383) 
Adeno 
Probe 
Probe 5’ FAM – TGC ACC AGA CCC GGG CTC AGG TAC 
TCC GA – BHQ1 3’ 
(383) 
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Table 2-5 Adenovirus hexon gene real-time PCR primers and probe. 
2.2.6 ADENOVIRUS TYPING  
PCR detection of hyper variable region 7 (HVR-7) of the Adenovirus hexon gene was 
carried out in the following mixture: 1x Bioline Buffer (Bioline, London, UK), 1.5mM 
MgCl2 (Bioline, London, UK), 0.25μM of HVR-7 Forward, 0.25μM HVR-7 Reverse, 
1mM dNTP’s (Bioline, London, UK), 2.5 units of Bioline Taq (Bioline, London, UK), 10μl 
DNA extract and molecular grade water to give a final volume of 50μl (see Table 2-6.).  
The reactions were cycled on a thermocycler as follows: 95˚C for 10 minutes followed 
by 40 cycles of 95˚C for 60 seconds, 51˚C for 60 seconds and 72oC for 60 seconds and 
a final elongation 72oC for 3 minutes.(384)   
Table 2-6 Sequence based adenovirus typing using hexon gene PCR primers. 
The cycling conditions and reagent proportions of this assay were modified in order to 
enable amplification from clinical extracts as well as extracted cell culture.  PCR 
detection of HVR-7 of the adenovirus hexon gene was carried out in the following 
mixture: 1x Accuprime PCR Buffer II (Invitrogen, Paisley, UK), 0.2μM of HVR-7 
Forward, 0.2μM HVR-7 Reverse,  2.5 units of Accuprime Taq (Invitrogen, Paisley, 
UK),10μl DNA extract and molecular grade water to give a final volume of 50μl. The 
reactions were cycled on the as follows: 94˚C for 2 minutes followed by 40 cycles of 
94˚C for 30 seconds, 60˚C for 30 seconds and 68oC for 60 seconds and a final 
elongation 68oC for 3 minutes.   
Amplified products were electrophoresed through a 2% (w/v) agarose gel with 12.5% 
(v/v) ethidium bromide for staining and bands were visualised by UV transillumination. 
Bioline hyper ladder IV (Bioline, London, UK) was run alongside the amplicons. 
Amplified products were then sequenced and analysed as described in section 2.2.7.   
Primer 
Name 
Primer 
Type 
Sequence Reference 
HVR-7 
Forward 
Forward 5’- CTG ATG TAC TAC AAC AGC ACT GGC AAC 
ATG GG - 3’ 
(384) 
HVR-7 
Reverse 
Reverse 5’- GCG TTG CGG TGG TGG TTA AAT GGG TTT 
ACG TTG TCC AT – 3’ 
(384) 
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2.2.7 SANGER DNA SEQUENCING 
Adenovirus typing PCR products were purified using Microspin columns which contain 
pores that allow molecules of differing sizes to pass through at different times. Larger 
molecules are excluded first into an eluate which is the purified PCR product (GE 
Healthcare Life Sciences, Little Chalfont, UK).   
Sequencing PCR for adenovirus typing was carried out in the following mixture: 1μl Big 
Dye 3.1 PCR buffer (Invitrogen, Paisley, UK), 0.02μM of HVR-7 Forward, 0.02μM HVR-
7 Reverse, 2μl Big Dye 3.1 reaction mix (Invitrogen, Paisley, UK), and 4.5μl amplified 
product to give a final volume of 12.5μl. The reactions were cycled as follows: 25 
cycles of 96˚C for 20 seconds, 50˚C for 5 seconds and 60oC for 4 minutes.  Amplified 
sequencing products were then cleaned up using ethanol precipitation and pellets re-
suspended in 5μl Hi-Di formamide (Life Technologies, Paisley, UK) prior to sequencing 
on an ABI 3130 capillary sequencer (Applied Biosystems, Warrington, UK) as per 
manufacturer’s instructions. 
Sequencing data was analysed using the Lasergene Suite version 12.0.0. (DNAStar, 
Madison, USA) and sequencing were uploaded for comparison on NCBI nucleotide 
BLAST available at http://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi. 
2.2.8 WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING ON THE MISEQ PLATFORM 
47 Klebsiella species isolates and 1 Enterobacter species isolate extracted as listed in 
methods section 2.2.1.1 were adjusted to 0.2ng/ul using the Qubit DNA High Sensitivity 
assay (see methods section 2.2.4.).  Library preparation was performed using the 
Nextera XT kit (Illumina, San Diego, USA) kit as per manufacturer’s instructions as 
described below.   
Enzymic DNA fragmentation and tagmentation was undertaken at 55oC for 5 minutes 
followed by PCR amplification of the tagmented DNA.  The amplification reactions were 
cycled on as follows: 72oC for 3 minutes, 95oC for 30 seconds followed by 12 cycles of 
95oC for 10 seconds, 55oC for 30 seconds and 72oC for 30 seconds and a final 
elongation 72oC for 5 minutes.   
The resulting amplified barcoded PCR products were normalised using 0.5x Agencourt 
AMPure XP (Beckman Coulter, High Wycombe, UK) to allow for size selection of 
>250bp amplicons.  The resulting libraries were then pooled and run on the MiSeq 
platform (Illumina, San Diego, USA) using the 500 cycle V2 cartridge (Illumina, San 
Diego, USA) as per manufacturer’s instructions. 
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2.2.9 PATHOGENICA HIGH THROUGHPUT SEQUENCING ON THE ION TORRENT 
PLATFORM 
47 Klebsiella species isolates and 1 Enterobacter species isolate extracted as listed in 
methods section 2.2.1.1 were adjusted to 0.5ng/ul using the Qubit DNA High Sensitivity 
assay (see methods section 2.2.4.).  Library preparation was performed using the HAI 
Biodetection kit (Pathogenica, Boston, USA) kit as per manufacturer’s instructions as 
described below.   
The hybridisation and ligation reactions to attach barcodes to the target DNA were 
cycled on as follows: 94oC for 10 minutes, ramp to 60oC at 0.1oC/second followed by 
60oC for 10 minutes.   This was followed by a capture reaction at 94oC for 2 minutes, 
then 37oC for 30 minutes.  Preparations then underwent an exonuclease digestion to 
remove unwanted DNA at 94oC for 15 minutes.   
The resulting barcoded DNA fragments were normalised using 0.8x Agencourt AMPure 
XP (Beckman Coulter, High Wycombe, UK) to allow for size selection of >200bp DNA 
fragments.  The Ion Torrent PGM sequencing platform (Life Technologies, Paisley, UK) 
was used to sequence the DNA fragments. Template preparation was carried out with 
the Ion PGM Template OT2 200 Kit (Life Technologies, Paisley, UK), according to 
manufacturer’s instructions. 
2.2.10  MULTI-LOCUS VARIABLE NUMBER TANDEM REPEAT TYPING 
2.2.10.1 ENTEROBACTER CLOACAE MULTI-LOCUS VARIABLE NUMBER TANDEM 
REPEAT TYPING 
Fifty five target loci were selected utilising Tandem Repeat Finder 
(http://tandem.bu.edu/trf/trf.html) using the whole genome sequence of Enterobacter 
cloacae (accession no. CP001918.1) as a reference sequence. 
Eighteen of these fifty five loci were selected for primer design based on the following 
criteria: indel score of 0, percentage matches of over 90% and where possible whole 
number copy repeat sizes.  Primers were designed using NCBI primer design 
programme available at www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov.  A maximum of fifty base-pairs can be 
amplified on either side of the target sequence and out of these eighteen potential 
targets, fifteen loci had flanking sequences that were suitable for primer set design. 
Two different master mixes were used depending upon how the PCR was to be setup.  
If automated setup was performed using the QiAgility (Qiagen, Crawley, UK), Platinum 
Taq (Invitrogen, Paisley, UK) was substituted for the Core Taq (Qiagen, Crawley, UK) 
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used during manual setup.  This was because PCR setup with the QiAgility took ~45 
minutes and therefore a hot start Taq polymerase was required. 
QiAgility PCR Setup: PCR detection of Enterobacter cloacae multi-locus variable 
number tandem repeat (VNTR) loci was carried out in the following mixture: 2.5μl 10x 
Coral Buffer (Qiagen, Crawley, UK), 0.2μM of locus forward primer, 0.2μM locus 
reverse primer, 1mM dNTPs, 5 units of Platinum Taq (Invitrogen, Paisley, UK), 2μl 
DNA extract and molecular grade water to give a final volume of 25μl (see Table 2-7.). 
The reactions were cycled on as follows: 94˚C for 3 minutes followed by 35 cycles of 
94˚C for 30 seconds, 57˚C for 30 seconds and 72oC for 45 seconds and a final 
elongation 72oC for 10 minutes.   
Manual PCR Setup: PCR detection of Enterobacter cloacae VNTR loci was carried out 
in the following mixture: 1x Coral Buffer (Qiagen, Crawley, UK), 1mM dNTPs, 0.2μM of 
Locus Forward primer, 0.2μM Locus Reverse primer,  5 units of Core Taq (Qiagen, 
Crawley, UK), 2μl DNA extract and molecular grade water to give a final volume of 25μl 
(see Table 2-7.).  
The reactions were cycled on a thermocycler as follows: 94˚C for 3 minutes followed by 
35 cycles of 94˚C for 30 seconds, 57˚C for 30 seconds and 72oC for 45 seconds and a 
final elongation 72oC for 10 minutes.   
Amplified products were electrophoresed through a 1.5% (w/v) agarose gel overlayed 
with Gel Red solution (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, USA) for staining and bands 
were visualised by ultra violet (UV) transillumination. Bioline hyper ladder II (Bioline, 
London, UK) was run alongside the amplicons.  Amplified products were also examined 
using the QiAxcel automated electrophoresis system (Qiagen, Crawley, UK). 
Primer 
Name 
Primer 
Type 
Sequence 
Locus 1 Forward 5’ – ACC GTT ACG CAT CAG CAG CGG – 3’ 
Locus 1 Reverse 5’ – GCC CCT GCG CCA CAG GCT TA – 3’ 
Locus 2 Forward 5’ – TCT GCG TGA AAT GCC CGG TGG – 3’ 
Locus 2 Reverse 5’ – CAA CAG CGC CGG GTT TTG CCG – 3’ 
Locus 3 Forward 5’ – ACG AAC CCT CAC GTG CAA AAT CA – 3’ 
Locus 3 Reverse 5’ – CCC GCC CGC GAT GAC AGA A – 3’ 
Locus 4 Forward 5’ – CTT GGC CGG AAC CGC AAA GC – 3’ 
Locus 4 Reverse 5’ – AGC GTC CGC TTG CCG ACT TT – 3’ 
Locus 5 Forward 5’ – CGG CCA GCT GTT CTG CTG CT – 3’ 
Locus 5 Reverse 5’ – GAT CCG TCT CGT CTG GCG GC – 3’ 
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Locus 6 Forward 5’ – GTT TAT TGC CGC CGC GCT GG – 3’ 
Locus 6 Reverse 5’ – ACA CGC CTG TGA AAC AAA AGG GA – 3’ 
Locus 7 Forward 5’ – CGC TCA ACC TCG CCA GAA TGA CC – 3’ 
Locus 7 Reverse 5’ – CCA CGT TCA CCA GGC TTT TCA GC – 3’ 
Locus 8 Forward 5’ – ACC GTC TCG GTC TGA CCC GC – 3’ 
Locus 8 Reverse 5’ – GGC AAA ATT GAG GTA AAT TCG CCC G – 5’ 
Locus 9 Forward 5’ – CCC GCG GGG AAG GCA AAA CC – 3’ 
Locus 9 Reverse 5’ – CGA CAG CGA AGC GTC CGG AC – 3’ 
Locus 10 Forward 5’ – GCC GTT ATC ATT GCC GCC GC – 3’ 
Locus 10 Reverse 5’ – GGT GAT AAC ACC GAC AAC GGT GG – 3’ 
Locus 11 Forward 5’ – ACC TGC CTA AAG GCG ACG CG – 3’ 
Locus 11 Reverse 5’ – GAG GTA GCG CCC AAC GCC TG – 3’ 
Locus 12 Forward 5’ – AGA TTT CGC TGG CTG GCT TTG T – 3’ 
Locus 12 Reverse 5’ – AAG GTG GTG TTG CCG CCT GG – 3’ 
Locus 13 Forward 5’ – TCG CGC AGA AAG AGA CCG GC – 3’ 
Locus 13 Reverse 5’ – GGT TGC TGC TCT TTG CCA CGG – 3’ 
Locus 14 Forward 5’ – AGC GTG TTG AGG TTC TCA TCC GC – 3’ 
Locus 14 Reverse 5’ – CAA CGG TTG CGT AAG CTT CCG – 3’ 
Locus 15 Forward 5’ – GGT GTC GGG TGA TCT CGC CC – 3’ 
Locus 15 Reverse 5’ – GCT GGT CAG TGT GAA CGT CAG CA – 3’ 
Table 2-7 E. cloacae VNTR loci primers. 
2.2.10.2 KLEBSIELLA PNEUMONIAE MULTI-LOCUS VARIABLE NUMBER TANDEM 
REPEAT TYPING 
PCR detection of Klebsiella pneumoniae VNTR loci was carried out in the following 
mixture: 2.5μl 10x Buffer (Invitrogen, Paisley, UK), 0.2μM of locus forward primer, 
0.2μM locus reverse primer, 1mM dNTPs, 5 units of Platinum Taq (Invitrogen, Paisley, 
UK), 3μl DNA extract and molecular grade water to give a final volume of 25μl (see 
Table 2-8.).  
The reactions were cycled on a thermocycler as follows: 94˚C for 2 minutes followed by 
35 cycles of 94˚C for 30 seconds, 58˚C for 30 seconds and 72oC for 60 seconds and a 
final elongation 72oC for 10 minutes.   
Primers were modified to permit analysis on the ABI 3130 capillary sequencer (Applied 
Biosystems, Warrington, UK) by the addition of fluorescent dyes to the forward primers. 
Primer 
Name 
Primer 
Type 
Sequence Reference 
Locus A Forward 5’ FAM - AGC GTA TCT GCC ATT GCC (55) 
Locus A Reverse 5’- CAG CAT GGC CAG TTT GTC (55) 
Locus E Forward 5’ HEX - CCA AATCCG GGT ATT TAT CG (55) 
Locus E Reverse 5’- TTC GAT ACC CAT CCG GAA G (55) 
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Locus H Forward 5’ NED - ATG ACC AAG GAA GAA CCC G (55) 
Locus H Reverse 5’- CTT TAC CTG GCA TGC GAA CG (55) 
Locus J Forward 5’ FAM - ACC GGA TTA AGC GCT ATT CC (55) 
Locus J Reverse 5’- TTC CTC GCC CAC GGA TAG (55) 
Locus K Forward 5’ HEX - GAG CTG GCG GCT GGA ATA (55) 
Locus K Reverse 5’- GCA ATC TGC CCG GAA ATA (55) 
Locus D Forward 5’ NED - GCA GGT CTC GTC TTC ATT CC (55) 
Locus D Reverse 5’- TGA CCA TCG AAG AGG CG (55) 
Locus N1 Forward 5’ FAM - CAT CAG GTG CAA GAT TCA A UP 
Locus N1 Reverse 5’- TGA GCG ATT GCT GGC CTA UP 
Locus N2 Forward 5’ HEX - GAT GCG GCA AGC ACC AC UP 
Locus N2 Reverse 5’- ACG CCC TGA CCA TTA TGC UP 
Locus N4 Forward 5’ NED - GTG CGG TGA TTG TGA TGG UP 
Locus N4 Reverse 5’- CTG ACA ACG TCG ATG TGG UP 
Table 2-8 Klebsiella pneumoniae VNTR loci primers (UP = unpublished primers). 
Amplified PCR products underwent AFLP analysis on an ABI 3130 capillary sequencer 
(Applied Biosystems, Warrington, UK) using MapMarker 1500X-Rhodamine size 
standards (Bioventures, Murfreesboro, United States of America).  Additionally 
amplified products were electrophoresed through a 1.5% (w/v) agarose gel stained with 
12.5% ethidium bromide and bands were visualised by UV transillumination. Bioline 
1Kb ladder (Bioline, London, UK) was run alongside the amplicons.   
2.2.11 REPETITIVE EXTRAGENIC PALINDROMIC BASED PCR 
Repetitive extragenic palindromic based PCR (REP-PCR) primer sequences are not 
listed as the typing is performed using a commercial kit and primer sequences are not 
disclosed. 
2.2.11.1 KLEBSIELLA AND ENTEROBACTER REPETITIVE EXTRAGENIC 
PALINDROMIC BASED PCR 
REP-PCR detection for Klebsiella and Enterobacter species was carried out in the 
following mixture: 1x GeneAmp PCR buffer (Applied Biosystems, Warrington, UK), 2μl 
Diversilab primer mix (BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France), 18μl Diversilab REP-PCR 
mastermix (BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France), 2.5 units AmpliTaq (Applied 
Biosystems, Warrington, UK), and 2μl DNA extract to give a final volume of 25μl (no 
reagents concentration listed as part of kit details).  
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The reactions were cycled on a thermocycler as follows: 94˚C for 2 minutes followed by 
35 cycles of 94˚C for 30 seconds, 55˚C for 30 seconds and 70oC for 90 seconds and a 
final elongation 70oC for 3 minutes.   
Amplified products were visualised via a microfluidics detection system using the 
Agilent 2100 bioanalyzer and results uploaded onto the Diversilab web system 
(BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France). Computational analysis was performed using the 
either the Pearson Correlation Co-efficient or the Kullback-Leibler analysis to calculate 
pairwise similarities between all samples tested.  REP-PCR traces were flagged as low 
intensity for traces where no detected peaks for that amplified product was greater than 
100 relative fluorescent units.  Low intensity traces were only included in the analysis if 
no acceptable trace could be detected after six sample repeats. 
2.2.11.2  E. COLI REPETITIVE EXTRAGENIC PALINDROMIC BASED PCR 
REP-PCR detection for E. coli was carried out in the following mixture: 1x GeneAmp 
PCR buffer (Applied Biosystems, Warrington, UK), 2μl Diversilab primer mix 
(BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France), 18μl Diversilab REP-PCR mastermix (BioMerieux, 
Mary l’Etoile, France), 2.5 units AmpliTaq (Applied Biosystems, Warrington, UK), and 
2μl DNA extract to give a final volume of 25μl (no reagents concentration listed as part 
of kit details).  
The reactions were cycled on a thermocycler as follows: 94˚C for 2 minutes followed by 
35 cycles of 94˚C for 30 seconds, 50˚C for 30 seconds and 70oC for 90 seconds and a 
final elongation 70oC for 3 minutes.   
Amplified products were visualised via a microfluidics detection system using the 
Agilent 2100 bioanalyzer and results uploaded onto the Diversilab web system 
(BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France). Computational analysis was performed using the 
either the Pearson Correlation Co-efficient or the Kullback-Leibler analysis to calculate 
pairwise similarities between all samples tested. REP-PCR traces were flagged as low 
intensity for traces where no detected peaks for that amplified product was greater than 
100 relative fluorescent units.  Low intensity traces were only included in the analysis if 
no acceptable trace could be detected after six sample repeats. 
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2.3 ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING  
2.3.1 VIROLOGICAL SURFACE SAMPLING 
A cotton tipped swab was lightly moistened in a vial of 1ml molecular grade water.  The 
sample area was as described in Table 2-9 and Table 2-10.  The surface was swabbed 
by rotating the swab and moving it first horizontally across the sampling area, then 
vertically and finally diagonally.   The cotton tip of the swab was then broken off into the 
fluid.  One additional vial of molecular grade water was produced to act as a negative 
control. Swabs were stored at 2-4oC for a maximum of 48 hours before further 
processing as described in sections 2.2.5.4 and 2.2.5.3. 
2.3.1.1 INFECTION CONTROL VIROLOGICAL SCREENING SITES 
Table 2-10 describes the sites used by the GOSH infection control team as part of their 
routine screening (discussed in Chapter 5).  This list of sites is used to monitor levels of 
virus within cubicles both pre and post clean.  Post clean screening is undertaken for 
all bone marrow transplant cubicles where an adenovirus positive patient has been 
present.  Other screening is undertaken for both norovirus and adenovirus as required 
by infection control. 
 
Swab 
No. 
Site Area to be Swabbed  
1 Floor outside known negative patient room 10 cm2 
2 Filing cabinet 10 cm2 
3 Floor outside known positive patient room 10 cm2 
4 Nurse’s station 10 cm2 
5 Sluice/medication room door handle Entire handle 
6 Floor by main exit doors 10 cm2 
7 Notes trolley 10 cm2 
8 PC keyboards Every key and surface on 
the right 50% (~10 cm2) 
9 Telephone on nurse’s station Entire key and handset 
10 Ward exit door handle Entire handle 
Table 2-9 Sampling sites for virology ward screening at GOSH. 
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Swab 
No. 
Site Area to be Swabbed  
1 Floor under sink 10cm2 
2 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
3 Chair with arms (right) Where hands rests (10cm2)  
4 Door handle into patient bathroom (cubicle 
side) 
Entire handle 
5 Telephone keypads Entire keypad 
6 Taps in Patient Bathroom Entirety of both taps 
7 Mattress top 10cm2 
8 Bed/Cot frame under bed 10cm2 
9 Trolley surface (in ante room if present) 10cm2 
10 Side window sill (right hand side) 10cm2 
11 Cubicle room exit door handle (cubicle side) Entire handle 
12 Corridor floor outside of cubicle/ante room 
entrance 
4 inch2/10cm2 
13 Negative N/A 
Table 2-10 Sampling sites for virology cubicle screening at GOSH. 
 
2.3.1.2 NOROVIRUS/ADENOVIRUS ROUTINE MONITORING SITES 
Environmental screening for adenovirus and norovirus was undertaken weekly on two 
wards at GOSH over a 6 months period from January – June 2011. Twelve sites were 
sampled within the shared ward area on each ward with a total of 144 swabs taken 
(Table 2-9).  Ward one was an 11 bedded in-patient hematopoietic stem cell 
transplantation unit (HSCTU) where all beds were located within single occupancy 
rooms with en-suite facilities. The second ward was a 10 bedded 
Immunology/Infectious Disease Unit (IIU), where all beds were located within ante-
chambered single occupancy rooms with en-suite facilities. Sampling was undertaken 
at similar times of day in relation to cleaning throughout the sampling period.  
2.3.1.3 HAEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY DAY UNIT VIROLOGICAL SCREENING 
SITES 
A one off screen was undertaken on a haematology/oncology day unit (HODU) to 
establish the level of environmental contamination present (Table 2-11).  
Swab No. Site Area to be Swabbed  
Day Procedure Bay 
1 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  2 Trolley 10cm2 
3 Bed rail 10cm2 
4 Nurses base 10cm2 
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5 Window ledge 10cm2 
Recovery 
6 Emergency door Entire bar 
7 Trolley 10cm2 
8 Chair seat 10cm2 
9 Notes container 10cm2 
10 Bed rail 10cm2 
11 Top of portable TV 10cm2 
Procedure Room 
12 Keyboard Every key and surface on 
   2  13 Prep surface 10cm2 
14 Trolley 10cm2 
15 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
16 Bed rail 10cm2 
Assisted Toilet 1 
17 Baby change 10cm2 
18 Exit door handle Entire handle 
Assisted Toilet 2 
19 Baby change 10cm2 
20 Exit door handle Entire handle 
21 Toilet seat 10cm2 
Cubicle ensuite (pre level two clean) 
22 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  23 Fan Fan blades 
24 Toy 10cm2 
25 Bed rail 10cm2 
26 Trolley 10cm2 
Bay 1 
27 Bed rail 10cm2 
28 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  29 Toy 10cm2 
30 Fan Fan blades 
31 Window ledge 10cm2 
Corridor 
32 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  33 Nurses station phone Entire key and handset 
34 Crash trolley 10cm2 
Bay 2 
35 Toy 10cm2 
36 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  37 Bed rail 10cm2 
38 Trolley 10cm2 
39 Childs table 10cm2 
Bay 3 
40 Dolls house 10cm2 
41 Table 10cm2 
42 Bed rail 10cm2 
43 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
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44 Fan Fan blades 
Height & Weight room 
45 Keyboard Every key and surface on 
   2  46 Nappy change 10cm2 
47 Weighing seat 10cm2 
48 Exit door handle Entire handle 
49 Window ledge 10cm2 
50 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim  
Reception 
51 Notes trolley 10cm2 
52 Keyboard Every key and surface on 
   2  53 Desk 10cm2 
54 Window ledge 10cm2 
55 Phone Entire key and handset 
Reception Seating 
56 Toy van 10cm2 
57 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  58 TV 10cm2 
59 Window ledge 10cm2 
60 Apron dispenser 10cm2 
Cubicle 1 
61 Toilet exit door handle Entire handle 
62 Bed rail 10cm2 
63 Clinical waste bin (toilet) Entire rim 
64 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
65 Trolley 10cm2 
Cubicle 2 (pre level two clean) 
66 Exit door handle Entire handle 
67 Bed rail 10cm2 
68 Pillow 10cm2 
69 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
70 Trolley 10cm2 
Treatment Room 1 
71 Teddy 10cm2 
72 Trolley 10cm2 
73 Drug trolley 10cm2 
74 Bench 10cm2 
75 Exit door handle Entire handle 
Treatment Room 2 
76 Toy 10cm2 
77 Bench 10cm2 
78 Computer trolley 10cm2 
79 Trolley 10cm2 
80 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
Treatment Room 3 
81 Trolley 10cm2 
82 IV bench 10cm2 
83 Keyboard Every key and surface on 
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84 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
85 Drip stand 10cm2 
Treatment Room 4 
86 Bench 10cm2 
87 Computer   10cm2 
88 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
89 Computer trolley 10cm2 
90 Window ledge 10cm2 
Table 2-11 Virological screening sites on the haematology/oncology day unit. 
2.3.2 BACTERIAL SAMPLING METHODS 
Detection methods included:   
• Direct sampling using contact plates with selective or non-selective agar (see 
section 2.3.2.1.) 
• Direct sampling using swabs that are then plated onto selective agar plates 
(see section 2.3.2.2.) 
• Swab sampling with an enrichment step with subsequent plating onto selective 
agar (see section 2.3.2.3.) 
• Commercially available swab systems that combine swab and enrichment (see 
section 2.3.2.4.) 
Swabs were taken to the right and contact plates to the left, when sampling identical 
sites.  Where swabs were taken in the centre of a surface, contact plates taken directly 
above.   
2.3.2.1 DIRECT SAMPLING USING CONTACT PLATES WITH SELECTIVE OR NON-
SELECTIVE AGAR TOTAL VIABLE COUNTS  
Total viable counts (TVC) sampling was carried out with 5.5 cm diameter contact plates 
(24 cm2).  Sampling utilised Tryptone Soya Agar (TSA) contact plates pressed onto 
surfaces for 10 seconds and then incubated aerobically at 37oC for 48 hours.    
Additional identification was undertaken via the MALDI Biotyper platform (Bruker UK, 
Coventry, UK) or API (BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France) as required (see section 
2.3.2.5). 
2.3.2.2 DIRECT SAMPLING USING SWABS THAT ARE THEN PLATED ONTO SELECTIVE 
AGAR PLATES 
This method was used where it was felt that organisms would be present in sufficient 
quantities that the reduced sensitivity of not using an enrichment step was countered 
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by being able to deliver a rough numerical count.  Swabs were used instead of contact 
plates in circumstances when multiple primary agars were required for growth and 
identification.  Direct plating was utilised to give semi-quantitative data (range: 0 to 3) in 
conjunction with chromogenic agar for primary identification of isolates.  
Cotton tipped swabs were lightly moistened in a vial of sterile water.  The surface was 
swabbed by rotating the swab and moving it first horizontally across the sampling area, 
then vertically and finally diagonally, before being replaced in the charcoal 
transportation media.   Swabs were stored at 2-4oC for a maximum of 48 hours before 
processing. 
Charcoal swabs were inoculated onto selective and non-selective agar plates within 48 
hours of samples being taken.  Plates utilised included methicillin resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) Chromogenic Agar, Braziers Agar and Urine 
Chromagenic Agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK).  Non-selective plates utilised throughout 
the project included Blood Agar and MacConkey Agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK).  
Braziers Agar was incubated anaerobically for 37oC for 48 hours, all other agars were 
incubated aerobically at 37oC for 48 hours.    
Additional identification was undertaken via the MALDI Biotyper platform (Bruker UK, 
Coventry, UK) or API (BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France) as required (see section 
2.3.2.5.). 
2.3.2.3 SWAB SAMPLING WITH AN ENRICHMENT STEP WITH SUBSEQUENT 
PLATING ONTO SELECTIVE AGAR 
A cotton tipped swab was lightly moistened in a vial of sterile water.  The surface was 
swabbed by rotating the swab and moving it first horizontally across the sampling area, 
then vertically and finally diagonally, before being replaced in the charcoal 
transportation media.   Swabs were placed into a selective broth for 48 hours in order 
to increase test sensitivity before being plated onto selective and non-selective agars 
for identification.  Testing is qualitative with no quantitative comparison possible.  
Swabs were stored at 2-4oC for a maximum of 48 hours before processing. 
For Gram-negative bacteria during surveillance of Great Ormond Street Hospital 
(GOSH) Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) swabs were placed into Brain Heart 
Infusion (BHI) enrichment media (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) and incubated for 48 hours 
at 37oC.  After 48 hours the broth was sub-cultured onto Urine Chromagenic Agar, 
Violet Red Bile Glucose Agar and MacConkey agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) plus a 
Colistin disk (BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France).  
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During sampling at the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery (NHNN) 
swabs were placed in salt broth (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) to enrich for Staphylococcus 
aureus and sub-cultured onto MRSA Chromogenic Agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK).  
Additional swabs were also taken and placed in Robertson’s Cooked Meat (Oxoid, 
Basingstoke, UK) and sub-cultured onto Braziers Agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) for C. 
difficile.  Swabs were also taken for Acinetobacter species and enriched using AVMA 
broth before being sub-cultured onto Urine Chromogenic Agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, 
UK). Braziers Agar was incubated anaerobically for 37oC for 48 hours, all other agars 
were incubated aerobically at 37oC for 48 hours.    
Additional identification was undertaken via the MALDI Biotyper platform (Bruker UK, 
Coventry, UK) or API (BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France) as required (see section 
2.4.2.5.). 
2.3.2.4 MICROSNAP ENTEROBACTERIACEAE SWABS 
Microsnap Enterobacteriaceae swabs (Hygiena International, Watford, UK) combine 
enrichment and detection in a two-stage process.  Swabbing was undertaken in an 
identical fashion to that listed in 2.3.2.3. with the Microsnap system that contained a 
pre-moistened swab.  BHI broth was released from the bulb in the swab post sampling 
and the swabs were incubated in the broth for seven hours at 37oC.  100µl of the 
enrichment broth was mixed with the detection substrate for 30 minutes at 37oC.  
Relative light units (RLU) were then recorded and the remaining broth plated onto 
Urine Chromagenic Agar, Violet Red Bile Glucose Agar and MacConkey Agar (Oxoid, 
Basingstoke, UK) plus a Colistin disk (BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France) and incubated 
for 48 hours at 37oC. 
Additional identification was undertaken as described in section 2.3.2.5. 
2.3.2.5 BACTERIAL IDENTIFICATION 
Bacterial isolates were initially typed using phenotypic features (colony morphology, 
colour and macroscopic features). Selected isolates then underwent Gram staining and 
either biochemical identification using API kits (BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France) or 
matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionisation time-of-flight (MALDI-ToF) analysis on the 
MALDI Biotyper system (Bruker UK, Coventry, UK) as per manufacturer’s instructions.  
Additional antibiotic sensitivity testing using the disk diffusion method on Iso-sensitest 
agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) and E-test (BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France) was 
undertaken as required.  
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2.3.2.6 BACTERIAL QUANTIFICATION  
Bacterial suspensions linked to survival and decontamination studies, as well as for 
standard creation, were quantified using the Miles and Misra method.(385) Inoculation 
suspensions (~ 5 Macfarlane units for control suspensions) were quantified using the 
following plate counting method: serial tenfold dilutions were made from this 
suspension in sterile water and 5 drops (20µl) of the 10-6, 10-7, 10-8, 10-9, 10-10 dilutions 
were pipetted onto pre-warmed blood agar plates and incubated at 37oC for 24 hours. 
Bacterial counts were determined from the blood agar dilution plates that demonstrated 
discreet colonies and values calculated to colony forming units per ml.  Bacterial 
recovery swabs were quantified in an identical fashion but 10-1, 10-2, 10-3 from the 
starting sample were used for quantification. 
2.3.2.7 BACTERIAL SWABBING FOR INOCULATION EXPERIMENTS 
Cotton tipped swab was lightly moistened in a vial of 1ml molecular grade water.  The 
surface was swabbed by rotating the swab and moving it first horizontally across the 
sampling area, then vertically and finally diagonally.   The cotton tip of the swab was 
then broken off into the fluid.  One additional vial of molecular grade water was 
produced to act as a negative control. Swabs were stored at 2-4oC for a maximum of 
48 hours before further processing as described in sections 2.2.5.1 and 2.2.5.2.  
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2.3.3 BACTERIAL SAMPLING SITES 
2.3.3.1 GRAM-NEGATIVE SURVEILLANCE ON THE PAEDIATRIC INTENSIVE 
CARE  
The PICU at GOSH was sampled on twenty occasions over five months using both 
TVCs as described in 2.3.2.1 and Enterobacteriaceae swabs as described in sections 
2.3.2.3 and 2.3.2.4.  Sampling focused on two adjacent bed spaces and the shared 
ward area (see Table 2-12 and Table 2-13). 
Swab 
No. 
Site Area to be Swabbed  
1 Floor near sink 10cm2 
2 Bin 10cm2 
3 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests (~10cm2) 
4 Bed rails (right) 10cm2 
5 Suspended shelf surface 10cm2 
6 Mouse Entire surface 
7 Sink rim Entire back rim 
8 Sink bowl Entire bowl 
9 Trolley 10cm2 
10 PC Keyboard Every key and surface on 
the right 50% (~10cm2) 
11 Lamp 10cm2 
12 Soap dispenser Entire of dispensing surface 
Table 2-12 Gram-negative surveillance bed space sampling locations on the 
GOSH Paediatric Intensive Care Unit. 
Swab 
No. 
Site Area to be Swabbed  
1 Telephone on nurses station Entire key and handset 
2 PC keyboards  Every key and surface on 
the right 50% (~10cm2) 
3 Nurses station  10cm2 
4 Notes trolley 10cm2 
5 Corridor floor outside of bed space 7 10cm2 
6 Corridor floor outside of bed space 10 10cm2 
7 Medication board 10cm2 
8 Dirty utility door handle Entire handle 
9 Desk by nurses station 10cm2 
10 Crash trolley 10cm2 
11 Floor by main exit doors 10cm2 
12 Exit door button Entire button 
Table 2-13 Gram-negative surveillance ward sampling locations on the GOSH  
Paediatric Intensive Care Unit.  
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2.3.3.2 GREAT ORMOND STREET HOSPITAL INTENSIVE CARE UNIT 
BACTERIAL SINK SAMPLING  
Data was collected in three intensive care unit (ICUs) within GOSH including: the 
cardiac intensive care unit (CICU), PICU and neonatal intensive care unit (NICU).  
Sampling was undertaken in parallel with the observational data collection, see 
methods section  2.5.2.  Swab samples were collected from eight sinks spread over the 
three units, both at the beginning (after morning cleaning with detergent) and at the end 
of observation days (before evening cleaning daily) then once a week for the next three 
weeks subsequently.  Samples were collected from seven different locations on each 
sink at each sampling occasion: faucet, left sink back - lip, right sink back - lip, left side 
of the sink bowl, right side of the sink bowl, depression pad on the gel dispenser and 
depression pad on the soap dispenser) in each of the eight sinks.  Samples were 
processed as described in methods section 2.3.2.2. and plated onto Urine 
Chromagenic Agar, Blood Agar and MacConkey agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK).   
2.3.3.3 NATIONAL NEUROLOGICAL HOSPITAL BACTERIAL SAMPLING  
Sampling was carried out over a three month validation period (each month referred to 
as a sampling period i.e. 1, 2 or 3) to identify sampling methodologies.  A total of 1408 
samples were taken in an adult surgical and medical ICU in order investigating the best 
ways of measuring surface microbial flora. Sampling included TVCs and specific 
pathogen quantification (MRSA, Clostridium difficile and antibiotic resistant 
Acinetobacter species). Samples were processed as described in methods section 
2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.3.  Surfaces were categorised as low (under 2 feet in height), medium 
(2 – 4 feet) or high (greater than 4 feet).  In addition surfaces were categorised as to 
whether they were high touch or not (see Table 2-14).   
Ward sites included: 
Alcohol hand gel and hand cream dispensers, domestic waste bin, nurses station, 
nurses station keyboard, nurses station phone, dispensing trolley, medicines fridge 
door handle, medicines fridge (top), curtain rail, floors by all doors and door 
plates/handles at all exits, sinks and taps, X-ray box (top), nurses station chair arms, 
crash trolley, storage trolley.   
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Bed space sites included: 
Sites (Surgical Intensive Therapy Unit) Sites (Medical Intensive Therapy Unit) 
Bed rails Bed rails 
Storage unit (top) Storage trolley 
Storage unit (shelf) Ops computer (top) 
Floor under bed Floor under bed 
Clinical waste bin Bed side table 
Ops computer (top) Clinical waste bin 
Bed wheels Bed wheels 
Bed side table Alcohol gel dispenser 
Alcohol gel dispenser  
Apron dispenser  
Table 2-14 Bacterial sampling sites at the National Neurological Hospital. 
2.3.3.4 HAEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY DAY UNIT SAMPLING SITES 
A one off screen was undertaken on HODU, to establish the level of environmental 
contamination present using methods described in sections 2.3.2.1, 2.3.2.3 and 2.3.2.7 
using sites described in Table 2-15.   
Swab No. Site Area to be Swabbed  
Day Procedure Bay 
1 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  2 Trolley 10cm2 
3 Bed rail 10cm2 
4 Nurses base 10cm2 
5 Window ledge 10cm2 
Recovery 
6 Emergency door Entire bar 
7 Trolley 10cm2 
8 Chair seat 10cm2 
9 Notes container 10cm2 
10 Bed rail 10cm2 
11 Top of portable TV 10cm2 
Procedure Room 
12 Keyboard Every key and surface on 
   2  13 Prep surface 10cm2 
14 Trolley 10cm2 
15 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
16 Bed rail 10cm2 
Assisted Toilet 1 
17 Baby change 10cm2 
18 Exit door handle Entire handle 
Assisted Toilet 2 
19 Baby change 10cm2 
20 Exit door handle Entire handle 
21 Toilet seat 10cm2 
Cubicle ensuite (pre clean after isolation of an MRSA positive patient) 
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22 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  23 Fan Fan blades 
24 Toy 10cm2 
25 Bed rail 10cm2 
26 Trolley 10cm2 
Bay 1 
27 Bed rail 10cm2 
28 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  29 Toy 10cm2 
30 Fan Fan blades 
31 Window ledge 10cm2 
Corridor 
32 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  33 Nurses station phone Entire key and handset 
34 Crash trolley 10cm2 
Bay 2 
35 Toy 10cm2 
36 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  37 Bed rail 10cm2 
38 Trolley 10cm2 
39 Childs table 10cm2 
Bay 3 
40 Dolls house 10cm2 
41 Table 10cm2 
42 Bed rail 10cm2 
43 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  44 Fan Fan blades 
Height & Weight room 
45 Keyboard Every key and surface on 
   2  46 Nappy change 10cm2 
47 Weighing seat 10cm2 
48 Exit door handle Entire handle 
49 Window ledge 10cm2 
50 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim  
Reception 
51 Notes trolley 10cm2 
52 Keyboard Every key and surface on 
   2  53 Desk 10cm2 
54 Window ledge 10cm2 
55 Phone Entire key and handset 
Reception Seating 
56 Toy van 10cm2 
57 Chair arm (right) Where hand rests 
2  58 TV 10cm2 
59 Window ledge 10cm2 
60 Apron dispenser 10cm2 
Cubicle 1 
61 Toilet exit door handle Entire handle 
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62 Bed rail 10cm2 
63 Clinical waste bin (toilet) Entire rim 
64 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
65 Trolley 10cm2 
Cubicle 2 (pre clean after isolation of antibiotic resistant Gram-negative patient) 
66 Exit door handle Entire handle 
67 Bed rail 10cm2 
68 Pillow 10cm2 
69 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
70 Trolley 10cm2 
Treatment Room 1 
71 Teddy 10cm2 
72 Trolley 10cm2 
73 Drug trolley 10cm2 
74 Bench 10cm2 
75 Exit door handle Entire handle 
Treatment Room 2 
76 Toy 10cm2 
77 Bench 10cm2 
78 Computer trolley 10cm2 
79 Trolley 10cm2 
80 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
Treatment Room 3 
81 Trolley 10cm2 
82 IV bench 10cm2 
83 Keyboard Every key and surface on 
   2  84 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
85 Drip stand 10cm2 
Treatment Room 4 
86 Bench 10cm2 
87 Computer   10cm2 
88 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) Entire rim 
89 Computer trolley 10cm2 
90 Window ledge 10cm2 
Table 2-15 Bacterial screening sites on the haematology/oncology day unit. 
2.3.3.5 BACTERIAL AIR SAMPLING 
Air sampling was performed using a Sampl’air lite (BioMerieux, Mary l’Etoile, France), 
sampling 1m3 of air onto a blood agar plate (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK).  Air sampling 
occurred at similar times to the surface sampling, separated in time by at least 1 hour 
to minimize user contamination.  Air samples were taken from the top right hand corner 
of each bed space at floor level (see Figure 2-1).  In addition samples were taken from 
the nurses station and doorways/Gates (see methods section 2.5.1.).  228 TVC 
samples were taken, 40 of which were taken using TSA and SAB Agar as well as 
Blood Agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) to determine which gave the most 
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comprehensive result.  All plates were read and colony forming units (CFU) were 
counted per plate giving total viable counts (TVC) that was recorded at 48hrs after 
incubation at 37°C.   
 
Figure 2-1 Floor plans with red x’s used to identify air sampling points of the 
surgical intensive care unit, medical intensive care unit and high depency unit at 
the NHNN. 
2.3.3.6 DOOR HANDLE SAMPLING 
Microbiological surveillance data were collected at the same time as handle usage 
using contact plates as described in section 2.3.2.1.  Door handles were cleaned 
thoroughly with 70% isopropyl alcohol wipes immediately before the start of the 
movement observations and swabs taken to ensure the handles and plates were free 
from bacteria. Sampling was undertaken at the start of the observation period and 
repeated at the same sites following a 150 minute observation (see section 2.5.1.).  
Observation periods were repeated twice a day to straddle both morning ward rounds 
and afternoon visits by relatives for 3 days. 
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2.4 SURFACE INOCULATION METHODS 
Inoculation experiments were used to test the effectiveness of decontamination 
methods as well as to conduct survival studies.  For each test organism and control 
sample, 250µl of the microbial/viral suspension or extracted DNA was inoculated in 
50µl droplets onto a 5x5 cm area of glazed ceramic tile surface with a minimum of 1 
duplicate, and allowed to dry for two hours at room temperature.  Swabbing of the test 
surface was undertaken as described in methods section 2.3.2.7. 
 
Figure 2-2 Ceramic tiles incoculated with 250µl of susepnsion per replicate in 
50µl droplets, with four replicates per tile. 
2.4.1 SURVIVAL STUDIES 
A 43 m3 chamber, with adjustable air changes per hour (ACH), temperature, and 
relative humidity was used as a stable environment to test the long term viability of 
Klebsiella pneumoniae (NCTC 13368), Staphylococcus aureus (NCTC 65711), and 
adenovirus serotype 1 (NCTC 0011051v).  DNA extracted as described in methods 
108 
 
Chapter 2 Materials and Methods 
section 2.2.1.1. of Klebsiella pneumoniae (NCTC 13368), Staphylococcus aureus 
(NCTC 65711), and adenovirus serotype 1 (NCTC 0011051v) was also inoculated.  
The air supply was high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtered. Temperature and 
relative humidity were set to 16°C and 43% respectively.   
Each time point had four replicates and samples were taken at point 0, 24h, 24 h, 72 h, 
1 week, 2 weeks, 3 weeks, 4 weeks and 3 months.  Viability testing was undertaken as 
described in methods section 2.1.2 and 2.3.2.6.  DNA detection was by real-time PCR 
as described in methods sections 2.2.5.1, 2.2.5.2. and 2.2.5.4. 
2.4.2 DECONTAMINATION STUDIES 
After inoculation as described in section 2.4. the decontamination method was then 
performed on the test sample, with the control being maintained in conditions that were 
as similar as possible.  A ceramic surface was selected for inoculation experiments in 
order to carry out experimentation on a surface that would enable maximum recovery. 
For viability bacterial suspensions were selected that allowed recovery of a minimum of 
106 colony forming units/ml of microorganism (McFarland No. 5; >1.0 optical density at 
620 nm).  Adenovirus was inoculated from cell culture for viability testing or extracted 
cell culture for DNA exposure experiments ~109 viral genome copies/ml as determined 
using adenovirus standards).  See sections 2.1.2 and 2.3.2.6. 
For molecular detection and DNA degradation studies molecular detection of viruses 
and bacteria were undertaken using real-time PCR as described in sections 2.2.5.1, 
2.2.5.2 and 2.2.5.4 
2.4.2.1 ULTRA VIOLET LIGHT EQUIPMENT DECONTAMINATION 
The use of ultraviolet light as delivered by the Nanoclave cabinets (Nanoclave, London, 
UK), which uses short wave ultraviolet light (UV-C 280 – 100nm) targeted from 360o 
around an object placed within in order to decontaminate object it.  
Viral testing involved the use of adenovirus species A31 (NCTC 0011265v) in VERO 
cell culture medium inoculated onto surfaces as described in section 2.4.from a stock 
suspension with a viral genome concentration of approximately 2.910 viral copies/ml (as 
determined by real-time PCR using standards provided by National Institute for 
Biological Standards and Control (NIBSC)).  During this analysis viral detection was 
undertaken by PCR as described in methods section 2.2.5.4 for DNA degradation and 
by tissue culture as described in methods section 2.1.2 for viability.  
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Surface Study 
A ceramic surface was selected for inoculation experiments in order to carry out 
experimentation on a surface that would enable maximum recovery. 250 µl of the 
adenovirus A31 suspension was inoculated in 50 µl droplets onto a 5x5 cm area of 
glazed ceramic tile surface with a minimum of one duplicate, and allowed to dry for two 
hours at room temperature. 
Medical Device Decontamination Testing 
Four medical devices were tested at two sampling points, one after a three minute UV 
exposure and one after a six minute UV exposure.  The medical devices included 
metallic and plastic surface types.  There was insufficient space on the device for a 
control inoculation. 
Devices submitted to preliminary testing and initial results: 
1. A remote control with a plastic surface  
2. A saturation monitor with a plastic surface  
3. A Dinomap (automated blood pressure device) with a plastic surface  
4. A piece of dialysis equipment was tested with a metal plate  
2.4.2.2 HYDROGEN PEROXIDE VAPOUR ROOM DECONTAMINATION 
The effectiveness of hydrogen peroxide vapour (HPV) technology was assessed by 
comparing two commercially available HPV technologies, Glosair 400 (ASP, 
Wokingham, UK) and Bioquell Q10 (Bioquell, Andover, UK).   
A 43 m3 chamber, with adjustable air changes per hour (ACH), temperature, and 
relative humidity was used to test the effect of hydrogen peroxide vapour on organism 
viability and DNA. The air supply was High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtered. 
Temperature and relative humidity were set to 20°C and 40% respectively 1 hour 
before the experiment.  During the experiment the chamber was sealed and at negative 
pressure compared to adjoining rooms. Measured ambient temperature and relative 
humidity ranged from 20 - 23°C and 38 – 40% for the test inside the chamber 
respectively, for this particular experiment the chamber ACH was off and fan on to 
achieve a well-mixed environment. Control sample tiles for bacteria and virus for were 
left outside the chamber at room temperature (25°C). 
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Equipment Experiment Cycle numbers Cycle dosage Contact time 
Bioquell 
Viable and DNA 
exposure 
1 1 10g/m3 15 min 
Glosair 
Viable bacteria 1 1 6ml/m
3 2hours 
DNA exposure 2 1 9ml/m3 2 hours 
DNA exposure 3 3 consecutive 12ml/m3 2 hour 
DNA exposure 4 3 consecutive 6ml/m3 2 hour 
DNA exposure 5 3 consecutive 6ml/m3 30 min 
DNA exposure 6 3 consecutive 6ml/m3 15 min 
Table 2-16 Hydrogen peroxide cycling conditions for Glossair and Bioquell 
systems for both viability and DNA denaturation experiments.  
Organisms tested with Glosair 400 (ASP, Wokingham, UK) included Klebsiella 
pneumoniae (NCTC 13368), Staphylococcus aureus (NCTC 65711), and adenovirus 
serotype 1 (NCTC 0011051v).  Viability was determined as described in methods 
section 2.1.2 and 2.3.2.6.  DNA degradation was assessed by real-time PCR as 
described in methods sections 2.2.5.1, 2.2.5.2 and 2.2.5.4. 
2.4.2.3 CLEANING AGENT COMPARISON 
1000ppm sodium hypochlorite (NaCIO) (Sigma-Aldrich, Gillingham, UK), 1000ppm 
sodium dichloroisocyanurate (NaDCC) (Chlor clean) (Guest Medical, Aylesford, UK) 
and chlorine dioxide (CIO2) (Tristel, Snailswell, UK) were compared to determine both 
their ability to render Klebsiella pneumoniae (NCTC 13368), Staphylococcus aureus 
(NCTC 65711), and adenovirus species C serotype 1 ((NCTC 0011051v) non-viable 
and to establish the effect on DNA. 
Organisms were exposed to each cleaning agent for 10 minutes, 60 minutes and 120 
minutes by wiping the ceramic tile with a single use cloth saturated with the agent for 
10 seconds.  Sampling was undertaken as described in method section 2.3.1 and 
2.3.2.7.  Viability was determined as described in methods section 2.1.2 and 2.3.2.6.  
DNA degradation was tested after extraction (see methods section 2.2.1.1) by real-time 
PCR as described in methods sections 2.2.5.1, 2.2.5.2 and 2.2.5.4. 
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2.5 SPACE SYNTAX  
2.5.1 GATE COUNTING 
Gates were defined as those thresholds across which individuals travel i.e. doorways 
with and without doors. People were watched as they moved across these gates with a 
single movement defined as one individual crossing the threshold of any gate as 
defined above. Movements through all gates in the SITU and MITU at the National 
Hospital were monitored for three days on a daily basis from 10:30 to 13:00 and from 
14:30 to 17:00. Individuals were assigned to one of several groups, namely staff local 
to the ward, other hospital staff, patients, and their visitors.  A “run-in” period of sham 
observation of three weeks was undertaken in order to minimise any bias which the 
observation process itself might trigger.   Gate counting was undertaken by a team of 
researchers to enable all gates to be observed. 
Microbiological samples were collected in parallel as described in methods section 
2.3.4.6.). 
2.5.2 SINK OBSERVATION 
The usage of 24 hand wash basins within the three different wards (cardiac intensive 
care unit (CICU), PIC and neonatal intensive care unit (NICU)) was monitored for three 
consecutive days, each day consisting of three 1.5 hour periods from eight in the 
morning until six in the evening, totalling 13.5 hours per sink. Sinks observed were all 
in the open ward environment and had identical fixtures and fittings (see Figure 2-3.).  
The observation data included the number of times each hand wash basin was used to 
undertake a hygienic hand wash, the length of time spent per hand washing event and 
bed space occupation. Observer fatigue was countered by the use of multiple 
observers with periodic observation cross checking to ensure consistency. Sink 
observation was undertaken by a team of researchers to enable all sinks to be 
observed. 
Microbiological samples were collected in parallel as described in methods section 
2.3.4.2). 
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Figure 2-3 Floor plans for CICU, NICU and PICU at GOSH with sink locations 
labelled and numbered in red. 
2.5.3 MOVEMENT STUDIES 
In order to determine whether user behaviour inside the PICU contributed to bacterial 
contamination and thus potential spread of infection, an observational study was 
performed in two bed spaces, henceforth referred to as BS6 and BS7.  Data was 
collected during three weekday days, 6 hours per day totalling 30 hours per bed space.  
The resulting data was coded in a spreadsheet as a string of contacts grouped by 
individual round of observations. Each round starts when the main nurse or another 
person (doctor, visitor, other medical specialist and non-medical staff) entered the bed 
space and concluded the moment they leave the bed space.  Each contact was 
recorded with a unique number.   
Eight contact categories were selected: washing hands, throwing waste in a bin, gloves 
on, gloves off, pick up an object from, leave an object onto, cleaning and other (general 
contacts). 21 objects were selected to record contacts: clinical waste bin, domestic 
waste bin, chair with arms, bed rails, bed, suspended shelf surface, mouse, chair, sink 
rim, sink bowl, trolley surface, small trolley surface, keyboard, gel dispenser, paper, 
panels, gloves, apron dispenser, soap dispenser, lamp, domestic waste bin. 
The observational study was done at the same time as testing for bacterial 
contamination via TVC (as described in methods section 2.3.2.1.) and was undertaken 
by Space Syntax Ltd.   
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2.5.4 VISIBILITY 
Plans of the three intensive care units (PICU, CICU, NICU) were analysed to quantify 
the visibility of each hand wash basin in terms of floor area i.e. the number of square 
meters of the floor area from which that hand wash basin was visible.(386)  Each bed 
space had a dedicated hand wash basin. The visibility score were calculated for three 
conditions: 
Visible area: Observer standing, when all curtains of bed spaces are drawn open. 
Limited visible area: Sitting, when all curtains of bed spaces are drawn open. 
Curtained area: When the curtained to the closest bed space to a specific sink is drawn 
closed. 
The visibility of the sink was then related to the sink usage data collected as described 
in methods section 2.6.2. 
2.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
With the exception of the analysis detailed in sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2., results were 
analysed using SPSS 16.0 and 22.0 for Windows as detailed in within each chapter. 
2.6.1 SPATIAL CONTAMINATION ANALYSIS 
In order to compare the different types of surfaces and furniture involved sampled in 
section 2.3.4.3., TVCs were analyzed using a Poisson mixed model with canonical log 
link function, quantifying association between bacterial counts and objects.  
Explanatory variables for models included: 'Object', 'Bedside' (including bed 
occupancy), and 'Ward'.  Diagnostic plots were examined to assess the quality of the 
model fit.  The 'Object' variable had eleven classes which were bed rails (reference 
class), floor, alcohol hand gel pump, bedside table, bed wheels, chair, clinical waste 
bin, storage trolley and unit top and shelf, top of computer.  For the variable 'Ward', the 
reference class was the MITU.   
Spatial analysis used to analyze the spatial variability of microorganisms in the air and 
on surfaces from samples taken as described in methods sections 2.3.4.3 and 2.3.4.5.  
Because numerous surface samples were taken at each location, mean TVCs were 
used.  The spatial distribution of microbiological results, both surface and air samples, 
were analyzed using Generalized Additive Models (GAM).(387)  This regressive 
approach was used to model the counts of microorganisms growing on TSA plates, 
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with a Poisson distribution model (using the log canonical link), adjusted on Ward 
(MITU and SITU), sample site situation (bedside or not), and Occupancy of the bed (if 
sample performed at a bedside).  The locations of each sample were referenced using 
Cartesian coordinates, which where modeled using thin plate splines.(388)  The model 
selection was based on analysis of covariance for nested models and UBRE-score.  
The conditions of use were checked using classical graphical means.   
The statistical analysis was performed using the software R 2.10.1 and the mgcv 
package developed by Simon Wood.(389)  Maps were performed using the geographic 
information system ArcGIS.  All p-values were compared to the classical α-threshold of 
0.05.   
2.6.2 SINK USE ANALYSIS 
To analyse observation data collected as described in section 2.5.2., standard linear 
regression analysis was used. Explanatory variables were ‘visibility’ and ‘occupation’ of 
the bed space and observed effect on sink usage and length of hand washing, in turn.  
The microbial data collected as described in section 2.3.4.2. had a three-level 
hierarchical structure as repeated measurements were taken at the beginning and at 
the end of the observation day (1st level) from seven different locations (2nd level) within 
eight sinks (3rd level). Therefore, data was analysed with multilevel regression using 
linear mixed effects model using ML and Bayesian estimation using Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations. The model accounts for the correlation within each 
cluster. In the model, random intercepts were included for each cluster and the model 
checks through diagnostic plots to look for violation of the model assumptions. The 
explanatory variables were defined as ‘usage’ of the sink and the ‘locations’ within the 
sink. The variable ‘location’ had three categories, where the categories were formed 
according to their risk of transmission of bacteria through contamination (i.e. sink 
bowls, back of sink - lips, faucet/gel-soap dispenser). In addition, to investigate whether 
the effect of wash basin usage differed between sink locations, the interaction between 
‘location’ and ‘usage’ was included in the analysis. The baseline category was defined 
as the bowl of the sink. All the explanatory variables were defined to have fixed effects.  
All the analysis was made through MLwiN version 2.20 which is a specialized software 
for fitting multilevel models.(390) 
2.6.3 
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HOSPITAL ADENOVIRUS MONITORING 
To analyse data collected as described in section 2.3.1.1 a standard linear regression 
analysis was used. Explanatory variables were ‘object’, ‘season’, ‘cleaning number’ and 
‘room’, in turn. 
In detail, the factors of interest are given as follows: 
`Object' which had twenty levels (sink, mattress, door handle, phone, TV, waste, 
window, bathroom, trolley, floor, bed, chair, sluice, macerator, fan, table, light, scales, 
CD player, computer).  `Room' included: ward areas (HSCUT and IIU), communal ward 
areas (HSCUT and IIU) and cubicles (eleven HSCTU cubicles, five IIU cubicles).  
‘Season' has four levels (winter, spring, summer and autumn) and `Cleaning' was the 
number of times a surface was cleaned and took values one to six. 
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) was used in combination with Analysis of Deviance 
to test whether each variable had an effect on the outcome.  All the analysis was made 
through MLwiN version 2.20 which is a specialized software for fitting multilevel 
models.(390) 
2.7 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
Interpretation of molecular typing results was informed where necessary by 
epidemiological information.  This was only utilised for isolates that had not been 
selected on the basis of suspected cross transmission.   
Isolates were determined to be potentially linked if patients had been present in the 
same location (ward) at the same time or within a two week period to allow for an 
environmental reservoir. 
2.8 BIOINFORMATIC ANALYSIS  
With the exception of the analysis detailed in sections 2.8.1, 2.8.2, 2.8.3 and 2.8.4 
sequencing data was analysed using the Lasergene Suite version 12.0.0. (DNAStar, 
Madison, USA). 
2.8.1 MISEQ ANALYSIS ONE 
The genomes produced from DNA extracts processed as described in section 2.2.8. 
were assembled by Piklu Bhattacharya at the ithree institute (University of Technology, 
Sydney, Australia) using the in-house bioinformatics genome assembly and analysis 
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pipeline.(391) Briefly, genomes were assembled using the A5-miseq pipeline, which can 
process reads up to 500 nucleotides (nt) long and constructs the de Bruijn graphs with 
k-mers up to 500nt.(392)  
Based on the initial phylogeny based on alignments of marker genes, the Klebsiella 
pneumoniae MGH78578 genome sequence was selected to draw a reference-based 
whole genome alignment of the Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates included in this study. 
MGH78578 is a completely-closed reference genome sequence freely available in the 
GenBank database (accession number CP000647). The phylogenetic analysis was 
carried out using an established reference-based whole genome alignment pipeline 
available at the bioinformatics facility of the ithree institute at the University of 
Technology, Sydney – Australia (Roy Chowdhury et al – manuscript in preparation). 
Reference-based consensus sequences of each isolate were combined into a multiple 
sequence alignment and alignment columns containing only unresolved nucleotides 
were removed, leaving only the differential site patterns. RaxML v7.2.6 was used 
subsequently to construct the Maximum Likelihood based phylogenetic tree.(393) The 
confidence in each clade of the Maximum Likelihood tree was estimated using 
RAxML's rapid bootstrap procedure with automatic extended majority-rule criterion (NN 
bootstraps) and the resulting tree and bootstrap confidence estimates were visualized 
using FigTree v1.4.0.(394) 
All analyses were performed without knowledge of the species determination, 
resistance phenotype or pulse field gel electrophoresis results.  
2.8.2 MISEQ ANALYSIS TWO 
Reads from the MiSeq run described in section 2.2.8.were aligned by Alex Rolfe 
against the Klebsiella pneumoniae MGH78578 genome sequence (Genbank accession 
number CP000647) using the Bowtie2 aligner (verson 2.1.0) in paired end mode with 
parameters “ --sensitive --minins 10 --maxins 1400” and a “--rg-id” parameter to store 
the sample name in the alignment output.  An average of ~224,000 reads were 
mapped per sample (median ~172,000, range 98,440 to 645,734 reads, with median 
64.87% aligned concordantly at least 1 time). Output files were then sorted and merged 
to generate a single BAM file with all aligned reads and then FreeBayes (version 
0.9.9.2-14) was used on that file to generate a VCF file of SNV (single nucleotide 
variants) calls.  SNV calls were filtered to include only those with 10 reads of coverage 
and at least 5 reads supporting the call.  If SNVs could be called in some samples then 
the other samples were included as “-” for missing data.  FASTA and PHYLIP files 
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were then generated using only genomic loci at which at least one sample showed a 
SNV.  The PHYLIP file was used as input to RaxML to generate the WGS phylogenetic 
trees with parameters “-T 16 -p $$ -f a -s ${project}.phylip -n ${project}.raxml-
gtrgamma.tree -m GTRGAMMA -x $$ -N autoMRE -k”.  Trees were generated both for 
the full set of samples and for a subset of more closely related samples (Klebsiella 
species and a Klebsiella pneumoniae tree).  Due to the input format, which contained 
only variant genomic loci, the tree distances do not measure a true distance (i.e., SNVs 
/ genome size) but rather a relative value (i.e. SNVs/number of variant loci).  Trees 
were optimized for display using the same optimal leaf ordering as was used for the 
HAI BioDetection trees. 
All analyses were performed without knowledge of the species determination, 
resistance phenotype or pulse field gel electrophoresis results.  
2.8.3 PHYLOSHIFT ANALYSIS OF MISEQ SEQUENCING DATA 
The genomes produced from DNA extracts processed as described in section 2.2.8. 
were assembled by Piklu Bhattacharya at the ithree institute (University of Technology, 
Sydney, Australia) using the in-house bioinformatics genome assembly and analysis 
pipeline.(391) Briefly, genomes were assembled using the A5-miseq pipeline, which can 
process reads up to 500 nucleotides (nt) long and constructs the de Bruijn graphs with 
k-mers up to 500nt.(392)  
A phylogenetic tree was constructed using PhyloSift.(395) PhyloSift works by identifying 
homologs of universally conserved 37 single copy elite markers (which accounts for 
approximately1% of any bacterial genome) from any given draft bacterial genome. For 
the purposes of this study, PhyloSift was used to create a concatenated multiple 
alignment of the marker genes from all draft Klebsiella species genomes and an 
Escherichia coli (55989) and a Vibrio cholerae (N16961) were included as outgroups. 
From this alignment, a phylogeny was inferred using FastTree2. The two outgroup 
isolates were removed from the final phylogenetic tree in order to display relationships 
among isolates at a higher resolution. Internal tree branches were annotated with the 
support value for each of the clades. 
All analyses were performed without knowledge of the species determination, 
resistance phenotype or pulse field gel electrophoresis results.  
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2.8.4 PATHOGENICA HAI BIODETECTION  
Sequencing data collected as described in section 2.2.9. were analyzed on the Ion 
Torrent server (Life Technologies, Paisley, UK) using the Pathogenica Ion PGM 
Sequencer analysis plug-in of Pathogenica's HAI BioDetection software v1.2 
(Pathogenica, Boston, USA).   This software used 103 to 106 sequencing reads to 
determine the genomic sequence of all of the loci targeted by the assay for each 
organism present in the sample. RAxML was used to generate a phylogenetic tree for 
the samples.(393). A shell-scripting interface to the software (rather than the Ion Torrent 
Server interface) was used to create the tree, whereby the probe weight and partition 
values were identical to those present in software v1.2. After tree construction, each 
tree's leaves were ordered using an optimal leaf ordering algorithm to make clusters 
easier to identify by eye.(396)  
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Chapter 3 DETECTION OF MICROORGANISMS WITHIN THE 
CLINICAL ENVIRONMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Historically, environmental contamination by pathogenic microorganisms was believed 
to have a negligible impact on the rate of nosocomial infections and that the evidence 
base for environmental surveillance was negligible.(182, 328, 397) Inanimate surfaces within 
the clinical environment are considered non-critical as the item only comes into contact 
with intact skin, and intact skin is considered a barrier to disease transmission.  It was 
therefore determined that non-critical items or contact with them carried little risk of 
transmitting pathogens to patients.(177, 362) This view is now challenged with increasing 
evidence that the environment acts as an intermediary reservoir for pathogens causing 
healthcare associated infection (HCAI).(183, 184) 
Microorganisms that cause HCAI must have the capacity to both contaminate the 
environment and survive within it.(300, 341)  Organisms enter this environmental niche by 
being released as droplets through respiratory secretions or diarrhoea and vomiting, 
via dust, or deposition of skin scales.(341)  If pathogenic organisms can survive within a 
niche and survive beyond the stay of one patient, they have the potential to pose a risk 
to subsequent patients.(341)  In order to cause HCAI, there must be direct or indirect 
transmission from this niche to a susceptible host. To prove that the environment was 
the source of HCAI is difficult. Proving that the organism originated from the 
environment requires molecular tagging, distinct antibiograms or whole genome 
sequencing. Therefore demonstration of an impact on HCAI by affecting a niche is 
used as an indirect measure of an environmental source.(300)  
The aim of cleaning within healthcare environments is accordingly to reduce levels of 
microorganisms so that they do not pose a cross-transmission risk to patients.  The 
only official UK Department of Health guideline in this area is the assessment of 
environmental cleanliness through visual inspection and regular disinfection of high 
contact surfaces.(398)  However one study has demonstrated that even when 82% of 
ward sites were visually clean, only 30% of sites were considered clean by 
microbiological sampling.(399)  Visual inspection was therefore shown not  to a reliable 
assessment of environmental cleanliness.(341)  As a result it has been proposed that 
hospitals should monitor the level of microbial contamination within the environment, 
either through total viable counts/aerobic colony counts or the presence of indicator 
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organisms such as methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA).(191) Griffith et 
al. (2003) have suggested that a surface should be considered to have failed cleaning 
and thus be a risk to patients if the number of colony forming units (CFU) detected is in 
excess of 2.5CFU/cm2 on an agar contact plate (60CFU/plate).(400)  However Dancer 
(2004) proposed a higher cut-off limit of 5CFU/cm2 (120CFU/plate) with failures leading 
to bed space closures and repeat cleaning.(191)  These recommendations do not 
however currently extend to encompass viruses. 
There is a requirement to develop testing methods that can be applied to the clinical 
setting in order to determine if there are pathogenic organisms within the clinical 
environment.  If organisms are present, we aim to evaluate how the proposed 
‘standards’ relate to contamination and if results can be interpreted in order to 
determine risk to patients. 
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3.2 CHAPTER AIMS 
The aim of this chapter was to develop methods for sampling the clinical environment 
for both bacteria and viruses and to then apply these methods to both adult and 
paediatric units to determine the presence of environmental contamination.  Methods 
were also established for inoculation of surfaces that could then be utilised in further 
decontamination and survival studies.  The specific aims are listed below: 
1. To develop an environmental sampling methodology that could be applied to 
clinical settings by testing available sampling techniques and commonly used 
sites. 
2. To develop a model for undertaking inoculation and survival/decontamination 
studies in order to evaluate the capacity of pathogens to survive in 
environmental niches.  
3. Application of the developed sampling methodology to clinical settings to 
determine the levels of environmental contamination present within those 
environments. 
4. To use levels of environmental contamination to draw conclusions about 
cleanliness and risk of HCAI. 
 
122 
 
Chapter 3 Detection of Microorganisms within the Clinical Environment 
3.3 RESULTS  
3.3.1 VALIDATION OF INOCULATION EXPERIMENT METHODOLOGY (SWAB 
SAMPLING) 
In order to establish the sensitivity of swabbing as a recovery technique and to 
establish a method of testing decontamination techniques, seven organisms were 
tested for recovery by cotton tipped swab from ceramic tiles (see method sections 2.4.1 
and 2.4.).  Inoculation experiments were undertaken using sterile water for the 
suspension. This demonstrated a 1 – 2 log10 loss between the inoculum and recovered 
counts with recovery rates of between 89% – 92% (see Table 3-1).  Phosphate 
buffered saline (PBS) and 0.3% bovine serum albumin (BSA) were also tested; as 
organisms within the clinical environment are often associated with proteinaceous 
material.  Under these test conditions, loss of viability appeared to be minimal (see 
Table 3-1).  Despite the increased recovery seen under proteinaceous conditions, 
decontamination testing was undertaken using suspensions made in sterile water as 
this reagent would not interfere with the decontamination approaches being studied 
(see Chapter 5). 
Organism Condition Sterile Water 
CFU/ml 
Sterile 1 * 
PBS 
CFU/ml 
Sterile 
0.3% BSA 
CFU/ml 
Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa 
NTCC 12903 
Inocula 1.09 * 1011 2.00 * 1009 3.5 * 1008 
Recovered  6.6 * 109 1.53 * 1009 2.13 * 1008 
% Recovery 88.97 98.75 97.48 
Acinetobacter 
baumannii 
(clinical strain) 
Inocula 1.4 * 1011 4.00 * 1009 4.00 * 1009 
Recovered  9.8 * 109 6.68 * 1009 3.38 * 1009 
% Recovery 89.64 102 99.24 
Enterococcus 
faecalis 
ATCC 29212 
Inocula 1.19 * 1011 2.50 * 1009 5.25 * 1008 
Recovered  1.82 * 1010 1.60 * 1009 3.38 * 1008 
% Recovery 92.64 97.94 97.81 
MRSA 
(clinical strain) 
Inocula 2.00 * 1011 4.10 * 1009 1.09 * 1011 
Recovered  2.00 * 1010 1.20 * 1009 2.82 * 1010 
% Recovery 91.2 94.45 94.68 
Escherichia coli 
(clinical strain) 
Inocula 1.5 * 1011 3.60 * 1008 5.00 * 1008 
Recovered  1.98 * 1010 3.78 * 1008 2.88 * 1008 
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% Recovery 92.13 100 97.25 
Klebsiella 
pneumonia 
(NCTC 13368)  
Inocula 1.5 * 1011 8.90 * 1009 1.00 * 1009 
Recovered  5.40 * 1009 2.32 * 1009 2.56 * 1008 
% Recovery 87.08 94.13 93.42 
Staphylococcus 
aureus 
(NCTC 6571) 
Inocula 6.0*109 1.30 * 1009 4.90 * 1010 
Recovered  3.5*108 3.35 * 1008 1.23 * 1010 
% Recovery 87.38 93.54 94.38 
Table 3-1 Recovery of bacterial species after drying, inoculated onto ceramic 
tiles and recovered using cotton tipped swabs.  Inoculums suspended in sterile 
water, phosphate buffered saline or bovine serum albumin. CFU = colony 
forming units. 
3.3.2 ESTIMATING SURVIVAL OF BACTERIA AND VIRUSES WITHIN THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
To establish a better understanding of how three organisms linked to HCAI would 
behave in the longer term under experimental conditions, a survival experiment was 
undertaken as described in the methods section 2.4.1.  Organisms were inoculated 
onto ceramic tiles and organism recovery was tested at 24 hours, 48 hours, 72 hours 
and at one week, two weeks, three weeks, four weeks and twelve weeks.  
Staphylococcus aureus, Klebsiella pneumoniae and adenovirus all demonstrated 
viability even after twelve weeks in dry conditions (see Table 3-2). 
Staphylococcus aureus  (NCTC 6571) 
Sampling 
Time 
Control 
CFU/ml 
Test CFU/ml 
Log10 
Control 
Log10 
Test 
Log10 
Reduction 
24 hrs 1.87*1009 7.75E+05 9.27 5.89 3.38 
48 hrs 1.87*1009 3.31E+04 9.27 4.52 4.75 
72 hrs 1.87*1009 2.52E+04 9.27 4.40 4.87 
week 1 1.87*1009 1.06E+03 9.27 3.03 6.25 
week 2 1.87*1009 7.43E+03 9.27 3.87 5.40 
week 3 1.87*1009 5.44E+03 9.27 3.74 5.54 
week 4 1.87*1009 8.20E+03 9.27 3.91 5.36 
week 12 1.87*1009 1.37E+02 9.27 2.14 7.14 
Klebsiella pneumoniae (NCTC 13368) 
Sampling 
Time 
Control 
CFU/ml 
Test CFU/ml 
Log10 
Control 
Log10 
Test 
Log10 
Reduction 
24 hrs 1.05*1009 8.06*1004 9.02 4.91 4.11 
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48 hrs 1.05*1009 2.83*1004 9.02 4.45 4.57 
72 hrs 1.05*1009 9.00*1003 9.02 3.95 5.07 
week 1 1.05*1009 1.06*1003 9.02 3.03 5.99 
week 2 1.05*1009 7.75*1002 9.02 2.89 6.13 
week 3 1.05*1009 8.75*1002 9.02 2.94 6.08 
week 4 1.05*1009 3.69*1002 9.02 2.57 6.45 
week 12 1.05*1009 2.00*1001 9.02 1.30 7.72 
Adenovirus C2 (NCTC 0108051v) 
Sampling 
Time 
Control Test 
24 hrs Positive Positive 
48 hrs Positive Positive 
72 hrs Positive Positive 
week 1 Positive Positive 
week 2 Positive Positive 
week 3 Positive Positive 
week 4 Positive 
Positive  
(3/4 replicates required 
passaging) 
week 12 Positive 
Positive 
 (4/4 replicates required 
passaging) 
Table 3-2 Recovery of Klebsiella pneumoniae, Staphylococcus aureus and 
adenovirus over a three month period inoculated onto ceramic tiles and 
recovered using cotton tipped swabs.  Four replicants were inoculated for each 
species for each time point, for adenovirus after week three some of the 
replicants required additional passaging in VERO cells to permit detection. CFU 
= colony forming units. 
3.3.3 SAMPLING METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
The surfaces selected for sampling at the adult units within the National Hospital of 
Neurology and Neurosurgery (NHNN) during the three month pilot phase of this study 
offered an opportunity for comparison between the common ward areas within the units 
studied (e.g. nurses’ station) as well as between bed spaces and ward types surgical 
intensive care unit (SITU) and medical intensive care unit (MITU). Sampling in all areas 
was carried out in a systematic way in order to allow comparison between surfaces and 
locations.  Surface types within the clinical environment were also considered and 
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included materials such as varnished wood, linoleum flooring, stainless steel, and 
textured plastics. 
In the following sections a number of sampling techniques and culture conditions are 
described.  These were trialled to develop a sampling methodology that would form the 
basis of the rest of this project (see sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.5.).  
In studies undertaken at Great Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH), the surfaces selected 
were those that have been shown to be linked to contamination within the environment, 
and sites that have been linked to outbreaks at GOSH, such as sinks. 
3.3.4 AIR SAMPLING 
228 total viable count air samples were taken (see methods section 2.3.2.1.), 40 of 
which were taken using both tryptone soya agar (TSA) and Sabouraud agar (SAB) 
plates in parallel in order to determine which gave the most comprehensive result.  The 
SAB plates provided greater consistency of low level fungal isolate detection but the 
units were not high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtered and so this was considered 
to be of lesser importance.  TSA plates were selected as the agar of choice for the 
remaining sampling as they consistently provided higher bacterial counts than the SAB 
plates.  Analysis of these results is presented in Table 3-3. 
3.3.5 SURFACE SAMPLING FOR SPECIFIC ORGANISM DETECTION 
During the pilot phase of this research, both swab sampling and contact plate methods 
were evaluated for detection of specific organisms.  
3.3.5.1 COMPARISON BETWEEN SWAB SAMPLING AND CONTACT PLATE 
METHODS FOR SPECIFIC ORGANISM DETECTION  
Having established the optimal method for swab sampling during development of 
inoculation experiment methodology (section 3.3.1.), a comparison was made between 
swab sampling and contact plates at two hospitals: NHNN (adult hospital) and GOSH 
(paediatric hospital). 
National Hospital of Neurology and Neurosurgery 
Over a three month period, 1020 samples were taken from 127 sites using contact 
plates, direct plating and enrichment sampling as per methods section 2.3.4.3.   
Over a three month period, 381 samples were collected from 127 sites for detection of 
MRSA.  Three of these samples (0.8%) were positive, all detected via enrichment 
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sampling only.  The positive sites included the storage unit top and bed wheels within 
an isolation bed space and the apron dispenser in the neighbouring empty bed space 
post clean.  
Sampling for Acinetobacter species (spp.) involved taking 258 samples from 86 
sampling sites using contact plates, direct plating and enrichment sampling as per 
methods section 2.3.2.  All were Acinetobacter spp. negative by all sampling 
techniques. 
Further sampling was undertaken for Clostridium difficile using contact plates, direct 
plating and enrichment sampling as per method section 2.3.2.  Over a three month 
period 381 samples were collected from 127 sites all of which were negative by all 
sampling techniques. 
Great Ormond Street Hospital 
A one off sampling validation was undertaken where infection control information could 
be accessed to determine patient status; this was not the case at NHNN. This targeted 
sampling session involved taking samples from 20 sites on the Immunology and 
Infectious Disease unit (IIU) for MRSA in a cubicle prior to cleaning that had been used 
for MRSA isolation (see methods section 2.3.2.).  Of the 60 samples taken, all the 
selective agar contact plates were negative for MRSA.  One sample was positive on 
direct plating (5%), the window sill.  Two swabs (10%) were positive using enrichment 
for MRSA, the windowsill and the room heater. 
3.3.6 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPATIAL LAYOUT AND BACTERIAL 
CONTAMINATION  
For estimating bacterial contamination (not specific organisms), TVCs were determined 
as described in methods section 2.3.2.1.  Sampling was carried out over an initial three 
month period with each month referred to as a sampling period i.e. 1, 2 or 3.  A total of 
228 air samples and 426 surface samples were taken using non selective contact 
plates in both SITU and MITU in order to test the hypothesis that organisms could be 
cultured from the clinical environment (see Figure 3-4.). Samples were taken from a 
range of surfaces including bed frames, trolleys and bed wheels as described in 
methods section 2.3.4.3.  Surfaces were categorised as level 0 (<0.6m in height), level 
1 (0.6m-1.2m) or level 3 (>1.2m).  In addition, surfaces were categorised as to whether 
they were high touch or not using previous studies in the literature.(174, 191)   
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TVCs were averaged between all sampling sessions and assigned arbitrary colours 
based on number of colonies recovered, see Figure 3-1, Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3.  
Green areas had a mean of less than 50CFUs.  Yellow areas had a mean of 50 -100 
CFUs.  Pink areas had a mean of between 101 and 200 CFUs.  Finally red areas had 
over 200 CFUs.   
 
Figure 3-1 Mean number of CFUs detected at level 0 in bed spaces and SITU and 
MITU ward areas over a 3 month period on sampling sites under 0.6m (green 
areas <50 CFUs, yellow areas 50 -100 CFUs. pink areas 101 and 200 CFUs, red 
areas over 200 CFUs).   
 
Figure 3-2 Mean number of CFUs detected at level 1 in bed spaces and SITU and 
MITU ward areas over a three month period on sampling sites 0.6m-1.2m high 
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(green areas <50 CFUs, yellow areas 50 -100 CFUs. pink areas 101 and 200 CFUs, 
red areas over 200 CFUs).   
 
Figure 3-3 Mean number of CFUs detected at level 2 in bed spaces and SITU and 
MITU ward areas over a three month period on sampling sites >1.2m high (green 
areas <50 CFUs, yellow areas 50 -100 CFUs. pink areas 101 and 200 CFUs, red 
areas over 200 CFUs). 
 
Figure 3-4 Mean number of CFUs detected at by air sampling in bed spaces and 
SITU and MITU ward areas over a three month period.  Coloured areas represent 
the proportion of area within the location sampled by the air sampler (green 
areas <50 CFUs, yellow areas 50 -100 CFUs. pink areas 101 and 200 CFUs, red 
areas over 200 CFUs).   
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These data showed that the main determinants of microbial density were height, with 
mid-levels surfaces associated with touch often being less contaminated (see Table 
3-3.). Air contamination did not appear to always correlate with levels of surface 
contamination.  Contamination levels did not appear to be linked to specific bed spaces 
for surface sampling but may be for air sampling.   
To test this theory, the data was analysed using Generalized Additive Models (GAM) to 
determine the spatial variability of microorganisms in the air and on surfaces and so 
assess the link between contamination, height, bed spaces/shared ward and 
occupation, see Figure 3-5.(387) Because numerous surface samples were taken at 
each location, mean CFUs were used. The locations of each sample were referenced 
using Cartesian coordinates, which were modelled using thin plate splines (see 
methods section 2.7.1).  
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Unit Height level 
Sampling Period 
1 
Sampling Period 
2 
Sampling Period 
3 
Median No. Samples 
CFU 
Range Median 
No. 
Samples CFU Range Median No. Samples CFU Range 
SITU Level 0 <0.6m 182 15 40-350 107 16 17-350 350 16 18-350 
 Level 1 0.6m-1.2m 71.2 33 2-269 34.8 36 1.5-350 64.5 36 3-350 
 Level 2 >1.2m 79.2 13 5-350 29.5 15 2.5-197 14.5 15 1-350 
 Air  98.5 12 60-167 60 11 27-158 164 11 39-419 
MITU Level 0 <0.6m 150.3 7 6-623 350 9 2-350 205 9 4-350 
 Level 1 0.6m-1.2m 34.4 24 238.3 28.7 25 2-126 55.4 25 9.7-350 
 Level 2 >1.2m 200 5 27-350 27 5 6-350 350 5 22-350 
 Air  103 7 99-217 88 7 50-167 182 7 51-213 
Table 3-3 Median and range of CFUs per 0.24m² plates (55cm diameter) detected at levels 0, 1 and 2  and during air sampling in bed 
spaces and within shared ward areas in SITU and MITU over a three month sampling period (periods 1, 2 and 3). 
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Figure 3-5 Modelling estimation of microorganism CFUs over a three month 
sampling period within the MITU and SITU at the NHNN.  Results were adjusted 
on bedside, bed occupancy, level (for surface analysis), Ward and location.  CFU 
estimations for the three sampling periods at different height levels and within 
air samples were included for each location.  The coloured scale equates colours 
with CFU values.   
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Sampling Period 
(% explained 
deviance - n§) 
Co-factors Incidence Ratio 
(IR) [CI95%] 
p-value 
Period 1 
(81.5% - n=19) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 - 
  Non occupied 
Bedside 
0.74[0.58;0.93] 0.007** 
  Occupied Bedside 1.11[0.91;1.35] 0.26 
 Ward MITU* 1 - 
  SITU 0.33[0.2;0.57] <0.001** 
Period 2 
(85.7% - n=19) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 - 
  Non occupied 
Bedside 
0.71 [0.52;0.97] 0.02** 
  Occupied Bedside 0.6[0.47;0.76] <0.001** 
 Ward MITU* 1 - 
  SITU 14.34 [8.08;25.44] <0.001** 
Period 3 
(49.6% - n=19) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 - 
  Non occupied 
Bedside 
1.92 [1.54;2.39] <0.001** 
  Occupied Bedside 1.96 [1.66; 2.31] <0.001** 
 Ward MITU* 1 - 
  SITU 0.07 [0.04;0.11] <0.001** 
Table 3-4 Spatial analysis of air samples from MITU and SITU using a 
Generalized Additive Mix Model. 
Risk factors were assessed each day by using Generalized Additive Mix Model, 
adjusted on Bedside (occupied or not), Ward and Location. 
§ n: number of locations 
*reference class 
**p<0.05 
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Sampling Period 
(% explained 
deviance - n§)  
Co-factors Incidence Ratio 
(IR)  [CI95%] 
p-value 
Period 1 
(38% - n=49) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 - 
  Non occupied 
Bedside 
0.78 [0.67;0.89] 0.0002** 
  Occupied Bedside 1.72 [1.54;1.91] <0.001** 
 Ward MITU* 1 - 
  SITU 0.77[0.59;1[ 0.05** 
 Height Level 0 <0.6m 1 - 
  Level 1 [0.6-1.2m] 0.39 [0.37;0.42] <0.001** 
  Level3 >1.2m 0.59 [0.56;0.64] <0.001** 
Period 2 
(56% - n=57) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 - 
  Non occupied 
Bedside 
6.96 [5.54;8.73] <0.001** 
  Occupied Bedside 3.14 [2.84;3.48] <0.001** 
 Ward MITU* 1 - 
  SITU 0.18 [0.13;0.24] <0.001** 
 Height Level 0 <0.6m * 1 - 
  Level 1 [0.6-1.2m] 0.39 [0.37;0.42] <0.001** 
  Level3 >1.2m 0.31 [0.29;0.33] <0.001** 
Period 3 
(27% - n=57) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 - 
  Non occupied 
Bedside 
2.24 [2.04;2.46] <0.001** 
  Occupied Bedside 1.5 [1.39;1.61] <0.001** 
 Ward MITU* 1 - 
  SITU 0.09 [0.07;0.12] <0.001** 
 Height Level 0 <0.6m * 1 - 
  Level 1 [0.6-1.2m] 0.47 [0.44;0.49] <0.001** 
  Level3 >1.2m 0.6 [0.57;0.64] <0.001** 
Table 3-5 Spatial analysis of surface samples from MITU and SITU using a 
Generalized Additive Mix Model. 
Risk factors were assessed each day by using Generalized Additive Mix Model, 
adjusted on Bedside (occupied or not), Ward, height and Location. § n: number of 
locations, *reference class, **p<0.05 
 
Roughly 120 samples were collected during each sampling period in order to obtain 
TVCs.  Results for surface and air samples showed large differences, with the second 
sampling period demonstrating the lowest levels of contamination for both MITU and 
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SITU. Both air and surface contamination levels varied, but globally, MITU showed 
higher contamination levels than SITU, see Table 3-4.  Within MITU the lowest height 
level (<0.6m) was the most contaminated for sampling period 2 (median TVC 350), but 
samples taken above 1.2m were the most contaminated for sampling periods 1 and 3 
(median TVCs 200 and 320 respectively). Mid-level surfaces sampled (between 0.6 
and 1.2m), mostly representing high touch surfaces, demonstrated the lowest levels of 
contamination during all three sampling periods on MITU (median TVC resp. 34.4, 
28.7, 55.4). Within the SITU the lowest height level (<0.6m) was the most 
contaminated for sampling periods 1, 2 and 3 (median TVCs were 182, 107 and 350), 
but the height level with lowest contamination varied between mid and high level 
samples depending on sampling period.  
Contamination varied within occupied/unoccupied bed spaces and the shared ward 
area both within and across sampling periods, see Table 3-5.  During sampling periods 
1 and 2, there were four and five beds occupied respectively for MITU and SITU.  
During sampling period 3, three and six beds occupied respectively for MITU and SITU.    
Bed spaces whether occupied or not were consistently more contaminated than the 
shared ward area for surface samples.  For air samples unoccupied bed spaces were 
less contaminated during sampling period 1 and both occupied and unoccupied bed 
spaces were less contaminated than the shared ward area by air sampling during 
sampling period 2.   Unoccupied bed spaces were more contaminated by surface 
sampling than occupied bed spaces for sampling periods 2 and 3, but not during 
sampling period 1. 
Cofactors Incidence Ratio 
(IR)  [CI95%] 
p-value 
Surface 
types Bed rails* 1 - 
 Floor 1.18 [0.76;1.83] 0.46 
 Alcohol hand gel pump 0.27 [0.1;0.79] 0.02** 
 Bed side table 0.087 [0.01;0.74] 0.03** 
 Bed wheels 1.97 [1.21;3.21] 0.01** 
 Chair (seat) 0.45 [0.09;2.24] 0.32 
 Clinical waste bin 0.61 [0.29;1.28] 0.19 
 Storage trolley 0.41 [0.18;0.91] 0.03** 
 Storage unit - shelf 0.62 [0.21;1.84] 0.39 
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 Storage unit - top 0.48 [0.25;0.89] 0.02** 
 Top of computer 1.06 [0.61;1.84] 0.83 
Ward MITU* 1 - 
 SITU 0.89 [0.64;1.24] 0.49 
Table 3-6 Analysis of the association between bacterial counts and object type 
for the different surfaces sampled at the NHNN.  
 
The adjusted incidence ratios (IR) are presented with their 95% confidence intervals. 
*reference class 
**p<0.05 
 
In order to compare the different types of surfaces and furniture involved in HCAI, 
TVCs were analyzed using a Poisson mixed model with the canonical log link function, 
quantifying association between bacterial counts and objects (see methods section 
2.7.1.. Results showed that bedside tables (p=0.03), storage trolleys (p=0.03), alcohol 
hand gel pumps (p=0.02), and top of the storage unit - top (p=0.02) were significantly 
less contaminated when compared to bed rails, see Table 3-6. Bed wheels were 
significantly more contaminated than the bed rails (p=0.01).  There was no significant 
difference between porous and non-porous surface types. 
3.3.7 LONG TERM SAMPLING (PAEDIATRIC INTENSIVE CARE UNIT BACTERIAL 
SAMPLING) 
Sampling at the NHNN during the pilot study occurred once a month over a three 
month period.  Due to the size of the units studied it was not possible to sample all bed 
spaces equally on every occasion.  In order to study bed spaces in greater depth and 
explore the difference between an adult intensive care unit (ITU) and a paediatric ITU, 
sampling was undertaken in two bed spaces within the paediatric intensive care unit 
(PICU) at GOSH, referred to as Bed Space 6 (BS6) and Bed Space 7 (BS7) as well as 
the shared ward area.  Sampling occurred weekly over a five month period as 
described in methods section 2.3.4.1.   
Table 3-7. illustrates the wide range of TVCs throughout the given time period by 
surface. Among the most contaminated objects in both bed spaces were the sinks 
(bowls and rims), the floor under the sinks and the chairs arms. Overall, BS7 had less 
contamination than BS6.  There was considerable variation in terms of TVC on all 
objects except the lamp which had a range of only 0 – 9 for BS6 and 0 – 30 for BS7. 
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Site sampled 
 BS6 
n = 20 
BS7 
n = 20 
Sink bowl 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
128 
64.5 (0 – 596) 
93 
75 (0 – 320) 
Floor under sink 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
121 
112 (4 – 268) 
111 
104 (0 – 296) 
Chair arms 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
114 
90 (0 – 388) 
61 
42.5 (0 – 210) 
Sink rim 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
64 
50 (0 – 284) 
76 
76 (0 – 228) 
Keyboard 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
64 
33 (0 – 445) 
25 
12.5 (0 – 98) 
Clinical waste bin 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
46 
31 (0 – 117) 
46 
24.5 (0 – 228) 
Soap dispenser 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
39 
9.5 (0 – 322) 
25 
5.5 (0 – 222) 
Computer mouse 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
30 
12 (0 – 168) 
28 
12 (0 – 138) 
Bed rails 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
16 
2 (0 – 112) 
29 
4.5 (0 – 244) 
Suspended shelf 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
16 
0 (0 – 184) 
6 
0 (0 – 121) 
Lamp 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
14 
3.5 (0 – 9) 
3 
0 (0 – 30) 
Trolley surface 
Mean 
Median (Range) 
13 
0 (0 – 160) 
7 
0 (0 – 110) 
Table 3-7 Mean, median and range of TVCs on objects within bed space 6 and 
bed space 7 on PICU over the five month study period. 
Bed spaces within the PICU at GOSH do not have high level objects; this was seen as 
a significant difference between the ITU bed spaces in NHNN and GOSH.  This meant 
that it was not possible to do a spatial analysis similar to that done for the NHNN data 
as almost all sampling points were located within the medium height level. 
It was decided instead to cluster the data into areas within the immediate bed area 
(bed rails, lamp, and suspended shelf), the wider bed space (chair arms, keyboard, 
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clinical waste bin, computer mouse, and trolley surface) and the sink area (sink bowl, 
sink rim, soap dispenser) with and without the floor. 
Bed Space Zone Mean TVC 
Median 
TVC 
TVC 
Range 
6 
Near bed 
(n = 60) 
15 1 0 – 184 
6 
Bed space 
(n = 100) 
53 23 0 – 445 
6 
Sink area (with floor) 
(n = 80) 
88 50 0 – 596 
6 
Sink area (without floor) 
(n = 60) 
77 43 0 – 596 
7 
Near bed 
(n = 60) 
13 0 0 – 244 
7 
Bed space 
(n = 100) 
33 15 0 – 228 
7 
Sink area (with floor) 
(n = 80) 
76 66 0 – 320 
7 
Sink area (without floor) 
(n = 60) 
64 43 0 - 320 
Table 3-8 Mean, median and range of CFUs on objects within bed space 6 and  
bed space seven on PICU clustered into those objects within the sink area (sink 
bowl, sink rim, soap dispenser) with and without the floor,  bed space area (chair 
arms, keyboard, clinical waste bin, computer mouse, and trolley surface) and the 
near bed space area (bed rails, lamp, and suspended shelf) over the five month 
study period. 
When bed spaces were split into zones it became clear that within both bed spaces the 
sink area was the most contaminated, even excluding the floor near the sink, see Table 
3-8.  Within BS6 when zones were analysed using a t-test there was no significance 
difference between the sink zone with and without floor, but the sink zone (including 
floor) was significantly more contaminated than both the bed space and the near bed 
space (p=0.03 and p=0.00003) respectively.  If samples for the floor by the sink were 
removed the sink zone itself was still significantly more contaminated than the near bed 
space (p=0.002).  For BS7 there was a significant difference in the level of 
contamination between the sink zone and the sink zone excluding the floor (p=0.003).  
The sink zone excluding floor was significantly more contaminated than both the bed 
space and the near bed space (p=3*10-5 and p=1.4*10-9)        In BS6 the median TVC 
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was 43 compared to 1 for the near patient area, and in BS7 the median for the sink 
zone was 43 with a median of 0 for the near patient zone.  The ranges were still 
broadly even when surfaces were grouped with this zoning approach with the near bed 
zone for BS6 equalling 0 – 184 and for BS7 equalling 0 – 244.  This indicates that 
although the near bed zone was generally less contaminated there were still sampling 
periods when contamination is high. 
3.3.8 THE USE OF TOTAL VIABLE COUNTS TO EVALUATE CONTAMINATION 
LEVELS 
Two standards have been suggested in order to use TVCs to monitor contamination 
levels within the clinical environment.  Griffith et al. (2009) have suggested a cut off of 
2.5CFU/cm2 on an agar contact plate (60CFU/plate).(400)   Whereas Dancer (2004) has 
proposed a higher cut-off limit of 5CFU/cm2 (120 CFU/plate), To evaluate the use of 
these suggested standards, TVCs from two bed spaces and the shared ward area 
were sampled (n = 720) on PICU and analysed using the proposed cut offs.   
Throughout the PICU bed space sampling period only one bed space on one sampling 
occasion (BS7 period 2) had no TVCs over 59.  Only on seven occasions out of 40 
would either bed space have passed the Dancer criteria (BS6 periods 3, 4, 13, 18 and 
BS 7 3, 13, 15).  For BS6 sampling period 9 demonstrated the highest levels of 
contamination with 8/12 sites failing using the Griffith standard, see Table 3-9.  BS7 
had three sampling periods where 6/12 sampling sites failed by the Griffith standard (9, 
18, 20).  In the shared ward area sampling, six sampling periods had contamination 
levels where 6/12 sampling sites failed by the Griffith standard (4, 5, 6, 9, 15, 17).  All 
sites that failed by the Dancer criteria also failed by the Griffith criteria. 
Within BS6, the floor under the sink and sink bowl had mean CFUs which failed the 
Dancer criteria.  The chair arms, sink rim and keyboard had mean CFUs that failed the 
Griffith criteria.  For BS7, all objects passed on mean CFUs according to the Dancer 
criteria. The floor under the sink, chair arms, sink bowl and sink rim all failed according 
to the Griffith criteria.  Four objects within the shared ward area had means that would 
fail the Griffith criteria: the floor by BS7 and 10, medication board and the exit door 
panel, see Table 3-10.   
Of the sites sampled within the shared ward area, 20 sites failed across the sampling 
period by the Dancer criteria, with an additional 30 failing by the Griffith criteria, see 
Table 3-11.  BS6 had 29 sites that failed by the Dancer criteria with an additional 12 
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sites failing by the Griffith criteria and during the sampling of BS7, 23 sites failed by the 
Dancer criteria with an additional 21 sites failing by the Griffith criteria.   
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BS 6 Site sampled 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Average 
1.Floor under sink 59 46 4 5 240 36 216 180 176 83 174 148 112 100 112 268 150 111 132 68 121 
2. Clinical waste bin 11 116 57 64 69 100 23 2 96 24 4 0 17 62 117 18 33 29 11 64 46 
3. Chair with arms 120 64 92 26 92 76 128 88 388 240 37 111 23 268 0 106 300 15 47 55 114 
4. Bed rails 1 90 0 0 8 8 19 30 3 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 112 23 16 
5. Suspended shelf  0 0 0 0 9 184 0 0 0 1 28 0 0 42 2 2 0 51 0 4 16 
6. Mouse 22 11 4 0 28 112 13 6 168 4 99 0 6 33 30 13 2 37 2 3 30 
7. Sink rim 55 35 72 106 47 1 60 53 86 45 134 16 26 46 66 0 31 3 130 284 65 
8. Sink bowl 55 176 33 43 248 20 0 74 75 286 176 92 12 50 31 108 47 2 596 436 128 
9. Trolley surface 0 0 0 0 34 160 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 0 0 13 
10. Keyboard 53 1 6 11 27 5 92 13 445 40 106 0 98 56 126 84 106 5 10 3 64 
11. Lamp 13 4 4 0 15 74 11 3 0 0 1 0 0 22 0 12 14 96 0 2 14 
12. Soap dispenser 0 4 6 20 208 49 10 5 67 0 322 0 0 19 9 5 24 21 15 4 39 
Average 32 46 23 23 85 69 48 38 125 60 93 31 25 58 41 51 59 37 88 79 56 
No. of sites in BS that 
failed 60cfu standard 0 3 2 2 5 4 2 2 4 1 2 2 2 1 3 3 2 3 1 2 41 
No. of sites in BS that 
failed 120cfu standard 1 1 0 0 3 2 2 1 4 2 4 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 2 29 
Table 3-9 TVCs of colonies cultured using contact plates from the surfaces of BS6 over a 5 month period (20 sampling periods).  
Bed space failures are listed across the sampling period number with failures by the Dancer standard coloured red, and failure 
by the Griffith standard coloured orange, all other results for bed spaces are coloured green.  The number of sampling sites 
within each sampling period that failed are listed and coloured orange if the TVC failed by the Dancer standard and red if the 
TVC failed by the Griffith standard.  Individual sampling sites are coloured white if they are <60CFU, blue if TVC is between 60 
and 119 and pink if >119CFU.   
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BS 7 Sites sampled 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Average 
1.Floor under sink 296 59 55 121 130 0 102 180 65 74 100 240 112 136 116 132 47 91 106 66 111 
2. Clinical waste bin 10 9 24 41 27 228 55 2 88 0 3 0 17 92 25 7 123 65 92 3 46 
3. Chair with arms 65 34 42 43 106 37 21 88 39 0 210 28 23 45 24 30 54 86 110 126 61 
4. Bed rails 7 23 2 0 0 10 2 30 2 4 0 244 0 70 0 20 2 75 77 5 29 
5. Suspended shelf  0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 121 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 6 
6. Mouse 0 3 18 6 21 14 27 6 57 0 4 10 6 66 19 8 5 138 128 15 28 
7. Sink rim 85 33 28 106 81 62 96 53 94 0 80 0 26 31 72 172 138 124 12 228 76 
8. Sink bowl 126 10 117 150 61 68 320 74 40 84 76 94 12 107 42 204 58 0 73 135 93 
9.Trolley surface 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 110 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 
10. Keyboard 0 7 12 17 7 62 20 13 6 3 36 9 98 0 17 44 82 0 0 63 25 
11. Lamp 0 7 0 0 30 0 5 3 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 1 0 8 0 2 3 
12. Soap dispenser 2 6 5 0 23 43 0 5 122 222 3 21 0 15 10 0 0 7 7 2 25 
Average 49 16 25 40 43 44 54 38 62 32 44 54 25 47 27 52 43 50 50 54 42 
No. of sites in BS that 
failed 60cfu standard 2 0 1 1 3 3 2 2 6 2 3 1 2 4 2 0 1 4 5 2 44 
No. of sites in BS that 
failed 120cfu standard 2 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 3 2 2 1 3 23 
Table 3-10 TVCs of colonies cultured using contact plates from the surfaces of BS7 over a 5 month period (20 sampling 
periods).  Bed space failures are listed across the sampling period number with failures by the Dancer standard coloured red, 
and failure by the Griffith standard coloured orange, all other results for bed spaces are coloured green.  The number of 
sampling sites within each sampling period that failed are listed and coloured orange if the TVC failed by the Dancer standard 
and red if the TVC failed by the Griffith standard.  Individual sampling sites are coloured white if they are <60CFU, blue if TVC is 
between 60 and 119 and pink if >119CFU.   
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Ward Sites sampled 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Average 
1. Phones 27 55 89 208 65 36 22 72 65 17 23 23 43 53 56 21 102 20 90 3 55 
2. Keyboard 43 27 17 38 23 100 52 31 88 30 34 78 93 45 128 8 21 19 24 37 47 
3. Nurses station 57 17 6 61 88 76 45 79 39 4 35 3 3 48 68 0 192 52 22 43 47 
4. Notes trolley 48 32 65 154 75 8 4 37 2 22 186 28 24 42 33 0 67 1 2 1 42 
5. Floor outside BS 7 39 68 49 124 101 184 204 106 121 42 80 216 52 188 89 164 161 51 56 31 106 
6. Floor outside BS 10 80 84 15 137 83 112 53 51 57 226 154 152 28 0 83 29 0 52 60 168 81 
7. Medication board 181 144 134 32 175 1 0 66 94 22 108 39 96 0 18 44 0 176 4 18 68 
8. Utility door handle 83 0 8 21 5 20 2 39 40 5 6 7 17 308 73 48 13 8 4 61 38 
9. Desk 50 176 20 44 39 160 101 25 110 4 34 23 42 59 0 0 62 41 60 49 55 
10. Crash trolley 7 21 4 4 0 5 3 28 6 0 9 0 2 47 0 0 5 0 6 0 7 
11. Exit doors 98 41 21 47 17 74 32 56 0 63 48 19 240 190 0 300 108 84 52 94 79 
12. Exit door button 35 17 75 87 15 49 97 34 122 15 81 53 69 75 140 72 31 20 13 33 57 
Average 62 57 42 80 57 69 51 52 62 38 67 53 59 88 57 57 64 44 33 45 57 
No. of sites in ward that 
failed 60cfu standard 3 2 3 3 5 4 2 4 4 1 3 1 3 1 4 1 4 1 3 2 50 
No. of sites in ward that 
failed 120cfu standard 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 1 0 1 30 
Table 3-11 TVCs of colonies cultured using contact plates from the surfaces of shared ward space over a 5 month period (20 
sampling periods).  Failures of the shared ward area are listed across the sampling period number with failures by the Dancer 
standard coloured red, and failure by the Griffith standard coloured orange, all other results for bed spaces are coloured green.  
The number of sampling sites within each sampling period that failed are listed and coloured orange if the TVC failed by the 
Dancer standard and red if the TVC failed by the Griffith standard.  Individual sampling sites are coloured white if they are 
<60CFU, blue if TVC is between 60 and 119 and pink if >119CFU.   
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As the analysis of the PICU data using the Griffith/Dancer criteria suggested numerous 
failures of both sites and bed spaces; additional data from the pilot study (MITU and 
SITU (n = 426), and two paediatric outpatient clinics (n = 148) were analysed.  A total 
of 1174 samples were taken. See Table 3-12 below. 
Location Bed Space 
Failures at 
120CFU 
Standard 
Bed Space 
Failures at 
60CFU 
Standard 
Sampling 
Site Failures 
at 120CFU 
Standard 
Sampling 
Site Failures 
at 60CFU 
Standard 
PICU bed space 
31 (78%) 
(n = 40) 
39 (98%) 
(n = 40) 
52 (11%) 
(n = 480) 
137 (28%) 
(n = 480) 
PICU shared ward 
area 
N/A N/A 
30 (13%) 
(n = 240) 
80 (33%) 
(n = 240) 
Outpatients N/A N/A 
29 (20%) 
(n = 148) 
62 (42%) 
(n = 148) 
MITU bed space 
10 (83%) 
(n = 12) 
12 (100%) 
(n = 12) 
38 (33%) 
(n = 114) 
51 (45%) 
(n = 114) 
MITU shared ward 
area 
N/A N/A 
5 (11%) 
(n = 45) 
13 (29%) 
(n = 45) 
SITU bed space 
16 (70%) 
(n = 25) 
20 (86%) 
(n = 25) 
52 (27%) 
(n = 192) 
82 (43%) 
(n = 192) 
SITU shared ward 
area 
N/A N/A 
9 (20%) 
(n = 75) 
24 (32%) 
(n = 75) 
Total 
57 (74%) 
(n = 77) 
71 (92%) 
(n = 77) 
201 (17%) 
(n = 1174) 
512 (44%) 
(n = 1174) 
Table 3-12 Summary of ward and outpatient TVC screening results using 60CFU 
and 120CFU suggested standards listed by site or bed space. 
Results shown in Table 3-12 indicate that when using the suggested standard of 
2.5CFU/cm2 (60CFU), 92% of bed spaces and 44% of sites sampled failed screening.  
Using the suggested standard of 5CFU/cm2 (120CFU), over half the bed spaces (74%) 
would have required the bed space to be closed and re-cleaned and 17% of sites 
would have failed.  Results were broadly similar across ward types, with a range of 11 
– 27% failing when using the 120CFU standard and 28 – 45% with the 60CFU 
standard.  Colony counts for bed spaces were similar for the 60CFU standard with a 
range of 86 – 100% failing screening.  Using the 120CFU standard, the range was 
similar for bed spaces with between 70 – 83% failing screening. 
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3.3.9 MICROBIOLOGICAL SURFACE SAMPLING OF THE ENVIRONMENT FOR 
SPECIFIC ORGANISMS 
Due to the large number of site failures when judging contamination using proposed 
TVC standards, analysis of environmental surveillance data was undertaken for MRSA, 
Enterobacteriaceae, adenovirus and norovirus as an alternative strategy for assessing 
contamination.   
3.3.9.1 MRSA BACTERIAL SURVEILLANCE SCREENING 
Over a three month period at the NHNN 381 sites were sampled using enrichment 
swabs (see methods section 2.3.4.3.) of these three samples were positive (0.8%).  
The positive sites included the storage unit top and bed wheels within an isolation bed 
space and the apron dispenser in the neighbouring empty bed space post clean.   
A one off sampling for MRSA that was undertaken at GOSH involved taking samples 
from 20 sites on the IIU for MRSA in a pre-clean cubicle used for MRSA isolation.  Of 
the 20 samples taken for enrichment swabs, two were positive (10%).  For direct 
plating 20 samples were taken and one was positive (5%).   
During an intensive screen of haematology/oncology day unit (HODU) 90 samples 
swab were taken, these were plated by direct culture as described in methods section 
2.3.4.4.  Of the 90 samples taken three were positive for MRSA (3%), all of which were 
taken from a room currently being used to isolate an MRSA positive patient, 3/5 (60%). 
3.3.9.2 ENTEROBACTERIACEAE BACTERIAL SURVEILLANCE SCREENING OF 
PAEDIATRIC INTENSIVE CARE UNIT AT GREAT ORMOND STREET HOSPITAL 
Screening of two bed spaces (BS6 and BS7) and the shared ward area on PICU at 
GOSH was undertaken over a four month period using enrichment screening, samples 
were taken using MicroSnap swabs (Hygiena International, Watford, UK) (as outlined in 
the method section 2.3.2.4.) in order to determine the levels of Enterobacteriaceae 
present.  
Over the sampling period a number of Enterobacteriaceae positive samples were 
detected.  432 Samples were taken over the sampling period of which eleven sites 
were positive (3%).  Species cultured and identified included six Pantoea species, two 
Klebsiella species and three Enterobacter species (see methods section 2.3.2.5.).  
Sites detected as positive included the floors by the sink, trolley surface and 
suspended shelf surface within the bed space, and the nurses’ station, phone and 
crash trolley within the shared ward area.  
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Table 3-13 shows the mean relative light unit (RLU) counts that correspond to the 
presence of coliforms for each object tested; an RLU of 10 is considered a positive 
result. 
Site Sampled  BS6 
(n = 144) 
BS7 
(n = 144) 
Floor under the sink Mean RLU 
Median RLU  
(RLU Range) 
45.85 
4  
(0-256) 
48.31 
6  
(0-349) 
Clinical waste bin Mean RLU 
Median RLU  
(RLU Range) 
2.23 
1  
(<10) 
2.39 
2  
(<10) 
Chair arms Mean RLU 
Median RLU  
(RLU Range) 
62.46 
2  
(0-585) 
2.46 
2  
(<10) 
Bed rails Mean RLU 
Median RLU  
(RLU Range) 
2.23 
1  
(<10) 
17.46 
2  
(0-150) 
Suspended shelf Mean RLU 
Median RLU  
(RLU Range) 
93.85 
3  
(0-1157) 
2.62 
1 
(<10) 
Computer mouse Mean RLU 
Median RLU  
(RLU Range) 
4.31 
3  
(0-25) 
12.23 
2  
(0-125) 
Sink rim Mean RLU 
Median RLU  
(RLU Range) 
2.77 
3  
(<10) 
5.08 
3  
(0-24) 
Sink bowl Mean RLU 
Median RLU  
(RLU Range) 
15.38 
5  
(0-156) 
35.23 
4  
(0-403) 
Trolley surface Mean RLU 
Median RLU  
(RLU Range) 
4.46 
2  
(0-21) 
2.77 
2  
(<10) 
Keyboard Mean RLU 
Median RLU  
(RLU Range) 
16.08 
3  
(0-171) 
4.92 
3  
(0-20) 
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Lamp Mean RLU 
Median RLU  
(RLU Range)) 
3.78 
3  
(0-11) 
34.54 
3  
(0-398) 
Soap dispenser Mean RLU  
Median RLU  
(RLU Range) 
4 
3  
(<10) 
5.15 
4  
(0-20) 
Table 3-13 Mean and range of RLU counts over the five month sampling period 
on PICU. Enterobacteriecae presence detected using MicroSnap swabs. RLUs >9 
were taken as positive indicators for the presence of Enterobacteriecae. 
The sink bowl and floor underneath the sink were identified as being sites that were 
likely to harbour Enterobacteriaceae in both bed spaces.  Other objects had variable 
Enterobacteriaceae detection varying between bed spaces and over time.  The clinical 
waste bins in both bed spaces never demonstrated positive numbers of RLUs.  
On the majority of occasions it was not possible to identify the species of 
Enterobacteriaceae from the brain heart infusion (BHI).  Frequently organisms cultured 
were other potential Gram-negative pathogens such as Pseudomonas aeruginosa, or 
other environmental organisms such as Stenotrophomonas spp.  BHI is a non-selective 
broth and these may represent overgrowth of other bacteria.   
Site Sampled TVC RLU Species Cultured 
Floor under sink 176 10 
 
Keyboard 45 10 
 
Floor outside BS7 188 10 
 
Lamp 0 11 
 
Nurses station 48 11 
 
Floor outside BS10 28 11 
 
Bed rails 70 12 
 
Floor under sink 136 13 
 
Floor outside BS10 0 13 
 
Nurses station 3 14 
 
Floor under sink 240 15 
 
Lamp 0 15 
 
Nurses station 192 15 
 
Exit doors 56 16 
 
Keyboard 128 16 
 
Floor outside BS7 89 16 
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Floor under sink 150 16 Klebsiella species 
Sink bowl 107 19 
 
Soap dispenser 10 20 
 
Medication board 108 20 
 
Sink rim 72 24 
 
Floor under sink 90 27 
 
Crash trolley 9 30 
 
Suspended shelf surface 2 37 
 
Exit doors 0 43 Klebsiella species 
Floor under sink 112 58 
 
Phones 43 60 
 
Exit doors 108 61 
 
Medication board 66 80 
 
Chair with arms 106 96 
 
Mouse 19 125 
 
Exit doors 0 144 Enterobacter cloacae 
Bed rails 0 150 
 
Sink bowl 12 156 
 
Floor under sink 180 186 Pantoea species 
Floor under sink 116 349 
 
Sink bowl 94 403 
 
Suspended shelf surface 42 1157 Enterobacter cloacae 
Table 3-14 Enterobacteriecae detection using MicroSnap swabs and the 
Enterobacteriaceae cultured from the broth over the five month sampling period 
on PICU, compared to the numbers of CFUs detected from TVCs collected at the 
same time from the same site.   TVCs failing the Dancer standard are coloured 
red, and failures by the Griffith standard are coloured orange, all other results 
are green.  RLUs >9 indicate the presence of Enterobacteriaceae within the 
sample. 
Sampling was undertaken using MicroSnap swabs (Hygiena International, Watford, 
UK) and TVCs taken in parallel.  The TVCs taken in parallel vary from 0 – 240, with 
most being under 60CFUs (see Table 3-14.).  Statistical correlation tests were 
performed to determine whether there was a correlation between levels of 
contamination (in TVCs) and the levels of Enterobacteriaceae as detected in RLU’s no 
significant relationship was identified. This indicates that the number of organisms 
found on a surface using TVCs cannot be correlated to levels of Enterobacteriaceae on 
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the same surface.  Low TVCs can therefore be linked to the detection of high RLUs on 
the same surface taken at the same time.  
3.3.9.3 PAEDIATRIC INTENSIVE CARE UNIT/CARDIAC INTENSIVE CARE UNIT/ 
NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE UNIT SINK SCREENING 
In addition to the bed space and ward sampling undertaken on PICU at GOSH, sink 
sampling was undertaken over three ITUs at GOSH (PICU, cardiac intensive care unit 
(CICU) and neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) Sinks were selected as potential 
sentinel sites due to their association with high levels of TVCs, RLUs, and indicator 
organism isolation.  Microbial samples were collected from eight sinks spread over 
three months at GOSH as described in methods section 2.3.4.2.).  The samples 
underwent direct plating and the degree of contamination was calculated and classified 
according to a scale of 0 (no growth) to 3 (greatest). Enterobacteriaceae were detected 
at all sites, but particularly high levels of contamination were detected on the lips of 
sinks (see Figure 3-6). 
 
Figure 3-6 Percentage of sampling occasions where organism were cultured 
from sampling locations within three ITUs and GOSH over a three month period. 
3.3.9.4 VIROLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE SCREENING 
The environment in communal ward areas on a IIU and hematopoietic stem cell 
transplantation unit (HSCTU) was screened for adenovirus and norovirus using real-
time PCR as described in methods sections 2.2.5.3 and 2.2.5.4.  Screening was also 
undertaken within the cubicles of adenovirus positive patients during routine occupation 
on the IIU.  Screening of these two areas sought to establish the risk of viral escape 
from cubicles where patients were isolated in order to be able to risk assess this 
transmission route. 
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Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplantation Unit and Immunology/Infectious 
Disease Units 
Over a 6 month period 539 samples were taken on the HSCTU and IIU as described in 
methods section 2.3.1.2. of which 13 (2.4%) were positive (Table 3-15). Ten positive 
samples were found on HSCTU and three on IIU; four were positive for adenovirus and 
nine for norovirus GII. All positive norovirus samples were found on HSCTU.  
Ten of the positive samples were floor swabs with six recovered from the floor by the 
main ward exit doors. Other sites with multiple positive samples were the floor outside 
a known negative and known positive patient’s room. Positive samples were also 
recovered from a filing cabinet, sluice door handle and notes trolley.   
Cubicles 
Screening of cubicles occupied by adenovirus positive patients before post-discharge 
cleaning was performed demonstrated that significant levels of contamination occur 
within these bed spaces (Table 3-15).  A total of 36 samples were taken within IIU 
cubicles occupied by adenovirus positive patients before post-discharge cleaning, of 
these 33 were detected as being positive (92%). All locations were positive for 
adenovirus on at least one occasion (Table 3-15). The floor under the sink, patient 
bathroom taps and corridor floor outside of the cubicle entrance were positive on two 
out of three samples rather than three out of three. Importantly, the exit door handle 
from the cubicles was always contaminated.   
Haematology/Oncology Day Unit 
Ninety samples were taken on one day on HODU. Eleven were adenovirus positive 
(12%) and one was positive for norovirus GI (1%) (Table 3-15). The norovirus positive 
site was the clinical waste bin lid within an isolation cubicle. Adenovirus positive sites 
included the surfaces of toys (dolls house, teddy bear and toy bricks), two chair arms, 
two exit door handles, one fan, two clinical surfaces (a trolley and an intravenous 
bench (IV) bench) and a clinical waste bin. All but one of the positive samples were 
recovered from bays and rooms where patients are weighed or treated. Locations with 
multiple positive samples were bays 2 and 3 and treatment room 1.  
HSCTU and IIU 
No. Location  Adenovirus Norovirus 
1 Floor outside known HSCTU 0 (n = 25) 1 (n = 25) 
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 negative patient room IIU 1 (n = 24) 0 (n = 24) 
2 
 
Filing cabinet 
HSCTU 0 (n = 25) 1 (n = 25) 
IIU 0 (n = 24) 0 (n = 24) 
3 
 
Floor outside known 
positive patient room 
HSCTU 0 (n = 25) 1 (n = 25) 
IIU 1 (n = 24) 0 (n = 24) 
4 
 
Nurse’s station 
HSCTU 0 (n = 25) 0 (n = 25) 
IIU 0 (n = 24) 0 (n = 24) 
5 
 
Sluice/medication room 
door handle 
HSCTU 0 (n = 25) 1 (n = 25) 
IIU 0 (n = 24) 0 (n = 24) 
6 
 
Floor by main exit doors 
HSCTU 1 (n = 25) 4 (n = 25) 
IIU 1 (n = 24) 0 (n = 24) 
7 
 
Notes trolley 
HSCTU 0 (n = 25) 1 (n = 25) 
IIU 0 (n = 24) 0 (n = 24) 
8 
 
PC keyboards 
HSCTU 0 (n = 25) 0 (n = 25) 
IIU 0 (n = 24) 0 (n = 24) 
9 
Telephone on nurse’s 
station 
HSCTU 0 (n = 25) 0 (n = 25) 
IIU 0 (n = 24) 0 (n = 24) 
10 Ward exit door handle 
HSCTU 0 (n = 25) 0 (n = 25) 
IIU 0 (n = 24) 3 (n = 24) 
11 Chair arm/crash trolley 
HSCTU 0 (n = 25) 0 (n = 25) 
IIU 0 (n = 24) 0 (n = 24) 
Adenovirus Positive Patient Cubicle (Pre-clean) 
No. Location Adenovirus Norovirus 
1 Floor under sink 2 (n = 3) 
Not done 
2 Clinical waste bin inner rim (under lid) 3 (n = 3) 
3 Chair with arms (right) 3 (n = 3) 
4 
Door handle into patient bathroom (cubicle 
side) 
3 (n = 3) 
5 Telephone keypads 3 (n = 3) 
6 Taps in patient bathroom 2 (n = 3) 
7 Mattress top 3 (n = 3) 
8 Bed/Cot frame under bed 3 (n = 3) 
8 Trolley surface (in ante room if present) 3 (n = 3) 
10 Side window sill (right hand side) 3 (n = 3) 
11 Cubicle room exit door handle (cubicle side) 3 (n = 3) 
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12 
Corridor floor outside of cubicle/ante room 
entrance 
2 (n = 3) 
HODU 
No. Location Adenovirus Norovirus 
1 Day procedure bay 0 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
2 Recovery bay 0 (n = 6) 0 (n = 6) 
3 Procedure room 0 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
4 Assisted toilet 1 0 (n = 2) 0 (n = 2) 
5 Assisted toilet 2 0 (n = 3) 0 (n = 3) 
6 En-suite cubicle 0 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
7 Bay 1 1 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
8 Corridor 1 (n = 3) 0 (n = 3) 
9 Bay 2 2 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
10 Bay 3 2 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
11 Height and weight room 1 (n = 6) 0 (n = 6) 
12 Reception 0 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
13 Reception seating 0 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
14 Cubicle 2 0 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
15 Cubicle 2 (pre-clean) 0 (n = 5) 1 (n = 5) 
16 Treatment room 1 2 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
17 Treatment room 2 1 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
18 Treatment room 3 0 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
19 Treatment room 4 1 (n = 5) 0 (n = 5) 
Table 3-15 Number of positive samples within the IIU, HSCTU, HODU found for 
adenovirus and norovirus for each sampling strategy. (n = total number of 
sampling points) 
3.3.9.5 TOTAL VIABLE COUNTS IN RELATION TO INDICATOR ORGANISMS 
A number of potentially pathogenic organisms were isolated from the environment 
during the sampling undertaken.  Where possible these indicator organisms were 
compared to TVCs taken at the same sampling site at the same time. 
For sampling undertaken on the HODU, of the 16 sites that were positive for indicator 
organisms, none would have failed using the Dancer criteria for TVCs.  Of the sites 
positive for indicator organisms, 4/16 would have failed if using the Griffith criteria for 
environmental monitoring (see Table 3-16.). For the 16 sites sampled, 3/16 sites were 
positive for pathogenic bacteria by culture, and 1/16 was positive for 
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Enterobacteriaceae by PCR (see methods sections 2.2.5.2, 2.2.5.3, 2.2.5.4 and 
2.3.2.3.  The other 12 sites were PCR positive for viruses.  
Site Name TVC 
Norovirus 
(PCR) 
Adenovirus 
(PCR) 
Ent DNA 
(PCR) 
MRSA 
(Culture) 
Fan 16 
   
Pos 
Bed rail 6 
   
Pos 
Trolley 59 
   
Pos 
Toy 41 
 
Pos 
  
Chair arm 81 
 
Pos 
  
Chair arm 55 
 
Pos 
  
Trolley 1 
 
Pos 
  
Dolls house 14 
 
Pos 
  
Fan 3 
 
Pos 
  
Exit door handle 119 
 
Pos 
  
Clinical waste bin 2 
  
Pos 
 
Clinical waste bin 38 Pos 
   
Teddy 73 
 
Pos 
  
Exit door handle 17 
 
Pos 
  
Clinical waste bin 94 
 
Pos 
  
Bench 0 
 
Pos 
  
Table 3-16 Sampling sites positive on the HODU for norovirus, adenovirus 
Entobacteriaceae or MRSA compared against CFUs present on TVC samples 
taken from the same surface at the same time analysed by the Griffith criteria.  
Orange colour coded sites failed by the Griffith criteria (>59CFUs) green colour 
coded sites were <60CFU and therefore were determined to pass the Griffith 
criteria. 
During sampling undertaken for Enterobacteriaceae on PICU, 11 sites were detected 
as positive, six for Pantoea species, three for Enterobacter species and two for 
Klebsiella species (see Table 3-17.).  Of the 11 sites positive, four would have failed to 
meet the Dancer criteria and five the Griffith criteria.  Six of the 11 positive sites were 
negative for a positive RLU result, only two of which overlapped with TVC failures using 
either standard.  The sites that failed most frequently were the floor under the sink and 
the exit door panel. 
153 
 
Chapter 3 Detection of Microorganisms within the Clinical Environment 
 
Site Sampled TVC RLU Species Cultured 
Crash trolley 6 0 Pantoea species 
Exit doors 0 144 Enterobacter cloacae 
Exit doors 0 43 Klebsiella species 
Floor under sink 148 4 Pantoea species 
Floor under sink 150 16 Klebsiella species 
Floor under sink 180 186 Pantoea species 
Floor under sink 188 4 Enterobacter species 
Nurses station 39 3 Pantoea species 
Phones 65 4 Pantoea species 
Suspended shelf surface 42 1157 Enterobacter cloacae 
Trolley surface 0 0 Pantoea species 
Table 3-17 Sampling sites positive on GOSH PICU for Entobacteriaceae species 
compared against CFUs present on TVC samples and RLUs detected from 
MicroSnap swabs taken from the same surface at the same time analysed by 
either RLU or the Griffith and Griffith criteria.  Orange colour coded sites failed 
by the Griffith criteria (>59CFUs) , red colour coded sites failed by the Dancer 
criteria (>119CFUs) green colour coded sites were <60CFU and therefore were 
determined to pass the Griffith criteria.  Blue colour coded sites are those not 
positive by RLU for Enterobacteriaceae and yellow colour coded sites are those 
positive for Enterobacteriaceae by RLU (>9 RLUs). 
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3.4 DISCUSSION 
3.4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING METHODOLOGY 
Method Selection for Environmental Sampling 
The sampling methodology developed for this work took into account the sampling 
methods evaluated in previous studies.(174, 197)  Cotton swabs for molecular based 
testing were selected for sampling. Although they may have reduced sensitivity 
compared to flocked nylon swabs they can be broken into test vials due the shaft of the 
swabs being wooden rather than plastic.(174, 199, 201-204) Cotton swabs were also selected 
for culture based testing as these enable comparison with molecular testing and were 
the standard type validated within GOSH, with the sample stabilised within charcoal 
transport medium (see Appendix 1). 
A sampling size of 10cm2 was utilised as this is a common size in the relevant literature 
and was determined to be of sufficient size to detect organisms within the environment 
as long as sufficient sites were sampled.(401, 402)  Sampling surfaces larger than this 
were found to dry out the swab and therefore negatively affect sampling efficiency.  
Due to the increased detection offered by pre-moistening, swabs were wetted with 
molecular grade water before surface sampling was undertaken.(209)   
Experimental validation of the direct inoculation protocol demonstrated that using 
sterile water as the moistening and sampling reagent the recovery varied between 
87.08% - 92.64% (see section 3.3.1.).  This is higher than demonstrated in some of the 
published comparisons but other variables such as humidity, temperature, recovery 
surface, and inoculation technique were not comparable and were likely to affect 
recovery percentage.(174-176)    The bacterial inoculum was higher in this study than that 
used in some of the published work (108 – 1011 vs 103 – 106) and this has been shown 
to affect recovery.(174)  In addition, we tested a greater variety of organisms and the 
strain types were not identical to those tested in the literature. This has been shown by 
other studies to affect survival and therefore potentially recovery.(403, 404)  The presence 
of protein improved recovery of organisms from the surface and appeared similar if 
BSA or PBS was used (see section 3.3.1.).  The reasons for this are unclear but may 
due to enhanced bacterial survival, perhaps through prevention of desiccation.   
Comparison of direct inoculation, enrichment and selective contact plates within the 
clinical environment in a pre-cleaned isolation cubicle at GOSH demonstrated a 10% 
MRSA positivity rate using enrichment, 5% using direct plating and 0% using selective 
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agar contact plates.  Within the clinical environment at NHNN, 2% of sites were positive 
by enrichment with no other sampling methods detecting MRSA (see section 3.3.5.1.). 
After the pilot phase of the study, direct inoculation of swabs onto plates was 
undertaken of samples where organisms were believed to be of sufficient levels to be 
detected and a level of crude quantification was required (level 1, 2 or 3 depending on 
how far the inoculum grew on the plate).  Where estimates of levels were lower, 
enrichment was used in order to increase test sensitivity by up to 18.7%.(210)   
In this study we used non-selective contact plates to quantify bacterial contamination 
on surfaces in order to capture all viable bacterial types.  However issues (specifically 
in terms of quantification) were observed when sampling was undertaken of moist 
surfaces or heavily contaminated ones.(405)    Application of contact plates to the 
surface in this study was undertaken for 10 seconds.  While some studies have 
increased the length of this time, this proves impractical when sampling within a clinical 
environment where large numbers of samples are required.(406)  Many articles within 
the literature do not state contact time between the contact plate and the surface, but 
when listed, contact times vary from 5 seconds – 60 seconds.  
3.4.2 INOCULATION AND SURVIVAL MODEL  
Opinion used to be that environmental survival of organisms was short term with Gram-
negative bacilli believed to rapidly disappear from dry surfaces and the half-life of 
Staphylococcus aureus being less than 24 hours.(407)  Although these survival times 
have been adjusted in recent years, there is still a failure to form a consensus related 
to whether Gram-positive or Gram-negative bacteria demonstrate longer environmental 
survival.  Galvin et al. (2012) found that Gram-positive bacteria such as 
Staphylococcus aureus and Enterococcal spp. survive for longer in dry environments 
than Gram-negative bacteria, with the exception of Acinetobacter baumannii.(190)  In 
comparison Kramer et al.(2006) found that Gram-negative bacteria survive in the 
environment for longer than Gram-positive bacteria, with the exception of 
Staphylococcus aureus at low humidity.(175)   
Within the literature, Klebsiella spp. have been shown to survive anywhere from two 
hours – thirty months, Staphylococcus aureus from seven days – seven months and 
adenovirus from seven days – three months.(175)  
The survival experiments undertaken in this study have demonstrated that viable 
Staphylococcus aureus, Klebsiella pneumoniae and adenovirus can be recovered from 
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non-porous dry environments after being kept for three months at mean humidity of 
43% and 16oC temperature, although the log10 reduction from the initial inoculum was 
substantial, 7.14 of Staphylococcus aureus, and 7.72 for Klebsiella pneumoniae (see 
section 3.3.2.).  Survival of microorganisms on surfaces is dependent upon the 
bacterium/viral species, inoculum size, humidity, temperature, suspension medium and 
the material tested.(174-176)  Variations in these factors may explain the wide range of 
results found when examining organism environmental survival.  Surface type used in 
survival experiments can have a significant impact as viruses can be trapped within the 
matrix especially if the surface is porous. Other studies have demonstrated that even if 
the same type of test material is used, other variations in conditions cause the material 
to reveal inconsistent results.(175)  For this reason, we always inoculated our 
experiments in an identical manner with distribution of organisms on the surface being 
kept consistent along with surface type, humidity, temperature, suspension medium, 
strain type and as far as possible inoculum level.  This enabled results across multiple 
experiments to be compared and the results demonstrated consistency. These results 
are described in more detail in Chapter 5. 
One of the potential short comings of the survival and inoculum experiments 
undertaken is that the same type strains and species were used throughout.  This was 
done to enable across experiment comparison; however, in addition to variation 
between species under experimental conditions, work has shown that there is variation 
in survival within species.  Survival of all Staphylococcus aureus strains is not identical 
under the same survival conditions.(404)  The survival of biofilm forming strains of 
Acinetobacter baumannii has been shown to be longer than that for non-biofilm 
producing strains, 36 vs 15 days.(403)  There is also some evidence that resistant strains 
may survive longer than sensitive ones. Outbreak strains of MRSA survived longer on 
surfaces than non-outbreak strains and isolates of Pseudomonas aeruginosa collected 
from hospital surfaces were more likely than isolates from clinical specimens to be β-
lactamase producers, 95% vs 36%.(190)  It is therefore possible that experimental 
results captured will only reflect the strain type tested rather than the entire species.  
Additionally, growth of viruses in cell culture for survival experiments means that they 
may not always represent the clinical situation.(175)  
Although the levels of viable bacteria recovered after the survival experiments was low, 
the longer an organism persists on a surface, the longer it can present a risk within the 
healthcare environment.  Even if environmental survival is poor, a low infectious dose 
can mean that viruses/bacteria persist in sufficient numbers to be infectious for several 
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days, weeks or in some cases months after contamination.(179, 408)  The results of the 
survival experiments demonstrate that, within conditions that can be found in clinical 
environments, Staphylococcus aureus, Klebsiella pneumoniae and adenovirus could 
survive for >3 months and therefore would present a potential risk to patients and staff. 
3.4.3 APPLICATION OF SAMPLING METHODOLOGY TO CLINICAL SETTINGS  
Surface Type 
When analysing data on surfaces for the pilot study it was decided to use bedrail 
contamination as the reference standard for use in a GAM (see section 3.3.6.).  The 
bed rails were selected as the reference standard due to published data demonstrating 
that bed rails are linked with the highest levels of contamination within bed spaces.(184, 
408-410)  Compared to bed rails, bed wheels were the most contaminated objects 
sampled with a mean TVC 1.97 times higher than on the bed rail.  Bedside alcohol gel 
dispensers were 0.27 times less contaminated than bed rails.  The bedside table was 
less contaminated than the bed rail, although in previous studies these have been 
linked with similar levels of contamination.(405, 411)   Both the storage trolley and the top 
of the storage unit were also less contaminated than bed rails.  Within sampling 
undertaken at GOSH, bed rails were found to demonstrate relatively low levels of 
contamination within the ITU with mean of 16CFU/24cm2 for bed space 6 and 
6CFU/24cm2 for bed space 7.  A bed rail was detected as positive for MRSA during the 
screening of the HODU in a cubicle utilised to isolate MRSA patients prior to cleaning. 
This was associated with a TVC count of 6CFU/24cm2 from the same surface. 
Some investigators have reported that material has no influence on survival whilst 
others have described longer survival on plastic or steel.(88)  Higher survival of viruses 
has been noted on non-porous material for most viruses with the exception of 
adenovirus; which has demonstrated higher persistence on porous material such as 
paper towels.(161)  Other authors have found differences in survival between Gram-
negative bacteria, with isolates surviving longer on synthetic plastics compared to 
cotton and terry fabrics, despite the later demonstrating increased surface area.(176, 412)  
Despite this, when a comparison of TVCs between porous and non-porous materials 
was undertaken it showed no significant differences (see section 3.3.6.).  Therefore 
surface type alone does not explain the differences in levels of detection of TVCs 
between objects. 
158 
 
Chapter 3 Detection of Microorganisms within the Clinical Environment 
Surface Height 
Within the study undertaken at NHNN surface types were divided into high >1.2m, 
medium 0.6m-1.2m and low <0.6m zones to see if that affected TVCs.  Results varied 
between wards and sampling occasions, but for the SITU the lower height levels was 
most contaminated on all sampling occasions (see section 3.3.6.).  This finding is 
similar to that of Best et al. (2014) who demonstrated those locations close to and 
including the floor remained the least clean.(413)  This may be may be as a result of 
cleaners focussing on more frequently touched middle and high site areas, but may 
also be because lower sites, such as bed wheels, are more difficult to clean.  Within 
MITU the lowest height level was the most contaminated on one sampling period, but 
for the other two the highest height level was the most contaminated.   It therefore 
appears that surface height has more of an impact than surface material in determining 
contamination, with the floors and items in contact with them being particularly 
contaminated. 
Floors are known to become rapidly contaminated with pathogens in the hospital 
environment.(183) In our work floors were consistently highly contaminated.  The floors 
represented the site where most Gram-negative organisms were detected outside of 
the sink during surveillance on the PICU at GOSH.  The floor by the sink grew Pantoea 
spp. Klebsiella spp. and Enterobacter spp. from samples, all of which were associated 
with high TVCs.  The floor was also the most commonly positive site for detection of 
norovirus and adenovirus.  Furthermore, the highest contamination levels occurred on 
bed wheels and objects at the lowest height level, indicating that these surfaces are 
hard to reach during cleaning procedures or that they are the objects that get most 
rapidly re-contaminated (see section 3.3.6.).   
Despite this, some studies have dismissed floor contamination as not high risk as most 
adult patients will have limited contact with the floor.(328, 414)  Some authors have even 
called for a reduction in focus on floor cleaning as there is little evidence between floor 
cleaning and reduction in HCAI rates, calling on a focus of cleaning high touch sites.(191, 
192, 409, 415)  Within the paediatric setting, children outside of the ITUs will interact with the 
floor on a regular basis as many will play with toys and will be learning to walk/crawl.(12)  
Even within the adult setting, conceptually the passage of trolleys and other equipment 
over the floor to patient’s cubicles may transfer the viruses/bacteria into a new 
environment. Staff and visitors place objects such as bags and boxes onto floors; this 
provides a vehicle for the transfer of microorganisms from the floor to other 
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surfaces.(416)  Given the low infectious dose of viruses/bacteria such as norovirus and 
E. coli and the potential for ready transfer between surfaces, it is therefore possible that 
this contamination represents a real risk of infection transmission.(415)  
The medium height level (0.6m-1.2m) item that was most associated with high levels of 
contamination were the door handles.  Door handles have been found to be a source of 
contamination within the clinical environment.(417)  During cubicle screening of rooms 
where patients were isolated for adenovirus, exit door handles were universally 
contaminated (see section 3.3.9.4.).  Therefore even if current infection control 
guidance in terms of personal protective equipment (PPE) were adhered to, staff and 
visitors hands would be contaminated on exit of the room and provide a route of 
contamination to the shared ward area or other patient cubicles.(296)  The exit door panel 
from the shared ward area on PICU has a mean CFU over the sampling period that 
would fail by the Griffith standard, with 9/20 individual sampling point having over 
60CFUs.(399)   The exit doors also had raised RLUs on four occasions, one of which 
was associated with growth of Enterobacter cloacae and once for Klebsiella spp (see 
section 3.3.9.2.).  The sluice room door handle on the HSCTU was positive for 
norovirus on 1/25 occasions and the ward exit door handle on the IIU was positive for 
norovirus 3/24.  Touching of door handles could provide a means of hand 
contamination and transfer both within and between clinical areas, this is explored 
further in Chapter 5.(417)  
Objects Linked to Frequent Interactions 
Within the shared ward areas the item that has been identified in previous studies as 
being the most likely to be contaminated were the computer keyboards.(184, 418, 419) High 
level contamination level of keyboards was not seen during sampling undertaken at the 
NHNN, probably because of ease of access for cleaning as they were in the shared 
ward areas and because they use wipable keyboards on the unit.(420)  The results from 
the NHNN are similar to those found in a study by Dancer et al. (2006).(409)  Computer 
keyboards at GOSH in clinical areas are also wipable and, within the PICU, 
demonstrated variability between bed space 6 and 7.  BS7 had a lower mean and 
median than BS6.  The two bed spaces are identical in terms of design and patient mix.  
The keyboards within the bed space are mainly accessed by the nurses covering shift 
and so contamination is unlikely to be due to visitors.  It is therefore likely that 
variations in contamination are linked to the variations in practice by nursing staff.  
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Keyboards were not linked to detection of any potential indicator organisms throughout 
the sampling period, despite the higher TVCs detected on keyboards in BS7.   
Toys are potentially high risk items that are unique to paediatrics and therefore were 
not studied outside of GOSH.  Within the HODU, three toys were positive for 
adenovirus out of the ninety surfaces sampled, a dolls house, teddy bear and some toy 
bricks (see section 3.3.9.4.).  No toys were sampled within the other areas as within the 
clinical ward environment toys are linked to particular patients and are not shared.  The 
presence of the teddy bear breached the hospital toy policy as it was a soft toy and not 
cleanable.  The other two toys conformed with hospital guidance.  Teddy bears have 
been shown to be contaminated within one week of being present in a hospital ITU with 
bacteria and fungi, such as Klebsiella spp., E. coli, Staphylococcus aureus and 
Candida spp.(421) In other studies, soft toys have been shown to be contaminated 
between 90% - 92% of the time, both in general practitioners waiting areas and in 
NICUs.(422, 423)   
Even hard toys have been demonstrated as having a 13.5% level of contamination 
within the general practitioner setting.  Hard toys can be cleaned and decontaminated, 
but in our study the doll’s house was unvarnished which made decontamination difficult 
as the surface was porous.(422)  Toys may therefore present a risk as, by their very 
nature they come into close contact with patients.(12)  If patients bring their own toys to 
hospital, they are likely to become contaminated and may present a recontamination 
risk to the local environment, to the patient and home environment.(422)   
Within all the studies undertaken on the GOSH ITUs, sinks were not only associated 
with high levels of TVCs, indicating general bacterial contamination, but also detection 
of specific pathogens, both within and around the sink.  Enterobacteriaceae including 
Klebsiella spp. and E. coli were particularly prevalent on the sink lips (see section 
3.3.9.3.).  Several studies have found that Gram-negative contamination centres on 
sinks and moist areas such as baths.(419, 424-427)  In a children’s hospital many of the 
patients are in nappies and it is to be expected that faecal flora will be prevalent, 
including in sink bowls, due to hand washing post nappy changing.  However the 
presence of Enterobacteriaceae in and around sinks presents a potential clinical risk.   
Air Sampling vs Surface Sampling 
Air sampling was undertaken at the NHNN on three occasions over three months on 
two units (SITU, MITU) that had a mixed ventilation system (see section 3.3.4.).  Air 
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sampling was not undertaken after the pilot study undertaken at the NHNN as the air 
data would be more difficult to interpret at GOSH, where the ITUs, IIU and HSCTU 
have HEPA filtrated air.  The differences in ventilation design between these units 
would have prevented cross comparison between units and affected data 
interpretation.   
The results of the investigation at the NHNN showed differences between air and 
surface samples; these could be interpreted as a lack of relationship between surface 
and aero-contamination (see section 3.3.6.).  Air contamination was variable but 
generally showed less contamination at unoccupied bedsides, clustering around the 
nurses’ station with more contamination at occupied bedsides.  We observed surfaces 
that were heavily contaminated in areas of low aero-contamination suggesting that air 
sampling provides a measure of the transient aero-contamination and enables a snap-
shot of general contamination levels to be gathered. King et al. (2013) demonstrated 
that bioaerosols can be deposited across a room at different distances from a source, 
due to air movement, that can be modified by furniture and people’s behaviour.(428)  
Other studies looking at Clostridium difficile transmission have noted that aero-
contamination could be detected but it was linked to periods of activity, such as bed 
changing and ward rounds.  These aero-contamination events were linked to 
dissemination of the bacteria on surfaces in some studies but not in others. This 
suggests that contamination events for air and surfaces were often not temporally 
linked and could depend on the virus/bacteria.(39, 429, 430)  
Surface sampling is affected by general contamination as some particles eventually 
settle on surfaces but surface samples are also highly affected by human behaviours 
within the clinical environment such as object touching.  Our results are similar to other 
studies that have investigated surface contamination variability and transmission by 
health professionals.  In one study that inoculated cauliflower mosaic virus DNA onto a 
phone within an NICU cubicle, the virus was spread to 58% of the sampling sites within 
that cubicle over a seven day period. It was also spread to five of five other cubicles 
and to shared ward locations where up to 80% of sites were positive; overall, 23% of 
collected samples were positive over the seven day sampling period.  There was also a 
temporal link to the spread of surface contamination with the areas within the initial 
cubicle having highest positivity rates at four and eight hours post inoculation sampling 
and other sites becoming positive later, with door handles on other cubicles becoming 
positive first.(431) This work means that, for some viruses and bacteria, surface 
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contamination depends more on human behaviours and cleaning procedures than 
aero-contamination.   
Location Differences 
Surfaces that were located within occupied bed spaces at the NHNN were always more 
contaminated than surfaces located within the shared ward area. TVC contamination 
was highest within bed spaces as has been demonstrated in other studies. This may 
be due to access for cleaning and lack of patient source.(183, 405)  
In contrast, surfaces within the PICU at GOSH which were all close to the bed space, 
demonstrated lower levels of contamination than those within the shared ward area 
(see section 3.3.9.3.).  Those surfaces closest to the patient were less contaminated 
than those further away within the bed-space and within the sink area. This may be 
explained by the fact that the bed spaces within GOSH ITUs had limited non-touch 
surfaces, which showed significant contamination within the MITU and SITU. In 
addition, cleaning was undertaken by nursing staff as well as domestic staff within bed 
spaces (see Chapter 5 for further details).   
Whether a bed space was occupied was not consistently related to an increase TVCs 
compared to unoccupied bed spaces (see section 3.3.6.). Although empty bed spaces 
should be easier to clean and access should not be a problem, increased 
contamination was noted on some occasions indicating that these bed spaces are not 
always contamination free.  One of the MRSA positive samples detected within the 
SITU was detected in a cleaned bed space.  Bed spaces are cleaned after a patient is 
discharged but are then left empty until the next patient is admitted.  During the time 
that the bed space is vacant, contamination can arise from the air as well as from 
contaminated hands.(367, 428)  As bed spaces within PICU were consistently occupied, a 
comparison with the NHNN could not be made. 
Differences existed not only between shared ward areas and bed spaces but between 
ward areas.  Surfaces sampled at SITU were always significantly less contaminated 
than surfaces sampled at MITU.  Differences in contamination between SITU and MITU 
can also be explained by differences in patient health status.  SITU patients are short 
term stay, most are ventilated and require high intensity support from staff.  Visitation is 
limited to two people per bedside and is only allowed during certain hours.  Due to the 
severity of illness on this ward, visitors have limited interaction with patients and the 
bedside environment.  In comparison, MITU patients are usually long stay and are 
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undergoing long-term recovery, these patients have much of their care, such as 
feeding, undertaken by visitors and are capable of interacting with their bedside 
environment to a much greater extent than those on SITU.  Due to the long stay nature 
of these patients, they have more of their own possessions within the bed space and 
visitation is encouraged, tends to be regular and prolonged.  Furthermore, MITU is a 
smaller unit and includes less staff than SITU.   
3.4.4 USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION DETECTION TO MAKE CLINICAL 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
Assessment of Surfaces Using Total Viable Counts 
In order to assess the clinical environment for both effective cleaning and risk to 
patients, both Dancer (2004) and Griffith et al. (2003) have suggested TVC cut-offs and 
this has been adopted by other authors for further work.(191, 400, 418, 432)  Despite the 
suggestion of standards linked to TVC cut-offs, there is no consensus on useful actions 
in response to sampling results, sampling methods or limits of acceptable risk.(184) 
Of the 1174 TVC samples taken over the study period, 17% of sites failed when using 
the original Dancer criteria of 5CFU/cm2 and 44% of sites failed when using the Griffith 
criteria, 2.5CFU/cm2.(191, 399)  When using the criteria to assess bed spaces, 74% would 
have failed at least one site if using the original Dancer criteria and 92% would fail 
using the Griffith criteria (see section 3.3.8.).  When examining surfaces rather than 
bed spaces, one other study demonstrated 32% of sites would have failed by the 
Dancer criteria in an acute stroke unit, 23% of sites in an ITU, and 27.5% in a medical 
day unit, figures similar to those seen within the SITU and MITU at the NHNN.(409)  
Another study found that 7.7% of sites failed with the Dancer criteria which was lower 
than any of the areas sampled within our study, although it is similar to the PICU bed 
spaces failures at 11%.  Studies using the Griffith criteria have demonstrated failure 
rates of between 23% - 52% with one study identifying an average CFU of 28 times 
higher than the Griffith criterion.(177, 401, 433)  The failure rate of sites using the Griffith 
criteria in this study was between 28% and 45%; this is similar to the range identified in 
these other studies. 
Within the original Dancer (2004) paper, there is also a standard for the detection of 
indicator organisms.(191)  This paper suggests that indicator organism such as 
Staphylococcus aureus, Clostridium difficile, vancomycin resistant enterococci (VRE), 
Salmonella spp. and multiply resistant Gram-negative bacilli could be undertaken.  
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Levels of indicator organism should be <1CFU/cm2, which equates to <24CFU per 
contact plate. 
The Dancer standard for monitoring the environment for indicator organisms includes 
the monitoring of hand touch sites for multiply resistant organisms.  Utilising this 
standard, 2.5% (1/40) of bed spaces would have failed. If applying a multiple resistant 
standard, no bed space failures would be registered (see section 3.3.9.5.).  One failing 
hand touch site was the suspended shelf surface.  The other hand touch site was the 
trolley surface, which was positive for a Gram-negative bacilli. However, the TVC was 0 
and the sample was only detected by enrichment and so it would not qualify as a 
failure.  If the same standard was used for all surface sites sampled, 0.4% (3/750) 
would fail, again depending on the definition of multiply resistant Gram-negative 
bacteria.  The nurses station phone, nurses station and suspended shelf would fail with 
TVCs of 39, 65, 42 respectively, but the other sites positive for Gram-negative bacilli 
were either floor sites (and so would not be counted) or had TVCs of 6, 0, 0, and 0.  Al-
Hamad et al. (2008) conducting a clinical validation of the Dancer criteria found that 
both a cabinet and a handle that had TVCs ranging from 0.1 – 6CFU/cm2 were 
persistently contaminated with MRSA indicating that TVCs were not necessarily linked 
to the presence of pathogens on the surface.(184) 
Assumptions of the Dancer Criterion 
In the publication that sets out the Dancer criterion a number of assumptions are made 
that facilitate the use of TVCs to make risk assessments about clinical risk to 
patients:(191)  
• An increased microbial burden suggests insufficient cleaning  
• A heavy microbial burden may mask the chances of finding a pathogen  
• A heavy level of contamination implies an increased chance of finding an 
epidemiologically related pathogen  
Although cleaning is acknowledged to be important in the control of microorganisms 
within the hospital environment, it has been demonstrated that surfaces become rapidly 
re-contaminated, reaching their original levels within four hours of cleaning.(434)  As the 
Dancer standard does not indicate when sampling should be performed in relation to 
cleaning, it is difficult to know when such sampling should be undertaken.(191)  The 
Griffith standard has been consistently utilised in his publications with screening 
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undertaken both before cleaning and 10 minutes after cleaning to determine its 
effect.(190, 399)  Galvin et al. (2012) has suggested that microbial assessments utilising 
TVCs are only useful if they are linked directly to cleaning monitoring as cleaning of the 
environment will only temporally change the numbers of infectious agents present, 
especially when TVCs are used to look at contamination that is mostly derived from 
skin flora.(190)  Data within this study has demonstrated that there are differences in 
TVC contamination between ward types, even in the same hospital, and with the same 
cleaning regimen. 
Work done within this study on comparing detection of microorganisms within the 
environment has demonstrated that low levels of microorganisms can be detected if 
enrichment is used (see section 3.3.3.).  Contamination of pathogens within the clinical 
environment is usually present at considerably lower numbers of microorganisms than 
would be found in clinical specimens and they are probably in a different physiological 
state.(190)  In general, nosocomial pathogens are present in the range of 1 – 
100CFU/cm2 and so enrichment is required in order to detect them.(174)  Although 
viable, these microorganisms may be more difficult to culture.(190)  There is no sampling 
method for detection of indicator organisms presented as part of the Dancer criteria. 
TVCs may not detect pathogens present in low levels as they are likely to be masked 
by more dominant skin flora.  However, this can be countered by selection of 
alternative sampling methods over the use of contact plates as microbial monitoring for 
pathogenic organisms does not require enumeration; presence or absence is 
sufficient.(190)  
The final assumption presented by S. J. Dancer (2004) is that pathogens are present in 
the environment in proportion to the level of overall contamination.(191)  In one study it 
has been found that there was a significant association with TVCs over 2.5CFU/cm2 
and MRSA detection from the same site (p=0.001).(405)  Other studies like this one have 
found no correlation between TVCs and detection of MRSA as an indicator 
organism.(184, 190, 197, 401, 406)  Risk is more likely to be related to the frequency and level 
of surface contamination with specific pathogens in combination with touch and hand 
hygiene practice. It is  therefore difficult to relate the detection of TVCs to infection 
risk.(406)   
It has been suggested as a consequence that data from microbial hygiene assessment 
should be used to provide trend analysis and monitor efficiency over time. This is 
contrary to the measures suggested in the Dancer criterion of closing bed spaces and 
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instigating deep cleaning after resampling.(190)   It has also been suggested that using 
hygiene assessment as part of continuous monitoring both standardization and 
optimization of a method would be required regarding when sampling should be done 
in relation to cleaning, and whether the presence of any CFUs would be acceptable 
directly after cleaning.(190)  Hygiene assessments utilised within the literature are 
usually performed sporadically; usually at the start and end of an outbreak or as part of 
defined piece of research rather than a continual assessment of cleaning; it is 
accordingly hard to truly evaluate their usefulness within the clinical setting.(190)   
Within this study we believe that we have demonstrated that within a dynamic hospital 
environment, a large proportion of sites screened for bacterial contamination would fail 
if using the criteria suggested by previous authors. This could lead to the closure of 
wards or bed spaces, increased costs and decreased patient care.  Surfaces were 
frequently contaminated, even with routine cleaning (see section 3.3.8.).  Despite 
raised TVCs, no evidence has been found to link raised TVCs to transmission of HCAIs 
either in this or other studies. Therefore the suggested criterion for assessing clinical 
risk are not practical and probably not very accurate.  Monitoring of cleaning using TVC 
sampling may prove useful in order to improve cleaning efficiency as part of continuous 
assessment but to do so would require the implementation of continued use and a 
standardized method.  Without such a method and practice, microbial counts give little 
indication of when a surface was last cleaned, how well it was cleaned and with 
what.(190)  
Use of Indicator Organisms 
Sampling of environmental sites was undertaken in shared ward and clinical areas 
during non-outbreak settings and in occupied rooms of infected patients to assess the 
ability to detect pathogens from surface sites in order to determine risk of transmission. 
Viruses within the Clinical Environment  
Relatively few studies have been conducted looking at levels of norovirus within the 
environment and only two have examined the contamination with adenovirus outside of 
the outbreak setting.  Of the studies that have looked for detection of norovirus, one 
also looked for rotavirus and astrovirus but did not separate out the data for individual 
viruses.  Data from this study showed that swabs taken four years apart on two 
paediatric wards had contamination rates of 20% in 2004 falling to 6% in 2008.(435, 436)  
The other norovirus study only found 1/176 samples (0.8%) to be positive.(437)  Within 
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an adenovirus outpatient study at GOSH, 37% of sites were detected as positive for 
adenovirus DNA.(438)  In the only other published adenovirus study, based within in a 
general surgery unit, virus was only detected in 1/176 sites (0.8%).(437)   
Data collected within our study showed that over a six month period, 539 samples were 
taken on the HSCTU and IIU of which 13 (2.4%) were positive, 0.7% (4/539) for 
adenovirus and 1.7% (9/539) for norovirus (see section 3.3.9.4.).   These numbers are 
substantially lower than demonstrated in some of the other studies, but are similar to 
those seen in the study by Carducci et al. (2011).(437)  Within the HODU, 1% (1/90) of 
sites were positive for norovirus and 12% (11/90) were positive for adenovirus.  This 
situation is similar to our adenovirus outpatient study although the levels are still lower 
(12% vs 37%).(438)  The ward is cleaned with chlorine due to the high risk nature of the 
patients in contrast to outpatients where only detergent is used. This may explain the 
reduced number of positive sites (see Chapter 5). 
Within the IIU, 36 samples were taken from cubicles occupied by adenovirus positive 
patients before post-discharge cleaning of which 33 were positive (92%) (see section 
3.3.9.4.).  This demonstrates that adenovirus positive patients highly contaminate their 
environment. This is likely to be due to the prolonged admission periods, sometimes for 
up to two years, in the ward setting.  Furthermore, these patients bring personal items 
with them which both interfere with cleaning as cleaners will not move them and act as 
a source of re-contamination.  Finally, the interaction of patients with the environment 
through toys, walking and/or crawling increases the risk of acquiring microorganisms 
from the environment.(12)   
One explanation for the variability in viral detection rates between studies is that 
surface detection is affected by a number of factors. These include viral species (due to 
virus size, variability within and between genera), low concentration of virus, presence 
of inhibitors, and limits of detection.(161)  As PCR was used to detect the viruses within 
this study, viability could not be determined and so may over estimate levels of 
infectious virus contamination (see Chapter 5).   
Bacteria within the Clinical Environment  
Within this study, MRSA was found in 10% of sites within one isolation cubicle at 
GOSH before cleaning and in 60% of sites in another.  Within an occupied isolation 
bed space in the NHNN SITU 20% of sites were positive for MRSA and, interestingly, 
were still positive in 10% of sites after cleaning in an adjacent empty bed space. 
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Within the literature, positive sites for MRSA vary from 3.3% to 73%.(29, 197, 210, 401, 414, 439, 
440)  Variations in positivity rates do exist depending on whether patients were 
colonised/infected.  Boyce et al. (2007) found that 69% of environmental samples were 
positive for patients who were colonized vs 73% for patients who were infected.(441) 
Another study found 34.1% of environmental samples positive in rooms occupied by 
colonized patients.(439)  Schabrun et al. (2006) pooled MRSA TVC contamination rate 
data from the literature and found that they ranged between 0CFU - >500CFU, with a 
mean of 82.1CFU/cm2.(442)  The wide variations in detection rates seen in our study are 
therefore are consistent with the published literature. Clearly any differences in 
sampling methodologies, type and number of personnel, activity, moisture, materials 
and air filtration will impact on detection rates.   
We and others have observed that MRSA can be detected in bed spaces and cubicles 
not occupied by MRSA positive patients.  In one study, MRSA was isolated from the air 
in the absence of MRSA positive patients on 7.6% of sampling occasions.  In another 
study, MRSA was cultured from 43% of beds from non MRSA colonized patients.(174)  
Gram-negative species were detected using enrichment in 15% (6/40) of bed spaces, 
each time at a rate of 8% per (1/12) bed space. Enterobacteriaceae were detected 
within the sink bowl on over 70% of occasions with sink lips contaminated over 50% of 
the time.  In the HODU, 1% (1/90) of samples were positive for Enterobacteriaceae by 
PCR, but no sinks were sampled.  Other studies have generally focussed on antibiotic 
resistant Gram-negative bacteria from the environment such as extended spectrum β-
lactamase producers, and not on the species.  In such studies, detection rates range 
between 3.8% – 30%.(174, 197, 203, 211, 419, 424, 440)  
Most of the sites detected as positive in this and other studies were those linked to 
moisture i.e. sinks or baths.(424)  Contaminated surfaces in a similar study included 
baths (8 times), bed rails (2), remote (1), and baby scales (2).  Of the 18 positive 
samples, 15 of the isolates were Klebsiella spp., two were E. coli and one isolate was 
Citrobacter freundii.  Of the 18 isolates, 10 were related to patient colonising 
organisms, 9 of which were Klebsiella spp.  The organisms found in the environment by 
this study were Pantoea spp. 6/11, Enterobacter spp. 3/11 and Klebsiella spp. 2/11.  
The sites in which Gram-negative organisms were detected differed to those usually 
colonised with MRSA that tend to be high touch sites. It is therefore possible that even 
if the same sites are sampled for both MRSA and Gram-negative bacteria, there may 
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be an underestimation of Gram-negative organisms within the environment if these do 
not include areas such as sinks.   
Variation in detection of Gram-negative organisms was not as wide as that seen with 
MRSA.  This is probably due to ease of culture, (i.e. biofilm), the degree of patient 
shedding (dependent on diarrhoea), sampling/culture methodology, difficulty of 
cleaning, and ongoing outbreaks.(174)   
In conclusion, this study has shown that extensive distribution of bacterial and viral 
contamination occurs outside of outbreaks. Sampling of these sites has been shown to 
be effective with the sampling methods used.  Extensive contamination exists within 
isolation cubicles and could present a source of cross transmission to other patients if 
transferred out of the cubicle environment.  Specific species isolation rates within this 
study are in line with others studies published in the literature but sampling strategies 
should be based upon the target species in order to avoid underestimation of pathogen 
contamination. 
Evidence of the Link between Environmental Contamination and HCAI 
Historically it has been stated that organisms within the inanimate hospital environment 
(particularly on surfaces and in the air) contribute negligibly to HCAI; however there 
now exists a general consensus that environmental cleanliness is important in 
controlling HCAI.(182)  During this study, we have demonstrated that microorganisms 
are able to survive within the environment both by experimental studies and by the use 
of TVCs and specific pathogen detection (see sections 3.3.2, 3.3.9.2 and 3.3.9.4.).  
Pathogenic organisms have been demonstrated both within this study and within the 
literature to be detected even in rooms where there is no obvious source, indicating 
survival beyond the length of one patient stay or transference of contamination from 
other patient rooms.(170)   There remains a need to prove that the environment acts as a 
source of HCAI by demonstrating a correlation between levels of bacterial 
contamination and HCAI levels. 
Wilson et al. (2011) utilized a randomized cross over trial within ITUs in two hospitals to 
demonstrate that enhanced cleaning reduced levels of environmental contamination 
and hand carriage of staff with Staphylococcus aureus.(434)  However, this reduction in 
environmental load (as measured by TVCs) did not impact on the acquisition of MRSA.  
Two other studies found that cleaning with disinfectant rather than detergent had no 
effect on HCAI rates. However, both studies mainly focused on floor contamination.(326, 
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443)  Wilcox et al. (2003) undertook a cross over study using hypochlorite vs neutral 
detergent on two elderly care medicine wards looking for detection of Clostridium 
difficile.  35% of 1128 environmental samples grew Clostridium difficile.(201)  Both wards 
were identical in design and had similar case mix but had different nursing and 
cleaning staff.  Both wards were cleaned with disinfectant. However whilst there was a 
significant decrease in cases on ward X from 8.9 – 5.3 cases/100 admissions 
(p=<0.05), this was not seen in ward Y. The reasons for this are unclear. One study 
has demonstrated that a reduction in HCAI MRSA infections with the use of an 
additional cleaner on the unit alongside a reduction in TVCs.(183)  It is however difficult 
to compare studies that discuss the use of cleaning in relation to HCAI rates as there 
are differences not only in cleaning products, cleaning staff and cleaning techniques, 
but also in sampling methodologies.  The multi-faceted nature of clinical interactions 
means that it is difficult to prove a correlation between reduction in environmental 
contamination and cross transmission.   
Another method for determining the relationship between the environment and cross 
transmission of infection is the use of statistical methods to determine whether entering 
a cubicle that has previously been occupied by a positive patient, and therefore 
potentially contaminated, affects acquisition risk.  The averages of eight studies related 
to hospital transmission including VRE, Acinetobacter baummannii, Clostridium difficile 
and MRSA showed an average 73% increased chance of acquisition if the previous 
patients occupying the room had been colonised/infected.(192)   
Studies have demonstrated that patients admitted to rooms previously occupied by 
colonised/infected patients with VRE had increased the chance of acquisition by 
between 37.1% and 87.5%.(170, 444-446)  Patients entering a room previously occupied by 
someone with Acinetobacter baumannii were 71.8% more likely to be colonised with 
Acinetobacter baumannii.  The same study demonstrated a 41.7% increased chance of 
acquiring Pseudomonas aeruginosa.  Environmental contamination with MRSA has 
been found to be a key component of MRSA colonisation pressure.(447)  Finally one 
study determined that previous room occupancy by an MRSA positive patient 
increased the likelihood of MRSA acquisition by the current occupant by 28.8%. 
These studies demonstrate that factors that influence environmental contamination can 
impact of the risk of HCAI. However, the data is mixed, largely due to the complex 
relationship between environmental contamination and human disease.  
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we have developed a sampling methodology that we have then applied to 
the healthcare environment.  As part of this work, we have analysed the environmental 
variability of microorganisms with respect to object type at different height levels and in 
different zones around the patient bed.  The results demonstrate that organisms can be 
detected from the environment using the methods developed and that relationships 
between organisms and the environment are complex.  Changes occur within the 
distribution of TVCs both within wards from place to place and time to time, although 
some sites such as floors and sinks are more likely to have high levels of 
contamination.   
Specific pathogens were screened to determine the relationship between TVCs and 
detection of pathogenic species.  Our data demonstrates that in a dynamic hospital 
environment, a large proportion of sites screened for bacterial contamination would fail 
if using hygiene criteria suggested by previous authors, particularly those sites closest 
to the patients.  Paradoxically, many sites that did not have potentially pathogenic 
bacteria would fail while sites that were contaminated with potentially pathogenic 
bacteria would pass.  It may be more cost effective to use a pathogen specific panel for 
surveillance with the use of sentinel sites rather than TVCs at multiple sites with the 
ward environment. 
The importance of controlling specific pathogens is highlighted by the growing evidence 
of cross transmission, especially where patients are admitted to rooms of a previously 
positive patient.  In this context, HCAI prevention requires appropriate use of bed 
spaces and adequate discharge cleaning (see Chapter 5). Importantly, even in wards 
with a high proportion of single rooms, the shared areas will also be contaminated and 
must also be considered as potential sources of pathogens.  
The work presented in this chapter emphasises the importance of evidence based 
infection control policies.  These should not only include good hand hygiene practices, 
but should consider ward design and use of space as will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 4 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL TYPING OF CLINICAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENTEROBACTERIACEAE ISOLATES  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Great Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH) is a paediatric hospital with over 300 beds.  
Within GOSH the hospital has a policy of active screening for resistant Gram-negative 
bacterial carriage and infection of all patients both on admission and in high risk 
patients (such as those on the haematopoietic stem cell transplantation unit (HSCTU)).  
GOSH defines multi-drug resistant (MDR) Gram-negative bacteria as being: 
Gentamicin resistant plus resistant to at least one other antibiotic of the following: 
Amikacin, Ciprofloxacin, Ceftazidime or Piptazobactam; or resistance to Amikacin or 
the Carbapenems irrespective of Gentamicin resistance.(448)   Once a patient is 
identified as carrying an MDR Gram-negative, their record is tagged and the clinical 
isolate undergoes both phenotypic and molecular typing.  If the resistant species is 
detected more than 48 hours after admission, the patient is classified as having a 
healthcare associated infection (HCAI) and further infection control investigations are 
undertaken to identify a possible source.  These investigations are informed by the 
molecular typing results of that and other patient isolates. 
Of the antibiotic resistant Gram-negative bacterial species frequently detected within 
GOSH, the Enterobacteriaceae are the most common.  The family Enterobacteriaceae 
is comprised of a heterogeneous group of bacterial species. Enterobacter cloacae for 
instance may actually represent a large complex of over 12 genetic clusters and 
Klebsiella pneumoniae is comprised of three closely related sub species.(45, 69, 70, 449) 
Due to this diversity, typing accuracy is problematic which has important implications 
for epidemiological surveillance.(215, 221) 
Outbreaks caused by Enterobacter species (spp.), E. coli and Klebsiella spp. are often 
clonal in nature.  Therefore when outbreaks occur it is important to identify whether 
clusters of infections are due to a shared source, or due to polyclonal isolates of the 
same species.(69, 215)  Different techniques for typing of clonally linked isolates are 
available, with molecular techniques extensively exploited in recent years.   
Detection of diversity within closely related isolates requires typing schemes to have a 
high level of discrimination.(242)  Discrimination is especially important for outbreak 
investigations as both the parent and their descendent strains are often included in the 
same sample set.(69, 221, 450-452)  In addition to discrimination, techniques should be 
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accessible to clinical laboratories, reproducible, cost effective, easy to use, with easily 
interpretable results.(87, 255)  
In a survey of 154 clinical microbiology laboratories who routinely type isolates, the top 
four methods for typing were:(453) 
• Pulsed field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), used in 32% of centres  
• DNA sequencing used in 22% of centres.  This includes multi-locus sequence 
typing (MLST) and other capillary sequencer methods such as  multi-locus 
variable number tandem repeat (VNTR) typing  
• Random amplified polymorphic DNA (RAPD), repetitive extragenic palindromic 
sequence PCR (REP-PCR) or other fragment length typing schemes; used in 
16% of centres 
• Phenotypic methods; used in 2.2% of laboratories 
All of the above molecular typing schemes look at specific areas of the genome, 
whether through housekeeping genes or specific genomic sites (restriction sites, 
tandem repeats, repetitive extragenic palindromic sequences) and assume they are 
representative of entire genome diversity.(454)  However the genetic discrimination of 
bacterial isolates provided by these techniques may be limited and lack sufficient 
resolution to allow accurate inference of transmission events.(69, 220)  
To improve discrimination there has been a trend for strain typing methods to 
becoming increasingly species specific.(455)  This is partly because no single core of 
universal genes has been evaluated for typing for all pathogens.  Within the 
Enterobacteriaceae, difficulties with phenotypic identification make it advantageous to 
use a typing technique capable of crossing species boundaries.  With the advent of 
high throughput sequencing (HTS) for microorganisms new typing schemes are being 
developed based on either whole genome sequence (WGS) data or by targeted 
simultaneous sequencing of a number of genes (such as ribosomal genes).(241, 278, 395, 
456)  These have yet to be extensively evaluated for outbreak typing within the 
Enterobacteriaceae.    
Once data are acquired, there is variability in what different clinical microbiology 
laboratories use to define epidemiological relatedness.  This variability is greater with 
some schemes than others, and is a particular issue within newly developed typing 
techniques.(457) 
174 
 
Chapter 4 Epidemiological Typing of Clinical and Environmental Enterobacteriaceae Isolates 
4.1.1 CHAPTER AIMS 
The aim of this chapter was to develop and evaluate methods for undertaking 
molecular based typing of Enterobacteriaceae for routine use specifically with 
Klebsiella spp, Enterobacter spp and E. coli.  Once methods for typing were 
undertaken they were applied to an outbreak investigation occurring at GOSH in order 
to draw conclusions about which methods would prove suitable for continued use.  The 
specific aims are listed below: 
1. To develop a multi-locus variable number tandem repeat typing scheme for 
Enterobacter cloacae and to modify a published VNTR typing scheme for 
Klebsiella pneumoniae. 
2. To evaluate repetitive extragenic palindromic sequence PCR for typing of 
Enterobacter spp., Klebsiella spp, and E. coli.  
3. Undertake high throughput sequencing/whole genome sequencing using two 
platforms via two different methods on a group of 48 isolates comprising three 
species (the platforms and analysis of which are listed in section 4.2.4.) 
4. To compare data from aims 1, 2 and 3 in order to draw conclusions about how 
to undertake routine clinical typing to investigate outbreaks. 
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4.2 RESULTS  
4.2.1 ISOLATE SELECTION 
4.2.1.1 TYPING COMPARISON 
Forty eight isolates that were initially identified as Klebsiella pneumoniae were 
investigated by all techniques (PFGE, VNTR, REP-PCR, Pathogenica, Phyloshift and 
whole genome sequencing (WGS)) and the results for typing methods compared in 
section 4.2.5.  The isolates were temporally linked and detected from both the 
environment and patients during 2011 and 2012.  They represented the main PFGE 
types detected within that period at GOSH.  Isolates selected comprised a single large 
PFGE cluster of 25 indistinguishable isolates (GREA14KL-7) that were believed to be 
linked to the outbreak described in section 4.2.5.1.  Three other small clusters of 
identical PFGE types were chosen, one where cross transmission was believed 
possible on the cardiac intensive care unit (CICU) but had not been confirmed 
(GREA14KL-3) and two where there was no crossover of patients and so the isolates 
were considered unconnected (GREA14KL-4 and GREA14KL-9).  Other isolates were 
selected as they were unique by PFGE.  In addition to the single ward where an 
outbreak was believed to have occurred (HSCTU), isolates came from a number of 
different wards, mostly surgical and private patient wards.  One isolate was from a 
sample was collected within outpatients from patient 3 (isolate no. 3). Environmental 
isolates originated from samples processed from two wards (HSCTU and CICU) where 
cross transmission may have occurred.   
As details of these samples was sent for external analysis these 48 isolates are 
referred to as isolates 1 – 48 in sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.  The additional isolate 
numbers for those isolates used to validate both REP-PCR and VNTR analysis are 
also listed in Table 4-1 along. Cluster numbering has been kept consistent between 
analysis of typing techniques for these isolates where possible.    On subsequent 
identification via MALDI-ToF post typing analysis four of the isolate tested were 
identified as Klebsiella oxytoca and one was identified as E. asburiae, this was tested 
but removed from HTS and WGS analysis to permit better cluster resolution. 
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4.2.1.2 REPETITIVE EXTRAGENIC PALINDROMIC SEQUENCE PCR VALIDATION  
In addition to the 48 eight isolates investigated by all typing techniques a further 11 
isolates detected from environmental samples during 2011 and 2012 were included in 
the REP-PCR typing analysis for both comparison with PFGE and determination of 
analysis similarity cut-offs, see Table 4-1.  Of these seven three were identified by 
biochemical analysis as Enterobacter cloacae and four as Klebsiella oxytoca (see 
methods section 2.3.2.5). One of the Klebsiella oxytoca isolates was subsequently 
identified as Klebsiella pneumonia by MALDI-ToF identification (sample S20262).  
Additionally one of the Enterobacter cloacae isolates was subsequently identified as 
Klebsiella pneumoniae by MALDI-ToF (sample S67498).  These isolates were included 
in this typing technique validation to explore the way that closely related 
Enterobacteriaceae performed. 
Intra-laboratory reproducibility was investigated for both E. coli and Klebsiella 
pneumoniae using nine isolates for each; which represented the first resistant isolate of 
patients newly diagnosed with MDR Gram-negative flora, either as carriage or causing 
infection during 2008 (see section 4.2.3.2.).  
Intra-laboratory reproducibility for Enterobacter spp. was validated using 18 isolated 
detected during 2000 – 2001.  These isolates were selected as they occurred during a 
period of frequent Enterobacter spp. detection within GOSH and thus permitted 
sufficient numbers to be processed to permit analysis to be undertaken (see section 
4.2.3.2.) 
Inter-laboratory reproducibility was tested using a panel of E. coli and Klebsiella 
pneumoniae isolates provided as part of an international study (see section 4.2.3.3.). 
4.2.1.3 MULTI-LOCUS VARIABLE NUMBER TANDEM REPEAT VALIDATION 
In addition to the 48 eight isolates investigated by all typing techniques a further six of 
the additional isolates that underwent REP-PCR typing also underwent VNTR typing, 
see Table 4-1.  These included environmental isolates identified as Klebsiella oxtoca 
and Enterobacter cloacae species.  The Klebsiella pneumoniae VNTR scheme 
validated was specific for Klebsiella pneumoniae and so isolates of other species were 
included to see how this typing scheme would perform.   
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Isolate No. Isolate Source PFGE VNTR REP-PCR Pathogenica Phyloshift MiSeq 
 
 
MiSeq 
 
 
1 Patient 1 Unique X X X X X X 
2 Patient 2 Unique X X X X X X 
3 Patient 3 Unique X X X X X X 
4 Patient 4 Unique X X X X X X 
5 Patient 5 * GREA14KL-4 X X ND ND ND ND 
6 Patient 6 Unique X X X X X X 
7 Patient 7 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
8 Patient 8 GREA14KL-3 X X X X X X 
9 Patient 5 GREA14KL-3 X X X X X X 
10 Patient 25 Unique X X X X X X 
11 Patient 23 GREA14KL-3 X X X X X X 
12 Patient 24 Unique X X X X X X 
13 Patient 9 Unique X X X X X X 
14 Patient 10 Unique X X X X X X 
15 Patient 11 Unique X X X X X X 
16 Environmental Unique X X X X X X 
17 Environmental # Unique X X X X X X 
18 Environmental GREA14KL-4 X X X X X X 
19 Patient 12 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
20 Environmental GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
21 Patient 13 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
22 Patient 14 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
23 Patient 12 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
24 Patient 12 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
25 Patient 15 GREA14KL- X X X X X X 
26 Patient 16 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
27 Patient 14 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
28 Patient 16 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
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29 Patient 17 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
30 Patient 13 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
31 Patient 18 Unique X X X X X X 
32 Patient 19 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
33 Patient 18 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
34 Patient 20 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
35 Environmental # GREA14KL-9 X X X X X X 
36 Environmental GREA14KL-9 X X X X X X 
37 Environmental # GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
38 Patient 17 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
39 Patient 21 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
40 Patient 22 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
41 Patient 15 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
NCTC 13368 Klebsiella spp. type strain Unique X X X X X X 
43 Environmental GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
44 Environmental GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
45 Environmental GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
46 Environmental # Unique X X X X X X 
47 Environmental GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
48 Patient 15 GREA14KL-7 X X X X X X 
S67498 Environmental 
 
ND X X ND ND ND ND 
S20245 Environmental # ND X X ND ND ND ND 
S20253 Environmental # ND X X ND ND ND ND 
S50381 Environmental ₰ ND ND X ND ND ND ND 
S50380-1 Environmental ₰ ND ND x ND ND ND ND 
S50380-2 Environmental ₰ ND ND X ND ND ND ND 
S50404 Environmental ₰ ND ND X ND ND ND ND 
S50403 Environmental ₰ ND ND X ND ND ND ND 
S20255 Environmental ₰ ND X X ND ND ND ND 
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S20260 Environmental ND X X ND ND ND ND 
S20262 Environmental ₰ ND X X ND ND ND ND 
Table 4-1  Isolates selected for typing comparison study along with PFGE type where available.  Table lists which tests were  
undertaken, study number and sample number, as well as the source of the sample. ₰ = E. cloacae # = Klebsiella oxytoca, * = 
Enterobacter asburiae. Boxes coloured green = typing technique undertaken on isolate, boxes coloured with technique not done on 
isolate. NA – not applicable, ND – not done. 
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4.2.2 VARIABLE NUMBER TANDEM REPEAT TYPING SCHEME DEVELOPMENT AND 
VALIDATION AGAINST PULSE FIELD GEL ELECTROPHORESIS 
4.2.2.1 ENTEROBACTER CLOACAE 
Enterobacter cloacae was selected as the target organism for initial VNTR design as 
there was no published VNTR scheme available, and along with Klebsiella spp. it 
represented the species most frequently linked with detection from sinks during 
sampling within GOSH (see Chapter 3).   
The initial validation of 15 potential loci was performed on 24 isolates from Public 
Health England (PHE) and GOSH as well as two type strains (NCTC 10005 and ATCC 
700323) (see methods section 2.2.10.1).  Of the 15 loci, four were identified as 
potentially discriminatory, containing variable numbers of repeats and little or no primer 
cross reactivity with other sites within the Enterobacter cloacae genome (see Table 
4-2.). Several of the isolates tested failed to amplify at any loci indicating they were not 
correctly identified phenotypically as Enterobacter cloacae while the type strains did 
(see Figure 4-1.) 
Locus Outcome 
Locus 7 Nucleotide position 3162518 – 3162545, repeat size of 7 bases demonstrated 
minimal variation with only 2 differences in repeat number. 
Locus 10 Nucleotide position 835605 – 835645, repeat size of 18 bases demonstrated at 
least 3 different numbers of repeats,  
Locus 12 
(Figure 
4-1) 
Nucleotide position 4521760 – 4522318, repeat size of 189 bases demonstrated 
at least 5 different numbers of repeats  
Locus 14 Nucleotide position 4687849 – 4687879, repeat size of 9 bases demonstrated at 
least 4 different repeat numbers  
Table 4-2 E. cloacae VNTR discrinatory loci validation results. 
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Figure 4-1  QiAxcel automated electrophoresis gel of 24 isolates amplified by 
Enterobacter cloacae VNTR locus 12 PCR primers. 
4.2.2.2 KLEBSIELLA PNEUMONIAE 
54 isolates were used to validate a modified version of the VNTR scheme published by 
Turton et al. (2010) as described in methods section 2.2.10.2. (55)  The sample included 
seven isolates identified by matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization time-of-flight 
mass spectrometry (MALDI-ToF MS) as Klebsiella oxytoca and one isolate of 
Enterobacter asburiae as well as 46 of Klebsiella pneumoniae (see methods section 
2.3.2.5.).  Nine loci were selected, six from the published assay, plus loci N1, N2, and 
N4 which are utilised for in-house VNTR typing by the reference laboratory (Figure 
4-2).   PFGE had been performed in 48 of the 54 isolates. 
 
Figure 4-2 Isolates 14 and 33 respectively amplified using nine loci Klebsiella 
pneumoniae VNTR primers (A, E, H, J, K, D, N1, N2 and N4) visualised on a 1.5% 
agarose gel stained with ethidium bromide. 
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Isolates were allocated to the same cluster if the number of repeats were the same 
across all nine loci or differed by only one repeat at one locus. Using this definition 
three clusters were apparent for the isolates tested, cluster 3 (purple), cluster 4 (blue) 
and cluster 5 (pink) (see Table 4-3).  Cluster 4 was comprised of two sub clusters, 4a 
(mid blue), cluster 4b (light blue).  When epidemiological information was included 
cluster 5 was re-classified as part of cluster four, forming a third sub cluster, 4d (see 
methods section 2.7).    With the exception of isolate no. 44, all isolates within cluster 
4d were identical.  22 of the isolates were determined to be unique by VNTR (green).  
Including all but one of the non Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates, the exception being 
S20245. Cluster 4b was the predominant sub-cluster within cluster 4. 
 VNTR Locus 
Isolate No. A E H J K D N1 N2 N4 
15 8 4 - - 2 2 3 3 1 
10 6 4 0 1 2 2 1 4 1 
1 6 2 1 1 2 1 3 3 1 
16 5 5 - 19 2 2 4 3 1 
13 5 5 0 - 2 2 4 3 1 
4 5 4 0 - 2 2 4 3 1 
18 3 5 2 - 2 1 3 4 1 
6 3 5 2 14 2 1 3 4 1 
11 3 5 2 14 2 1 3 4 1 
8 3 5 2 14 2 1 3 4 1 
9 3 5 2 14 2 1 3 4 1 
14 3 1 2 0 1 1 1 3 1 
S20260 2 - - - - - - 4 1 
2 2 3 5 1 1+ 2 4 2 1 
3 2 3 1 0 1 1 4 1 1 
NCTC 13368 1 - - - - 1 1 3 3 
5 EA 1 - - - 0 2 1 4 1 
12 1 3 1 14 2 2 2 3 1 
24 1 2 4 1 0 3 1 4 1 
26 1 2 4 1 0 3 1 4 1 
29 1 2 4 1 0 3 1 4 1 
45- 1 2 4 1 0 3 1 4 1 
S20245 KO 1 2 4 1 0 3 1 4 1 
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7 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
19 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
23 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
22 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
S67498 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
20 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
21 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
25 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
30 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
28 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
27 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
33 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
32 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
34 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
36 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
47 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
S20253 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
40 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
43 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
41 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 4 1 
44 1 2 4 1 0 3 1 2 1 
48 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 2 1 
38 1 2 4 1 0 2 1 2 1 
39 1 0 0 0 1 1 3 3 3 
S20255 KO 0 - - - - - - 12 1 
37 KO 0 - - - - 2 1 12 - 
35 KO 0 - - - - 2 1 12 1 
46 KO 0 - - - 1 1 3 - 3 
S20262 KO 0 - - - 0 2 1 12 1 
31 - - - 1 0 1 1 - 1 
17 KO - - - - - - - - 1 
Table 4-3 VNTR typing results with nine loci for 54 isolates.  Isolates were 
clustered if they were had identical VNTR types or altered by one repeat at one. 
Clusters are colour coded: unique = green, cluster 3 = purple, cluster 4 = 
blue/pink (4a = mid blue, VNTR 4b = light blue, VNTR cluster 4d/5 = pink) EA = E. 
asburiae, KO = K. oxytoca. 
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Loci Variation 
Locus J had the largest number of repeats present of all the loci, with up to 19 repeats 
detected.   Locus A had the greatest variety of repeat numbers detected, with eight 
different numbers of repeats detected, including no amplification of the locus.  This 
suggests that Locus A has the highest discriminatory power of all loci.  Within the 
outbreak strain (cluster 4) at Locus D, 22 isolates had two repeats and six isolates had 
three repeats.  At Locus N2, 25 isolates had four repeats and three isolates had two 
repeats.  One isolate (44) had alterations from the 1,2,4,1,0,3,1,4,1 VNTR profile at two 
locations, D and N2 (see Table 4-3).  Locus N4 demonstrated the lowest level of 
tandem repeat diversity, with only four isolates having a repeat size other than one.  
One isolate (37) failed to amplify at this locus and the other three isolates had three 
repeats (samples 39, 46 and NCTC 13368).   
Inter-Laboratory Validation 
Thirteen of the isolates also underwent VNTR typing at the PHE.  Amplicons at the 
PHE were visualised using gel electrophoresis.  These results were compared to 
GOSH study VNTR results where analysis was undertaken using capillary 
electrophoresis.  Except for Locus J where visualisation was undertaken with both gel 
and capillary electrophoresis due to the size of the repeat (see Table 4-4.).  
Comparative results indicate that it is possible to differentiate repeat sizes using the 
two methods.  However five of the thirteen VNTR types differed by at least one repeat 
at one locus between analysis at the two centres, only one sample differed by more 
than one repeat at more than one locus.  Isolates 17 and 33 had differences in Locus 
N4, when using the two different analysis methods.  Isolate 11 had a repeat difference 
of one (13 vs 14) at Locus J despite them both being visualised using gel 
electrophoresis.  Isolate 5 had different repeat sizes at 7/9 loci indicating an alternative 
isolate may have been tested.  Isolate 16 had an insertion sequence (IS) detected in 
Locus J, there are no consensus rules for determining this.   
Isolate No. PHE VNTR Study VNTR 
5 3,5,2,-,2,1,3,4,1 1,-,-,-,0,2,1,4,1 
6 3,5,2,14,2,1,3,4,1 3,5,2,14,2,1,3,4,1 
8 3,5,2,14,2,1,3,4,1 3,5,2,14,2,1,3,4,1 
9 3,5,2,14,2,1,3,4,1 3,5,2,14,2,1,3,4,1 
11 3,5,2,13,2,1,3,4,1 3,5,2,14,2,1,3,4,1 
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16 5,5,-,IS,2,2,4,3,1 5,5,-,19,2,2,4,3,1 
17 No amplicons ,-,-,-,-,-,-,-,-,1 
19 1,2,4,1,0,2,1,4,1 1,2,4,1,0,2,1,4,1 
20 1,2,4,1,0,2,1,4,1 1,2,4,1,0,2,1,4,1 
23 1,2,4,1,0,2,1,4,1 1,2,4,1,0,2,1,4,1 
27 1,2,3,1,0,2,1,4,1 1,2,4,1,0,2,1,4,1 
29 1,2,4,1,0,2,1,4,1 1,2,4,1,0,3,1,4,1 
33 1,2,4,1,0,2,1,4,- 1,2,4,1,0,2,1,4,1 
Table 4-4 Comparison of 13 VNTR sample resuts detected via gel electrophoresis 
(PHE) and capillary electrophoresis (GOSH) IS = insertion sequence. 
Comparison with Pulse Field Gel Electrophoresis Results 
PFGE typing was performed on 48 isolates by the PHE, which is considered to be the 
reference standard.  This was done as part of the routine clinical service and was 
compared to VNTR and the results are shown in Table 4-5.(55, 236)   For 41/48 (85%) of 
these isolates clustering was identical between the two techniques.   Nineteen of the 48 
isolates were unique when typed using VNTR, of these 15 were also unique when 
typed using PFGE.  When the VNTR data was compared to the available PFGE data 
all of the isolates within cluster 3 had a PFGE profile of GREA14KL-3, apart from 
isolate 6 which was previously considered unique.  This was the earliest isolate within 
this cluster and so may have been considered to have a unique PFGE profile when 
initially tested.  Isolates 5 and 18 were considered to be linked by PFGE forming the 
cluster GREA14KL-4, but were unique when using VNTR.  By PFGE isolate 37 was 
determined to be part of the GREA14KL-7 cluster, but this isolate had a unique profile 
by VNTR.  This isolate was initially identified as a Klebsiella pneumoniae by 
biochemical phenotypic identification, but during this study the isolate was 
subsequently identified as Klebsiella oxytoca by MALDI-ToF (see methods section 
2.3.2.5.).  Similarly isolate 36 was originally identified as Klebsiella oxytoca, but the 
isolate cultured and processed for this study was identified using MALDI-ToF MS as 
Klebsiella pneumoniae.  The initial PFGE profile for this isolate clustered it with isolate 
35; which was taken from the same surface at the same time.  The VNTR result on this 
isolate links it with cluster 4 as part of PFGE group GREA14KL-7 rather than 
GREA14KL-9.  With the above noted exceptions all isolates typed by PFGE as 
GREA14Kl-7 clustered within VNTR cluster 4 (see Table 4-5.). 
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Isolate No. PFGE VNTR 
1 Unique Unique 
2 Unique Unique 
3 Unique Unique 
4 Unique Unique 
5 GREA1L-4 Unique 
6 Unique 3 
7 GREA14KL-7 4a 
8 GREA14KL-3 3 
9 GREA14KL-3 3 
10 Unique Unique 
11 GREA14KL-3 3 
12 Unique Unique 
13 Unique Unique 
14 Unique Unique 
15 Unique Unique 
16 Unique Unique 
17 Unique Unique 
18 GREA14KL-4 Unique 
19 GREA14KL-7 4a 
20 GREA14KL-7 4a 
21 GREA14KL-7 4a 
22 GREA14KL-7 4a 
23 GREA14KL-7 4a 
24 GREA14KL-7 4b 
25 GREA14KL-7 4a 
26 GREA14KL-7 4b 
27 GREA14KL-7 4a 
28 GREA14KL-7 4a 
29 GREA14KL-7 4b 
30 GREA14KL-7 4a 
31 Unique Unique 
32 GREA14KL-7 4a 
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33 GREA14KL-7 4a 
34 GREA14KL-7 4a 
35 GREA14KL-9 Unique 
36 GREA14KL-9 4a 
37 GREA14KL-7 Unique 
38 GREA14KL-7 4d 
39 GREA14KL-7 Unique 
40 GREA14KL-7 4a 
41 GREA14KL-7 4a 
NCTC 13368 Unique Unique 
43 GREA14KL-7 4a 
44 GREA14KL-7 4d 
45 GREA14KL-7 4b 
46 Unique Unique 
47 GREA14KL-7 4a 
48 GREA14KL-7 4d 
Table 4-5 Comparison of PFGE and VNTR results for 48 isolates.  VNTR clusters 
are colour coded:  purple = cluster 3 and blue = cluster 4 (light blue = 4b, mid 
blue = 4a and dark blue = 4d). 
4.2.3 REPETITIVE EXTRAGENIC PALINDROMIC SEQUENCE PCR VALIDATION 
AGAINST PULSE FIELD GEL ELECTROPHORESIS 
4.2.3.1 DETERMINING SIMILARITY CUT-OFFS FOR KLEBSIELLA SPECIES 
USING REPETITIVE EXTRAGENIC PALINDROMIC SEQUENCE PCR 
59 isolates detected from both patient and environmental samples during 2011 and 
2012 were processed by REP-PCR as described in methods section 2.2.11.1.  Isolates 
including 24 environmental samples and 35 patient samples from 23 patients on seven 
wards as described in 4.2.1.      
No consensus was available for interpretation of isolate relatedness using REP-PCR 
based linked to percentage similarity.  In order to determine a suitable analysis cut-off 
for outbreak isolates results were analysed using both available analysis algorithms, 
and different similarity cut-offs (see methods section 2.2.11.1.). 
All isolates were interpreted with either Pearson Correlation Co-efficient (PC) or the 
Kullback-Leibler (KL) analysis using 98%, 95%, 93% and 91% similarity cut-offs to 
determine clustering. See Table 4-6.   
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Sample 
No. 
PC 98 PC 95 PC 93 PC 91 KL 98 KL 95 KL 93 KL 91 
1 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
2 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
3 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
4 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
5 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
6 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
7 4e 4e 4e 4b 4e 4e 4b 4b 
8 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
9 Unique 3 3 3 Unique 3 3 3 
10 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
11 Unique 3 3 3 Unique 3 3 3 
12 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
13 Unique Unique 1 1 Unique Unique Unique Unique 
14 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
15 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
16 Unique Unique 1 1 Unique Unique Unique Unique 
17 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
18 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
19 4e 4e 4e 4b 4e 4e 4b 4b 
20 4d 4d 4d 4d Unique 4d 4d 4d 
21 Unique 4a 4a 4a Unique 4a 4a 4a 
22 4e 4e 4e 4b 4e 4e 4b 4b 
23 Unique Unique 4a 4a Unique Unique Unique Unique 
24 Unique 4a 4a 4a Unique 4a 4a 4a 
25 Unique 4c 4c 4c Unique Unique 1 1 
26 4e 4e 4e 4b 4e 4e 4b 4b 
27 4e 4e 4e 4b 4e 4e 4b 4b 
28 4d 4d 4d 4d 4d 4d 4d 4d 
29 4d 4d 4d 4d 4d 4d 4d 4d 
30 4e 4e 4e 4b 4e 4e 4b 4b 
31 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
32 Unique 4e 4e 4b Unique 4e 4b 4b 
33 4f 4b 4b 4b 4f 4b 4b 4b 
189 
 
Chapter 4 Epidemiological Typing of Clinical and Environmental Enterobacteriaceae Isolates 
34 4f 4b 4b 4b 4f 4b 4b 4b 
35 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
36 Unique 4b 4b 4b Unique 4b 4b 4b 
37 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
38 Unique 4b 4b 4b Unique 4b 4b 4b 
39 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
40 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
41 4d 4d 4d 4d Unique 4d 4d 4d 
42 Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique Unique 
43 4b 4b 4b 4b 4b 4b 4b 4b 
44 Unique Unique Unique 4a Unique 4g 4g 4g 
45 Unique 4d 4d 4d Unique 4d 4d 4d 
46 8 8 8 8 Unique 8 8 8 
47 Unique 4b 4b 4b Unique 4g 4g 4g 
48 Unique 4e 4e 4b Unique 4e 4b 4b 
S67498 Unique 4a 4a 4a Unique 4a 4a 4a 
S20245 4b 4b 4b 4b 4b 4b 4b 4b 
S20253 Unique 4c 4c 4c Unique Unique 1 1 
S50381 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
S50380-1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
S50380-2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
S50404 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
S50403 2 2 2 2 Unique 2 2 2 
S20255 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
S20260 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
S20262 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Table 4-6 59 isolates detected in 2011 and 2012 processed by REP-PCR and  
interpreted with both the Pearson Correlation Co-efficient and the Kullback-
Leibler analysis using 98%, 95%, 93% and 91% similarity cut-offs to determine 
clustering.  Isolates where changing analysis type or similarity cut-off altered 
isolate clustering are coloured red.  Isolates with only low intensity traces 
available are coloured green (samples 31 and 45). 
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For 39/59 isolates results were unaltered by changing the analysis algorithm or 
similarity cut-off, as long as sub-clusters of cluster 4 were only counted at the main 
cluster 4 level (see Table 4-6.).  Two isolates 31 and 45 only had low intensity traces 
available, which may affect data reliability (see methods section 2.2.11.1.) 
Two isolates (13 and 16) were determined to be identical from cluster 1 by PC analysis 
at cut-offs 93% and 91%.  Both were however determined to be unique by all KL 
analysis.  Isolate 23 was determined to be unique by KL analysis and was also classed 
as unique utilising PC analysis with 98% and 95% cut-offs.  Isolate 44 was clustered as 
part of cluster 4 using KL analysis at 95%, 93% and 91% similarity cut-offs, and was 
considered to be unique when analysed by PC analysis at all thresholds.   
For PC analysis, results varied for 13 isolates between the 98% and 95% cut-offs, all of 
which went from being called unique to being part of a cluster.  If the similarity cut-off 
was adjusted from 95% to 93% isolates 13 and 16 were clustered together instead of 
being called unique.  Finally if a 91% cut-off was used, isolate 44 was considered as 
part of cluster 4, instead of being considered unique. 
When using the KL analysis 16 sample results varied between the 98% and 95% cut-
offs, all of which went from being called unique to being part of a cluster.  Two results 
would be altered using a similarity cut-off of 93% instead of 95%, samples 25 and 
S20243 would cluster together as a new cluster.  No results would change by using a 
91% threshold instead of a 93% for KL analysis. 
When combined with epidemiological information it was felt that using a either a 93% or 
a 91% cut-off using PC analysis would present an accurate epidemiological picture and 
therefore the more conservative 93% cut-off was used for data analysis see methods 
section 2.7.  
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4.2.3.2 INTRA-LABORATORY REPRODUCIBILITY 
 
Enterobacter spp. 
The use of REP-PCR for typing of Enterobacter spp. was evaluated through 
retrospective typing of 18 MDR Enterobacter spp. isolates that were detected at GOSH 
in 2000 and 2001.  Samples were processed as discussed in the methods section 
2.2.11.1. To determine intra-laboratory reproducibility all extracts were run in at least 
duplicate.  All isolates had also been processed for PFGE by the PHE, which was 
considered to be the reference standard.(87, 236)   
All samples processed attained the minimum levels of amplification required to be 
included in analysis (see methods section 2.2.11.1.) which was undertaken using the 
Pearson Correlation Co-efficient with a 93% similarity cut-off (as decided in section 
4.2.3.1.).   
REP-PCR results for Enterobacter spp. demonstrated good reproducibility when 
replicates of samples were tested, see Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4.  However sample 
00B61229a did not cluster with either 00B61229b or 00B61229c.   
Reproducibility did not appear to vary as a result of PFGE type.  Additionally on the 
whole samples with the same PFGE group did cluster together by REP-PCR analysis.  
However, there were a few exceptions: 00B59823 (a and b) and 00B31316 (a and b) 
clustered within PFGE group B, but by REP-PCR they clustered with one sample linked 
with PFGE type E (00B4586), and another sample linked to PFGE type C 
(00B34811b).  
REP-PCR could not discriminate between PFGE types: A/D, E or G as demonstrated 
by the single cluster seen by REP-PCR analysis.  PFGE types H and K also clustered 
together by REP-PCR with the exception of sample 00B38661 (a and b); which 
although part of PFGE type K clustered separately from all other samples.  
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Figure 4-3 Dendrogram demonstrating REP-PCR results for 18 Enterobacter spp. 
isolates from 18 patients detected between 2000-2001 along with with PFGE 
results.  Processing was performed in duplicate and analysed by Pearson 
Correlation Co-efficient.  Colour coding: PFGE type H = peach, PFGE type K = 
dark pink, PFGE type A/D = green, PFGE type E = bright pink, PFGE type G = 
aqua, PFGE type B = purple and PFGE type B = light pink (continued on next 
page).  
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Figure 4-4 Continued from Figure 4-3 above. 
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Klebsiella Species 
The use of REP-PCR for typing of Klebsiella spp. was evaluated through retrospective 
typing of nine isolates.  These isolates represented the first resistant isolate of patients 
newly detected with MDR Gram-negative flora in 2008 as identified within methods 
section 2.3.2.5., either as carriage or causing infection.  To determine intra-laboratory 
reproducibility all isolates were run in duplicate and analysed using the Pearson 
Correlation Co-efficient using a >93% similarity cut-off.   
All isolate duplicates grouped in pairs at >98% similarity when analysed using the 
Pearson Correlation Co-efficient, indicating that they were indistinguishable, except for 
08B56878 (see Figure 4-5).  The fingerprints for 08B56878 and 08B56878A clustered 
at ≥95% and were identical when overlaid, with one band of 08B56878 demonstrating 
increased intensity over those seen in 08B56878A.  This led to the two samples 
appearing to be less closely related, but were still considered indistinguishable using 
93% similarity as a cut-off. Two unrelated individual samples (08B17954 and 08B0262) 
were indistinguishable.  Further investigation revealed that these isolates related to 
patients who had not been epidemiologically linked as in-patients, but had attended the 
same outpatient unit, haematology oncology day unit (HODU), on the same day. 
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Figure 4-5 Dendrogram demonstrating REP-PCR results of nine Klebsiella 
species isolates from nine patients performed in duplicate and analysed by 
Pearson Correlation Co-efficient. 
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E.coli 
The use of REP-PCR for typing of E. coli was evaluated through retrospective typing of 
nine isolates.  These isolates represented the first resistant isolate of patients newly 
diagnosed with MDR Gram-negative flora in 2008 as identified within methods section 
2.2.11.1.  To determine intra-laboratory reproducibility all isolates were run in duplicate 
and analysed using the Pearson Correlation Co-efficient using a >93% similarity cut-
off.    
 
Figure 4-6 Dendrogram demonstrating REP-PCR results of nine E. coli isolates 
from nine patients performed in duplicate and analysed by Pearson Correlation 
Co-efficient 
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All E. coli duplicates grouped in pairs at >98% similarity when analysed using the 
Pearson Correlation Co-efficient, indicating that they were indistinguishable using a 
>93% cut-off (Figure 4-6).  In addition two individual samples (08B04974 and 
08B45932) were indistinguishable despite having no previously known epidemiological 
links.  Further investigation revealed that these isolates related to patients who had not 
been epidemiologically linked as in-patients, but had attended the same outpatient unit 
(HODU) on the same day.  These were different patients to those investigated within 
the above Klebsiella REP-PCR section. 
4.2.3.3 INTER-LABORATORY COMPARISON  
To understand inter-laboratory reproducibility of the REP-PCR typing system, work was 
undertaken as part of an international study involving 11 participating centres in six 
countries across Europe (Austria, England, Germany, Spain, The Netherlands) and 
Canada.(458)  In total 39 E. coli isolates and 39 Klebsiella spp. that had been previously 
typed by PFGE were selected from the collection of the Hospital Hygiene Department 
in Bronovo Hospital, Netherlands and were sent out to the 11 centres.  The centres 
were anonymised to the PFGE clustering.  
Isolates were processed as discussed in methods section 2.2.11.1. as per the shared 
study protocol.  Data was analysed using the Pearson Correlation Co-efficient with 
Isolates demonstrating a similarity of <95% considered different and isolates with a 
similarity >98% considered indistinguishable.  Isolates between 95% and 98% 
analysed by looking at individual peaks to determine relatedness.  
Low intensity traces (see methods section 2.2.11.1.) were only used if no satisfactory 
traces could be acquired after six repeats being processed.  In total typing data was 
available for analysis for 425 of 429 E. coli and 422 of 429 Klebsiella spp. Four E. coli 
isolates were not processed or determined non-typable (<1%) and one showed no 
amplification in one of the centres (<1%) and six of the Klebsiella spp. samples (1%) 
were not processed. The analyses by the individual centres were confirmed by the 
central laboratory.  
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Klebsiella pneumoniae Comparison Results 
PFGE was used as a reference standard to permit comparison of results between 
centres.  PFGE identified one cluster of six isolates, three clusters of three isolates, 
three clusters of two isolates, and 18 unique isolates.  In comparison, our study 
identified four clusters: 1 containing five isolates, 2 containing two isolates, 3 containing 
two isolates, 4 containing two isolates plus 28 unique isolates for Klebsiella spp. (see 
Table 4-7). Compared to results seen at other centres our results demonstrated 
increased levels of unique isolate interpretation for Klebsiella spp., although our isolate 
clustering broadly agreed with other centres.   
After six repeat PCRs, four samples failed to demonstrate amplification that met the 
minimum analysis criteria, i.e. low intensity traces.  These isolates (26K, 31K, 33K and 
36K) had the most acceptable low intensity trace included in the analysis.  All four low 
intensity traces failed to cluster with any other isolates (see Table 4-7). 
Of the isolates that were called unique: sample 33K was called unique by 2/11 centres 
with one additional centre finding it non-typable.  Within our centre, 33K demonstrated 
low intensity amplification, and may therefore have clustered appropriately with 02K if 
sufficient amplification had occurred.  5/11 centres identified 02K as unique, and 4/11 
centres clustered 33K with another isolate unrelated by PFGE.  31K also failed to 
amplify sufficiently to permit cluster identification; this isolate by PFGE should have 
clustered with 26K; which also had low intensity amplification, and 05K which was 
subsequently determined to be unique in our analysis.  10/11 centres found 05K to be 
unique by REP-PCR and 6/11 centres found that 26K and 31K clustered together.  36K 
should have clustered with 09K and 23K according to PFGE typing.  36K demonstrated 
low intensity amplification; however both 09K and 23K were identified as being unique 
despite sufficient peak sizes. 4/11 centres found all three of these isolates to be 
unique, with one centre reporting no growth from these isolates, thus preventing typing. 
Finally our centre identified clustering that was not seen with PFGE.  Cluster 2 
contained 03K and 19K, this finding was repeated by 9/11 centres.  Cluster 4 contained 
isolates 21K and 28K, this clustering was also identified by five other centres.  One 
cluster, 3, contained 38K and 15K, this finding was not repeated in any other centre.  
Three other centres clustered 38K with 21K, while 7/11 found this isolate to be unique, 
thus matching the PFGE type.   
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 PFGE Centre 8 Centre 9 Centre 4 Centre 1 Centre 10 Centre 11 Centre 6 Centre 2 Centre 3 Centre 7 Centre 5 
01K             
04K             
08K             
12K             
20K             
18K             
15K             
27K             
34K             
23K        NV     
09K        NV     
36K        NV     
02K             
33K           NT  
06K             
28K             
05K             
26K             
31K             
11K             
39K      
 
       
19K        NV     
03K             
37K             
35K           NT  
21K             
38K             
10K           NT  
29K      NT       
16K             
17K             
24K        NV     
30K      NT       
07K             
13K             
14K        NV     
22K             
25K             
32K             
Table 4-7  Comparison of the local clustering of Klebsiella spp. and the clustering of the isolates using PFGE. Isolates belonging 
to one cluster according to local analysis or PFGE are indicated by the same colour.  Isolates left blank were considered unique 
isolates according to central analysis.  GOSH results were those in centre 5.  NT: Non-typeable. NV: Non-viable.(458) 
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E. coli Comparison Results 
PFGE was used as a reference standard to permit comparison of results between 
centres.  Overall there was little correlation between PFGE type and REP-PCR type 
among any of the test centres (see Table 4-8.). 
PFGE identified one cluster of six isolates, three clusters of three isolates, three 
clusters of two isolates, and 18 unique isolates.  In comparison within our study eight 
clusters were identified: 1 containing two isolates, 2 containing three isolates, 3 
containing two isolates, 4 containing six isolates, 5 containing seven isolates, 6 
containing two isolates, 7 containing 2 isolates and 8 containing two isolates plus 13 
unique isolates. Compared to results seen at other centres our results demonstrated 
that the largest cluster found by three other centres formed two clusters in our centre.  
Apart from this, the isolate clustering in our centre agreed broadly with the other 
centres.   
After six repeat PCRs, four samples failed to demonstrate amplification that met the 
minimum analysis criteria, i.e. low intensity traces.  These isolates (02E, 15E, 28E and 
37E) had the most acceptable low intensity trace included in the analysis.  Three of the 
four isolates with low intensity failed to cluster with any other isolates, the fourth 37E 
clustered with 18E.  02E and 28E were unique by PFGE, but 15E should have 
clustered with 33E, 23E, 12E, 20E and 29E.  Within this PFGE cluster 20E was also 
determined to be unique by REP-PCR in our centre, this finding was not repeated in 
the other testing centres.   
The isolates determined to be unique by PFGE included 31E, 32E, 18E, 37E, 14E, 
24E, 25E, 13E, 11E, 35E, 07E, 27E, 02E, 04E, 08E, 10E, 21E and 28E.  Isolates 31E 
and 32E clustered together by REP-PCR in 9/11 centres.  18E and 37E clustered by 
REP-PCR in 7/11 centres.  Although determined to be unique by PFGE, isolates 14E, 
24E and 25E were identified as identical by 8/11 centres.  Two further centres found 
14E and 24E to be the same and another determined 24E and 25E to be linked.  
Isolate 11E was found to be unique by only 1/11 centre.  Our centre (Centre 5) found 
that it clustered with 12E and 13E, with three other centres repeated this finding.  Other 
centres clustered 11E with a number of different isolates (01E, 16E, 38E, 36E, 09E).  
One unique isolate (07E) by PFGE was clustered with 34E, 03E, 33E, 29E, 30E, 17E, 
01E, 16E, 38E, 36E.  This finding was not repeated in other centres. 
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PFGE Centre 1 Centre 2 Centre 3 Centre 4 Centre 5 Centre 6 Centre 7 Centre 8 Centre 9 Centre 10 Centre 11 
31E             
32E           NT  
22E       NA      
39E           NP  
18E             
37E             
14E             
24E             
25E             
34E             
06E             
03E           NT  
26E             
19E             
05E             
13E             
33E             
23E             
12E             
20E             
15E             
29E             
30E             
17E             
09E             
01E             
16E             
38E           NP  
36E             
11E             
35E             
07E             
27E             
02E             
04E             
08E             
10E        NP     
21E             
28E             
Table 4-8 Comparison of the local clustering of E. coli and the clustering of the isolates using PFGE. Isolates belonging to one 
cluster according to local analysis or PFGE are indicated by the same color.   Isolates left blank were considered unique 
isolates according to central analysis. GOSH results were those in centre 5.  NT: Non-typeable. NP: Not processed. NA = No 
amplification.(458) 
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4.2.3.4 COMPARISON WITH PULSE FIELD GEL ELECTROPHORESIS RESULTS 
PFGE was performed on 48 of the 59 Klebsiella spp. isolates as described in section 
4.2.1 by PHE, which is the reference standard. (236, 459),  Of the 48 samples typed using 
both methods 40/48 (83%) of results were in concordance by the two methods when 
using a 93% cut-off and PC analysis (see Figure 4-8).  18 isolates were determined to 
be unique by REP-PCR of which 14 were also considered unique by PFGE. 
Of those samples that were discrepant, isolate 8 clustered as part of GREA14KL-3 by 
PFGE along with samples 9 and 11; however when using REP-PCR analysis this 
sample was identified as unique.  
Isolate 16 was determined to be unique by PFGE, but clustered with isolate 13 by 
REP-PCR as part of cluster 1.  
Isolate 44 was counted as part of cluster GREA14KL-7 by PFGE, but was determined 
to be unique by REP-PCR.   
Isolate 25 was also counted as part of cluster GREA14KL-7 by PFGE, but clustered 
with sample 20253 (PFGE not performed) by REP-PCR.   
Isolate 39 clustered with GREA14KL-7 by PFGE, but was unique by REP-PCR. 
Three isolates (35, 37, and 46) clustered together (cluster 8) and were identified as 
Klebsiella oxytoca rather than Klebsiella pneumoniae by subsequent MALDI-ToF MS 
identification.  These isolates were originally identified by PFGE as GREA14KL-9, 
GREA14KL-7 and unique.   
 
203 
 
Chapter 4 Epidemiological Typing of Clinical and Environmental Enterobacteriaceae Isolates 
 
Figure 4-7 REP-PCR clustering of 59 isolates of four species using the Pearson 
Correlation Co-efficient at a 93% cut-off demonstrating six clusters main clusters 
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8) with cluster 4 consisting of 5 sub-clusters (4a – 4e).  PFGE were 
colour coded:  PFGE KL-7 = purple, PFGE KL-4 = pink, PFGE KL-3 = green, PFGE 
KL-9 = aqua, PFGE unique = peach and no PFGE results available = blue. 
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4.2.4 HIGH THROUGHPUT SEQUENCING VALIDATION AGAINST PULSE FIELD GEL 
ELECTROPHORESIS 
4.2.4.1 PATHOGENICA TYPING ANALYSIS VALIDATED AGAINST PULSE FIELD 
GEL ELECTROPHORESIS 
Typing was undertaken using the Pathogenica HAI Biodetection typing kit 
(Pathogenica, Boston, USA) (as described in the methods sections 2.2.9 and 2.8.4.) on 
48 Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates that were linked to both patients and the 
environment, see section 4.2.1.   One isolate (5) was subsequently identified as 
Enterobacter cloacae by the Pathogenica kit and Enterobacter asburiae  by MALDI-
ToF and so this was not included in the analysis.  Six main clusters were identified (1, 
2, 3, 4, and 7).  Cluster numbering was selected to maintain consistency across typing 
technique analysis, see Figure 4-8.  The main cluster (Cluster 4) included the large 
PFGE cluster GREA14KL-7, which it sub-clustered into five groups (4a – 4e).  In 
addition there was a more distant cluster, cluster 8; which contained isolates later 
identified by MALDI-ToF MS identification to be Klebsiella oxytoca (see methods 
section 2.3.2.5.). 
Comparison of PFGE and Pathogenica results demonstrated concordance in 33/47 
(70%) of results.  Five isolates were considered unique by both Pathogenica (isolates 
1, 3, 4, 14, 15), and by PFGE.  Pathogenica clustered three isolates which were unique 
by PFGE (2, 10, and 12) within a new cluster, cluster 2.  Another unique isolate, isolate 
6, clustered with isolates 8, 9 and 11, all of which havehad the PFGE type GREA14KL-
3.  Samples 13 and 16 had unique PFGE types, but cluster together by Pathogenica.   
Three unique isolates by PFGE (31, 39, and 42) formed cluster 7 by Pathogenica. 
Isolate 36 was identified by PFGE as GREA14KL-9, but was linked to PFGE cluster 
GREA14KL-7 by this HTS analysis. 
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Figure 4-8 Pathogenica typing of 43 Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates, identifying 
five clusters (1, 2, 3, 4, and 7) with sub-clustering identified within cluster 4 (4a – 
4e).  Blue boxes indicate unique isolates by Pathogenica analysis. 
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Four isolates (17, 35, 37, and 46) clustered together within cluster 8 and were identified 
as Klebsiella oxytoca rather than Klebsiella pneumoniae on subsequent identification 
(see Figure 4-9.).  These isolates were originally identified by PFGE as GREA14KL-9, 
GREA14KL-7 and unique.    
 
Figure 4-9 Pathogenica typing cluster 8 demonstrating the relationship between 
four Klebsiella oxytoca isolates. 
4.2.4.2 MISEQ DATA ANALYSIS VALIDATED AGAINST PULSE FIELD GEL 
ELECTROPHORESIS 
48 isolates underwent whole genome sequencing (WGS) on the Miseq platform 
(Illumina, San Diego, USA) as described in methods section 2.2.8.   The 48 isolates 
consisted of samples linked to both the environment and patients on two wards, with 
additional patient samples from five other wards.  These represented one large and 
three small clusters of isolates identified as indistinguishable by PFGE and isolates 
identified as unique (see section 4.2.1.).  Data from the MiSeq run was then sent to two 
different bioinformatics groups for phylogenetic analysis and the results subsequently 
compared. 
Full single nucleotide variant (SNV) analysis was not undertaken between samples as 
insufficient published information exists to determine the molecular clock within 
Klebsiella spp. and therefore the significance of individual SNVs.(51, 460)  However 
numbers of SNVs within clusters was used as a measure of cluster diversity.   
Four of these 48 isolates were identified as Klebsiella oxytoca on fresh identification by 
MALDI-ToF MS analysis (see methods section 2.3.2.5.).  These were included in 
MiSeq analysis one, but not in MiSeq analysis two.  The isolate from sample 5 was 
identified as Enterobacter asburiae by MALDI-ToF MS and WGS data and was 
therefore not included in the phylogenetic analysis. 
Inter-Laboratory Analysis Comparison 
MiSeq WGS on the 48 isolates was analysed independently by two separate centres to 
identify analysis reproducibility.  One blinded analysis was undertaken by Alex Rolfe 
(MiSeq analyais one) and the other by Piklu Bhattacharya (MiSeq analysis two) as 
described in methods sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2. 
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 MiSeq Data Analysis One 
MiSeq analysis one identified five clusters of related isolates (2, 3, 4, 7 and 8), with 
cluster 8 representing Klebsiella oxytoca, see Figure 4-10.   
 
Figure 4-10 Analysis of MiSeq sequencing data by Alex Rolfe including 47 
Klebsiella spp. isolates demonstrating five clusters (2, 3, 4, 7, and 8).  Cluster 8 
consists of Klebsiella oxytoca isolates, PFGE cluster GREA14KL-7 is 
represented by cluster 4.  
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Comparison of the analysed WGS data to PFGE results showed concordance in 31/47 
(66%) of isolates.  Three isolates were identified as unique during the analysis, all of 
which were also unique by PFGE.  The other isolates formed five clusters (2, 3, 4, 7 
and 8), the largest of which was cluster 4, which had no sub-clusters.  Cluster 4 
contained isolates identified as GREA14KL-7 by PFGE.  Of the results that did not 
match with PFGE isolates 2, 3, 10, 12, 13 and 15 all formed one cluster, all of which 
were unique by PFGE.  Cluster three consisted of five isolates (6, 18, 8, 9 and 11).  
Isolates 8, 9 and 11 were part of the PFGE GREA14KL-3 cluster, isolate 6 was unique 
and isolate 18 was typed as GREA14KL-4.  The four isolates identified as Klebsiella 
oxytoca formed cluster 8 and had been identified by PFGE as either unique, 
GREA14KL-9 or GREA14KL-7.  Three unique isolates S31, S39, S42 by PFGE formed 
the novel cluster 7.  Finally isolate 36 which had been identified as GREA14KL-9 by 
PFGE was placed within cluster 4, along with isolates typed as GREA14KL-7 by PFGE.  
MiSeq Data Analysis Two 
As the four Klebsiella oxytoca isolates were excluded from this analysis, comparison 
was done on the remaining 43 Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates, see Figure 4-11.  
Identical clustering was seen for 28/43 (65%) of isolates with both PFGE and WGS.   
Samples fell into six clusters (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7), with one unique isolate (14) that was 
also unique by PFGE.  Of the remaining unique isolates by PFGE, isolates 1, 3, and 15 
formed cluster 2.  Isolates 2 and 4 formed cluster 5 and isolates 31, 39 and 42 formed 
cluster 7. Isolate 39 had been typed by PFGE as GREA14KL-7, other isolates of which 
formed cluster 4.  All the other isolates in cluster 7 were typed as unique by PFGE.  
Cluster 1 was formed of isolates 10, 13 and 16 all of which were unique by PFGE.  
Sample 18, which was identified as GREA14KL-4 by PFGE, joined samples 6, 8, 9, 
and 11 to form cluster 3.  Sample 6 had previously been classified as unique.  Sample 
36 was identified by PFGE as GREA14KL-9, but was identified as part of cluster 4 
alongside isolates PFGE typed as GREA14KL-7 in this analysis. 
Samples within cluster 4 appeared identical with no sub-clusters identified 
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Figure 4-11 Analysis of MiSeq sequencing data by Piklu Bhattacharya including 
43 Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates. demonstrating six clusters (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 
7).  PFGE cluster GREA14KL-7 is represented by cluster 4.  
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Cluster Number Total SNVs Within the Cluster 
1 11,842 
2 19,313 
3 3727 
4 1139 
5 11,168 
7 60,012 
Table 4-9 SNV analysis of the total number of SNVs within clusters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 7 identified by MiSeq analysis two. 
Within the clusters there was variation in the number of SNVs detected (see Table 
4-9.).  Within clusters 3 and 4 there were considerably fewer SNVs than within the 
other clusters.  Clusters 3 and 4 were examined further with the addition of 
epidemiological information and were considered to be isolates detected linked to 
Klebsiella pneumoniae cross transmission events on two wards (see methods section 
2.7.).  
MiSeq Analysis Final Results 
Six results varied between MiSeq analysis one and two, isolates 1, 2, 4, 10, 13 and 16 
(see Table 4-10.).  These altered results were re-analysed with further epidemiological 
information in order to produce a set of final MiSeq results for further typing comparison 
Isolate No. MiSeq Analysis One 
MiSeq 
Analysis Two 
MiSeq Final 
Analysis 
1 Unique 2 Unique 
2 2 5 2 
3 2 2 2 
4 Unique 5 Unique 
5 ND ND ND 
6 3 3 3 
7 4 4 4 
8 3 3 3 
9 3 3 3 
10 2 1 2 
11 3 3 3 
12 2 2 2 
13 2 1 2 
14 Unique Unique Unique 
15 2 2 2 
16 2 1 Unique 
17 8 ND 8 
18 3 3 3 
19 4 4 4 
20 4 4 4 
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21 4 4 4 
22 4 4 4 
23 4 4 4 
24 4 4 4 
25 4 4 4 
26 4 4 4 
27 4 4 4 
28 4 4 4 
29 4 4 4 
30 4 4 4 
31 7 7 7 
32 4 4 4 
33 4 4 4 
34 4 4 4 
35 8 ND 8 
36 4 4 4 
37 8 ND 8 
38 4 4 4 
39 7 7 7 
40 4 4 4 
41 4 4 4 
42 7 7 7 
43 4 4 4 
44 4 4 4 
45 4 4 4 
46 8 ND 8 
49 4 4 4 
48 4 4 4 
Table 4-10 Comparison of MiSeq anlaysis one and MiSeq analysis two results, 
with a final results informed by epidemiological analysis.  Green colour coding = 
results that differ between MiSeq analysis one and MiSeq analysis two.  ND = not 
done. 
The six results that varied between MiSeq analysis one and two had been selected for 
typing validation studies as they were all unique by PFGE.  As such no epidemiological 
investigation had been undertaken of the isolates in under to determine if they were 
cases of cross transmission between patients.  In order to interpret the two differing 
sets of results in order to determine a final MiSeq  result isolates 1, 2, 4, 10, 13 and 16 
were investigated further and results combined with epidemiological information (see 
section 2.7) .   
Isolate 1 was from a sample collected from patient 1; this patient did not cross over as 
an inpatient with any other patients that were identified as having isolates as part of 
cluster 2.  The sample was thus determined to be unique. 
Isolate 2 was from sample 2 collected from patient 2 and could form part of either 
cluster 2 or 5.  This patient did not cross over as an inpatient with any other patients 
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that were identified as having isolates as part of cluster 2.  This patient also did not 
overlap with the other patient (patient 4) that was determined to be part of cluster 5.  
This patient was in two weeks before patient 9 (isolate 13) and therefore it was 
determined that the isolate should cluster within cluster 2, to allow for the possibility of 
environmental transmission.   
Isolate 10 was from a sample taken from patient 25 and was determined to part of 
either cluster 1 or cluster 2.  Patient 25 overlapped with other patients that were part of 
cluster 2 but not those in cluster 1 and so was considered to be part of cluster 2. 
Isolate 13 belonged to patient 9 and was analysed to be part of either cluster 2 or 
cluster 1.  Although this patient did not have any overlapping inpatient stays with other 
patients, they had been an inpatient two weeks after patient 2.  This isolate was thus 
determined to be part of cluster 2, in order to allow for environmental cross 
transmission, 
Isolate 16 was cultured from an environment sample taken from the cardiac intensive 
care unit (CICU) where cross transmissions identified in cluster 3 occurred.  None of 
the other patients that formed part of cluster 1 or 2 had ever been an inpatient on the 
unit.  This isolate was the sole remaining isolate in cluster 1 and so this isolate was 
determined to be unique. 
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4.2.4.3 PHYLOSHIFT DATA ANALYSIS OF MISEQ DATA VALIDATED PULSE 
FIELD GEL ELECTROPHORESIS 
Phyloshift data analysis based on 37 genes was undertaken on MiSeq WGS data of 
Klebsiella pneumoniae 47 isolates as described in methods section 2.8.3. (461)     The 
analysis revealed seven clusters (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8) and one unique sample, isolate 
28 (see Figure 4-12). 26/47 (55%) of isolates clustered identically with PFGE with 
Phyloshift,   Subsequent to sample processing, four isolates of the 47 were identified 
as Klebsiella oxytoca by MALDI-ToF analysis (2.3.2.5.).   
There were no isolates that were determined to be unique by both PFGE and 
Phyloshift and analysis.  The unique sample by Phyloshift was isolate 28; which had a 
PFGE profile of GREA14KL-7.  All other PFGE profiles for GREA14KL-7 clustered 
within cluster 4, except isolate 37 which was subsequently identified as being a 
Klebsiella oxytoca.   
Phyloshift clustered isolates 1, 3, 10 and 12 together into cluster 2, all of which were 
unique by PFGE.  Isolates 2, 8, 9, 11, and 18 formed cluster 3.  Within cluster 3, isolate 
2 was unique by PFGE, isolate 18 was GREA14KL-4 and the others were identified as 
forming cluster GREA14KL-3.   
Isolates 4 and 6 were unique by PFGE but comprised cluster 5 in this analysis.  Cluster 
1 was formed of isolates 13 and 16, both of which were unique by PFGE.  Other unique 
PFGE isolates (42, 39, and 31) formed a single cluster, cluster 7. 
Cluster 8 was comprised of Klebsiella oxytoca isolates 35, 46, 37 and 17.  Isolates 17 
and 46 were unique by PFGE.  Isolate 35 was grouped as GREA14KL-9 by PFGE and 
isolate 37 was part of GREA14KL-7.  The only other isolate not to match with PFGE 
type was sample 36 which had a PFGE type of GREA14KL-9, but typed using 
Phyloshift as part of the GREA14KL-7 cluster.  
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Figure 4-12 Analysis of MiSeq sequencing data by Phyloshift analysis  including 
47 Klebsiella species isolates. demonstrating seven clusters (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 
8).  PFGE cluster GREA14KL-7 is represented by cluster 4, with sub-clustering 
present. Cluster 8 is comprised of Klebsiella oxytoca isolates. 
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4.2.5 COMPARISON OF OUTBREAK INVESTIGATION TYPING RESULTS FOR FRAGMENT 
ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES, HIGH THROUGHPUT SEQUENCING AND WHOLE GENOME 
SEQUENCING 
In order to compare the typing techniques validated in sections 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 48 
isolates were typed using all techniques (VNTR, REP-PCR, HTS and WGS).  Of these 48 
isolates 25 were related to the outbreak described in section 4.2.5.1 and were tested 
retrospectively and compared see how typing techniques would perform in an outbreak 
investigation. 
4.2.5.1 KLEBSIELLA PNEUMONIAE OUTBREAK 
Twelve patients over eight months had a first detection of presumed acquired Klebsiella 
pneumoniae on the HSCTU at GOSH, detected as part of routine admission/weekly 
surveillance screens in 2011 and 2012 (see Table 4-11).  All isolates were extended spectrum 
β-lactamase (ESBL) positive and resistant to Ceftazidime, Ciprofloxacin, Gentamicin and 
Piptazobactam.  All isolates were sent for typing by PFGE and were determined to be 
indistinguishable (designated strain identification GREA14KL-7).  Patients had been admitted to 
the HSCTU for between 0 and 299 days with a mean admission prior to acquisition of 51 days.  
Two patients were positive for the outbreak strain on day 0, both of these patients had 
overlapped with discharged carriers of the same strain on the HODU prior to admission.   
The timeline of the outbreak is shown in Table 4-11.  Patient 7 was admitted to the HSCTU on 
the 8/10/10 and remained until the 27/07/11.  During this time he was first detected as positive 
for the outbreak strain on the 02/05/2011.  He was then re-admitted to the unit on the 08/08/11 
until the 18/10/11.  During this second admission period, one other patient (patient 23) was 
detected as positive in September, three patients in October and two patients in November.  
One patient was admitted with the outbreak strain in December (patient 17) and another was 
admitted with the outbreak strain in January (patient 18).  In January two additional patients 
also acquired the outbreak strain whilst on the unit.  No further cases were detected until May, 
at which point there was one further patient acquisition (patient 22) prior to the end of the 
outbreak. 
Seven patients (patients 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18) had multiple isolates typed during the 
outbreak period.  Positive samples included stool and urine samples. Time from detection of the 
resistant strain to receiving a typing result for these isolates by PFGE was three weeks on 
average. 
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In addition to patient screening, 151 swabs were taken from both cubicles of positive patients 
and the shared ward area.  Of the initial 21 swabs taken from the shared ward area, only one 
site was positive for Klebsiella pneumoniae, the intravenous (IV) medication room sink, where 
clinical equipment was cleaned. 
 
Figure 4-13 Image of the intravenous medication room equipment sink on the HSCTU 
where the outbreak strain of Klebsiella penumoniae was detected in both 2011 and 2012. 
During the subsequent environmental screen post infection control interventions, 130 swabs 
were taken (discussed in Chapter 5).  Twenty sites were sampled using the methods developed 
in Chapter 3 within each of five cubicles and a further 30 swabs were taken from the shared 
ward area.  No sites within the cubicles of known carriers were positive despite long admissions 
within the same cubicle, one patient had been positive within the same cubicle for over three 
months.  Within the shared ward areas three sites were positive for Klebsiella pneumoniae 
including: the IV room sink and lips, the medication room sink back and the entrance sink plug 
hole.  In addition to Klebsiella pneumoniae, Klebsiella oxytoca and Enterobacter spp. were 
isolated from these swabs. These isolates demonstrated identical antibiograms to the outbreak 
strain and the Klebsiella pneumoniae isolates shared the same PFGE type. 
Interventions linked to this outbreak related to cleaning and design will be discussed further in 
Chapter 5. 
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Table 4-11 Klebsiella pneumoniae on the HSCTU outbreak timeline by month with the number of consecutive inpatient days 
prior to colonisation (PIP) within GOSH per patient. Green = un-colonised period of admission to HSCTU, Red = colonised 
period of admission to HSCTU. 
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4.2.5.2 COMPARISON OF TYPING TECHNIQUE RESULTS 
Forty eight isolates were investigated using PFGE, VNTR, REP-PCR, Pathogenica HTS, 
Phyloshift data analysis and WGS and the results for typing methods compared, see Table 
4-12.  The 48 samples consisted of temporally linked isolates detected from both the 
environment and patients during 2011 and 2012.  Isolates were selected on the basis of PFGE 
type with a single large cluster of 25 isolates that were identical by PFGE (GREA14KL-7) and 
were believed to be linked to the outbreak described in section 4.2.5.1.  Three other small 
clusters of identical PFGE types were chosen, one where cross transmission was believed 
possible on the cardiac intensive care unit (CICU) but had not been confirmed (GREA14KL-3) 
and two where there was no crossover of patients and so the isolates were considered 
unconnected (GREA14KL-4 and GREA14KL-9).  Additional isolates were selected as they were 
unique by PFGE.  In addition to the single ward where an outbreak was believed to have 
occurred (HSCTU), isolates came from a number of different wards, mostly surgical and private 
patient wards.  One isolate was from a sample collected within outpatients from patient 3 
(isolate no. 3). Environmental isolates originated from samples processed from two wards 
(HSCTU and CICU) where cross transmission may have occurred.   
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PFGE VNTR REP-PCR (93% PC) Pathogenica Phyloshift 
MiSeq 
Final Analysis Isolate No. Isolate Source 
Unique Unique Unique 7 7 7 42 Klebsiella spp. type strain 
Unique Unique Unique 7 7 7 31 Patient 18 
Unique Unique Unique Unique 5 Unique 4 Patient 4 
Unique Unique Unique Unique 2 Unique 1 Patient 1 
Unique Unique Unique Unique 2 2 3 Patient 3 
Unique Unique Unique 2 3 2 2 Patient 2 
Unique Unique Unique 2 2 2 10 Patient 25 
Unique Unique Unique 2 2 2 12 Patient 24 
Unique Unique Unique Unique 2 Unique 14 Patient 10 
Unique Unique Unique Unique 2 2 15 Patient 11 
Unique Unique 1 1 1 2 13 Patient 9 
Unique Unique 1 1 1 Unique 16 Environmental 
Unique Unique Unique 8 8 8 17 Environmental # 
Unique Unique 8 8 8 8 46 Environmental # 
Unique 3 Unique 3 5 3 6 Patient 6 
GREA14KL-4 Unique Unique ND ND ND 5 Patient 5 * 
GREA14KL-4 Unique Unique 3 3 3 18 Environmental 
GREA14KL-9 Unique 8 8 8 8 35 Environmental # 
GREA14KL-9 4a 4b 4b 4d 4 36 Environmental 
GREA14KL-3 3 Unique 3 3 3 8 Patient 8 
GREA14KL-3 3 3 3 3 3 9 Patient 5 
GREA14KL-3 3 3 3 3 3 11 Patient 23 
GREA14KL-7 Unique Unique 7 7 7 39 Patient 21 
GREA14KL-7 Unique 8 8 8 8 37 Environmental # 
GREA14KL-7 4a Unique 4b 4 4 25 Patient 15 
GREA14KL-7 4a Unique 4b 4 4 40 Patient 22 
GREA14KL-7 4d Unique 4b 4c 4 44 Environmental 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4d 4b Unique 4 28 Patient 16 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4c 4 4d 4 7 Patient 7 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4c 4b 4d 4 19 Patient 12 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4d 4e 4 4 20 Environmental 
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GREA14KL-7 4a 4a 4 4d 4 21 Patient 13 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4c 4a 4c 4 22 Patient 14 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4a 4a 4 4 23 Patient 12 
GREA14KL-7 4b 4a 4 4d 4 24 Patient 12 
GREA14KL-7 4b 4c 4b 4 4 26 Patient 16 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4c 4b 4c 4 27 Patient 14 
GREA14KL-7 4b 4d 4b 4 4 29 Patient 17 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4c 4c 4 4 30 Patient 13 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4c 4e 4d 4 32 Patient 19 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4e 4d 4d 4 33 Patient 18 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4e 4c 4 4 34 Patient 20 
GREA14KL-7 4d 4e 4b 4d 4 38 Patient 17 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4d 4b 4 4 41 Patient 15 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4b 4b 4d 4 43 Environmental 
GREA14KL-7 4b 4d 4b 4 4 45 Environmental 
GREA14KL-7 4a 4b 4b 4d 4 47 Environmental 
GREA14KL-7 4d 4c 4d 4d 4 48 Patient 15 
Table 4-12 Comparison of 48 isolates from both environmental and patient samples by PFGE, VNTR, REP-PCR, Pathogenica, 
Phyloshift and MiSeq typing techniques.  Results organised by PFGE result, with difference between fragment analysis 
techniques (PFGE, VNTR and REP-PCR) colour coded in purple and differences between sequence based techniques 
(Pathogenica, Phyloshift and MiSeq final analysis) colour coded in green.  * = E. asburiae # = K. oxytoca.  
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Overall there was good agreement with typing of the outbreak strain GREA14KL-7, but 
agreement between other schemes about isolates unique by PFGE was less 
consistent. 
When comparing samples across all techniques 22/43 (51%) of isolates clustered 
identically across all typing methods.  All consensus isolates were either GREA14KL-7 
or GREA14KL-3 by PFGE.  Unique isolates were detected more infrequently in 
sequence based analysis techniques, with only 10 samples being identified as unique 
across all three analysis types (Pathogenica, Phyloshift, MiSeq final analysis).  This 
compared to 53 isolates determined as unique using fragment analysis techniques.  No 
isolates were unique across all typing methods. 
Typing of Multiple Isolates on the Same Patient 
Patients 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 all had multiple samples submitted for typing during the 
outbreak on HSCTU, all of which typed as linked to the outbreak strain.  Typing 
included isolates (48 and 41) from one patient (patient 15) taken seven months apart, 
with consistent results.  Only one patient, patient 18, had different typing results for the 
same species between samples.  One isolate grown from a urine sample on the 5th 
January 2012 was typed by PFGE, VNTR and REP-PCR as unique and by other 
methods as part of cluster 7.  The second isolate from this patient was cultured from a 
stool sample taken on the 17th February 2012 and typed as part of the outbreak strain 
GREA14KL-7 or cluster 4. 
Clusters of Isolates Not Associated with the HSCTU Outbreak 
A further apparent outbreak, potentially linked to environmental cross transmission, 
was detected by these typing methods.  Isolates from patients 5, 8 and 23 (CICU) were 
previously linked by PFGE typing as part of GREA14KL-3.  One further isolate from 
patient 6, had a unique PFGE profile (isolate 6).  However this isolate was 
subsequently typed as cluster 3 by MiSeq final analysis, Pathogenica and VNTR, along 
with the other patient isolates.  In addition an environmental sink isolate from the 
clinical hand wash basin on the unit; which had previous typed as GREA14KL-4 by 
PFGE (18), was also placed in cluster 3 by all HTS typing techniques.   
Samples 25, 28, 36, 40, and 44 had only one typing scheme that disagreed with the 
others.  Of these disagreements four occurred within the clustering by REP-PCR, and 
one by PFGE. 
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Isolate 1 was determine to be unique by fragment analysis techniques as well as 
Pathogenica and MiSeq final analysis, but formed part of cluster 2 for  Phyloshift 
analysis.  
Isolate 2 was unique by all fragment analysis techniques, but formed part of cluster 2 
by both Pathogenica and MiSeq final analysis.  This sample clustered differently with 
Phyloshift, forming part of cluster 3 with samples 8, 9, 11, and 18.  
Isolates 3 and 12 were unique by all fragment analysis techniques as well as by 
Pathogenica, but formed part of cluster 2 by all other techniques.  
Isolate 10 was unique by all fragment analysis techniques and formed part of cluster 2 
for all sequence based techniques.   
Isolates 13 and 16 were unique by VNTR, PFGE and MiSeq final analysis, but formed 
part of cluster 1 by targeted sequence analysis.   
For isolate 14 all techniques determined it to be unique, except for Phyloshift which 
clustered it as part of cluster 2.  
Isolate 15 was determined to be unique by fragment analysis techniques and 
Pathogenica, but other techniques included it as part of cluster 2. 
Isolate 6 was unique by PFGE and REP-PCR, but formed part of cluster 3 in all other 
techniques, except Phyloshift.   
Isolate 8 was part of cluster 3 by all techniques except REP-PCR; which identified it as 
being unique.   
Isolate 4 was unique by all fragment analysis techniques as well as Pathogenica and 
MiSeq final analysis, but formed part of cluster 5 by Phyloshift. 
Isolates 31, 39 and 42 were all unique by fragment analysis techniques and formed 
part of cluster 7 by all sequence based techniques.   
The isolates that were subsequently identified as being Klebsiella oxytoca (17, 35, 37, 
46) formed part of cluster 8 by all sequence based methods.  Isolate 17 was 
considered unique by all fragment analysis methods.  Isolates 35, 37 and 46 were 
included as part of cluster 8 by REP-PCR and considered unique by VNTR.  PFGE 
clustering varied and included GREAK-7, GREA14KL-9 and unique. 
223 
 
Chapter 4 Epidemiological Typing of Clinical and Environmental Enterobacteriaceae Isolates 
Diagnostic Test Specifications Using Either PFGE or MiSeq as Reference 
Standards 
PFGE is considered to be the current reference standard for typing within the 
Enterobacteriaceae.  In order to compare typing methods a comparison of sensitivity, 
specificity, positive predictive value (PPV) and negative predictive value (NPV) was 
undertaken, using both the current reference standard and using WGS data.  A result 
was considered a true positive when it matched the reference standard in assigning an 
isolate to the same isolate cluster.  A result was considered a true negative when it 
matched the reference standard in assigning a unique type.  False positives were 
where a cluster was assigned when the isolate was considered unique by the reference 
standard and a false negative consisted of the method assigning a unique identification 
when the reference standard had clustered the isolate. 
When compared to PFGE, VNTR had a sensitivity of 84% and a specificity of 88%, with 
a PPV for typing agreement of 93% and a NPV of 74%.   If using the MiSeq consensus 
analysis, VNTR had a sensitivity of 66% with a specificity of 100%.  The PPV was 
100% with an NPV of 21%. 
When PFGE was used as the reference standard the sensitivity of REP-PCR was 77% 
and the specificity was 67%, with a PPV of 79% and an NPV of 63%.   Using the MiSeq 
consensus analysis sensitivity was 64% and specificity 60%.  The PPV for matched 
typing results was 93% and the NPV 17%. 
For MiSeq analysis, if MiSeq analysis 1 was compared with PFGE as the reference 
standard, the sensitivity was 100% with a specificity of 15%.  The PPV was 61% and 
the NPV was 100%.  For MiSeq analysis 2 the sensitivity when compared to PFGE was 
100% and the specificity was 7%, with a PPV of 67% and a NPV of 100%.  When the 
data analysis was combined to form a consensus the sensitivity of WGS versus PFGE 
was 100% with a specificity of 25%.  The PPV was 72% and the NPV 100%. 
The sensitivity of Pathogenica when PFGE was used as the reference standard was 
100%, with a specificity of 26.32%.  The PPV was 67% and the NPV was 100%.   
When Pathogenica was compared to MiSeq final analysis as a reference standard the 
sensitivity was 95% and the specificity 60%.  The PPV was 95% and the NPV 60%.  
When comparing Phyloshift against PFGE the sensitivity was 96% with a specificity of 
0%.  For MiSeq final analysis the sensitivity was 98% and specificity 0%.  As the 
Phyloshift identified an isolate as unique that was not identified by MiSeq or PFGE the 
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NPV for Phyloshift was 0% and the PPV 84% for MiSeq and the PPV was 57% and the 
NPV 0%.for PFGE.   
Finally PFGE with MiSeq consensus as the reference standard had a specificity of 
68%, a sensitivity of 44%, a PPV of 84% and an NPV of 25%. 
VNTR typing therefore had the highest PPV when compared against both MiSeq final 
analysis and PFGE of the fragment analysis techniques.  
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4.3 DISCUSSION   
Prospective molecular typing undertaken during this study was performed using PFGE.  
PFGE results took an average three weeks from sample collection to result.  PFGE 
represents the current reference standard for bacterial typing, it does however have 
limitations.  PFGE is very labour intensive and as demonstrated by the turnaround time 
in this study cannot provide results in real time.  The PFGE process requires expensive 
equipment and considerable expertise and so was not able to be conducted in-house 
at GOSH.(225)   In addition although PFGE analysis is undertaken using the Dice 
coefficient and rules established by Tenover et al. (1995), a recent review 
demonstrated that PFGE studies had definitions which varied from 67 – 100% similarity 
requirements for relatedness.(246, 457)  In order to investigate whether other typing 
techniques represented a viable alternative to PFGE typing for routine use VNTR, 
REP-PCR, HTS and WGS typing were investigated.  
4.3.1 VARIABLE NUMBER TANDEM REPEAT (VNTR) TYPING SCHEMES FOR 
ENTEROBACTER CLOACAE AND KLEBSIELLA PNEUMONIAE 
Designing of Multi-locus Variable Number Tandem Repeat Typing 
Two different VNTRs studies were undertaken as part of the typing evaluation (see 
sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.2.2.).  The first involved the development of a VNTR scheme 
for Enterobacter cloacae. Four loci were identified all of which showed some level of 
tandem repeat variation (section 4.2.2.1.).  The only other published VNTR scheme for 
this genus is for Enterobacter sakazakii and this scheme also uses four loci. 
Comparison of this published Enterobacter sakazakii VNTR scheme to PFGE analysis 
demonstrated that it compared favourably across 112 isolates representing 16 
subgroups, although PFGE was shown to be more discriminatory.(87)  It is crucial when 
selecting loci for VNTR that they are optimised in terms of tandem repeat variation.  If 
they are too unstable then they may not reflect the ‘real’ distribution of bacterial 
genotypes and if they are too stable then they may be not be discriminatory enough 
making interpretation difficult.(462)  Seven loci are normally selected for VNTR typing 
schemes, although this may be less organism specific and more to do with the number 
of loci usually used for the design of MLST schemes.  It is however possible that a 
smaller number of loci may be adequate for typing of Enterobacter cloacae.  
Designing of VNTR schemes requires the availability of whole genome sequence data 
for the target species, in order to identify the repeat motifs.(141)  The current number of 
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genomes sequences for species is usually limited to a few strains, plus the type 
strain.(70)  Genome sequencing so far has demonstrated considerable diversity within 
species, especially in species such as Klebsiella and Enterobacter.(66, 69, 70, 449, 463, 464)    
For example eight complete whole genome sequences of Enterobacter spp. are 
currently available on Genbank four of which belong to Enterobacter cloacae and only 
one of which is linked to human infection.(66)  Too few sequences from the same 
organism exist and so many VNTR scheme, like the one in this study, are designed 
based on only one whole genome sequence.  They are thus based on the assumption 
that the available sequence will represent all strains within that species.  
The Effect of Culture on Multi-locus Variable Number Tandem Repeat Typing 
Some of the failed amplification of loci within both VNTR schemes is likely to be due to 
poor phenotypic identification, and/or increased genetic diversity when compared to the 
reference genome.(87)  For example within this study one isolate (S20245) identified by 
MALDI-ToF MS and API 20E (Bio-Merxieux, Mary I’Etoile, France) as Klebsiella 
oxytoca, when typed, amplified at all loci, whereas the type strain NCTC 13368 failed to 
amplify at 4/9 loci (see section 4.2.2.2.).   
Comparison of VNTR data with PFGE typing demonstrated consensus in the majority 
of cases (85%).  VNTR identified both isolates within cluster GREA14KL-4 as unique 
and added an additional, previously unique, sample to the GREA14KL-3 cluster.  All 
isolates of Klebsiella oxytoca and Enterobacter spp. were identified as unique, bar one 
which was clustered with the outbreak strain.  One other sample (36) was identified as 
GREA14KL-9 along with its partner isolate 35 by PFGE; the difference in result by 
VNTR type is probably due to an initial mixed culture. 
Other Factors Affecting Multi-locus Variable Number Tandem Repeat Typing 
One of the advantages of VNTR schemes is that they are portable.(221)  Despite this, a 
comparison undertaken by the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) of a number of 
centres, identified differences between fragment sizing between two types of capillary 
sequencers, suggesting a need for external quality control when establishing a VNTR 
scheme.(465)  To test intra-laboratory performance, comparison of VNTR results 
between two centres (GOSH and the PHE) was undertaken, and was shown to be 
comparable in 8/13 samples (section 4.2.2.2.).  One sample had completely unrelated 
VNTR types and is likely to be due to mixed colonies on the initial isolation plate.  
Three samples varied by one repeat size at a single locus.  This is likely to be due to 
227 
 
Chapter 4 Epidemiological Typing of Clinical and Environmental Enterobacteriaceae Isolates 
differences in sizing repeats between the use of a capillary sequencer and the use of 
agarose gel, and is another reason for allowing some variation in loci sizing when 
interpreting results.  One sample size difference between centres was identified at 
Locus J, where one centre classed this as an insertion sequence, and the other called 
it a large tandem repeat. This has been noted in the literature as another evaluation 
that is required to produce an interpretative algorithm, as the size difference in a locus 
may not always reflect the real number of tandem repeats due of the presence of 
insertions.(466)  
Loci for the Klebsiella pneumoniae VNTR were selected as suitable for VNTR as they 
had a relatively high mutation rate.(55)  Hypermutation of tandem repeats has been 
shown to be on average 10-2 – 10-3 per generation; with E. coli demonstrating 7.0*10-4 
mutations/generation for a single loci and 6.4*10-4 mutations/generation across 28 
loci.(267, 463)  Rapid mutation rates are thought to be a result of compounding effects of 
various factors intrinsic to loci, including repeat copy number, repeat unit size, and 
functionality of the mismatch repair system.  Repeat copy number effects appear to 
apply both across loci and within an individual locus.  In a mutation study undertaken 
on E. coli by Vogler et al. (2006) it was shown that mutation rates were high and varied 
across loci.(267)  Of 186 mutations detected 74.7% were single repeat changes (either 
insertions or deletions).  The remaining 47 (25.3%) involved multiple repeat changes 
ranging from 2 – 20 repeats.  When mutations occurred in large repeat copy numbers 
they were more likely to be due to deletions than insertions. (267) 
Within the loci tested for Klebsiella pneumoniae Locus J was the largest along with 
Locus H (both the largest number of base pairs) (see section 4.2.2.2.).  The smallest 
locus tested was locus D; which consisted of 14 base pair repeats with a 119 base pair 
flanking sequence.  No evolution of repeats was noted in Locus J in repeat samples 
from patients, although it did represent the greatest variation in repeat number present, 
as well as the largest repeat size.  Locus D was one of the two loci that demonstrated 
deviation from the main outbreak VNTR type while the other was loci N2 (a 57 base 
pair repeat).  Locus N2 changed by a double repeat in isolate 44 and a single repeat in 
Locus D.   
The main pitfall suggested of VNTR schemes is that two identical clones may appear 
different because selection has led to the generation of two variants that have 
differences in one or more VNTR loci. This is due to the inherent instability of tandem 
repeats and has been suggested as a limitation of its use as a typing scheme.(463, 466, 
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467) One study that compared high throughput amplified fragment length polymorphism 
(AFLP) and VNTR when looking at genomic variation in functionally constrained 
genomic regions, and regions of hypermutability, has however demonstrated that 
although enhanced variability occurred in the repeat regions, the clustering of strains 
remained traceable.(250)  Within patients in this study the VNTR type did not alter in 
repeat samples, even when repeated samples were taken for up to seven months 
apart.   
The one sample that appeared to be related to but different from the outbreak strain 
was an environmental sink sample (isolate 44).  Variation within the environmental 
sample did not match that of an additional isolate grown on the same plate from the 
same swab, which matched the main outbreak type.   This sample was included as part 
of the outbreak cluster, but only when epidemiological information was included as part 
of the analysis.  Little is known about the factors that affect mutation rates of tandem 
repeat loci and this is particularly relevant when the isolates are from different niches or 
hosts.(267, 463, 468)  Environmental isolates are likely to be subject to different selection 
pressures to those present within human hosts, especially as growth is likely to occur in 
biofilms.   
Interpretation of Multi-locus Variable Number Tandem Repeat Typing 
In the published version of the Klebsiella pneumoniae VNTR scheme no interpretative 
guidance is given.(55)  Some publications have used a similar interpretative algorithm as 
used in this study, i.e. +/- 1 or difference in only one locus, with or without additional 
epidemiological information.(249)  This is the same interpretation which is used in-house 
by the PHE (personal communication J. Turton).  Other publications have used 
different guidelines for clustering, some of which used the MLST cluster defining rule 
that differences of ≤2 alleles were grouped as a cluster, with the most common type 
being chosen to be cluster defining.(251)  Another study defined isolates as related if 
they varied at fewer than four loci.(469) (470)  There is a need to define what related means 
across the literature, although this is complicated by variations in the number of loci 
used and a lack of thorough mutation studies to understand the factors affecting 
mutation rates in all species.(465) 
Christiansson et al. (2011) undertook a study where up to 20 isolates were taken from 
30 patients in two long term care facilities.  They found that colonisation with more than 
1 VNTR type was found in eight individuals.(108)  Of the eight colonised patients with 
more than one VNTR type, three differed by only one repeat unit at only one locus.  
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These isolates would be identified as identical using the algorithm used for this study.  
The remaining five differed by 2 – 6 loci, with differences occurring between different 
sites (perineum and urine) and may therefore represent different strains.  It has also 
been suggested that intra-loci differences occur one tandem repeat at a time during 
outbreaks while unrelated isolates are more likely to differ by more than one tandem 
repeat.(108)  This was not supported by sampling of isolates within this study, as part of 
cluster 4 varied by 2 repeats, and thus was only included when epidemiological 
information was included within the analysis (section 4.2.2.2.).  It may also be that a 
different criterion may be required for interpretation of environmental isolates.(249) 
4.3.2 REPETITIVE EXTRAGENIC PALINDROMIC SEQUENCE PCR FOR TYPING OF 
ENTEROBACTER SPECIES, KLEBSIELLA SPECIES, AND E. COLI 
The use of REP-PCR was evaluated for Enterobacter spp, Klebsiella spp. and E. coli 
as part of this study.  REP-PCR judges the possible relatedness of isolates based on 
the number of different fragments obtained; which are the result of insertions, deletions, 
inversions of DNA or mutation of the repetition.(459)  For the detection of clonal 
outbreaks of Enterobacter spp. and Klebsiella spp. PFGE is considered to be the 
reference standard.(69) 
Use of REP-PCR for typing has a number of advantages over other typing techniques.  
REP-PCR targets have been shown to be stable as targets for typing in patients over a 
prolonged period of time, with the same profile being found in a patient sampled at 
regularly intervals for a period of one year.(471)  As the technique is less affected by 
species identification as the same primers are used for both Enterobacter spp. and 
Klebsiella spp. it is less adversely affected by organism mis-identification.(459)  It has 
also been able to type a number of strains that were not typable by PFGE, either due to 
mis-identification or other reasons.(459, 472)  The main drawback of the Diversilab REP-
PCR system is that the primer sequences used in PCR reactions are proprietary, thus 
limiting the potential for trouble shooting or assay development by the user in response 
to specific needs.  The system also has significant cost implications compared to the 
other fragment analysis typing schemes. 
Comparison of Repetitive Extragenic Palindromic Sequence PCR and Pulse Field 
Gel Electrophoresis Results 
Study comparisons between PFGE and REP-PCR have varied in their outcomes.  
Consensus between REP-PCR and PFGE has varied between 60% and 97%.(69, 120) 
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Some studies have found that REP-PCR differentiates better than PFGE, dividing 
within PFGE types.  However it could be that this is an over-estimation of relatedness, 
rather than true increased discrimination.(69, 120, 472)  Other studies have identified that 
REP-PCR is not as discriminatory as PFGE.(103, 223, 458, 467)  Some of these studies 
demonstrated that discrimination was species specific, with Enterobacter spp. and 
Klebsiella spp. linked to increased discrimination in comparison to PFGE, and E. coli 
clustering into larger clusters than shown by PFGE.(458, 459, 472)  
PFGE for E. coli, Enterobacter spp. and Klebsiella spp. in this study confirmed that the 
paediatric patients admitted to GOSH during this period had a mixture of resistant 
isolate detections of an unknown source and multiple cross-transmissions with several 
clusters of PFGE types.  For the outbreak study PFGE and REP-PCR demonstrated a 
concordance in 83% of samples (section 4.2.3.4.).  For Enterobacter spp. REP-PCR 
could not distinguish between some PFGE clusters and other samples clustered by 
PFGE were split by REP-PCR clusters.  This matches the findings described in the 
literature.(69, 120, 472)  Within both the outbreak study and the international centre 
comparison Klebsiella spp. isolates that were linked by PFGE were sometimes found to 
be unique.  In comparison, and in line with published studies on E. coli, REP-PCR was 
found not to be as discriminatory as PFGE but it did split some PFGE clusters (sections 
4.2.3.3 and 4.2.3.4.).(458, 459, 472) 
Interpretation of Repetitive Extragenic Palindromic Sequence PCR Typing 
One of the reasons for discrepancies found between studies in terms of agreement 
with PFGE may be due to the lack of agreements between authors on either the correct 
analysis algorithm or the percentage cut-off used to determine isolate similarity.  This 
has been noted in a number of publications to be one of the major limitations of the 
system.(459, 467, 473)     
Analysis of REP-PCR profiles can utilise either the Pearson Correlation Co-efficient or 
the Kullback-Leibler analysis to calculate pairwise similarities among all samples 
tested.  If using the Pearson Correlation Co-efficient, isolate similarity is judged based 
on the number of different fragments obtained and the intensity of the bands present; 
and band presence is weighted over band intensity.  The Kullback-Leibler analysis is 
based on both the number of different fragments obtained and the intensity of the 
bands present, with band intensity weighted over band presence.  As both 
interpretations are based on the number of bands and amplification intensity the 
analysis outcome may be equivalent.(474)   
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A number of publications have used the Pearson Correlation Co-efficient with a 
similarity cut-off of ≥98% similarity as indistinguishable and of less than ≤95% similarity 
as different.  For isolates that have similarity between 95 and 98% digital overlays of 
the isolate results were compared.(458, 459)  Others have used a cut-off of ≥97% similarity 
as indistinguishable and of ≤95% similarity as different, with overlays or number of 
band differences used for the intervening analysis.(77, 103, 474)  Other studies using 
Pearson Correlation Co-efficient have utilized a wide variety of cut-offs including: 
≥95%,(73, 89, 120, 467, 475-477) ≥93%,(478) ≥92%,(56) or a  ≥90%.(76)  Some of these authors 
varied cut-offs between the above figures for E. coli, Klebsiella spp. and Enterobacter 
spp. as they found that no one figure provided sufficient discrimination.  
When using the Kullback-Leibler analysis most studies have used either ≥95% 
similarity or ≥97% similarity as indistinguishable and of less than ≤95% similarity as 
different with overlays or number of band differences used for the intervening 
analysis.(474, 479, 480)  In the two studies that compared results using both, one found that 
results were identical whereas the other found that Kullback-Leibler was less 
discriminatory.(474, 479)   
When analysing the produced dendogram a similarity cut-off must be imposed to 
determine isolate clusters.  If a cut-off is set to be too discriminatory, potential 
association between isolates could be missed and the outbreak would be believed to 
be multi-clonal.  If however the discrimination method is too low it could lead to the 
conclusion that outbreaks are monoclonal, leading to unnecessary infection control 
interventions.   It is therefore important to be aware of the genetic evolution of the 
organism investigated in order to be able to draw correct conclusions about genetic 
relatedness and to always include epidemiological information in result interpretation. 
(473) 
Within this study a cut-off of ≥93% using Pearson Correlation Co-efficient analysis, was 
used.  This was felt to the most appropriate cut-off when informed by epidemiological 
information (section 4.2.3.1.).  The only exception to the use of a ≥93% using Pearson 
Correlation Co-efficient analysis was during the intra-laboratory comparison where a 
≥95% - ≥98% cut-off was set by the study co-ordinator to fit in with their previous 
work.(458, 459) 
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Sources of Variation in Repetitive Extragenic Palindromic Sequence PCR 
Another reason for variability between studies may be due to the variation both within 
and between centres performing the assay.  As part of the multi-centre comparison 
study considerable variation was noted between centres and this was identified as 
being possibly due to: variance between people performing the assays, inconsistent 
amplification, inconsistent quality/quantity of DNA and/or variation between equipment. 
(458)  
A number of isolates in our study failed to amplify sufficiently even when DNA was 
quantitated within the acceptable study range; however issues exist with quantitation of 
DNA using the nanodrop platform.  In a validation study undertaken on the DNA from 
this study results from nanodrop quantification varied when performed on different days 
and did not correlate to DNA as quantified by other methods (data not shown).  This 
may account for some of the variability between samples.   
Healy et al. (2005) in the initial publication of the Diversilab version of the REP-PCR 
assay found that reproducibility between E. coli grown on different culture agars was 
97%; which is problematic if using a 98% cut-off for studies.(455) No other papers 
discuss the culture medium used for their assays and it was not a component of the 
protocol for the mutli-centre comparison study.(458)  However this could impact on DNA 
quantification as the level of extracellular polysaccharide material excreted varies 
dependent on the culture media utilised for growth.  Extracellular polysaccharide can 
not only affect extraction efficiency but can also contain DNA.  Highly mucoid colonies 
may contain non chromosomal DNA excreted as part of the extracellular 
polysaccharide, this would be included in DNA quantification, but which would not be 
suitable for amplification in the assay.(344, 345, 481-484)  This may be especially true for 
environmental organisms.   
Amplification efficiency and the variations linked to it may be due to the thermocyclers 
used.  Healy et al. (2005) validated the assay on five different thermocyclers and found 
a reproducibility of >96%.(455) This would again affect analysis undertaken using a 
≥98% cut-off.  To counter this within this study a single validated thermocycler was 
used for all amplification; however some amplicon variation was still noted.  
A number of studies have noted problems with reproducibility of results in addition to 
the multi-centre comparison undertaken by Voets et al. (2013).(458)  These studies have 
noted that different extractions have led to different clustering, especially but not 
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exclusively, when initial low level amplification was detected.(467)  Inconsistency was 
also noted between extracts taken from the same isolate and between amplification 
runs.(467)   Within this study REP-PCR typing has been demonstrated to be reproducible 
as long as stringent quality control measures are undertaken, as poor data is not 
always apparent (section 4.2.3.2.).  This has included always running isolates in 
duplicate on separate amplification runs in order to compare results and if necessary 
using different extracts.  All of these measures have cost implications. 
4.3.3 HTS FOR INVESTIGATION OF A GROUP OF 48 ISOLATES OF THREE SPECIES 
A number of different high through put sequence based typing techniques were 
evaluated in this study.  These included the Pathogenica system; which undertakes 
typing based on twelve 10,000 base pair sequenced fragments per isolate (see 
methods section 2.8.4).  Other data analysis was undertaken on the same raw data 
produced by MiSeq sequencing and included: Phyloshift which analysed 37 genes from 
the core bacterial genome, and WGS typing, based on assembly of the whole genome 
using a reference sequence (see methods sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2).   
Comparison of High Throughput Sequence Typing and Pulse Field Gel 
Electrophoresis 
Findings in published studies comparing HTS based typing approaches and PFGE 
have found variable results.  One study found that clusters that were indistinguishable 
by PFGE were not linked when analysed using WGS comparison, implying that PFGE 
inappropriately clustered isolates when there was no epidemiological relationship.(220)   
Other studies have found that PFGE was not discriminatory enough and so failed to 
cluster isolates sufficiently when compared to WGS.(220, 223)  Typing results in our study 
when compared to PFGE were in line with the findings from the later published studies 
(sections 4.2.4.1, 4.2.4.2 and 4.2.4.3.).  Pathogenica demonstrated a 70% consensus 
with PFGE, MiSeq analysis one a 66% match, MiSeq analysis two 65% similarity and 
Phyloshift 55%.  Typing based on sequence data demonstrated increased clustering 
between isolates and fewer isolates classified as unique.  
Sources of Variation in High Throughput Sequence Typing Analysis 
Both targeted sequencing and WGS approaches are affected by issues linked to the  
typing of the core or accessory genome.  The core genome represents the genes 
present in all strains of a species while the pan genome consists of a core and all 
genes within the accessory gene pool.(70, 95, 464)  The accessory gene pool consists of 
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genes that vary between strains of the same species and is thought to be an important 
source of variability gained through lateral gene transfer, to permit adaptation to 
specific niches.(464, 485)  This raises questions about what genes should be used for 
defining genome similarity and whether it should include the core genome, the 
accessory genome, or both.(70) 
Data analysis of WGS data requires the use of a reference genome.  The current 
number of sequenced genomes for many species is normally limited to a few strains 
plus the type strain genome.(70)  Although the amount of WGS being undertaken is 
increasing, many available genomes are incomplete as finishing a sequence requires 
both gap closure and resolution of sequencing errors this is time and resource 
intensive.(464)  When using one reference genome it is possible to miss genes present 
within the accessory genome 
Eight complete whole genome sequences of Enterobacter spp. are currently available 
on Genbank.  Enterobacter cloacae spp. are diverse and includes bacteria associated 
with plants, soil and humans.(66)  E. cloacae genomes share 3540 core genes with 645 
– 825 genes currently identified within their accessory genome.  Four Klebsiella 
pneumoniae species are currently available; these have a core genome of 4269 genes, 
98.8% of which are chromosomally located,   The core genes formed 65 – 75% of the 
total predicted genome; accessory plus core genome, with most of the accessory 
genes located on plasmids.(44, 47)  For E. coli the core genome is 2200 genes, forming 
roughly half of the gene complement.   The pan genome is ~13,000 genes, with the 
trend for continual increase with each newly sequenced genome.(486)  When a 
reference assembly is undertaken, data included in the analysis is likely to be biased 
towards inclusion of the core genome of a species, with the inclusion of some 
accessory genes dependent on those contained within the reference sequence.  In the 
case of Klebsiella and Enterobacter genomes, a number of plasmids are included 
alongside core genomes in reference databases as they contain antibiotic resistance 
determinants; this expands the inclusion of accessory genes within the analysis. 
Due to these issues it is important to choose the correct reference when undertaking 
assembly, especially in the Enterobacteriaceae, as they are so diverse.(464)  Single 
nucleotide variant (SNV) detection is a problem if there are only a few reference 
genomes available, especially for the Enterobacteriaceae. This is even more of a 
problem when trying to look at strains within a species, as many more samples are 
needed to capture representative genomes.(51, 221) 
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Studies have found that targeted sequencing of either the core alone or core plus the 
accessory genome can be of use to accurately determine the evolutionary history of 
organisms.(221, 278, 280, 461, 464)  Both the Pathogenica system and Phyloshift focus on the 
use of core genes within the genome in order to undertake typing.  In the case of 
Pathogenica this is supplemented by analysis of the accessory genome for 
identification of antibiotic resistance; which are often carried on plasmids.(278, 395, 456)  
Both systems make the assumption that isolates demonstrating the same strain type 
using targeted sequencing approaches will share other unmeasured genetic 
characteristics.(487)  It has been suggested that the most important criteria for loci 
selection in the case of targeted genome typing, should be selection of targets based 
on nucleotide diversity rather than gene function.(488)  Despite this, one experimental 
study has shown that including positively selected genes did not hinder typing, and 
non-coding regions also yielded similar results, suggesting that the use of core genes 
alone for typing is a reliable approach.(243)  Both targeted sequence based techniques 
in this study appear to provide results that closely resemble WGS (section 4.2.5.2.).  
Interpretation of High Throughput Sequence Typing 
In order to investigate the use of WGS for prospectively typing it is necessary to 
understand the population structure of the significant pathogenic species of interest.  
HTS typing has so far demonstrated considerable diversity within species and has 
demonstrated the need to develop clear criteria in order to group strains within a 
species.(485)  Lineages need to be studied both on a national scale but also within 
individual patients and specimens, to determine how frequently SNVs arise, and how 
these affect evolutionary fitness.(489)  This is needed to provide the necessary context 
for interpretation of typing results.(220)   
SNVs are often relatively evolutionarily stable and can be identified within the core 
genome.(51, 221, 464, 485)  However using SNVs for clustering of strains presents a problem 
as there is no standardised criteria that can used to determine whether patient to 
patient transmission has occurred.(457) Some studies have used exclusively molecular 
criteria to determine genetic relatedness and then used genetic relatedness alone to 
suggest patient to patient cross transmission.  Other studies have required genetic 
relatedness along with clinical relatedness: such as overlapping hospital stay or patient 
proximity.(457)  It is also possible that separate molecular clocks may be required for 
separate genes as synonymous substitutions are likely to occur at different rates as 
different genes are under different types of selective pressure.(490)  This work has 
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currently been undertaken for some Gram-positive organisms such as Staphylococcus 
aureus where a cut off of 40 SNVs was determined to be suitable.  This detail is 
currently missing for the Enterobacteriaceae and additional sequencing studies are 
required to capture the genetic diversity of clinical strains.(51, 220)  
For this reason within this study data interpretation was based on phylogenetic cluster 
rather than number of SNVs, with the number of SNVs within clusters used to guide 
interpretation.  If the number of SNVs within WGS clusters is taken into account the low 
number of SNVs in clusters 4 and 3 suggest that these are true cases of possible cross 
transmission (section 4.2.4.2.).  The large number of SNVs within the other clusters 
suggested much greater diversity and that isolates are related but not linked to direct 
cross transmission.  This interpretation was confirmed with the addition of 
epidemiological analysis.  This indicated that although the data is not currently 
available to determine directional isolate transmission SNVs can be used to determine 
when clusters are linked to cross transmission events due to differences in isolate 
diversity. 
To study isolate stability over time within patients carrying Enterobacteriaceae one 
study looked at carriage of an outbreak strain over an 18 month period, during which 
11 SNVs were acquired.(460)  Stability of patient isolates appears to be considerable, in 
that the patient isolates sampled within this study remained stable for up to seven 
months as has been described in other studies.(52)   However there is variation with 
patients at different sites.  One study that involved sequencing of seven isolates from a 
patient over a four week period revealed the production of seven SNVs.  Four SNVs 
were present in all four of the urine isolates, groin and BAL isolates shared three SNVs.  
Throat isolate shared three SNV that were also seen in the urine sample.(51)  Within this 
study variation was seen between urine and faecal isolates in one patient taken two 
days apart, suggesting that similar but unrelated isolates are carried in different 
anatomical sites (section 4.2.5.2.). 
Possible Differences between Environmental and Clinical Isolates 
Microbial species investigated so far using HTS have been markedly skewed towards 
invasive isolates of clinically significant pathogens.  Host shifts or changes in 
transmission pathways can impose strong evolutionary pressures on pathogen 
populations to adapt to a new niche.(486, 491)   Intra-strain variation at the nucleotide level 
may therefore relate to life style adaptations.(44)  In studies that may contain an 
environmental source it is crucial to understand how these differences in selective 
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pressure may cause two related isolates to evolve differently within a short period of 
time, to ensure accurate typing investigation.(66)  
Environmental organisms present in the clinical environmental may interact with 
pathogenic species through horizontal gene transfer when in close proximity.  This 
exchange may have implications for infection control as environmental organism have 
been shown to have large accessory genomes that may act as genetic sinks for 
virulence genes and antibiotic resistance.(77, 457, 468)  Several studies have underlined 
the environmental resistome as a source of resistance genes.  Within the clinical 
environment many antibiotics are excreted unchanged and can persist they may thus 
lead to selection pressure for microorganisms present on sinks or other surfaces.(468, 
492)  It is particularly important therefore that studies are undertaken to understand how 
these factors affect environmental isolates, as this can affect the typing results 
received.(51, 70, 464)   
4.3.4 ROUTINE CLINICAL TYPING FOR OUTBREAK INVESTIGATION 
Within this study two outbreaks were identified (clusters three and four), both linked to 
the presence of outbreak strains isolated from sinks within the relevant clinical 
environment.  In the outbreak on the HSCTU the outbreak was only controlled when 
the sink environment was altered to remove the source of the outbreak, the equipment 
sink (see Chapter 5).  The finding of the outbreak strains was initially by antibiogram, 
but subsequently supported by PFGE typing. These findings identify environmental 
contamination as not just a potential risk, but a likely cause of clinical disease. 
During the initial outbreak investigation on the HSCTU identification of isolates was 
undertaken by the API 20E system (Bio-Merxieux, Mary I’Etoile, France) (see methods 
section 2.3.2.5).  Five of the outbreak isolate initially identified as Klebsiella 
pneumoniae using this system were subsequently shown to be either Klebsiella 
oxytoca/Enterobacter asburiae/Enterobacter cloacae.  Enterobacter asburiae was the 
identification given for isolate 5 by MiSeq analysis one and two and by MALDI-ToF MS 
(see methods section 2.8.1, 2.8.2 and 2.3.2.5).  Isolate 5 was identified as 
Enterobacter cloacae by the Pathogenica system (see methods section 2.8.4).  All four 
isolates (35, 37, 46, 17) identified as Klebsiella oxytoca were consistently identified by 
all none API methods.  This has also been found in a study undertaken by Giammanco 
et al. (2011) where the API 20E system (Bio-Merxieux, Mary I’Etoile, France) mis-
identifed 5/30 isolates.(493)  Inappropriate identification can significantly impact typing as 
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schemes such as VNTR are species specific and so can lead to either a non-typable or 
aberrant typing result. 
Within the fragment analysis based typing schemes evaluated in this study VNTR 
appeared to give best concordance with HTS data, although a number of isolates were 
identified as unique in comparison (section 4.2.5.2.).  A number of those isolates 
identified as unique formed part of the Klebsiella oxytoca cluster and therefore, if 
correctly identified would not be included in the Klebsiella pneumoniae VNTR scheme 
for typing.  VNTR correctly identified both clusters of outbreak strains (clusters 4 and 
3), with the exception of the environmental isolate (18) linked to cluster 3.  REP-PCR 
failed to identify 3/5 isolates within the second outbreak cluster (cluster 3), finding them 
to be unique.  This indicated that VNTR is probably the most appropriate scheme to 
use as an in-house typing scheme until HTS can be undertaken in a routine fashion. 
There were some isolates that clustered variably between MiSeq analysis one and two, 
Phyloshift and Pathogenica this makes data interpretation more complicated.  Within 
MiSeq analysis two clusters 1 and 2 could be considered to be one cluster dependent 
on the analysis criteria used.  This would bring samples 10, 13 and 16 in line with 
analysis from MiSeq analysis one.  Other isolates that showed a lack of consensus 
between the different analyses of the MiSeq data were isolates 1, 2, and 4 (section 
4.2.4.2.).    
Isolate 1 was considered to be unique in both the Pathogenica and MiSeq analysis 
one.  However it was considered to form part of cluster 2 by MiSeq analysis two and 
Phyloshift analysis.  Isolate 2 was clustered as part of cluster 2 by both the 
Pathogenica and MiSeq analysis one, but both Phyloshift and MiSeq analysis two 
clustered it separately.  For sample 4 MiSeq analysis one and Phyloshift analysis 
clustered the sample as part of cluster 5, while both MiSeq analysis two and 
Pathogenica considered the isolate to be unique.  These comparisons suggest that the 
analysis performed for MiSeq analysis one and Pathogenica are more similar, while 
MiSeq analysis two and Phyloshift are more comparable for these samples.  All three 
of these isolates were considered to be unique by fragment length typing techniques.  
The difficulty in interpreting the results of these three samples, demonstrates that no 
typing scheme can be interpreted without routine epidemiological information to inform 
clinical decision making. 
MiSeq analysis one and two varied by three results, if cluster 1 was considered to be 
shared with cluster 2.  If these three samples are excluded, as they demonstrate a lack 
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of consensus across sequencing typing schemes; then Phyloshift differed from the 
MiSeq WGS analysis by a further three samples and Pathogenica by one result.  This 
suggests that the Pathogenica analysis more closely resembles the data derived from 
WGS analysis.   
Although the WGS sequence data is assumed to offer the greatest discrimination for 
isolates it may find links between unconnected isolates due to the high level of 
clustering detected.(69, 451, 452)  Studies using a purely molecular HTS approach without 
inclusion of epidemiological information are likely to report falsely high patient to patient 
transmission rates, since patients months or years apart may have genetically similar 
isolates and are unlikely to represent true person to person transmission.(457)  However 
this could be due to intermediate sources such as the environment, or the presence of 
institutional strains, possibly carried by staff.  As a consequence more rigorous 
definitions that require genetic relatedness along with clinical criteria might miss 
transmission events if they do not allow for intermediate sources.(457)  
In addition to data interpretation issues discussed in each of the typing scheme 
sections, there remain some other scientific barriers to implementation of HTS for 
infection control typing.  One study has reported that multiple variants of a strain could 
persist in an infected individual/population without any one becoming dominant.  As 
HTS studies have not been validated for detection limits it is unclear whether this data 
would be captured or would be available through the currently data analysis 
programmes available.(494)  There remains considerable contention about how to 
sample colonies for typing, specifically whether to take multiple single colonies or a 
sweep from a plate in order to capture diversity.(495)  Greater validation needs to be 
undertaken to answer these issues before routine implementation is undertaken.(486) 
There are also a number of implementation barriers to the introduction of HTS based 
typing within the routine clinical setting.  First, there is a need to streamline 
bioinformatics and for access to readily accessible curated databases, this is easier to 
do with kit based systems such as Pathogenica, but comes at an increased cost.(278, 456)  
Outside of kit based systems there are a number of bioinformatics programmes 
becoming available that provide either WGS analysis or targeted analysis of both the 
core and accessory genomes, all of which still require a high level of bioinformatics 
knowledge.(464)  Secondly, it requires a considerable IT infrastructure, especially if the 
data is to be kept and shared between centres as clinically relevant.(223, 496)  Thirdly 
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linked to increased oversight in order to achieve accreditation, universal use of HTS 
would require a level of standardization and consistency not currently attained.(185) 
As typing data does not currently provide sufficient information to predict phenotypic 
expression of antibiotic resistance, even if the data is captured, there is still a need for 
good phenotypic identification and processing.  This is especially true for those typing 
schemes that are species specific, such as VNTR.(230)  Additionally although HTS and 
other typing schemes can identify the source of transmission, they do not always 
explain the mode of spread and therefore both targeted sampling as discussed in 
Chapter 3 and interventions as discussed in Chapter 5 are essential for outbreak 
control.(215) Finally HTS cannot truly be utilised for routine infection control typing until it 
ceases to be limited by a lack of real time deployment.  For this reason fragment based 
typing schemes are likely to continue to be used, at least in the short term.(284) 
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4.4 CONCLUSIONS  
This study has demonstrated that sequence based techniques, whether targeted or 
whole genome have the capacity to identify cross transmission between patients and 
the environment.  They may however provide a level of discrimination that could make 
interpretation difficult for infection control teams without the support of better 
information.  This information would need to include data on molecular clocks for both 
invasive, non-invasive and environmental isolates and definitions for how these should 
be interpreted linked to cross transmission in order to permit their use in outbreak 
investigations. The criteria for the definition of relatedness must be independently 
investigated for each species.(457) 
Until HTS methods are common place and standard practice, rapid typing methods are 
still required.(461)  From the analysis in this study VNTR provides a tool that is capable 
of discriminating at a level that could detect transmission between patients, at least 
within isolates that do not have an environmental source.  VNTR is therefore the most 
appropriate tool for current use in-house as it is rapid, inexpensive and portable 
between centres. 
There remains a difficulty with all the typing schemes, except PFGE, that there are no 
definitions of relatedness that can be universally applied, even for single species.  Long 
term carriage studies of patients colonised in multiple sites, with and without exposure 
to antibiotics are needed.  This should be done in addition to sampling of environmental 
isolates where work should be done examining mutation rates given different 
environmental exposures e.g. to cleaning agents and mixed biofilms.(264) 
Another barrier to the implementation of HTS in routine practice is the amount of data 
produced.  This requires a large amount of information technology infrastructure.  
Additionally finding a way to deliver the large amounts of data to infection control teams 
and other clinicians in a context driven, epidemiologically linked fashion is a major 
challenge.(284) 
Finally as most of infection control typing continues to be retrospective and therefore 
does not immediately inform outbreak control, prevention of cross transmission events 
will continue to rely on infection control interventions.  Optimal interventions may 
depend upon the organism targeted.(215, 457)  For this reason they are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 5 INFECTION CONTROL INTERVENTIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Published studies as well as those described in Chapters 3 and 4 have demonstrated 
that potentially pathogenic organisms are present within the healthcare 
environment.(438, 497, 498)  In order to aid in the prevention of healthcare associated 
infection (HCAI), the environment should be considered as a possible source of 
infection and targeted appropriately.(183, 341, 368)   
Kleypas et al. (2011) suggest that the best way of reducing HCAIs after hand hygiene 
is environmental control, which should be upon based on good cleaning, thorough 
removal of organisms by mechanical action and by disinfection.(21, 300, 360)  Routine 
cleaning within Great Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH) is undertaken with Tristel Fuse 
(Tristel, Snailwell, UK); which contains chlorine dioxide (CIO2).  This is used except for 
those areas deemed to be at high risk for environmental contamination (determined 
based on work undertaken in Chapter 3) or containing particularly susceptible 
patients.(499)  In these high risk areas ChlorClean (Guest Medical, Aylesford, UK) which 
contains sodium dichloroisocyanurate (NaDCC) is utilised for all routine cleaning, and 
areas cleaned in this way include the hematopoietic stem cell transplantation unit 
(HSCTU) and the infectious diseases and immunology unit (IIU) as well as the other 
haematology/oncology units. In contrast cleaning during studies undertaken as part of 
this work at the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery (NHNN) was 
undertaken with microfibre cloths and water. 
GOSH also undertakes ‘deep clean’ post discharge for patients colonised/infected with 
pathogens such as viruses, methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), 
Clostridium difficile, resistant Gram-negative flora and vancomycin resistant 
Enterococci (VRE).(500)  These are referred to as level 2 cleans (level 1 cleans being 
standard discharge cleans) and involve removal of all linen and clinical equipment from 
the cubicle; these then undergo a separate cleaning protocol.  The remaining items, 
floor, and walls to hand height are cleaned using NaDCC and disposable cloths and 
mops.   
The most extensive cleans performed within GOSH are referred to as level 3 cleans 
and are undertaken on discharge in cubicles where patients have been positive for 
CRE, MRSA with  a skin shedding condition, Mycobacterium tuberculosis or norovirus 
with vomiting.(500)  Additionally level 3 cleans are undertaken in the HSCTU and IIU 
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when patients have been adenovirus positive. Level 3 cleans are the same as level 2 
cleans, but include the cleaning of all walls and ceilings.   
As chlorine based cleaning chemistries such as (NaDCC) can impact the fabric of the 
environment and the efficiency of standard cleaning techniques has been questioned 
there has become an increasing focus on the use of novel decontamination 
technologies.(501-503)   Technologies such as those utilising hydrogen peroxide (HP) and 
ultraviolet light (UV) are becoming more widely utilised as they are less reliant on user 
efficiency in order to decontaminate the healthcare environment.(504-506)   
As much as decontamination of the environment has been identified as a corner stone 
for environmental control, healthcare environments are complex, especially within 
intensive care units, and it is likely that there will be multiple healthcare worker-patient 
and healthcare worker-environment interactions.(300)  With increased interactions there 
is increased potential for the environment to become contaminated in between 
decontamination episodes, it has therefore it has been suggested by a number of 
authors that there is a role for the built environment in controlling transmission of 
HCAI.(324, 332, 336)  Despite this suggestion, little work has been undertaken, with the 
exception of air ventilation, to investigate how building design and use can affect 
microbial contamination.   This study aims to investigate ways of managing the 
environment to minimise transfer organisms within it through cleaning, movement 
modifications and design. 
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5.2 CHAPTER AIMS 
The aim of this chapter was to utilise the sampling techniques and inoculation studies 
developed in Chapter 3, to test both current and novel techniques for decontamination 
of clinically relevant pathogens.  On the basis of these studies a quality algorithm linked 
to the standards discussed in Chapter 3 was developed for use with routine monitoring.  
In addition, this study aimed to identify how the use of clinical environments, and thus 
levels of microbial contamination could be affected by design and to identify potential 
interventions that could be used for improvement.  The specific aims of this work were 
to: 
1. Establish the effectiveness of current cleaning chemistries (NaDCC, CIO2, and 
sodium hypochlorite (NaCIO)). 
2. Undertake a study to understand the effectiveness of cleaning in practice and to 
develop a monitoring algorithm to assess cleaning quality. 
3. Investigate the use of novel technologies for surface and room 
decontamination.  
4. Investigate the effect of hospital design and staff movement on contamination of 
the clinical environment. 
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5.3 RESULTS 
5.3.1 SELECTION OF ORGANISMS FOR STUDY WITHIN INTERVENTION STUDIES 
5.3.1.1 KLEBSIELLA PNEUMONIAE 
Klebsiella pneumoniae was selected as species for inoculation studies as it had been 
demonstrated, during experiments discussed in Chapter 3, to be able to survive within 
the environment for a number of months as well as being a potential source of 
outbreaks.  As Klebsiella spp. are capable of forming biofilms and as such produce a 
high level of extracellular polymeric substance (EPS) they may respond differently to 
cleaning and were important to include.   The type strain NTCC 13368 was investigated 
as part of the outbreak study discussed in Chapter 4, and although not representative 
of the outbreak strain, it was included as the Klebsiella spp. strain within this study as it 
is a well characterised strain. 
The stability of DNA from the type strain NCTC 13368 was explored as described in 
methods section 2.4.1.  Extracted DNA from the type strain was demonstrated to be 
stable on a ceramic surface at a mean temperature and humidity of 16oC and 43% 
respectively for >2 months. 
5.3.1.2 ADENOVIRUS 
Human adenovirus consists of six common clinical species. These species are diverse 
and so in order to select a species to use for inoculation studies it was important to 
establish which species was most commonly represented in the patients that were 
admitted to GOSH.  To achieve this, all primary adenovirus isolates received between 
2009 and 2011 from patients within GOSH were typed using sequencing of the Hexon 
gene using single locus sequence based typing (see methods section 2.2.6.). 
83 samples from 60 patients were successfully amplified.  Some samples failed to 
amplify due to insufficient volume or viral loads of fewer than 50,000 copies/ml (see 
Figure 5-1.).  Sequence data from type strains (available from Genbank database) 
were also included and analysed as described in methods section 2.8.  There was only 
one result that did not cluster as expected with the other sequences and that is a 
sequence downloaded from Genbank AF542119, the provenance of which is unknown. 
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Figure 5-1 Adenovirus hexon gene typing results aligned by ClustalW analysis 
for adenovirus isolates received between 2009 and 2011 from patients within 
GOSH, with additional Genbank reference sequences for adenovirus serotypes. 
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Patients within the HSCTU and the IIU were mainly infected with adenovirus species C, 
with a small minority of patients positive for adenovirus species A and F.  Other species 
were detected in non-immunocompromised patients located outside of these two units.   
Typing results from patients located within the HSCTU and IIU were of particular 
interest, as patients within those areas were at risk of severe clinical infection when 
exposed to viruses. This is particularly pertinent because adenovirus was detected 
within the environments of these units as discussed in Chapter 3.   
As a result of these typing results adenovirus species C was selected as the species 
for inoculation studies.  To establish how genetically similar these serotypes were a 
whole genome sequence alignment was produced from available sequences taken 
from the Genbank database as described in methods section 2.8. 
 
Figure 5-2 Whole genome ClustalW alignment of Genbank reference sequences. 
Adenovirus species C demonstrates a highly conserved genome, see Figure 5-2.  
Genotype 5 was rarely detected from patient samples and no adenovirus species 
genotype 6 was detected. The C1 cluster of patients was marginally larger than the C2 
cluster.  Because of these studies adenovirus C1 was selected as type strain to be 
utilised for inoculation studies.  
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The stability of DNA from the type strain C1 (NCTC 0011051v) was explored as 
described in methods section 2.4.1.  Extracted DNA from the type strain was 
demonstrated to be stable on a ceramic surface at a mean temperature and humidity of 
16oC and 43% respectively for >2 months. 
5.3.1.3 STAPHYLOCOCCUS AUREUS 
Staphylococcal spp. were the most common isolates detected throughout the sampling 
undertaken for Chapter 3.  Within the Staphylococcus genus Staphylococcus aureus is 
the species most frequently associated with HCAI and has been shown to survive 
within the environment for >3 months by studies undertaken as part of this work.  For 
this reason it was decided to use NCTC 65711 within the inoculations studies. 
The stability of DNA from the type strain NCTC 65711 was explored as described in 
methods section 2.4.1.  Extracted DNA from the type strain was demonstrated to be 
stable on ceramic surface at a mean average temperature and humidity of 16oC and 
43% respectively for >2 months. 
5.3.2 ESTABLISHING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT CLEANING CHEMISTRIES 
5.3.2.1 EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
In order to investigate how current cleaning chemistries utilised at GOSH rendered 
organisms non-viable, inoculation studies were undertaken. The impact of these 
cleaning chemistries on the integrity of DNA was also determined with a view to 
assessing if DNA degradation was sufficient to permit molecular surveillance of 
organisms in the environment.  Three cleaning chemistries were investigated:  
• NaCIO (Sodium Hypochlorite) (Sigma–Aldritch, Gillingham, UK) which has been 
determined in the literature to degrade DNA,  
• CIO2 (Tristel Fuse Chlorine Dioxide) (Tristel, Snailwell, UK) which is utilised for 
routine cleaning in non-high risk areas at GOSH 
• NaDCC (ChlorClean Sodium dichloroisocyanurate) (Guest Medical, Aylesford, 
UK) which is used for level 2 and 3 cleans as well as routine cleaning in high 
risk areas at GOSH.  
Both NaDCC and NaCIO had 1000ppm available chlorine; Tristel Fuse does not list 
available CIO2.   
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Klebsiella pneumoniae (NCTC 13368), Staphylococcus aureus (NCTC 65711) and 
adenovirus C1 (NCTC 0011051v) were inoculated onto ceramic tiles and exposed to 
NaCIO, NaDCC and CIO2 for 10 minutes, 60 minutes and 120 minutes as described in 
methods section 2.4.2.3.  Samples were then processed for viability and for DNA 
amplification as described in methods sections 2.2.5.1, 2.2.5.2, 2.2.5.4, 2.3.2.6 and 
2.1.2.   
Data analysis was undertaken looking at the mean colony forming units (CFU/ml) log10 
reduction between four replicates for viability studies.  This is standard practice within 
the published literature and is in line with ISO standards (see Chapter 1).(21)  For 
molecular studies DNA degradation was assessed by examining the mean cycle 
threshold value (CT) change within test samples compared to controls using real-time 
PCR amplification, this is also standard practice within the literature.(507, 508)  No 
quantification was performed using PCR standards because, as discussed in Chapter 
3, swabbing is not a quantitative sampling method as DNA extraction from cotton 
swabs is not 100% efficient.  However a CT value increase of 3.3 CTs equates to a 
theoretical 1 log10 reduction in detectable genomes within the input extract.  A PCR 
value of 40 equates to a negative clinical result and a CT result >45 equates to 
undetectable as this is the end point of the assay. 
Bacterial Viability 
Klebsiella pneumoniae was determined to be non-culturable after 60 minutes of 
exposure to all cleaning agents.  Staphylococcus aureus remained viable after 120 
minutes of exposure to CIO2.  Both NaDCC and NaCIO produced negative culture 
results at 60 minutes of exposure, see Table 5-1. 
Bacterial 
Suspension 
Exposure 
Time 
(minutes) 
Inoculum 
CFU/ml 
NaCIO 
CFU/ml 
NADCC 
CFU/ml  
CIO2 
CFU/ml 
Control 
CFU/ml 
S. aureus 
10-1 
10 6*109 845 370 2340 3.5*108 
S. aureus 
10-1 
60 6*109 ND ND 745 4*109 
S. aureus 
10-1 
120 6*109 ND ND 5 3.5*108 
K. pneumoniae 10 1.2*1010 705 225 905 5*108 
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10-1 
K. pneumoniae 
10-1 
60 1.2*1010 ND ND ND 5*108 
K. pneumoniae 
10-1 
120 1.2*1010 ND ND ND 5*108 
Table 5-1  Effect on Klebsiella pneumoniae and Staphylococcus aureus viability 
when exposed to NaCIO, NaDCC and CIO2. for either 10, 60 or 120 minutes.  ND = 
not detected. 
Bacterial DNA Degradation (Viable Suspension Inoculated and Exposed) 
Bacterial suspensions in saline were inoculated onto ceramic tiles as described in 
methods section 2.4. with four replicates run for each 10-1, 10-2, and 10-3 test and 
control dilutions. DNA degradation was inferred by an increase in mean test CT when 
compared with mean control CT (∆CT) when tested by real-time PCR.    
Klebsiella pneumoniae DNA demonstrated degradation with all three cleaning 
chemistries, see Figure 5-3.  The highest levels of degradation were observed in the 
10-1 dilutions.  The combined ∆CT (all ∆CT differences from controls combined for each 
cleaning agent) as a measure of DNA degradation was greatest for NaCIO (97) 
followed by NaDCC (79) and CIO2 (68).  
 
Figure 5-3 Alteration in CT detection of DNA in comparison to controls for 
Klebsiella pneumoniae when exposed to NaCIO, NaDCC and CIO2. for either 10, 
60 or 120 minutes.   
When exposed to NaCIO 7/9 averaged replicates became undetectable by PCR and so 
were assigned a CT value of 45.  For NaDCC 4/9 averaged replicates were 
undetectable by PCR and for CIO2 3/9.  Interestingly, at 60 minutes, all cleaning 
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chemistries led to decrease in CT detected, indicating increased availability of DNA in 
the starting sample.  
Samples with a CT greater than 40 would be considered negative for clinical samples.  
All averaged replicate results, at all time points, when exposed to NaCIO would be 
considered negative using a cut-off of 40 CTs, 7/9 would be negative when exposed to 
NaDCC and 6/9 for CIO2 exposed DNA. 
Staphylococcus aureus DNA degraded at all dilutions for both NaCIO and NaDCC, but 
failed to demonstrate degradation in comparison to the control for 2/3 dilutions when 
exposed to CIO2.   The highest levels of degradation were observed in the 10-1 
dilutions, see Figure 5-4.  The exposure time with the greatest number of amplified 
samples was 60 minutes, where all samples had detectable levels of DNA present.  
The combined ∆CT change was greatest for NaCIO (80) followed by NaDCC (66) and 
CIO2 (18). 
 
Figure 5-4 Alteration in CT detection of DNA in comparison to controls for 
Staphylococcus aureus when exposed to NaCIO, NaDCC and CIO2. for either 10, 
60 or 120 minutes.   
When the inoculated Staphylococcus aureus suspension was exposed to NaCIO 1/9 
averaged replicates became undetectable by PCR, 3/9 averaged replicates became 
negative when exposed to NaDCC and 1/9 exposed to CIO2. 
Samples with a CT greater than 40 would be considered negative for clinical samples.  
When exposed to NaCIO all averaged replicates (9/9) would be considered negative 
using a greater than 40 CT cut-off.  Of samples exposed to NaDCC 7/9 averaged 
replicates were considered negative and 6/9 averaged replicates exposed to CIO2. 
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Virus Viability 
Adenovirus tissue culture at a concentration of 4.75*108 copies/ml was inoculated onto 
ceramic tiles as described in methods section 2.4 with four replicates run for each 10-1, 
10-2, 10-3 10-4, 10-5, and 10-6 test and control dilutions. Adenovirus C1 tissue culture 
samples were non-viable post 120 minute exposure to NaCIO, NaDCC and CIO2 when 
grown in tissue culture for 6 days as described in methods section 2.1.2. 
Virus DNA Degradation  
Viable adenovirus C1 tissue culture was inoculated onto ceramic tiles as described in 
methods section 2.5.2.3.  DNA degradation was observed with all three cleaning 
chemistries when tested by PCR as described in methods section 2.2.5.4.  The 
exposure time with the lowest CT (indicating greatest available DNA) within amplified 
samples was after 10 minutes exposure for all cleaning agents, except CIO2; which 
demonstrated the lowest CTs after 120 minutes of exposure. The combined ∆CT 
change was greatest for NaCIO (51) followed by NaDCC (46) and CIO2 (44) (see 
Figure 5-5). No averaged replicate (mean of four individual test replicates) became 
undetectable or negative using a >40CT cut-off. 
 
Figure 5-5 Alteration in CT detection of DNA in comparison to controls for 
adenovirus C1 tissue culture when exposed to NaCIO, NaDCC and CIO2. for 
either 10, 60 or 120 minutes.   
Adenovirus C1 extracted DNA was inoculated as described in methods section 2.4. to 
determine if the presence of protein within the tissue culture altered results for DNA 
degradation.  DNA inoculated samples were exposed to NaDCC for 120 minutes and 
results compared to those when tissue culture was inoculated.  
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Figure 5-6  Alteration in CT detection of DNA inoculation versus tissue culture 
inoculation at three dilutions for adenovirus C1 when exposed to NaDCC for 120 
minutes.   
No averaged replicates became undetectable or negative using a >40CT cut-off for 
positivity.  In the presense of protein there was a ∆CT reduction range of 4 – 8 CTs, for 
DNA there was a ∆CT reduction range of 3 – 9 CTs, see Figure 5-6.   Cumulative ∆CT 
changes were similar, with 19 for DNA inoculations and 20 for tissue culture. 
5.3.2.2 HOSPITAL APPLICATION STUDY 
As NaDCC had been demonstrated to degrade DNA during the experimental study 
described in 5.3.2.1., screening of cubicles by PCR that had been occupied by 
adenovirus positive patients was undertaken within the HSCTU and IIU after cleaning 
with NaDCC. Data was collected using environmental screening methods as discussed 
in Chapter 3 and methods section 2.3.1.1. The data collected and analysed was the 
result of infection control environmental surveillance over a 5 year period with 794 
surfaces screened in 48 cubicles from 2005 to 2009.  For the first three years 
surveillance data was collected as part of routine infection control surveillance, rather 
than an experimental study and so the selection of sites screened varied slightly during 
this period.    
Of the total sites sampled during the screening period 28% of surfaces were detected 
as positive for adenovirus DNA.  In one instance it was found that sinks, clinical waste 
bins, phones and floors were still contaminated after six consecutive cleans.  In another 
bathroom taps, bed frames, mattresses, taps, trolleys, window sills, exit door handles 
and chair arms were only decontaminated after five consecutive cleans. 
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Further analysis was undertaken during the final twelve months of the screening period 
when a new screening protocol was introduced as per methods section using linear 
regression techniques (see methods section 2.6.).  Statistical modelling demonstrated 
that objects present in cubicles such as: bed frames, mattresses, telephones, bathroom 
taps, exit door handles, and chair arms, were the objects most likely remain 
contaminated, with chair arms being significantly linked to contamination (p=0.008).  
These items were identified as difficult to clean and/or are linked to high levels of 
parent/patient contact. 
The number of surfaces found to be adenovirus DNA free per cubicle during this period 
ranged from 60% - 100%; however of the total 585 sites cleaned once only, 23% of 
sites remained positive. Of the 48 cubicle screens analysed, twelve (25%) had at least 
one site with a CT value of <34 or at least two sites with samples containing 
adenovirus detected at between 34 and 38 cycles.   
Second and fourth cleans were significantly less effective at removing adenovirus DNA 
than the initial clean, or third and fifth cleans (p=<0.01).  After a second clean all but 
one contaminated cubicles remained positive for adenovirus DNA.  Following a third 
clean, only three cubicles remained contaminated, and this reduced to two after a 
fourth clean.  One cubicle remained positive after a fifth clean and no cubicles had 
adenovirus DNA detected after a sixth clean.  Table 5-2 shows the results for a cubicle 
that required six consecutive cleans to have no adenovirus DNA detected.  This cubicle 
was screened by both trained and untrained personal which produced different results 
on identical sites screened within two hours of each other and no other members of 
staff entering the cubicle.  The possible reasons for this variation are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3. 
Site 
Post 
1st 
L3C 
(CT) 
Post 
2nd 
L3C 
(CT) 
Post 3rd 
L3C 
(untrained) 
(CT) 
Post 3rd 
L3C 
(rescreen -
trained) 
(CT) 
Post 
4th 
L3C 
(CT) 
Post 
5th 
L3C 
(CT) 
Floor under sink 34 38 40 ND ND ND 
Clinical waste bin 35 39 ND 33 37 ND 
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Chair arms 35 41 38 35 34 38 
Bathroom door 
handle ND 44 ND 38 42 ND 
Telephone 33 36 ND 35 34 ND 
Bathroom taps ND ND ND ND 37 ND 
Mattress top 
(patient) ND 37 40 38 34 36 
Bed frame 
(parent) 39 IS ND 35 34 ND 
Trolley ND 41 ND IS 39 ND 
Window sill 41 ND ND 36 39 ND 
Exit door handle ND 41 ND 40 39 ND 
Corridor floor 43 37 45 36 34 ND 
Table 5-2  Adenovirus real-time PCR results on the same cubicle after 5 level 
three cleans (L3C) with no inpatient admission inbetween screening and 
cleaning.  Screening undertaken by both trained and untrained personal.  IS 
insufficient ND not detected. 
Cubicles sampled during the summer months had significantly less adenovirus DNA 
detected than those sampled during the winter months (p=<0.01).  There was no link 
between individual cubicles for detection of contamination. 
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5.3.3 EVALUATION OF NOVEL DECONTAMINATION TECHNIQUES 
As demonstrated in section 5.3.2.2. and in Chapter 3 interventions utilising current 
cleaning chemistries are not always successful at reducing environmental 
contamination and so two newly available technologies were evaluated for 
decontamination; either for use on clinical equipment or rooms.   
Data analysis was undertaken looking at the mean colony forming units (CFU/ml) log10 
reduction between four replicates for viability studies.  This is standard practice within 
the published literature and is in line with ISO standards (see introduction).(21)  For 
molecular studies DNA degradation was assessed by examining the mean cycle 
threshold value (CT) change within test samples compared to controls using real-time 
PCR amplification, this is also standard practice within the literature.(507, 508)  No 
quantification was performed using PCR standards because, as discussed in Chapter 
3, swabbing is not a quantitative sampling method as DNA extraction from cotton 
swabs in 100% efficient.  However a CT value increase of 3.3 CTs equates to a 
theoretical 1 log10 reduction in detectable viral genomes within the input extract.  A 
PCR value of 40 equates to a negative clinical result and a CT result >45 equates to 
undetectable as this is the end point of the assay. 
5.3.3.1 OBJECT DECONTAMINATION 
The use of ultraviolet light (UV) for decontamination of clinical equipment was 
investigated using UV cabinets (Nanoclave Technologies, London, UK).  Cabinets use 
short wave UV light (UV-C) targeted from all directions in order to decontaminate an 
object. An inoculation experiment was undertaken as described in methods section 
2.4.2.1.  During the inoculation experiment adenovirus species A (serotype 31) was 
used, as work was undertaken prior to the adenovirus typing described in section 
5.3.1.2.  
Virus Viability 
Viable adenovirus A31 was inoculated from tissue culture onto tiles as described in 
methods section 2.4.  Tissue culture contained ~2.9*1010 copies/ml of adenovirus and 
dilutions 10-1, 10-2, 10-3 and 10-4 were used.  A six minute exposure to UV rendered all 
replicates at all dilutions of the virus non-detectable by tissue culture at six days. 
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Virus DNA Degradation on Simple Surfaces 
Viable adenovirus A31 was inoculated in duplicate from tissue culture onto tiles as 
described in methods section 2.1.2.  The effect of UV on adenovirus DNA was 
determined utilising adenovirus PCR as described in methods section 2.2.5.4. 
  Exposure time 
 Control 1 min 2 min 3 min 4 min 5 min 6 min 
Mean 
CT 
(n=4) 
18 22 27 27 34 ND ND 
Table 5-3  CT values of adenovirus PCR performed on swabs from inoculated 
test areas of ceramic material after accumulative exposure to UV light in the 
Nanoclave cabinet. Not detected (ND) = CT>45. 
After a 3 minute UV exposure a ∆CT of 9 was detected and after 5 minutes DNA was 
undetectable by real-time PCR, see Table 5-3.   
Virus DNA Degradation on Complex Surfaces 
Five medical devices were tested at two sampling time points (as described in methods 
section 2.4.2.1.), one after a three minute UV exposure and another after a six minute 
UV exposure.  The medical devices consisted of metallic and plastic surface types.  As 
there was inadequate space for a control, control data was used from experiments run 
in parallel on ceramic tiles in order to calculate the log10 reduction (control CT at 18). 
As multiple versions of the same object were not available multiple sites were 
inoculated onto the same equipment, 50% were sampled after three minutes of 
exposure to UV light and the other 50% were sampled after six minutes of exposure.  
Both the remote control and pulse oximetry monitor consisted of plastic surfaces and 
demonstrated a ∆CT of 11 and 10 respectively after a six minute exposure.   A single 
piece of dialysis equipment was tested, where the sample area consisting of a metal 
plate.  It demonstrated a ∆CT of 7 after a three minute exposure and DNA was 
undetectable after a six minute exposure.  The electronic blood pressure gauge 
consisted of a plastic surface and demonstrated a ∆CT of 5 after a six minute 
exposure.  There was no difference in CT detection between sampling at time points 
three minutes and at six minutes (see Table 5-4.) 
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Remote 
Control 
(Mean CT) 
Pulse 
Oximetry 
Monitor 
 (Mean CT) 
Blood 
Pressure 
Gauge 
(Mean CT) 
Dialysis Equipment 
(Mean CT) 
3 minute 
exposure 
20 32 23 25 
6 minute 
exposure 
29 28 23 ND 
Table 5-4  CT values of adenovirus PCR performed on swabs from inoculated 
test areas on medical devices after accumulative exposure to UV light in the 
Nanoclave cabinet. Not detected (ND) = CT>45. 
Position of the surface tested appeared to impact on adenovirus DNA detection, with 
objects containing complex surface sites that were partially obscured, such as the 
electronic blood pressure gauge, demonstrating a lower CT (increased DNA detected) 
after a six minute exposure.  This may also explain the discrepancy in results for the 
pulse oximeter, as some of the inoculation sites may have been exposed to higher 
levels of UV than others, due to the complex nature of the surface.  
5.3.3.2 ROOM DECONTAMINATION  
Hydrogen Peroxide (HP) H2O2 has been suggested as an effective additional 
decontamination method to support standard surface cleaning.  In this study, we 
assessed the ability of HP treatment to eliminate viable bacteria and viruses and 
degrade DNA.  Two different HP–based instruments were investigated as described in 
methods section 2.4.2.2: the Bioquell Q10 (Bioquell, Andover, UK) which used 
hydrogen peroxide vapour (HPV) and the GLOSSAIR™ 400 (Advanced Sterilization 
Products, Wokingham, UK) which utilises a dry mist hydrogen peroxide (DMHP) 
system.  The Bioquell system produces a vapour from 30% H2O2 using heat 
evaporation.  In contrast, the Glossair system produces a fine dry mist by aerosolizing 
a solution containing 5% v/v hydrogen peroxide, with silver cations at less than 50ppm.  
HP cycles were undertaken as described in Table 5-5 and methods section 2.4.2.2. 
Equipment Experiment No. Cycle No. 
Cycle 
Dosage Contact Time 
Bioquell 
Viable and DNA 
exposure 
E1 1 10g/m3 15 min 
Glosair 
Viable bacteria and 
DNA exposure 
E1 1 6ml/m3 2hours 
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DNA exposure E2 1 9ml/m3 2 hours 
DNA exposure E3 3 consecutive 12ml/m3 2 hour 
DNA exposure E4 3 consecutive 6ml/m3 2 hour 
DNA exposure E5 3 consecutive 6ml/m3 30 min 
DNA exposure E6 3 consecutive 6ml/m3 15 min 
Table 5-5  Hydrogen peroxide cycling conditions for Glossair and Bioquell 
systems for both viability and DNA denaturation experiments. 
Bacterial Viability 
Klebsiella pneumoniae (NCTC 13368) and Staphylococcus aureus (NCTC 65711) 
suspensions were made in each of 1 * phosphate buffered saline (PBS) and 0.3% 
bovine serum albumin (BSA) and inoculated onto ceramic tiles.  Tiles were placed on a 
surface at waist height within an environmentally controlled chamber and exposed to 
the manufacturers’ recommended HP cycle (methods section 2.4.2.2.).  Klebsiella 
pneumoniae was determined to be non-culturable after exposure to a standard cycle of 
the Bioquell HP instrument in both suspensions made up in PBS and BSA, 
representing a >7 log10 reduction, see Table 5-6.  The inoculum used with the standard 
Glossair cycle was greater (109 vs 1010) and Klebsiella pneumoniae remained viable 
even though Glossair achieved >8 log10 reduction under both suspension conditions.  
Staphylococcus aureus had residual viability under all test conditions.  The lowest log 
kill was achieved by the Bioquell cycle with a suspension in PBS while Glossair 
achieved a >9 log10 reduction.  Log kills for Glossair and Bioquell were similar for BSA 
suspensions with both demonstrating a >8 log10 reduction. 
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1 * Phosphate Buffered Saline 
Bacterial Suspension 
0.3% Bovine Serum Albumin 
Bacterial Suspension 
Organism and 
HP 
Technology 
Control 
CFU/ml 
Test 
CFU/ml 
Log 
Reduction 
Control 
CFU/ml 
Test 
CFU/ml 
Log 
Reduction 
Bioquell 
S. aureus 
3.35*108 2.63*102 6.11 1.23*1010 25 8.69 
Glossair 
S. aureus 
4.49*1010 10 9.65 1.73*109 10 8.24 
Bioquell 
K. 
pneumoniae 
2.32*109 ND 8.37 2.56*108 ND 7.41 
Glossair 
K. 
pneumoniae 
4.5*1010 10 9.65 2.44*109 10 8.39 
Table 5-6  Comparative effectiveness at reducing bacterial viability of Bioquell 
and Glossair hydrogen peroxide decontamination methods using standard 
cycling conditions. 
Virus Viability  
Viable adenovirus C1 was inoculated from tissue culture onto tiles as described in 
methods section 2.5.2.2.  Tissue culture contained 4.16*108 copies/ml of adenovirus 
and dilutions 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 10-4, 10-5 and 10-6 were used.  Post exposure to HP via 
standard cycles of Bioquell and Glossair all replicates at all dilutions of the virus were 
rendered non-detectable by tissue culture at six days. 
Bacterial DNA Degradation 
Staphylococcus aureus (NCTC 13368) and Klebsiella pneumoniae (NCTC 65711) DNA 
was inoculated onto ceramic tiles as described in methods section 2.4. with four 
replicates run for each test and control dilution.  Tiles were placed on a surface at waist 
height within an environmentally controlled chamber and exposed to the 
manufacturers’ recommended HP cycle.  Additional cycles were undertaken using the 
Glossair technology with variations in terms of contact time and HP dosage as 
described in the methods section 2.4.2.2.   
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DNA degradation was not consistent, with only cycle Glossair E2 (9ml/m3 cycle dose) 
showing reductions in DNA amplification at all dilutions when compared to the control, 
see Figure 5-7.   4/18 dilutions across experiments when exposed to HP by all Glossair 
cycles demonstrated no change in CT relative to the control; 10-1 E1, 10-3 E1, 10-1 E4 
and 10-3 E5 (see table 5.6. for cycle differences).  2/18 dilutions across experiments 
when exposed to HP by Glossair demonstrated an increase in amplification when CT 
was compared to controls, tests 10-1 E3 and 10-3 E6, indicating greater DNA 
amplification.  12/18 tests showed between 1 and 15 CT increases between control 
and test CTs, indicating DNA degradation.  For Bioquell exposed samples 2/6 tests 
demonstrated an increase in amplification relative to control sample with both the 10-1 
and 10-2 dilutions (decrease in CT).  Of the other four dilutions that were exposed to the 
HP cycle no difference between control and test CTs was noted. 
 
Figure 5-7 Staphylococcus aureus real-time PCR results for Glossair and 
Bioquell experiments comparing CTs between test conditions and control (∆ CT). 
Klebsiella pneumoniae DNA degradation was demonstrated with all six Glossair HP 
cycles at all but two test dilutions, see Figure 5-8.  CT increases between 1 and 14 CTs 
occurred in 16/18 tests between control and test CTs, indicating DNA degradation.  
One test, 10-1 dilution in cycle E1, demonstrated no change between control and test 
CTs.  One further test, 10-2 cycle E2, demonstrated a 1 CT decrease between test and 
control, indicating increased DNA amplification.  All tests exposed to Bioquell HP 
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demonstrated a decrease in CT between test and control, with CTs decreasing in the 
test between 1 and 8 CTs, indicating increased DNA amplification. 
 
Figure 5-8 Klebsiella pneumoniae real-time PCR results for Glossair and Bioquell 
experiments comparing CTs between test conditions and control (∆ CT). 
Viral DNA Degradation 
Tests for adenovirus DNA degradation were initially run on the ABI 7500 Fast real-time 
PCR machine (Applied Biosystems, Warrington, UK) using fast amplification conditions 
and master mix (Fast Universal PCR mastermix (Applied Biosystems, Warrington, UK)) 
as described in methods section 2.2.4.4.  Amplification for tests exposed to Glossair 
cycles was limited, but this was not seen for controls (see Figure 5-9).  Tests were re-
run using the same PCR machine, but using slow amplification conditions and master 
mix (QuantiTect mastermix (Qiagen, Crawley, UK)) as described in methods section 
2.2.4.4.  Amplification was then observed in almost all test samples (see Figure 5-10).  
A similar affect was not observed for Bioquell exposed samples processed at the same 
time. 
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Figure 5-9 Fast amplification of adenovirus DNA exposed to the Glossair 
platform. 
 
Figure 5-10 Slow amplification of adenovirus DNA exposed to the Glossair 
platform. 
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Adenovirus C1 DNA was inoculated onto ceramic tiles as described in methods section 
2.5. with four replicates run for each 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 10-4, 10-5, 10-6 test and control 
dilutions.  Tiles were placed on a surface at waist height within an environmentally 
controlled chamber and exposed to the manufacturers’ recommended HP cycle.  
Additional cycles were undertaken using the Glossair technology with variations in 
terms of contact time and HP dosage as described in the methods section 2.4.2.2. and 
Table 5-5.   
 
Figure 5-11 Adenovirus real-time PCR results for Glossair and Bioquell 
experiments comparing CTs between test conditions and control (∆ CT). 
Adenovirus DNA degradation was demonstrated with all six Glossair HP cycles and at 
all, but seven test dilutions (10-4 E2, 10-1 E3, 10-1 E6, 10-2 E6, 10-3 E6, 10-4 E6 and 10-5 
E6).  Bioquell HP exposure resulted in a reduction in CT for dilutions 10-1 and 10-4 and 
an increase in CT for dilutions 10-2, 10-3 and 10-5, with no change versus control seen 
for the 10-6 dilution.  Changes of >3 logs (increase of >11 CTs) was demonstrated for 
Glossair experiment 1 between control and test samples for all dilutions.   
No single HP cycle degraded DNA reproducibly across both bacterial and viral DNA 
(Figure 5-7, Figure 5-8 and Figure 5-11).  The standard Glossair cycle caused the 
highest level of DNA degradation, but for both Staphylococcus aureus and Klebsiella 
pneumonia there were still dilutions with no change from controls. 
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5.3.4 SINKS  
Sinks have been demonstrated to be a potential source of outbreaks within the 
healthcare setting (see Chapter 4).  The outbreak described continued for some 
months despite the practice of cleaning with NaDCC which was validated as effective 
in section 5.2.2.1.  Outside of outbreak situations and in spite of routine cleaning using 
the techniques validated in section 5.3.2.1., high CFU counts  and pathogens were 
detected on sinks within GOSH (as discussed in Chapters 3).  A number of studies 
were undertaken both at GOSH and at the NHNN in order to better understand why 
sinks were contaminated, why that contamination persisted within the HSCTU, and why 
it was not consistent between sampling occasions in other areas.  
5.3.4.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VISIBILITY AND SINK USAGE 
Pilot work was undertaken on an adult ITU based at the NHNN to understand the 
relationship between sink visibility and sink use.  Within the adult ITU the bed 
space:sink ratio was higher than at GOSH 1.3:1 compared to 1:1.  Sink visibility was 
analysed as described in methods section 2.6.2.  Figure 5-12 demonstrates the 
visibility of some sinks was influenced when the curtains were drawn around the bed 
space.  
 
Figure 5-12 The effect of curtain closure on the visibility of sink 5 within medical 
intensive care unit at the NHNN (sink in the centre of the image).  The sink is 
visible within the brown area and the green area is the area blocked when 
curtains are closed. 
When no curtains were drawn the central sink was visible from the entirety of the unit; 
when the curtain on the right hand bed space was closed the sink remained visible 
from most locations within the unit; however when the curtains were drawn in both the 
adjacent bed spaces the sink was visible only from the main entrance gate and the 
nurses station. 
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In the medical intensive care unit (MITU) ward sink visibility was identified as being 
related to sink usage as is demonstrated in Table 5-7. 
Sink No. in MITU 
Number of Time 
Utilised During a 3 
Hour Observation 
% Visibility 
Curtains Opened Curtains Closed 
Sink 4 (left hand 
sink in Figure 5-12) 11 89 15 
Sink 5 (central sink 
in Figure 5-12) 34 97 68 
Sink 6 (right hand 
sink in Figure 5-12) 1 77 13 
Table 5-7 Sink usage in the MITU related to visibility based upon curtains 
open/closed as monitored over a three hour observation period (two 1.5 hour 
sessions) on a single day. 
5.3.4.2 SINK SCREENING AND SINK LOCATION STUDY AT GOSH 
Following the pilot at NHNN, which indicated that visibility may play a role in sink 
usage, further investigations exploring the links between sink visibility and sink use was 
undertaken at GOSH on the paediatric intensive care unit (PICU), cardiac intensive 
care unit (CICU) and neonatal intensive care unit (NICU).  The visibility of hand wash 
basins was calculated on the basis of the ward plans as described in methods section 
2.5.4.  Within GOSH, the bed space:sink ratio was 1:1; however because of the ward 
layout not all sinks were equally visible,  with sinks in central bed spaces usually 
demonstrating higher levels of visibility, see Figure 5-13.  In addition as sinks were 
mostly situated on pillars at the end of bed spaces some were more visually obstructed 
than others, depending upon bed space position.   
Sink usage was observed as described in the methods section 2.5.2. and analysed as 
described in methods sections 2.6.2. using linear regression analysis.   
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Figure 5-13 GOSH floor plans for areas studied (PICU, CICU and NICU) showing 
numbered sink locations. 
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It was found that as the proportion of visible area increased, the number of hand 
washing episodes also increased (p=0.007). The more visible the sink the more 
frequently it was utilized for hand washing.  Sink usage was then assessed in relation 
to bed space occupancy. Visibility remained the main determinant of sink usage; 
however the average time spent per hand washing episode was influenced by bed 
occupancy. When the bed space was occupied and visible, people washed their hands 
for longer than when the bed space was not occupied (p=<0.001).  
The mean length of hand washing per sink ranged from 9.28 – 22.13 seconds.  The 
shortest hand washing time observed was 4.83 seconds, and the longest was 65.28 
seconds, with an overall mean of 14.59 seconds based on 1063 observations. 
Although hand washing compliance was not specifically monitored as part of these 
observations, GOSH undertakes monthly hand washing on all three units with an 
average compliance during the observation period of 93%, based on over 7000 
observations using the National Patient Safety Agency audit tool.(509)  Hand washing 
compliance within the individual units averaged at 97% for CICU, 85% for PICU and 
87% for NICU during the period of the study.   
Determinants of Sink Contamination 
Bacterial swab samples were collected from eight sinks located in the three units at 
GOSH (PICU, NICU, and CICU) in conjunction with observational studies of the levels 
of hand washing undertaken.   
Microbial data was collected daily during the hand washing observation period in both 
the morning and afternoon and then once a week for three weeks subsequently as 
described in methods section 2.3.4.2.  The aim of this work was to model the effect of 
hand washing on the change of bacterial growth levels in the sinks and to gain an 
understanding of bacterial sink contamination as a potential transmission route.  
Microbial growth in relation to sink use was modelled using multilevel regression using 
linear mixed effects models as described in methods section 2.6.2.    
All sinks and associated soap and alcohol dispensers had some bacterial 
contamination over the sampling period. The major organisms identified were 
Staphylococcal spp, followed by Enterobacteriaceae and Enterococcal spp. Greater 
sink usage was associated with higher levels of bacterial contamination within the bowl 
of the sink. In contrast, compared to the bowl of the sink, the contamination of the sink 
lips and soap/alcohol dispensers were inversely related to sink usage ((sink) p=0.018, 
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(gel dispenser) p=0.049)). Enterobacteriaceae were detected at all sites except for 
soap and alcohol dispensers, but were particularly high on the lips of sinks; 
Staphylococcal spp. were detected at all sites.  
During sampling it was observed that although against hospital policy, a number of 
items were stored in the sinks and personnel and professional equipment was placed 
on the sink edges, whilst undertaking hand hygiene and procedures (see Figure 5-14). 
 
Figure 5-14 Image of inappropriate sink use on the GOSH PICU. 
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5.3.5 MOVEMENT STUDIES 
Having determined that utilisation of sinks impacted on bacterial contamination (see 
section 5.3.4.2.) it was decided to investigate how user behaviour inside the PICU at 
GOSH and intensive care units (ITUs) at the NHNN contributed to bacterial 
contamination within bed spaces and at other points of focus within the wards, i.e. 
doorways.  
5.3.5.1  PAEDIATRIC INTENSIVE CARE UNIT BED SPACE STUDY 
Work was undertaken as an observational study described in methods section 2.5.3.  
The activity of staff and visitors, mostly focused on nurses, was recorded over three 
days in two bed spaces on PICU (BS6 and BS7). This observational study was done at 
the same time as the final three days of testing for bacterial contamination, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Figure 5-15 shows the layout of the two bed spaces where 
both the observations and testing for contamination were performed.  
The most contact in both bed spaces was focussed on the nurse’s trolley surfaces: 113 
contracts in BS6 and 115 in BS7.  In BS6, there were also a number of contacts with 
the clinical equipment panels (92), whilst in BS7, the bed rails (76 for rail to the left and 
82 for rail to the right) were frequently contacted. 48% of the objects had between 50 
and 100 total contacts over the three days of observation.  
Hand hygiene constituted 43% of all movements (see methods section 2.5.3.).  Hand 
washing was slightly more popular than decontamination using alcohol gel with 162 
versus 149 events.  When entering the bed spaces nursing staff undertook hand 
hygiene, either with hand washing or alcohol gel, on 41% of occasions.  Upon exiting 
the bed space nursing staff under took hand hygiene, either with hand washing or 
alcohol gel, on 9.6% of occasions. 
Gloves were used in 43% of the movements within bed spaces.  Of those movements 
that included glove use, they were changed on average 2.2 times.  Fresh gloves when 
donned were most frequently taken from glove dispensers within the sink zone, rather 
than those present by the trolley in the bed space area. 
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Figure 5-15 Frequency of contact with objects within bed space 6 and bed space 7 on PICU over a three day observation period  
Circle size and colour indicate frequency of contact. 
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Object Bed Space 6 Bed Space 7 
 Total CFUs 
Total. No 
of 
Contacts 
Total CFUs 
Total No. 
of 
Contacts 
Sink Bowl 1034 3 208 1 
Sink Rim 417 3 364 2 
Bed Rails 138 114 157 158 
Chair Arms 117 2 322 11 
Clinical Waste Bin 104 0 160 0 
Lamp 98 3 10 1 
Trolley Surface 70 113 0 115 
Suspended Shelf Surface 55 35 0 30 
Computer Mouse 42 90 281 73 
Soap Dispenser 40 86 16 74 
Keyboard 18 78 63 40 
Table 5-8 Total number of CFUs detected on contact plates over three days along 
with the total number of contacts observed during the same three day period in 
bed spaces 6 and 7 on PICU per object. 
Table 5-8 compares the CFU counts and the frequency of contacts over the three days 
observation period.  There was no statistically significant correlation between 
contamination and frequency of contact. The sink area was determined to be the most 
contaminated in both bed spaces as determined by CFUs, as well as being linked to 
contamination with pathogens in 5.3.4.2.  During the observational study, activity was 
recorded as movements between two objects. It was decided to investigate whether 
there was a link between areas of contamination and areas activity. Table 5-9. shows 
the ten most common movements between two objects. 
Movement From Movement To Number of Trips 
Sink Bowl Soap Dispenser 156 
Paper Towels Domestic Waste Bin 151 
Soap Dispenser Paper Towels 151 
Clinical Bin Clinical Bin 136 
Bed Rails Clinical Bin 85 
Clinical Bin Sink Bowl 56 
Trolley Surface Clinical Bin 51 
Glove Dispenser Trolley Surface 50 
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Clinical Bin Trolley Surface 39 
Clinical Bin Gel Dispenser 35 
Table 5-9 Ten most frequent trips made between two objects during a three day 
observation period on GOSH PICU. 
The three most common movements made were between objects required for hand 
washing: sink bowl – soap, paper towel – domestic bin, soap – paper towel.  In 
addition, six of the ten most common movements involve the clinical bin, which is also 
among the more contaminated objects in both bed spaces.  
Data on movements was examined again for BS6 based on zoning so that three 
clustered areas were considered: the near bed area (n = 4)), the wider bed space (n = 
9) and the sink area (n = 13). 
Zone Number of Trips Within Zone 
Number of Trips 
Between Zones 
Number of Trips 
Between Zones 
Near bed 138 Near bed to sink area 195 
Sink area 571 Bed space to sink area 482 
Bed space 727 Near bed to bed space 562 
Table 5-10 Total number of trips within BS6 between objects located within the 
sink, near bed and wider bed space zones as well as the number of trips between 
zones. 
The number of trips from within the bed space (both near the bed space and wider bed 
space area) to the sink area was 677 and this represented the greatest number of 
directional trips.  There were also a large number of trips within the bed space, with all 
movements combined indicating 1248 trips involving the sink zone.  In comparison 
there were 1289 trips that involved the wider bed space, either within the wider bed 
space itself or trips from the near bed space to the wider bed space.  The area with the 
fewest within zone movements was the near bed space with only 138, indicating that 
the highest levels of activity during the observation study were not based around 
contacts with the patient bed side (see Table 5-10.).  However this study did not 
capture direct nurse patient interactions as it focussed on contact with objects within 
the clinical environment. 
In addition to routine cleaning within the bed spaces nurses undertook cleaning with 
Clinell Universal surface wipes (GAMA Healthcare, London, UK).  Cleaning of surfaces 
was observed in 16% of movement rounds and in 1.6% of all contacts.  The objects 
most frequently cleaned were trolley surfaces within the bed spaces. 
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5.3.6 INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE CONTAMINATION OF SINKS 
Having established the potential for sinks to act as a reservoir for the spread of 
potential pathogens, a number of interventions were undertaken on the HSCTU during 
the outbreak described in Chapter 4 to try and reduce the risk. These included: 
• Level 2 cleans of all shared ward areas with NaDCC  
• Improved sink use - no items to be stored near sinks or in sinks, no items left to 
dry on sinks  
• Improved sink cleaning in medication room (post environmental screening) – all 
hand washing sinks and equipment sinks to be cleaning with NaDCC every two 
hours 
• Door handles to be cleaned six times a day  
Utilisation of sinks was identified as providing a potential route of transmission from the 
contaminated sink environment into patients’ rooms and this into patients.  Trays for 
intravenous infusion were left to dry on the sink surface as were tablet crushers (see 
Figure 5-16).  The installed sink was a stainless steel unit with draining board inserted 
into a covered wooden countertop, with under sink storage and no splash back present 
on the wall. 
 
Figure 5-16 Photograph of the equipment sink within the HSCTU. 
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Despite two hourly cleaning for three months Klebsiella spp. and Enterobacter spp. 
continued to be detected on sink surfaces.  The number of sites detected as positive 
increased during the second environmental screen.   
After three months of cleaning with NaDCC the sink sealant appeared as shown in 
Figure 5-17.    
 
Figure 5-17 Image of the sealant breakdown on the equipment sink within the 
HSCTU. 
The damaged sealant was replaced but despite this the sink areas continued to remain 
positive for the outbreak strain of Klebsiella pneumoniae described in Chapter 4, and 
other pathogens.  Additionally new cases continued to be detected despite the above 
interventions and so In July 2012 a new sink design was installed within the unit.   
The newly designed and installed sink unit was stainless steel with no drainage area 
(see Figure 5-18).  Sealant was above the height of taps where present and less 
sealant was utilised as the unit was self-contained.  The back of the sink was raised to 
form a metal splash back.  No under sink storage was included.  After the sink was 
replaced no further cases were detected and environmental screens linked to the sink 
were negative. 
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Figure 5-18 Replacement equipment sink fitted on the HSCTU at GOSH. 
5.3.7 ARE DOOR HANDLES A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONTAMINATION? 
Door handles are frequently associated with high levels of both bacterial and viral 
contamination (as discussed in Chapter 3).  To understand how both the traffic through 
a door and door handle design affect the levels of contamination a study was 
undertaken at the NHNN within a Surgical Intensive Care Unit (SITU) (with an attached 
high dependency unit (HDU)) and MITU.  Gates were studied which represent access 
point to the unit, both with and without doors.  Gates shown in Figure 5-19 are those 
with doors and thus permit microbial sampling of the associated door handles 
.  
 
Figure 5-19 Floor plan of the SITU, MITU and HDU at the NHNN showing gates 
with associated door at the NHNN. 
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A parallel study was not undertaken at GOSH as no door handle variation was present 
within the ITUs. Traffic was observed as described in methods section 2.5.1. for three 
consecutive days. 
During observation periods there was variation in the number of patients admitted; with 
HDU having between zero and four patients, SITU having five to seven patients; and 
MITU three to four patients. The highest number of movement recorded in a single 150 
minute observation period was 241 movements within SITU when six out of nine beds 
were occupied. Ward staff were responsible for 50% of all movements observed 
through that gate. Table 5-11 displays the total number of movements according to 
category of building user over a three day observation period. Doorways were denoted 
as Gates as not all doorways had doors. For this study only Gates with doors were 
included. Movements through the main entrances to the ITUs (Gates number 4 and 5), 
constituted almost 51% of all movements. 87% of movement through all gates were 
made by staff members, of which 54% belonged to the ward observed.  Patient and 
visitors utilised gates much less frequently, at 1% and 12% respectively.  These data 
demonstrate large variation in traffic across doorways, which were related to location 
and time, but not direction. Ward and hospital staff generated the majority of these 
events.  
 Ward Staff Other Staff Visitors Patients Total 
Movements 
Through 
Gate 
Gate 
No. 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1 41 66 21 34 0 0 0 0 62 
4 381 50 262 31 146 18 8 1 797 
5 249 36 332 57 109 16 6 1 696 
6 295 51 219 38 58 10 3 1 575 
7 580 57 102 39 37 4 5 0 724 
10 36 73 13 27 0 0 0 0 49 
Total 1582 54 949 33 350 12 22 1 2903 
Table 5-11 Movement of each type of person per gate, both absolute number and 
proportion of the total movement through that gate. 
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There were three types of door handle design present on the units studied: a flat push 
plate, pull handles and lever handles (see Figure 5-20).   
 
Figure 5-20 Different door handle types present on doors within MITU, SITU and 
HDU at the NHNN. 
Figure 5-21 demonstrates that there was considerable variation between doors in 
terms of the mean CFUs detected; samples were collected as described in methods 
section 2.3.4.6.  Confluent or near confluent bacterial growth on door handles was 
sometimes detected in the context of low levels of traffic (Gates 1 and 10). These 
exceptions may be explained by less frequent contact with highly contaminated hands. 
When confluent samples were excluded, as they prevented quantification, a significant 
correlation existed between movement density and CFUs when data was analysed by 
Spearman’s Rho Product Moment test (p=<0.01). Low traffic density was associated 
with low CFUs for Gates 1 and 10 and the more heavily used doors at Gates 4, 5, 6 
and 7 were more contaminated.  
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Figure 5-21 Mean number of CFUs detected by doorway during the study period 
on the SITU, MITU and HDU at the NHNN. 
Gate 6 was the only gate to exhibit fluctuating levels of contamination based upon time 
of day, where the afternoon samples were consistently found to be greater than 
300CFU/plate or were confluent.   Gate 6 was not as heavily used as Gate 7 and had 
similar proportions of staff groups entering and exiting the unit.  Gate 6 represented the 
main route to and from the sluice room and timing of contamination may have been 
linked to removal of clinical waste prior to the end of the domestic workers day. 
In order to investigate further the differential patterns of contamination across gates 
analysis was undertaken linked to door handle type. 
Gate No. 
Movements 
In 
CFU/ 
Movement 
In 
Movements 
Out 
CFU 
/Movements 
Out 
CFU/ 
Movement 
1 Handle 0.43 Handle 8.56 4.63 
4 Pull 1.82 Push 0.49 1.18 
5 Pull 2.63 Push 1.29 1.97 
6 Pull 5.44 Push 0.99 3.27 
7 Push 0.62 Pull 0.76 0.69 
10 Handle 1.57 Handle 14.52 8.56 
Table 5-12 Ratio of CFU/Movement for each type of handle. 
Traffic density heading either in or out of the doors was balanced and not influenced by 
door handle design (Table 5-12.). However analysis of individual and mean CFUs for 
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each type of door handle, revealed that bacterial load on pull handles was consistently 
higher than those on the push plates located on the other side of the door, although not 
statistical significant when analysed using a one way ANOVA test (p=0.053). Further 
analysis relating to handle type revealed that lever handles had the highest ratio (6.38 
CFUs/movement), followed by pull handles (2.24 CFUs/movement), which were in turn 
were nearly double that of the push plates (1.20 CFUs/movement) (see Table 5-12).  A 
representation of why this might occur is shown in Figure 5-22. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-22 Representation of the distribution of microbes on door handle types 
with the same starting level of hand contamination.(417) 
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5.4 DISCUSSION   
5.4.1 TO ESTABLISH THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT CLEANING CHEMISTRIES. 
Selection of Cleaning Chemistries 
Cleaning must be undertaken with the most appropriate cleaning agents, in an 
appropriate fashion, if it is to make a difference to the risk of environmental cross 
transmission.(189)  Chlorine based products are considered to be the cheapest and 
easiest form of environmental disinfectants and result in the irreversible lysis of 
bacterial cells.(189, 357, 359)  In this chapter, the effectiveness of three disinfectants were 
investigated, particularly assessing the impact of concentration and formulation (see 
section 5.3.2.1.).   
In addition to disinfectant factors those factors relating to the microorganism tested are 
also important and were therefore also examined.(189)     Bacteria commonly associated 
with both environmental contamination and HCAI were tested.  Adenovirus was also 
investigated as an indicator virus for surface disinfection, as well as water and air 
decontamination.(333)  Along with polioviruses, adenoviruses are considered to be 
model viruses and surrogates for testing virucidal efficacy of all human pathogenic 
viruses.(508)  However viruses, even from the same family, are not characterized by a 
uniform response to disinfectants, therefore within the literature often adenovirus 
species C serotypes 2 or 5 are utilised.(508)  Within this study adenovirus species C 
serotype 1 was selected, as this represented the serotype that infected the majority of 
patients within high risk areas at GOSH (see section 5.3.1.2.).    Sauerbrei at al. (2004) 
demonstrated that differences in adenovirus species sensitivity are probably due to 
adenovirus genomes, as they are non-enveloped viruses.(508)  We demonstrated that 
the genomes of adenovirus species C are very similar and so the use of adenovirus C1 
for disinfectant studies should reflect results that would have been achieved with either 
of the virus serotypes used more frequently within the literature.(508)   
Finally application factors such as the type of surface, type of soil, mode of application, 
contact time, humidity and temperature affect the efficiency of disinfection.(189)  For 
these reasons unlike standard ISO disinfectant testing protocols, as discussed in the 
introduction, testing was undertaken as per standard environmental conditions found 
within GOSH, (temperature, humidity) and applied as per the GOSH cleaning protocol 
(single use disposable cloths, one per surface wiped for 10 seconds).  This permitted 
testing of bacteria and viruses in circumstances where they are less susceptibility to 
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disinfection, i.e. dried onto a surface rather than in hydrated suspension.(510) This more 
accurately reflects real world conditions where surface disinfection is a two stage 
process of rehydration followed by disinfection.(510)  
Effectiveness of Chlorine Cleaning in Laboratory Testing 
For registration as an environmental surface disinfectant a 3 – 5 log10 reduction should 
be achieved in the viability of test organisms.(21)  Hospital surface contamination ranges 
from a mean <10CFU/cm2 to 300/cm2 depending on the study; this maximum level is in 
part likely to be linked to maximum quantitation of contact plates as discussed in 
Chapter 3.(8, 21)  Viral loads are likely to be considerably higher, with norovirus 
contaminating surfaces at up to 30 million viral copies/ml.(157) 
Within this study there were differences in response to NaDCC, ClO2 and NaClO 
between Staphylococcus aureus and Klebsiella pneumoniae for viability.  Klebsiella 
pneumoniae demonstrated a 6 log10 kill for NaDCC and a 5 log10 kill for ClO2 and 
NaClO after 10 minutes, with no Klebsiella pneumoniae recovered for any agent after a 
60 minute exposure.  All agents met the standard of a   >5 log10 kill of Staphylococcus 
aureus. However, it remained viable after 10 minutes exposure to all cleaning agents, 
and was still detected after 120 minutes of exposure to ClO2, despite achieving a 7 
log10 kill.  No viable Staphylococcus aureus was recovered after a 60 minute exposure 
for either of the other agents (see section 5.3.2.1.).   
The Centre for Disease Control (CDC) discusses a requirement for a one minute 
contact time for non-critical equipment and environmental surfaces.(511)  These data 
demonstrate that it is unlikely that a 5 log10 reduction would occur within the amount of 
contact time suggested.  A 6 log10 kill is often used as the required cut-off for 
examination of disinfectant activity in laboratory studies.  For ClO2 this would require a 
60 minute contact time to achieve.(512)  Additionally viable colonies of Staphylococcus 
aureus were recoverable after a 120 minute exposure and although the number of 
colonies recovered was small, they could still present a potential for harm to at risk 
patients.   
The finding that NaClO and NaDCC have similar activity has been identified in other 
studies, and the delayed killing of Staphylococcus aureus also noted.(356, 513)  While 
ClO2 showed reduced activity, its use for disinfection of Clostridium difficile spores 
found was to be more effective than NaClO in one study undertaken within a ward 
environment.(514) One reason for this may be because of the levels of proteinacious 
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material present within clinical environments.  Chlorine based agents react with organic 
matter and so the antimicrobial activity is proportionally decreased based on the level 
of organic material present, but the level at which they are affected varies between 
agents.(515)  It is therefore necessary to have sufficiently high levels of available chlorine 
to oxidise cellular components, which may explain why NaClO is more active at low 
concentrations compared to NaDCC.  In spite of high levels of protein within the 
adenovirus tissue culture, all agents rendered 785 million viral copies/ml of adenovirus 
non-viable after 120 minutes of exposure.(356)  Therefore the recommended levels of 
0.1% (1000ppm) available chlorine are suitable to attain high level disinfection with 
GOSH hospital cleaning protocols. 
Chlorine DNA Degradation 
Monitoring of DNA degradation utilising molecular methods, such as real-time PCR, is 
widely recognised as both sensitive and specific.(507, 508)  Molecular changes within the 
genome results in loss of PCR amplification of specific target regions and is therefore 
one of the most suitable tools to evaluate the effect of disinfectants on both bacterial 
and viral DNA.(508)   
As molecular detection for evaluation of environmental contamination is increasingly 
common, additional testing was undertaken to explore the effect of chlorine based 
agents on DNA.  Chlorine is an oxidative biocide which due to its low molecular weight 
should be able to pass through cell walls and membranes in order to react with cellular 
components such as DNA, resulting in single or double strand breaks.(355, 516)   
There is little available information within the literature on the effect of chlorine on DNA 
in solution and none on the effect of chlorine based agents on DNA on surfaces.(516)  Of 
the studies that have been undertaken on the effects of chlorine on DNA within solution 
for both viruses and bacteria, all demonstrated that chlorine based agents are capable 
of degrading DNA.(157, 369, 507, 517) However both contact time and size of DNA fragment 
had an effect on degradation and this was especially true for ClO2.(369)   
DNA degradation in this study was greatest for all three organisms with NaClO, 
followed by NaDCC and ClO2 (see section 5.3.2.1.).  All bacterial DNA samples would 
be considered negative using clinical cut offs after 120 minute exposures to NaClO, 
indicating greatest DNA degradation occurred with this agent.  However for adenovirus 
there was substantially less DNA degradation detected despite the much smaller 
adenovirus genome.  This is a similar finding to that of Page et al. (2010) who found 
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that in solution adenovirus amplification was only reduced by 50% in the presence of 
chlorine.(507)  This is most likely due to the fact that in comparison with bacterial 
suspensions there was a substantial amount of non-adenovirus DNA present in the 
inoculum.  This is because adenovirus is grown in tissue culture and over 50% of the 
DNA present originates from the Green African Monkey cell line (data not shown).  As 
a result the available chlorine will be binding to non-adenovirus as well as adenovirus 
DNA, in both the extracted and non-extracted tissue culture, resulting in decrease in 
detectable degradation.  This may not necessarily reflect the true situation with 
environmental chlorine exposure.   
5.4.2 TO UNDERTAKE A STUDY TO UNDERSTAND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
CLEANING IN PRACTICE AND TO DEVELOP A MONITORING ALGORITHM TO ASSESS 
CLEANING QUALITY. 
Cleaning has rarely been investigated as a scientific entity, mostly due to the difficulty 
in controlling so many interactions; however most of the investigations undertaken 
have been to investigate terminal cleaning.(341)  Terminal disinfection aims to ensure 
that a room or bed space can be used safely for future patients, without posing a risk of 
infection.(189)  Thorough cleaning of all surfaces is often not feasible prior to patient 
discharge.(288)  The persistence of adenoviral contamination indicates how difficult it 
can be to decontaminate occupied rooms (as discussed in Chapter 3).   The efficiency 
of terminal disinfection was investigated in this study as even when the most effective 
disinfectant product is used the degree of efficiency of the cleaning staff will ultimately 
determine its success since they determine both wiping action and contact time.(21)  
Adenovirus was selected for this work as it is a non-enveloped virus which is 
considered to be resistant to infection.(518)  As described in this chapter in section 
5.3.2.2., 28% of surfaces remained positive for adenovirus post terminal cleaning with 
NaDCC.  As NaDCC was capable of denaturing DNA and making adenovirus non-
viable; detection of virus was considered to be a cleaning failure supporting a view that 
cleaning with effective agents is only 90% effective due to human error.(514) 
Viability vs DNA Detection 
PCR cannot differentiate between viable and non-viable virus.  It has been 
demonstrated that the effect of disinfectants on the adenovirus genome does not 
always correlate with the speed at which the virus is rendered non-viable.(508)  Living 
cells demonstrate a higher susceptibility to chlorine than DNA, most likely due to the 
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presence of multiple targets rather than just DNA molecules, thus leading to an over 
estimation of the virological risk to patients.(157, 508)   
25% of the cubicles tested post terminal cleaning with NaDCC had adenovirus DNA 
detected and required at least one re-clean to render it PCR negative, and one cubicle 
required cleaning five times for no adenovirus DNA to be detected (see section 
5.3.2.2.).   Viral DNA may remain intact when the virus has been rendered non-
infectious. For practical purposes, positive PCR results are frequently used to indicate 
the presence of infectious viral particles as for a virus to be considered truly 
inactivated, viral nucleic acids must be destroyed.(157)   Tuladhar et al. (2012) noted that 
there was a 10fold difference between the level of viable virus and the level of PCR 
detected DNA and so this was taken into account during algorithm development, as 
discussed below.(508, 519)  
Monitoring Algorithm  
Routine auditing of the environment using the environmental screening methods 
developed as part of Chapter 3 offered a way to compare cleaning results over time.  
Results from the applied hospital study in 5.3.2.2. were analysed along with 
epidemiological information on cross transmission events.  These data were 
considered in the light of clinical risk assessment strategies discussed in Chapter 3 and 
utilised to establish a cleaning monitoring algorithm to decide when cubicles were 
sufficiently clean to permit further in-patient admissions.  The algorithm was as follows:  
• The cubicle is opened with no further cleaning required if no site has an 
adenovirus CT of <39. 
• If the cubicle has two sites with CTs of no lower than 34, then those sites are 
re-cleaned twice using NaDCC and the cubicle can be re-opened, as long as 
the sites positive to do not include the floor inside the room.  If the floor inside 
the cubicle is positive than the cubicle undergoes a repeat ‘deep clean’ and is 
re-screened. 
• If the cubicle has more than two sites with a CT of 34 – 38 or if any one site has 
a CT of lower than 34, then the entire room must have a repeat ‘deep clean’ 
and be re-screened in full before opening.   
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• If the same objects fails to become negative after three cleans and screens, 
that object if possible is replaced within the cubicle and disposed of 
appropriately. 
This algorithm was applied to all environmental screens from 2010 onwards (see 
Environmental Screening policy, Appendix 1).  As a result of the data analysis 
demonstrating that only a small number of cubicles fail two cleans, and that if they fail 
twice then they are likely to continue to fail, an amendment to the policy was 
introduced.(500)  This was based on mounting evidence that persistent cleaning failures 
are due to human error.  For example no correlation between the amount of time taken 
to clean a surface and the effectiveness of cleaning was noted in one study.(413)  
Another study demonstrated that the thoroughness of cleaning did not equate to 
hospital size, case mix or geographical location.(348)  Therefore it is important that 
terminal disinfection is delivered with not only a set of standards and adequate training, 
but audit and monitoring to ensure delivery of efficient cleaning.(189)  The change to the 
algorithm was that if a cubicle fails two screens then it triggers a meeting to investigate 
cleaning methods and a review of any new adenovirus infections on the unit.  These 
meetings include cleaners, ward staff and infection control and are used in order to 
recognise cleaning issues that had occurred.(500)  In combination these measures are 
considered to support and facilitate the use of environmental screening to monitor 
discharge cleaning efficiency. 
5.4.3 TO INVESTIGATE THE USE OF NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES FOR SURFACE AND 
ROOM DECONTAMINATION.  
Equipment cleaning as well as terminal cleaning is based upon manual application of 
existing cleaning chemistries.  In spite of interventions to improve cleaning, studies 
note that only 85% efficacy is possible.(351)  Due to this reliance on manual application 
of cleaning processes it has been suggested that novel cleaning technologies could be 
used to support both equipment cleaning and room decontamination.(413, 520) 
Novel decontamination technologies often come with substantial capital equipment 
costs as well as the being limited to terminal disinfection due to the need to remove 
both personnel and patients from the room.  Therefore their use needs to be carefully 
evaluated.(351, 521)   
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The Use of UV-C for Equipment Decontamination 
Adenovirus is one of the most resistant organisms to UV-C radiation (280 – 100nm); 
resistance is in part due to the double stranded nature of the genome.(335, 506)   UV 
irradiation breaks the molecular bonds of DNA via cyclobutyl-pyrimidine dimerization 
and the affect is as a function of light intensity and exposure time.(332, 379, 512, 516)  
The studies described in this chapter in section 5.3.3.1 demonstrated that UV exposure 
via the Nanoclave cabinet on flat surfaces led to the degradation of adenovirus DNA, 
inoculated from viable culture material, such that it became undetectable by PCR. As 
adenovirus is likely to become non-viable before DNA becomes non-detectable by 
PCR, the exposure time required for reduction in viable organisms may be less than 
used in these experiments.  No other equipment decontamination studies have been 
published, but when UV light has been validated for room decontamination it has been 
shown to decrease vegetative bacteria viability by 4 log10 indicating that the level of 
decontamination achieved in this study was higher.(379, 522)  This is likely due to higher 
light intensity exposure due to its close proximity to the surface. The intensity of the 
radiation will decrease proportionate to the square of the distance between the source 
and the object. 
As demonstrated by the object decontamination results (section 5.3.3.1.), this process 
worked best for flat surfaces where all test locations get equal exposure to UV light.  
These results are similar to those found by other studies that demonstrated reduced 
decontamination efficiency when objects were not directly exposed due to shading, 
with efficiency decreased by >2 log10.(379, 413, 512, 520, 522) 
There are potential drawbacks with these technologies. Objects require cleaning in 
order to remove soiling and allow adequate penetration by UV light; this process may 
not be more efficient than chlorine cleaning alone.(379, 523)  Haas et al. (2014) noted that 
manual cleaning efficiency actually decreased when the use of UV for room 
decontamination was introduced as cleaners were aware that an additional cleaning 
step was to be undertaken post clean.(522)  Additionally UV radiation can reduce the life 
span of pieces of equipment made of plastic or fabric.(512)  
Hydrogen Peroxide Room Decontamination 
Hydrogen peroxide is effective against a wide range of bacteria and viruses and may 
provide a new and efficient cleaning method.(373) The chemical breaks down to 
insignificant amounts of oxygen and water, and has the best safety profile of the 
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gaseous decontamination methods available. Killing occurs in two modes.  One occurs 
at low H2O2 concentrations and is due to DNA damage (mode one), and the second 
occurs at higher concentrations and is dependent on the presence of oxygen and 
hydroxyl radicals and therefore only effective under aerobic conditions (mode two).(373, 
413, 524) Under experimental conditions it has been demonstrated that 100% of nucleic 
acids showed extensively fragmented DNA when exposed to liquid H2O2 in both the 
exponential phase and the stationary phase.(373) 
Adenovirus at a concentration of 416 million viral copies/ml was rendered tissue culture 
negative by exposure to both HP systems (see section 5.3.3.2.).  Bacterial viability was 
decreased by >6 log10 for both systems, with the lowest log kill seen in Staphylococcus 
aureus using the Bioquell system.  These results are similar to those seen in other 
studies, apart from one study by Fu et al. (2012) which identified a reduced kill for the 
Glossair system.(413, 510, 519, 525-527)  This study was however funded by Bioquell and 
contained a number of their employees as authors. 
Bacterial and Viral DNA Degradation by Hydrogen Peroxide  
As well as being effective against viable microorganisms, it has been suggested that 
HP could be used as a DNA degradation agent to eliminate nucleic acids. As cleaning 
efficiency in hospitals is increasingly evaluated using PCR, detection of non-viable 
DNA may lead to cleaning failure and re-cleaning of the area. If effective against DNA, 
HP treatment may prevent over-estimation of cleaning failure rates. 
The Glossair system utilised 5-6% HP in comparison to the Bioquell system that utilises 
30-35% HP.  The level of DNA degradation observed in all organisms tested was less 
with the Bioquell system. This may be related to the higher H2O2 concentration used by 
Bioquell, possibly resulting in mode two killing versus mode one killing, as seen with 
the Glossair system.   In this investigation the recovered DNA for Bioquell tests was 
frequently greater than that of the control (section 5.3.3.2.).  This is probably due to the 
increased level of moisture produced during the chemical breakdown of the H2O2 with 
the Bioquell system. This may enable greater recovery of DNA.  Degradation of DNA 
was greater for adenovirus genomes than for bacterial genomes, unlike that seen for 
chlorine based disinfectant.   
The level of DNA degradation was greater for Glossair, although inconsistent.  This is a 
potential problem with molecular environmental monitoring using HP.  In addition the 
Glossair system contains <50ppm cationic silver ions.  Silver is believed to bind to DNA 
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potentially impairing both DNA replication and also PCR amplification due to its effect 
on double stranded DNA.(516, 528, 529)  This may be the reason for the issues with the 
detection of DNA degradation when fast cycling conditions were used as it may have 
prevented the DNA denaturation step from occurring thus impairing amplification.  The 
only other publication to examine DNA degradation caused by cationic silver as 
detected by PCR ran samples using slow cycling conditions on the same PCR platform 
as this study.(529)  Knowing that the silver binding interferes with PCR amplification is 
crucial as environmental monitoring by PCR could appear falsely negative.  
Surface Decontamination with HP 
HP was shown in published studies to work differently on different surfaces, with the 
longest time to reduction occurring on stainless steel.  Unfortunately  chlorine based 
products cannot be used to clean stainless steel, making it a difficult material to clean 
within the clinical environment.(525)  The fastest decrease in viability occurred on 
linoleum flooring, with intermediate times observed on glass, plastic and ceramic tiles 
(15 minutes for a 4 log10 reduction).(525)  Our study took place on ceramic tiles and 
results should therefore give a good general indication of the effect of HP for 
decontamination of microorganisms. 
One of the main advantages of HP is that it can be used on electrical equipment, which 
would be damaged by the use of biocides. It can also reach locations which are difficult 
to clean manually.(413, 530)  However neither HP system works well against biofilms or on 
deteriorated fabric.(374)  Additionally since these systems work by breaking down into 
water and oxygen they are unlikely to work well against surfaces that are already moist, 
such as sinks, showers and baths.  This might have a significant impact on its 
effectiveness in routine use as many organisms will exist within the clinical environment 
in biofilms, and HP does not have the mechanical action used with chlorine  cleaning to 
aid in biofilm disruption. 
Surfaces still require cleaning before the use of HP as H2O2 reacts with proteins, lipids 
and nucleic acids within the environment oxidising them, thereby reducing its 
efficacy.(351, 373, 374, 531)  Within this study reductions in viability were ~1 log10 less in the 
presence 0.3% BSA when compared to PBS alone.  The extra cleaning lasts  90 – 120 
minutes and is in addition to the time for the HP cycle.(532) This can offer logistical 
challenges, especially when the use of chlorine alone can achieve a >5 log10 kill, as 
has been demonstrated in this study (see section 5.3.2.1.).  For this reason the use of 
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chlorine disinfection without the use of HP in health economic analysis is more 
favourable than either HP plus chlorine or HP alone.(357)   
Other challenges involved with the routine use of HP are the staff time needed to 
transport equipment, and safety concerns due to the interference with both mechanical 
ventilation and fire alarm systems.(351, 413)  In addition the Bioquell system is large as it 
requires both a HP unit and an aeration unit and so it may not be suitable for small 
isolation rooms.(533)  However due to the log10 reductions observed within this study it is 
indicated that HP could be a useful adjunct to routine cleaning if these logistical issues 
can be overcome. 
5.4.4 TO INVESTIGATE THE EFFECT OF HOSPITAL DESIGN AND STAFF MOVEMENT 
ON CONTAMINATION OF THE CLINICAL ENVIRONMENT. 
The design of the healthcare environment is increasing recognised for its impact on 
healthcare quality and outcomes.(376, 431)  However architects use a ‘comfort’ model 
where the design of indoor spaces have sufficient temperature, humidity and air flow 
provide comfortable surroundings.(376)  Increasingly there is the need for scientific 
studies to be undertaken to understand the effect of design on the utilisation of these 
complex spaces and  on the microbiome that exists within them.(376) Microorganism 
transmission can occur due to inappropriate design of both equipment within that 
environment and the environment itself.(336) 
To our knowledge there was no previous coordinated study of how people’s behaviour 
is influenced by the built environment and how this relates to microbial spread.(534)  In 
this study we combined microbiological and observational approaches with statistical 
modelling to assess the use of sinks and doorways to demonstrate how this could be 
influenced by the ward environment. 
Hand Contamination 
Contamination of hand contact surfaces may be a significant factor in the nosocomial 
spread of microorganisms, both during and after hand washing events.(400)  Hand 
hygiene has a strong modifying effect on hand contamination.  If performed perfectly, in 
an uncontaminated sink environment, contamination would never be present on health 
care workers hands.  However real world impediments include imperfect compliance, 
and cross contamination from the hands of healthcare workers to the environment and 
vice versa.(288)  
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Healthcare workers touch surfaces within the clinical environment with greater 
frequency than they touch patients and have demonstrated decreased hand hygiene 
compliance when they do so, both within this study and others.(288)  Additionally 
transmission of microorganisms can occur within the setting of appropriate hand 
hygiene when hands become contaminated during the hand washing episode itself, 
from contaminated sink lips, drain or bowls.(214)  Contamination of all of these sites was 
observed within the ITUs in this study (section 5.3.4.2.) and the objects included within 
the highest number of movements were the sink bowl, soap dispenser, paper towel 
dispenser and the domestic waste bin.  All of these were located within the sink zone of 
the bed space and demonstrated high levels of CFUs. 
As demonstrated in this study and others soap and alcohol dispensers have been 
found to be contaminated with fomites.(535) It would appear that the alcohol gel and 
dispensers are not contaminated prior to  clinical use.(536)  Therefore the source of 
contamination is exogenous and may be due to aerosols generated by sink use or from 
contaminated hands.(289) The latter is likely to explain the contamination on the lever of 
the dispenser, which was the most contaminated area sampled within this study, that 
has most contact with the users hands, and is the most difficult to clean.(535) 
Fingerpads of nursing staff have been found to be contaminated with coliforms, 
especially after washing patients.(302)  As with the organisms found on sinks within this 
study, the most frequent pathogens isolated from the hands of healthcare workers were 
Acinetobacter baumanii, Klebsiella pneumoniae and Staphylococcus aureus.(303)  Not 
only were fingerpads found to be contaminated but these pathogens were found to 
transfer from the hands to fabric and from hands to the environment.(302) 
The frequency of hand washing affects the type, and number of microorganism on 
hands, as well as whether hand hygiene was undertaken with alcohol gel or soap and 
water.(290) In order to prevent carriage of organisms on hands, especially Gram-
negative organisms, skin needs to be in good condition.(7, 537)   In addition to impacting 
on organism carriage skin condition is one of the factors that is used to explain low 
compliance to hand hygiene.(537)   
In addition to hand hygiene glove use is a major way of preventing hand contamination.  
Gloves were used in 43% of movements within this study, roughly equal to the amount 
of hand hygiene actions undertaken (see section 5.3.5.1.).  Gloves were changed 
frequently, but were most often taken from the glove dispenser located within the sink 
area.  The gloves within this area are as likely to be as contaminated as objects such 
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as the soap and alcohol gel dispensers.  Gloves are often perceived as being 
protective for the member of staff wearing them, rather than protecting the patient and 
incorrect glove use has been observed within the clinical environment, where 37% of 
cases were inappropriate.(6)  In this case gloves could be contaminated and then 
utilised for patient interactions, increasing the likelihood of transfer. 
The T-zone includes the mucous membranes within the eyes, nose and mouth.  It has 
been noted that even within healthcare setting members of staff engage in frequent 
face touching, with one study noting that healthcare workers touched the T-zones a 
mean number of 19 times over a two hour period, which may place healthcare workers 
at risk of organism acquisition/transfer.  .  Additionally organisms could survive on the 
skin for minutes to hours and thus present a source of hand contamination when 
touched in the future, with a possible spread to patients and surfaces.(538)   
Hand Hygiene Compliance 
Effective control of HCAI requires both regular hand hygiene and decontamination of 
high touch sites within the clinical environment.(21, 295)  Despite the widespread 
agreement with this principle, compliance varies widely, even within groups of 
healthcare workers, with compliance often averaging only 50%.(7, 295)  Mathematical 
modelling has demonstrated that hand hygiene compliance of >50% is required to 
interrupt vancomycin resistant Enterococci (VRE) transmission.(298)  The hand hygiene 
compliance on the units studied during data collection was >80%. 
 ITU environments are complex with multiple patient-nurse interactions throughout the 
day resulting in up to 60 hand hygiene opportunities/shift for nursing staff.(300)  Most 
hand hygiene opportunities are undertaken by nursing staff, at 77%, compared to 8% 
undertaken by physicians and therefore observations within this study focussed upon 
this group.(330)    
Nurses have identified work flow, access to supplies and deficiencies within the built 
environment as obstacles to good quality patient care.(324)  In addition the built 
environment has been identified as key to facilitating improved hand hygiene and 
avoiding cases of HCAI by placing the correct number of sinks in the correct place 
within the clinical environment.   
The CDC and World Health Organisation (WHO) have identified that sink location and 
sink number are often a contributing factors to sub-optimal hand hygiene.(290, 324)  
Studies that have looked at the amount of time that hand hygiene compliance requires 
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have noted that full compliance to hand hygiene can take between 60 and 240 minutes 
per shift.(539)  This is partly because even without undertaking hand hygiene for the 
recommended 60 seconds it took nursing staff over a minute to walk to a sink and the 
return to the patient’s bedside.(324, 539, 540)   
Hand Washing Duration 
The WHO recommend that hand washing duration should be between 40 and 60 
seconds.(4)  This work was supported by a study that demonstrated it required 60 
seconds to undertake effective hand washing, where all hand hygiene steps were 
completed.(538)  Healthcare workers often take considerably less time to wash their 
hands than the times proposed, with one study finding that 22% of workers took less 
than 10 seconds to undertaken hand hygiene and another demonstrating that workers 
took between 6.6 and 30 seconds to undertake hand hygiene.(4, 538)  During this study 
mean hand washing duration ranged from 9.28 seconds – 22.13 seconds depending 
upon the sink (see section 5.3.4.1.).  The shortest hand washing duration observed 
was 4.83 seconds and the longest was 65.25 seconds. This indicates that although 
hand hygiene compliance was high on the units studied, hand hygiene efficiency is 
unlikely to have been high.  This was identified in another study where although hand 
hygiene compliance was high, more than 90% of hand washes were inadequate.(292) 
One of the proposed reasons why hand washing compliance reduces when units 
relocate to new environments with a 1:1 bed space to sink ratio is that staff feel a 
reduction in perceived risk to themselves.(541, 542)  Risk is one of the major drivers for 
hand hygiene and the perception of what is clean and what is dirty in terms of 
equipment and body fluids, meaning that the elective component of hand hygiene are 
driven by perception rather than a set of healthcare rules.(290)   
This may explain our observation that hand washing duration increased at sinks within 
occupied bed spaces (see section 5.3.4.1.).   When nursing staff are undertaking direct 
patient care they have a greater perception of risk, both to themselves and to their 
patients.  This leads them to undertake hand washing with greater efficiency and thus 
increases hand hygiene duration.  Environments are still not perceived as being ‘risky’ 
and so there is not an equivalent perception driven hand washing response.   
This concept is supported by one study that demonstrated 42% of hand hygiene 
activity was focussed prior to contact with a patient and 39% directly after contact with 
a patient.(330)  Although our study did not focus on direct patient contact and thus the 
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WHO’s ‘five moments’, observations were made that nursing staff only undertake hand 
hygiene 9.6% of the time when they exit bed spaces, despite frequent contact with the 
environment; whereas hand hygiene upon entry was 41%.  This has been seen in other 
centres undertaking hand hygiene compliance audits.(189)  
Sink Visibility 
In view of the importance of hand washing, numerous studies have examined ways of 
improving hand washing compliance.   Some studies have demonstrated an increase in 
hand hygiene compliance when wards have moved from a shared sink to a 1:1 sink 
bed space ratio.(298, 326)  Others have not found an increase in compliance; however the 
majority have not directly examined the impact of sink visibility.    
It may be possible to explain some of the published data by considering sink location 
as hand hygiene compliance varies widely dependent upon the built environment. For 
example, even when sink numbers are increased, their location at the entrance of 
patient rooms may impede visibility, which may explain the lack of apparent 
improvement in hand washing frequency.(378, 543-545)  Indeed in one study that examined 
sink position in terms of distance from the bed space, a 26% reduction in HCAI was 
noted in those patients whose bed space was closest to the sink.(540) Our findings 
support the observations of Boyce at al. (2001) who demonstrated an increase in 
compliance when moving to new units with an improved bed space to sink ratio. In this 
facility, care was taken to ensure that sink access was not obstructed by medical 
equipment, which could have affected lines of sight (see section 5.3.4.1.).(540)  
One of the reasons that visibility may play a key role in hand hygiene compliance is 
that hand hygiene is not an entirely rational behaviour.(286)  The hospital environment is 
both rich and attention seeking with multiple demands being placed upon the attention 
of healthcare workers.(546)  Attention is an ongoing cognitive process which requires the 
gathering of information from the environment.  Divided attention is the cognitive 
process of sharing attention between multiple sources.  It can be considered that a 
failure to process visual cues to enable appropriate hand hygiene may be classed as a 
failure of divided attention leading to an error in omission of undertaking an action 
which had been intended.(286, 546)  
We have shown that hand wash basin usage is directly related to their visibility.  When 
sinks are more visible, people wash their hands more frequently.  This is true even 
when their usage is controlled for bed occupancy and bed space:sink ratio, accounting 
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for perceived clinical risk.  By making sinks more visible they provide a richer visual cue 
in order to support healthcare worker attention.  This was shown in one other published 
study with the use of alcohol gel where improved line of sight increased compliance 
from 37% - 66%.(546) Sink location may be particularly important when staff/ward 
relocation occurs due to the unfamiliar environment and reduced awareness of sink 
position.  
Sink Design and Sink Contamination 
During long term environmental screening, human movements have been found to 
have a considerable effect on the bacterial flora of sinks and the spread of that flora to 
adjacent spaces.(547) A study that examined sink flora during the move into a new 
hospital building identified that the composition of flora changed and stabilised when 
patients were introduced into clinical areas and the species found altered from being 
water borne commensals to species linked with opportunistic clinical infection, with 
Enterobacter cloacae and Serratia marcescens predominating.(547)  As discussed in 
Chapter 3 Gram-negative bacteria have been frequently linked to isolation from sinks in 
this study.  In both Chapter 4 and previous studies it has been demonstrated that 
patients become colonized and sometimes infected by bacteria from sinks, although 
these results indicate that sinks may also become ‘infected’ from patients.(548)   
Multiple hospital room design elements, including sink placement and design, can 
impact on nosocomial transmission of infection.(549)  Testing of in use hand wash sinks 
with fluorescent and other markers has demonstrated that water can create aerosols 
that travel for upwards of one meter from the sink and thus potentially contaminate 
nearby surfaces with organisms.(549)  Additionally when hands are dried with paper 
towels ballistic droplets are produced contaminating up to 2m from the dispenser, 
although the distance that the contamination travelled depended upon volunteers, skin 
condition, technique and body temperature.(289, 336, 550)  These contaminated droplets 
may contribute to the high levels of surface contamination detected during this study 
and help explain why the sink area is most contaminated region.  This indicates that 
not only the sink but the sink area needs to be the focus of a design approach.(189) 
Our multilevel analysis showed that hand washing is an important factor directly 
relating to levels of bacterial contamination on sinks and around the sink area (see 
section 5.3.4.2.).  Sink usage was inversely related to levels of bacterial contamination 
on the outside of the sink bowl area, including taps, gel/soap dispensers and lips of the 
sink.  This has implications in the face of increasing use of single rooms and 1:1 bed 
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space ratios as depending upon occupancy rates, certain sinks may routinely get less 
use than others, increasing their likelihood of contamination.(336) Inactivity may be a risk 
for spreading bacterial via contact with taps and sink lips. 
In contrast bacterial levels in the sink bowls increased as the number of hand washing 
actions increased. Increased usage may increase the risk of spreading microorganisms 
via sink bowls as these are frequently used for inappropriately storing/placing bowls 
and IV bags. Shallow basin depths can result in the splashing of the contaminant to 
surfaces adjacent to the hand washing sink or if the patient is close directly onto the 
patients, thus potentially being a source of HCAI.(549)  These findings indicate that 
patterns of sink usage are important determinants of microbial contamination on and 
around the sinks.  
Positioning of sinks in order to encourage frequent use and therefore prevent the 
establishment of high levels of bacterial contamination may therefore impact upon the 
risk of HCAI within the clinical environment.  Placement of all sinks must be considered 
not just hand washing sinks, especially in relation to patients and clean equipment.  
The sink involved with the Klebsiella pneumoniae outbreak described in Chapter 4 was 
non-compliant with a number of suggested design features meant to prevent HCAI.(324)  
The sink was designed with under sink storage, the sink area was not designed to 
prevent splashing and contamination of the sink area and finally the sink was not well 
sealed which permitted biofilm development (see section 5.3.6.). 
Hota et al. (2009) described a HCAI outbreak linked to the placement of sinks within 
1m of patient heads, that resulted in an outbreak of Pseudomonas aeruginosa due to 
aerosolisation from sinks.(549)  Not only is placement considered to be important for 
avoiding HCAI but also there is a need to consider the design of those sinks, the 
material they are composed of and the ease with which cleaning of them can be 
performed.(189) 
Biofilms on Sink Surfaces 
Once a sink becomes contaminated with microorganisms permanent removal can be 
problematic.  The materials utilised within the built environment for sink and room 
design, play a role in the community composition of the environmental microbiome.(88)   
Pseudomonas aeruginosa and other clinically important pathogens such as 
Enterobacter spp. have been isolated in high numbers from wet surfaces, such as 
sinks, both in this study and in others.(88)   Environmental disinfection policies should be 
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based upon risk assessments for different surface types with specific guidance for 
different types of cleaning.(189)  This is especially true for sinks and other moist surface 
that have been linked to high levels of contamination within this study.  Due to the 
nature of the surface disinfectants are likely to be diluted on application and cleaning 
efficiency affected by the presence of biofilms.(189)  
The ability of bacteria to adhere to surfaces and form biofilms is one of the main factors 
resulting in the inefficiency of disinfecting agents, despite there being proven in vitro 
activity, such as that demonstrated in 5.3.2.1.(551)  Disinfection with chlorine without 
disruption of the biofilms present will only offer low level organism control because the 
remaining viable bacteria will continue to multiply until previous levels of organisms are 
re-established.(341, 548)  Biofilms that contain MDR organisms have been found within the 
clinical environment despite chlorine cleaning on high contact items such as doors and 
curtains.(189, 552)  
Biocides such as chlorine based agents have lower activity towards sessile bacteria, a 
state in which most organisms within biofilms are found.(504, 551)  This is because most 
disinfectants are developed and tested again planktonic bacteria.  Microorganisms in 
biofilms can be up to 1000 times more resistant to toxic substances than those in 
suspension.(551)  Cleaning studies within this work were also undertaken against 
planktonic bacteria, but the chlorine studies were undertaken in the presence of 
mechanical action; this would be crucial in the disruption of biolfilms on surfaces.   
It has been suggested that organisms within the environment will therefore be exposed 
to sub lethal doses of biocides, which could potentially induce resistance.(88, 189)  
Although there is evidence that some biocides such as Ticlosan, quaternary 
ammonium compounds and silver ions can select for biocide resistance, there is no 
evidence for resistance linked to the use of chlorine based disinfectants.(553, 554)  It is 
important when using these agents that lethal concentrations of the agent are rapidly 
delivered in order to avoid selection of resistance.(189) 
Although there is no link between chlorine use and resistance it has been 
demonstrated that non-lethal concentrations of biocides can actually promote biofilm 
formation.  Additionally mixed biofilm formation as detected on the sinks in both the 
HSCTU and ITUs at GOSH are also linked with both increased biofilm production and 
increased resistance to antimicrobials.(344, 555)  Despite the in vitro sensitivity of 
organism to chlorine, flushing, as attempted for the outbreak intervention linked to the 
HSCTU, cannot be completely effective.(548)  Also as seen in the Figure 5-17 of the sink 
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area increased cleaning with chlorine can instead make the situation worse by 
degrading the fabric of the sink and sink area. 
Once significant biofilm has developed on the sink, it may be, as observed in the 
outbreak on the HSCTU, that the only intervention that will end cross transmission is 
the replacement of the sinks themselves.(548)  It must be noted that unless an 
intervention in terms of sink design or placement occurs, this may not be a permanent 
solution as the practice that led to the initial contamination event is unlikely to have 
changed long term.(548) 
Door handles 
There are very limited data on door handles and their potential for microbial 
transmission. In a study looking at surrogate markers of nosocomial pathogen 
transmission, door handles were highlighted as one site that rapidly became 
contaminated within the context of a neonatal intensive care setting.(431)  A recent study 
has shown that it is possible to reduce bacteria on door handles provided they are 
regularly cleaned; however even with regular cleaning, bacteria were detected on more 
than 20% of handles.(556) 
The presence of bacteria on hands and surfaces increases the risk of transmission 
from hands to the environment and vice versa during hand manipulations.(88)  Some 
surfaces within the clinical environment are only cleaned approximately 30% of the 
time, with door handles within the clinical environment being one of the least frequently 
cleaned surfaces.(557)  One study demonstrated that once a door handle was 
contaminated, the subsequent 14 people who used that handle had contaminated 
hands after use.(157) 
We have demonstrated that within a number of different healthcare environments, door 
handles are regularly contaminated with both bacteria and viruses (see Chapter 3 and 
section 5.3.7.).  Furthermore the design, frequency, and manner in which they are 
operated are independently related to contamination density and this in turn may 
impact on the potential for microbial spread.  We also identified a relationship between 
how often and how many people cross door thresholds and the number of bacteria 
deposited on door handles. This finding supports the requirement for hand hygiene 
whenever hospital thresholds are crossed, as per WHO guidance.(296) 
Cleaning, both of hands and the environment, has been widely accepted as an 
important factor in curbing the spread of pathogens in hospitals.(558)  Our data indicate 
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that, while cleaning is important, it is not always practical, as in some cases a single 
touch by a contaminated hand was sufficient to result in a confluent plat.  Other 
approaches may therefore be required.  This could include recent design innovations 
linked to no touch door opening or handles that release antimicrobials either by gel or 
other means.(559) 
5.5 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Decontamination within the clinical environment is an important way of reducing 
microbial contamination on surfaces.  The efficiency with which decontamination is 
undertaken is driven by not only the biocide used but also their application.  Therefore 
cleaning efficiency studies that evaluate in use cleaning are important.  
Decontamination of the cleaning environment can be supported by the use of novel 
technologies; however these cannot replace routine cleaning and can only be used as 
an adjunct to terminal disinfection.  Cleaning undertaken by nursing staff may be the 
key to reducing environmental contamination on high risk sites, but only if those sites 
are perceived as a clinical risk and the decontamination of them supported even at 
times of high clinical work load. 
Application of cleaning techniques in high risk areas requires auditing of cleaning 
standards in order to ensure patient safety and the introduction of monitoring 
algorithms to evaluate cleaning should be considered. The use of molecular techniques 
to undertake auditing is acceptable, but only if the disinfectant is known to affect DNA 
to permit interpretation of cleaning data.  In addition, items that are known to be difficult 
to clean due to biofilms or high levels of use should be targeted for additional cleaning 
and as the subject of education so that cleaning is undertaken in a way that ensure 
adequate contact time and concentration of the applied biocide. 
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Chapter 6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE AVENUES 
This project aimed to fill three major gaps in the available literature: 
1. To develop methods for undertaking bacterial and viral sampling of the clinical 
environment and to apply them in order to determine levels of environmental 
contamination.  
2. To develop and validate different typing techniques for Gram-negative bacteria 
(Enterobacter species, E. coli and Klebsiella species) and apply them in order to 
determine if there was a link between those organisms found within the environment, 
and those found within patients. 
3. To validate available infection control interventions for their effect on environmental 
contamination.  
6.1 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
6.1.1 TO DEVELOP METHODS FOR UNDERTAKING BACTERIAL AND VIRAL SAMPLING 
OF THE CLINICAL ENVIRONMENT AND TO APPLY THEM IN ORDER TO DETERMINE 
LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION.  
A combination of culture and molecular techniques were validated to optimise 
sensitivity for recovery of organisms present in the clinical environment.  Sampling 
reported in this thesis demonstrated that organisms can be recovered from throughout 
the healthcare environment. Differences were observed in the location of different 
bacteria and viruses, leading to the development of different screening algorithms for 
bacteria and viruses to enable detection.  Particularly high levels of organisms were 
detected within patient rooms where patients were isolated for viruses and in 
outpatients and day unit wards.   
Certain items within the healthcare environment were demonstrated to be more likely to 
be contaminated with microorganisms.  Sink areas including the sink itself, but also the 
area immediately around the sink were found to harbour Gram-negative pathogens, 
especially within the paediatric setting.  Gram-positive bacteria were more frequently 
detected in high touch areas and on sites, such as fans, that were more likely to be 
contaminated by skin scales. 
Both bacteria and viruses were found to survive for prolonged periods at room 
temperature.  This finding is in line with the published literature for Staphylococcus 
302 
 
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Avenues 
aureus, but is novel for Klebsiella pneumoniae.  This prolonged survival for more than 3 
months indicates that if these pathogens are present within the healthcare 
environment, and if not removed by cleaning, could represent a potential risk to 
patients.   
Little correlation was detected between the presence of specific pathogenic organisms 
and the level of total viable counts upon surfaces.  Although the use of contact plates 
facilitates quantitative measurement of flat surfaces and may therefore be useful for 
audit purposes, they lack the overall sensitivity necessary to rule out the presence of 
pathogens within the clinical setting.  For this reason it is proposed that specific 
pathogen detection constitutes the preferred investigation to underpin risk assessments 
of the clinical environment. 
6.1.2 TO DEVELOP AND VALIDATE DIFFERENT TYPING TECHNIQUES FOR GRAM-
NEGATIVE BACTERIA (ENTEROBACTER SPECIES, E. COLI AND KLEBSIELLA 
SPECIES) AND APPLY THEM IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF THERE WAS A LINK 
BETWEEN THOSE ORGANISMS FOUND WITHIN THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THOSE 
FOUND WITHIN PATIENTS. 
Identification of potential sources of outbreaks and determining whether cross 
transmission events have occurred is crucial to enable selection of appropriate 
interventions.  This is far from simple.  Chapter 4 discussed the potential role for 
environmental pathogens as the source of an outbreak.  For Gram-negative species 
such as Enterobacter and Klebsiella, even primary identification can prove problematic.  
A number of typing schemes such as multi-locus variable number tandem repeat typing 
(VNTR) rely upon accurate identification of isolates through phenotypic typing before 
molecular typing can occur.  Other techniques such as pulse-field gel electrophoresis 
can only be undertaken at reference laboratories, resulting in a delay to receive 
appropriate typing information.   
All typing techniques have advantages and disadvantages.  The most appropriate 
technique will depend upon a number of variables such as the length of time over 
which the outbreak occurs, whether results need to be transferred to other centres, and 
the level of discrimination required (this will depend whether investigations are local or 
national).  One of the universal problems with all the typing techniques evaluated was 
the need to develop and validate interpretation criteria, and the need for these to be 
informed by isolates from closely defined epidemiological cohorts as well as molecular 
variation. 
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This study demonstrated that whole genome and high throughput sequencing methods 
could be used to provide a suitable typing scheme.  However these techniques require 
further information if they are to be used routinely. Specifically data on differences in 
molecular clocks of individual species and individual strains and an understanding of 
how these differ between patients who are colonised or infected and those found within 
the environment.  Use of these techniques is currently limited by cost, data handling, 
interpretation of the results and the delay all of these cause. 
In lieu of comprehensive genomic coverage (whether of the core genes or core plus 
accessory genes) VNTR appeared to provide the most accessible, rapid and 
discriminatory technique for typing of these organisms.   
6.1.3 TO VALIDATE AVAILABLE INFECTION CONTROL INTERVENTIONS FOR THEIR 
EFFECT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION.  
As pathogens are present within the environment and linked to cross transmission, as 
demonstrated within Chapters 3 and 4, then their removal via cleaning is an important 
infection control intervention.  As contamination levels have been shown to differ 
between wards and between different locations on wards then knowledge of both 
patient susceptibility and of organism distribution may be key in making decisions 
about cleaning interventions in order to prevent cross transmission.   Detection of 
pathogens within this work has demonstrated that current cleaning standard of visually 
free of dirt, dust and debris does not mean that the environment will be free of 
pathogens.  As such organisms that remain after cleaning may be a risk to patients.  
Retrospective typing has shown that cross transmission was occurring on the 
haematology oncology day unit.  Although these patients may be at relatively lower risk 
and are exposed to normal community microorganisms, the transmission of multidrug 
resistant organisms within the unit has the potential for significant patient impact.  As 
such, interventions in terms of alteration of the cleaning product should be considered, 
despite the increase in expense. 
Cleaning may be modified by a number of techniques, such as introduction of chlorine 
based cleaning products or delivery through an airborne system, such as hydrogen 
peroxide.  If cleaning is modified to order to reduce risk then it is crucial to be able to 
monitor cleaning to ensure that it is being delivered effectively.  Monitoring should be 
appropriate to the cleaning technique.  In the case of the adenovirus study undertaken 
as part of this work 25% of terminal cleans with NaDCC failed to successfully remove 
potential pathogens.  Therefore without monitoring there is a risk that the additional 
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investment in cleaning will be unsuccessful in controlling cross transmission.  Total 
viable counts may have a role to play in sampling directly after cleaning in order to 
measure levels of bacterial contamination; however the turnaround of this technique is 
48 hours and therefore will not give rapid enough information to allow direct 
intervention.  PCR was determined to be more effective as a method of environmental 
monitoring. This is due to its speed and that co-screening could be undertaken for both 
viruses and bacteria at the same time.  Although PCR is likely to overestimate the 
levels of viable contamination, if appropriate cleaning chemistries are used it is an 
appropriate technique to assess their efficacy. 
Cleaning has also been shown within the Klebsiella pneumoniae outbreak, discussed 
in both Chapters 4 and 5, to be potentially ineffective in removing biofilms within clinical 
environments and damaging.  Chemistries such as NaDCC that are able to affect 
biofilm can lead to degradation of infrastructural materials, which results in changes in 
surface topography leading to increased resilience to cleaning. 
As surfaces become rapidly re-contaminated after cleaning (as was shown in the door 
handle study) cleaning by itself is unlikely to be able to ensure that the environment is 
free from pathogens.  In order to help in controlling contamination by containing it to 
certain points, facilitating cleaning or by changing user behaviour, design may have an 
important role to play. 
If the environment can be acknowledged to be a source of risk to patients, as 
demonstrated in this work, a logical plan can be instituted to limit cross transmission. 
This could include better environmental design coupled with efficient hand hygiene. 
When planning clinical environments, infection control teams should be involved in 
making designs that can support infection control activities such as hand washing and 
also impact on critical moments that are recognised as targets for high impact 
interventions.  These include not only the number and types of sinks required, but the 
placement of those sinks within the new unit.  In addition the location of doors and the 
types of handles should be considered as our results indicate that both traffic density 
and door location impact on contamination. 
This strategy is reflected in the WHO 5 moments of hand hygiene, where ‘changing 
environment’ i.e. when entering and leaving a bed space, is a requirement for 
performance of hand hygiene.  However, poor compliance is still linked to patient 
contact and more needs to be done to raise awareness of the environment as an 
infection risk and to encourage appropriate behaviour.   
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6.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study has five main limitations: 
Firstly, it is assumed that the specific pathogens that were included in the sampling 
algorithm are representative of the nosocomial pathogens that are frequently 
associated with healthcare associated infection (HCAI).  This may not be the case. The 
specific pathogens tested for (norovirus, adenovirus, Staphylococcus aureus and 
Gram-negative bacteria) represented those organisms, which are important for HCAI 
within paediatric settings in England, and were therefore determined to be clinically 
significant.  In different settings other species may be more important. In adult units for 
example, Clostridium difficile may play a larger role and in other countries vancomycin 
resistant Enterococci constitutes more of a problem.   
Secondly, the organisms used to represent infection caused by Gram-positive, Gram-
negative bacteria and viruses in this study (adenovirus, Klebsiella pneumoniae and 
Staphylococcus aureus) may not actually be representative.  The individual strains 
selected were also assumed to be representative of their species.  This assumption 
was made in order to facilitate testing due to resource limitations, but also because 
these were the most clinically significant organisms within those groups in terms of 
cross transmission events occurring at Great Ormond Street Hospital. However it’s still 
an assumption and not all strains will be representative of the organisms causing 
clinical infection.  
Thirdly, viability testing was not undertaken for viruses recovered from the environment 
and it was assumed that a positive PCR result represented a risk to patients. The use 
of tissue culture delays results and would require an idea of which viruses could be 
present prior to inoculation, whereas PCR permits a panel approach. 
Fourthly, it was not possible when undertaking typing analysis to determine directional 
transmission of Klebsiella pneumoniae, in order to truly confirm whether the 
environment acted as a source.  This is because there was insufficient genomic data 
available on Klebsiella pneumoniae to be certain about data interpretation using single 
nucleotide variants.  Epidemiological information however strongly indicates a 
continuous environmental source leading to cross transmission of Klebsiella 
pneumoniae to patients. 
Finally this work has not demonstrated that interventions such as terminal cleaning with 
monitoring have an impact on levels of HCAI within Great Ormond Street Hospital.  
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This is in part because of the way that data is recorded, meaning that bed spaces are 
not listed and so it is not possible to associate cases of HCAI with specific rooms.  In 
addition although active surveillance and typing is undertaken for a number of resistant 
bacteria, typing is not undertaken routinely for viruses and so it is often difficult to link 
cases.  Additionally although levels of HCAI are decreasing as interventions are 
introduced, interventions are rarely introduced singly, with a bundle approach being 
more common.  Therefore it is difficult to determine the level at which the infection 
control interventions introduced as part of this work have contributed to decreases in 
HCAI levels. 
6.3 FUTURE WORK 
• Work needs to be done to understand how host colonisation, immune evasion, 
virulence, transmission within and between host and the environment can 
change phenotype and or genotype.  This data is required for interpretation of 
whole genome sequence typing data.  This work may involve: 
o Following up colonised patients over a period of twelve months to see 
how isolates vary and looking at co-colonisation 
o Pairing isolates from carriage samples and those in infected sites and 
undertaking whole genome sequencing to look at variation 
o Examining isolates from patients colonised in multiple sites to determine 
within host variation 
o Sequencing isolates from an immune competent host as they become 
immunocompromised and immunocompromised hosts as they 
reconstitute to identify the impact of immune function  
o Investigation of environmental isolates and further active surveillance to 
determine directional transmission 
• As microbial resistance becomes an increasing problem work should be 
undertaken to better understand how genomic resistance relates to phenotypic 
resistance, and how testing for such resistance should be undertaken. 
• Work on development of an Enterobacter cloacae VNTR scheme will be 
continued as better phenotypic identification is now available, which may 
improve results. 
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6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, this thesis and the resulting publications have contributed to the 
understanding of the distribution of organisms within the clinical environment, the effect 
of interventions - such as cleaning and design - that can impact upon them and typing 
of those organisms in order to identify reservoirs and aid outbreak control. 
The data acquired has led to changes within infection control at Great Ormond Street 
Hospital.  New policies and standard operating procedures were formulated, informed 
by the evidence collected.  The resulting policies have been made available to other 
centres.  
Design based changes have ensured that staff and visitors are able to exit areas of 
high contamination, such as cubicles, without touching the door and also access hand 
hygiene directly afterwards. Sink environments, where possible, have been modified to 
provide shelf space so that items are not stored on potentially contaminated sink 
surfaces.  New sinks being introduced now follow design principles, such as splash 
backs, that reduce sink contamination. 
Cleaning standards have been adjusted on the basis of this work, with NaDCC now 
used for cleaning throughout the hospital.  Certain clinical environments are monitored 
for high risk organisms, such as adenovirus, using molecular techniques instead of 
visual standards. For antibiotic resistant bacterial species, such as carbapenemase 
producing Enterobacteriaceae, additional cleaning steps have been introduced, 
including the use of hydrogen peroxide vapour decontamination in addition to chlorine. 
Identification of different likely reservoirs for Gram-negative and Gram-positive bacteria 
and viruses during this work has led to the development of screening algorithms.  
These are now utilised whenever potential cross transmission is detected to identify 
environmental reservoirs when present so that interventions can be targeted. This has 
resulted in decreased time to introduce appropriate interventions, such as sink control, 
for Gram-negative bacteria. Finally, undertaking of in-house typing using VNTR has 
decreased the time to outbreak confirmation and thus improved outbreak response. 
Many of the potential interventions identified in this study are low cost.  As such they 
can be introduced in centres without substantial financial and scientific resources.  As 
such, developing this evidence based approach to understanding which interventions 
are effective is key to correctly allocating resources to prevent HCAI. 
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2. Introduction
A range of Trust policies are designed to reduce the risk of patients acquiring potentially 
pathogenic microorganisms by cross transmission from other patients, staff or visitors, or directly 
from the environment. Standard infection prevention and control precautions and environmental 
cleaning are adequate to reduce risk in most situations.  
Policies are present as clinical guidelines: 
http://www.gosh.nhs.uk/clinical_information/clinical_guidelines?category=I 
However, some situations arise where additional controls are implemented for which 
microbiological monitoring is required to validate the control has been successfully applied. 
3. Aims and objectives
The aim of this policy is to help reduce the risk of patients or staff acquiring potentially pathogenic 
microorganisms from the environment. 
The objective of the policy is to define 
3.1 When microbiological screening of the environment is required 
3.1.1 Environmental clearance for specific organisms: 
Where a specific microorganism or clinical infections is recognised to lead to greater risk through 
environmental contamination, whether or not a cross transmission has occurred assurance is 
required that adequate cleaning has taken place beyond that demonstrated by the satisfactory 
standard checks (e.g. visual) after appropriate cleaning has been completed and before re-
occupation of area.  
Organisms and procedure listed below. 
3.1.2 Confirmation of protective isolation ventilation: 
Where increased patient susceptibility is present due to a severe immunodeficiency (congenital or 
acquired) and local risk assessment has designated requirement for a protective environment 
including HEPA filtered air. (Procedure below - Appendix 5: Environmental air screening protocol 
for critical ventilation systems supplying clinical areas; Schedule of sampling is in Estates 
Ventilation Policy). 
Operating theatre environment – Validation of microbiological air standard is required at 
commissioning and annually as part of the planned preventative maintenance described in Estates 
Ventilation Policy (Testing procedure below) 
Water quality – microbiological quality of water is monitored routinely for legionella and 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa (as described in Estates Legionella policy) and as required when 
investigations of specific organisms suggests water may be involved in the transmission.  
3.1.3 How sampling is performed and the expected standard results are 
interpreted against 
Procedures and standards are shown below in appendices 
3.2 This policy does NOT cover 
• Monitoring of air volumes and pressures as part of the validation of specialist ventilation
Units (schedule and parameters in Ventilation policy)
• Schedule for testing for legionella (see legionella control policy) and Pseudomonas
aeruginosa in water (to be included in Estates document in preparation)
• Microbiological monitoring of water in dialysis, Decontamination department, hydrotherapy
Pool where separate policies exist
• Environmental monitoring in Pharmacy suites, gene or cell therapy, SSD, mortuary,
laboratories or other research areas where separate polices exist 
4 Duties and responsibilities 
Infection prevention and control (IPC) team – to update policy and undertake procedure. To teach 
other to undertake procedures as required by clinical areas and keep records. 
Staff at ward level – to liaise with IPC, ensure area clean and ready; to undertake screening if 
trained 
External contracted companies – to comply to these procedures 
5 Procedure or guideline 
5.1 Environmental clearance for specific organisms 
Screening will only take place after appropriate adequate cleaning has been completed and 
signed off according to normal standards (Infection Clean Protocol GOS-EAF-PRO-10587) 
Organisms Screened For: 
Individual risk assessment is performed by the Infection Prevention and Control Team (IPC 
Team) to grade risk associated with any particular organism. The need to perform screening is 
dependent on the organism, any current outbreak/transmission and susceptibility of individuals 
who may be exposed.  
Examples of organisms which may be screened for include: 
Methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
Multi-resistant gram negative species  
Clostridium difficile 
Vancomycin resistant enterococci (VRE) 
Norovirus 
Adenovirus 
Carbapenem resistant Enterobacteriaceae and Acinetobacter species 
Other organisms as determined by IPC Team 
5.2 Preparation of bed spaces and patient areas 
Bed spaces may be screened post a level 2 or 3 clean carried out by the cleaning contractor. 
Bed spaces should be left for at least 2 hours post clean to allow all surfaces to dry adequately.  
Bed spaces need to have been checked by a cleaning supervisor and ward representative (as 
per cleaning SLA) before screening takes place and the bed space checking form must be signed 
to say that a check has taken place before screening is undertaken.  Bed spaces must be visibly 
clean; if they are not then screening must be suspended until the room has been re-cleaned. 
Bed spaces must be free of all disposable equipment, clinical equipment and linen.  If this is not 
the case screening cannot be carried out until these are removed.  Please note that the room is 
unlikely to be organism free if these items have not been removed pre-clean as they impede 
cleaning.  It may be advisable to request the room be cleaned again before screening.   
If the room has not been properly prepared or is still visibly dirty this must be flagged both to the 
cleaning contract supervisor and the senior ward staff member, as well as the Infection 
Prevention and Control Team and the member of Facilities in charge of the cleaning contract.   
If this situation is found an incident form must be completed.  
Screening should be carried out by a trained member of staff. This may be a member of IP&C 
Team or a ward designated staff member. 
After screening the bed space will be sealed until the results are back and a decision as to 
whether or not to open the room made.  
Screening samples may be processed by a number of methods with availability of results differing 
between 1 and 5 days.  
The decision to open the room must be made in conjunction with ward manager (who is expected 
to liaise with consultant staff) and IP&C and an individual risk assessment.  
If a bed space is found to have two consecutive cleaning failures due to microbial detection after 
consultation with the IP&C Team then a meeting must be called to include the contract manager, 
the Mitie supervisor and appropriate ward staff and an action plan developed.  (Infection Cleaning 
Policy/document library) 
5.2.1 General Ward/Clinic Areas 
General ward areas may be screened in response to cross transmission or outbreaks.  Ward 
areas will be screened by a member of the Infection Control Team and may be carried out in 
relation to a requested level 2/3 cleaning instead of the routine ward clean. 
5.2.2 When is Screening Necessary: 
The risk assessment considers the organisms, underlying condition of host, potentially 
susceptible individuals, current transmissions, prior experience with this organism and any clinical 
consequences of delay in bed opening. Screening may be requested for specific very high risk 
organisms (highly transmissible or highly resistant) in any situation, or other organisms when 
involved in outbreaks.  
5.2.3 MRSA 
Experience has shown certain strains and patient conditions lead to increased risk of cleaning 
failure (despite visually satisfactory inspection). For some children, the IP&C team are able to 
alert these children on PIMS as carrying highly transmissible strains. Screening will be carried out 
post discharge of patients with a highly transmissible strain of MRSA after a level 3 clean. 
Screening may also be necessary with other strains in an outbreak situation. 
Screening results will take 72 hours (longer if processed over a weekend) 
Criteria for bed space reopening - all sites free from MRSA 
5.2.4 Multi-resistant Gram Negative Species 
A large number of children are present in the trust colonised with multiresistant bacteria and 
routine trust screening, isolation and cleaning protocols are adequate to control most of these.  
However, certain highly resistant bacteria may be present for which screening should be carried 
out post discharge. The alert that this is a highly resistant strain of gram negative microorganism 
should be included on the alert in PIMS. A level 3 clean is usually required pre screen. 
Screening results will take 72 hours (longer if processed over a weekend) 
Examples include Enterobacteriaceae (Klebsiella, Enterobacter and Escherichia) or 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa carrying genes for transmissible carbapenemases, or multiresistant 
Acinetobacter baumanii (MRAB), which have caused major outbreaks in other London hospitals. 
Criteria for bed space reopening - all sites free from Multi-resistant Gram Negative organisms 
5.2.5 Clostridium difficile 
Screening may be requested in response to outbreaks or in relation to specific patient factors. 
C. difficile cases are usually sporadic in this trust, but the organism produces very resistant 
spores and outbreaks frequently occur in many health care settings. Screening will not be carried 
our routinely following detection of a case, but may be carried out in response to a request from 
the Infection Control Team/Consultant Microbiologist.   
Screening results will take up to 7 days 
Criteria for bed space reopening - all sites free from C. difficile 
5.2.6 Vancomycin Resistant Enterococcus faecium or Enterococcus faecalis 
(VRE) 
Screening may be requested in response to outbreaks or in relation to specific patient factors. 
Detection of VRE is uncommon in GOSH, but the faecally carried organism has been responsible 
for outbreaks in the past, usually felt to be propagated through environmental contamination 
despite cleaning. Screening will be considered post discharge of any patient colonised or infected 
with VRE, this should be included on the alert in PIMS and would require a level 3 clean pre 
screen.  
Screening results will take 72 hours (longer if processed over a weekend) 
Criteria for bed space reopening - all sites free from VRE 
5.2.7 Norovirus 
Norovirus and other enteric viruses survive well in the environment and have a low infectious 
dose. Environmental decontamination is paramount for control. Risk assessment must consider 
that certain immunocompromised individuals will excrete high levels of virus for long periods and 
environmental contamination may be high. 
Screening will be carried out in response to a request from the Infection Control Team/Consultant 
Microbiologist.  Screening may also be requested:  
in response to outbreaks and  
in rooms where the next admitted patient is likely to be immunosuppressed (e.g. Lion, Giraffe, 
Elephant and wards) 
Screening results will take up to 72 hours (longer if processed over a weekend) 
Criteria for bed space reopening - all sites free from Norovirus 
5.2.8 Adenovirus 
Adenovirus may survive well in the environment and are excreted long term in large numbers in 
some immunocompromised children. Epidemiological data suggests cross transmission may 
occur in the hospital setting.  
All cubicles occupied by Adenovirus excreting children which will next have severely 
immuncompromised children in (currently usually Fox, Robin and Butterfly BMT cubicles) must be 
screened after the level 3 clean post discharge.   
Screening may also be requested  
in response to outbreaks and  
in rooms where the next admitted patient is likely to be immunosuppressed (e.g. Lion, Giraffe, 
Elephant and wards) 
Screening results will take up to 72 hours (longer if processed over a weekend) 
Criteria for re-opening:  Decision to open room before results will be assessed with respect to the 
risk in next room occupant. 
5.3 Criteria for bed space reopening: 
The cubicle is opened with no further cleaning required if no site has an Adenovirus positive CT 
result of lower than 39. 
If the cubicle has 2 sites positive with Adenovirus at CT’s of no lower than 34, then those sites 
are recleaned twice using chlorine and the cubicle can be re-opened, as long as the sites positive 
to do include the floor inside the room.  If the floor inside the cubicle is positive than the cubicle 
undergoes a repeat ‘deep clean’ and is re-screened. 
If the cubicle has more than 2 sites with an Adenovirus positive CT of 34 – 38 or if any one site 
has a CT of lower than 34, then the entire room must have a repeat ‘deep clean’ and be re-
screened in full before opening.   
If the same objects fails to become negative after 3 cleans and screens, that object if possible is 
replaced within the cubicle and disposed of appropriately. 
6 Step by step guide and flowchart  
6.1 How to Carry Out Environmental clearance for Specific organisms 
A set of predefined areas should be screened according to the attached protocols. 
See appendix 1 – bacterial screening protocol 
See appendix 2 – bacterial screening form 
See appendix 3 – viral screening protocol 
See appendix 4 – viral screening form 
6.2 Ward and Other Environmental Screening 
Ward Screening 
General ward areas may be screened in response to cross transmission or outbreaks.  Ward 
areas will be screened by a member of the Infection Control Team and may be carried out in 
relation to a requested level 2/3 cleaning instead of the routine ward clean.  Screening results will 
take up to 7 days depending on the organism screened for. 
Swab 
No. 
Site Area 
1 Corridor floor outside of cubicle/ante room 
entrance of a known positive 
10cm2 
2 Corridor floor outside of cubicle/ante room 
entrance of a known negative 
10cm2 
3 Storage trolley surface outside of the room of 
known positive 
10cm2 
4 Storage trolley surface outside of the room of 
known negative 
10cm2 
5 Sluice work surface 10cm2 
6 Sluice room door handle (exit to corridor) Entire handle 
7 Macerator lid Round the entire seal 
8 Nappy weighing scales Entire top surface 10cm2 
9 PC keyboards Every key and surface on 
the right 50% (~10cm2) 
10 Nurses station 10cm2 
11 Nurses station phone Entire Keypad and handle 
12 Notes trolley 10cm2 
6.3 Monitoring of areas with critical mechanical ventilation systems 
(providing protective HEPA filtered environment or operating 
theatre standard air quality) 
Screening will be carried out by the IPC team, or a company that fulfils the screening criteria 
under direction of estates, under the following conditions: 
• During commissioning
• As part of the annual maintenance schedule annual verification
• In areas where work has been undertaken on mechanical ventilation units providing
protective HEPA filtered environment or operating theatre standard air quality where air quality 
may be altered (work on filter or down stream of filter) 
• In areas supplied by mechanical ventilation where the fabric of the room has been
breached. 
All maintenance work or renovation in the clinical areas must be discussed with the Infection 
Control Team prior to implementation.  Screening will be undertaken using the protocol set out in 
appendix 5 and form appendix 6: 
appendix 5 –  Environmental air screening protocol for critical ventilation systems supplying 
clinical areas  
appendix 6 – Screening of critical ventilation systems - form 
Screening will involve the use of settle plates (blood agar alone is adequate) and air sampling 
(carried out prior to the placement of settle plates) onto blood agar.  Sampling will be undertaken 
post level 3 clean and the room will be closed to entry throughout the sampling time.  Screening 
time will depend on the area to be screened, but will take a minimum of three hours. 
Screening results will take 72 hours (longer if processed over a weekend) 
Plates are incubated according to laboratory protocol BSOP0058 
6.3.1 Specifications for microbiological air sampling  (BSOP0058) 
Test types: 
1 cubic metre air tests (also called active air test or air test): collected using a 
calibrated air sampling device, 1 cubic metre of air will be sampled on to a suitable 
agar plate. In house we use blood agar, although other non-selective agar is 
suitable. 
Incubation:  18-24 hours at 35 -37C with initial 1 day cfu report 
 Then 2 additional days at room temperature to give final report. 
Reading:  Plates are read for colony count (fungi are identified to genus level) 
Report:  Bacterial count in cfu/m3  
Fungal count in cfu/m3  (ensure report no Fungi grown, if none, and any growth is 
identified to genus level) 
Settle plates: 9 cm blood agar plates left for 2 hours. 
Incubation:  18-24 hours at 35 -37C with initial 1 day cfu report 
 Then 2 additional days at room temperature to give final report. 
Reading:  Plates are read for colony count (fungi are identified to genus level) 
Report:  Bacterial count in cfu/ plate  
Fungal count in cfu/plate (ensure report no Fungi grown, if none, and any growth is 
identified to genus level) 
6.3.2 Criteria for satisfactory validation – depends on the standard the area 
has been built and designed to e.g. HTM2025 or HTM 03-01 (or 
replacement documents); 
Theatres: 
HTM 03-01 modified standards: 
none HEPA filtrated area   -10 or less cfu/m3 total count 
HEPA filtrated area -10 or less cfu/m3 with no fungal colonies 
HTM 2025 modified standards: 
none HEPA filtrated area   -35 or less cfu/m3 total count 
HEPA filtrated area -35 or less cfu/m3 with no fungal colonies 
Requirement for each area should be described in the Estates produced schedule but in 
summary: 
Theatres: 
Theatres are currently operating to 2025 (to which they were designed) but we aim to achieve 03-
01 where possible, so theatre results that do not meet 03-01 total count need to be reviewed. 
Protective isolation rooms and ward areas: 
Newer PPVL rooms should meet HTM 03-01, with no Fungi detected 
Older rooms and wards were built with HTM2025 standards. 
If 03-01 standard is not meet the area needs review and individual decision made considering 
commissioning and annual verification records of what was achieved. 
6.3.3 Areas requiring specialised ventilation screening: 
• Operating theatres
• Clinical areas with HEPA filtration – Robin and Fox wads; Butterfly Transplant
Suite
• PICU, NICU, CICU, Angio Suite, HSDU
• All individual rooms providing protective isolation (e.g. the positive pressure ventilated lobby
rooms) 
Other critical ventilation systems, shown below, are NOT covered by this policy 
• Pharmacy: Cytoxic Suite, TPN Suite, Sterile Unit
• SSD
• Gene and cell therapy suites
Areas should comply with good manufacturing clean room standards, administered by
Pharmacy or research sponsors.
• Pathology laboratories.  Covered by Pathology documents.
• Mortuary
6.4 Requirements for microbiological sampling 
• Investigations will be undertaken by the Infection Control Team / Microbiology Department
during routine laboratory working hours only or by delegated competent staff employed by
Estates or GOSH staff trained by IPC
• Any problems requiring urgent attention must be discussed with the Infection Control Team.
• Notification of the cleaning programme must be sent in advance, in writing, by the project
leader concerned to the Infection Control Department
• Confirmation that the programme is on time, must be made by phone, by the project leader
to the Infection Control Team (CNS or Infection Control Clinical Scientist) or Infection
Control Doctor
• Appropriate arrangements for removal and storage of furniture, sterile and non sterile
stores must be made prior to commencement of any work.
6.4.1 Procedures to be undertaken prior to microbiological sampling 
• Air flow and pressure parameters must be confirmed as meeting standards by Estates prior
to any microbiological testing - Ventilation validation reports MUST be sent to Infection
Control Team / Microbiology Department in time for these to be checked prior to sampling
• Level 3 clean (Infection Clean Protocol GOS-EAF-PRO-10587)
• Check that all appropriate windows and doors are closed
• Check that air conditioning is switched on.  It must be ensured that both main and backup
systems are fully functional.
• The area must be locked and left empty for a minimum of 2 hours prior to air sampling.
• It is the responsibility of the project leader concerned to inform the Infection Control Team
that the area is ready for sampling. 
6.5 Communication of results 
• If testing is performed by an external company employed by Estates, result must be sent to
Infection Control Team as well
Results will be made available by the Medical Microbiologist, or member of the Infection
Control Team, who will phone and email the appropriate manager / project leader
• Where a microbiological failure is documented, individual advice on re-cleaning and
sampling will be given by the Infection Control Team or Medical Microbiologist
7    Local arrangements for implementation 
7.1 Who to Contact 
Infection Control Team bleep 0640 ext 5284 and either the Virology or Microbiology lab as 
appropriate. 
7.2 Who Should Carry Out Screening 
This should be performed by a member of the Infection Control Team or a member of staff 
trained by the Infection Control Team; or company appointed by Estates 
7.3 Distribution of Screening Results 
The member of staff in charge of the ward will be contacted with the environmental screening 
results.  If the cubicle/ward area is passed as clean the area is then available for use. 
If the cubicle/ward area fails the first environmental screen the Infection Control team will discuss 
with the member of staff in charge what subsequent tasks need to be undertaken.  The cleaning 
contract liaison and the cleaning supervisor will also be informed of any screening failure (as per 
the Infection Clean Protocol GOS-EAF-PRO-10587).   
If repeat cleaning and screening is undertaken as a result of a failure the reporting process is the 
same.  However if a cubicle/ward area fails its environmental screening more than twice a 
meeting will be called as detailed in the cleaning policy to evaluate why failures are occurring and 
how the situation can be resolved.   
7.3.1 Archiving of screening results 
Samples will be booked in to the laboratory computer system.  Paper copies of results are not 
sent to clinical areas but will be archived in IP&CT office in a folder called Environmental 
Screening for future reference. 
8     Training arrangements 
Staff carrying out environmental screening should be trained and signed off as competent by a 
member of the Infection Control Team.  A training update should be carried out annually and a 
training record maintained.  Members of staff being trained to carry out environmental screening 
need to be trained to carry out both bacterial and viral sampling; as these procedures are 
different. 
The training will be carried out by the IP&C team and record maintained locally by the ward or 
theatres. 
9 Auditing and monitoring 
 Annual audit against Estates maintenance records to confirm microbiological air tested when 
appropriate 
Annual audit against level 3 clean list to check screening was requested when     appropriate 
Annual audit training records for update 
Audit that all external companies have followed our procedure  
10 Appendices 
Appendix 1: Screening Protocol 
Bacterial Environmental Screening Method (MRSA and 
Multi-Resistant Gram Negative Organisms) 
Introduction 
Bacteria can be a source of contamination when a patient who is infected/colonised is present in 
a cubicle.  These bacteria can also survive for long periods in the environment and so when a 
patient, with an alert requiring a level three clean, is discharged or moves room, we need to know 
that the cubicle is free from bacteria before placing another patient inside.  The Infection Control 
team may ask that you sample (swab) a room after cleaning to make sure that all the bacteria 
have been removed. 
What you need 
Supplies needed on ward 
• Permanent marker pen (to write on tubes)
• Charcoal swabs (kept in a clean dry location)
• Gloves
• Disposable aprons (white)
• Polythene specimen bag to put your samples in once taken
• Sterile water (from the clean utility)
Supplies provided upon request by bacteriology (phone bacteriology each time): 
•Bacteria Environmental Screening Form (1 per cubicle - to be completed during screening by
the person swabbing) 
What you do
When you have been asked to screen a cubicle by the Infection Control Team: 
Call bacteriology and ask for the number Bacterial Environmental Screening Forms (1 
per 
cubicle).  Tell them where you are screening and for which organism/alert. 
Find out from the person in charge the information you need to fill out the Bacterial 
Environmental Screening Form and complete it.  
When you have everything from the what you need section including gloves and aprons 
(taken from the clean utility room) put everything in a clean suitable place outside of the 
cubicle i.e. a fold table, or use a clean plastic tray which you can take into the room. 
Wash your hands thoroughly with soap and water. 
Put on a disposable plastic apron and gloves. 
Enter the cubicle 
Write on the Bacterial Environmental Screening Form in the Swab No. column the 
number of the swab you are taking (i.e. 1 – 12) and write in the Site Swabbed column 
which area you are going to sample (use the sites to be included table on the back of the 
form).  Label the swab you are going to use with the swab number, site, cubicle number, 
ward and date.  Only label one swab at a time!  
Once your swab is labelled and the form written take a clean swab from its pack, being 
careful not to touch the cotton end.   
Lightly moisten the swab in the sterile water.   
Swab the area (use the Area to be Swabbed description in the table on the back of the 
form to help you) 
Put the cotton end of the swab back into the tube containing the charcoal transport media. 
Put the tube in the clean sample bag. 
Collect the plastic caps to be thrown away in a clinical waste bin when you have finished 
taking all the swabs. 
Repeat steps 7 and 8 with each swab to be taken. 
If at any point you think you may have got something on your gloves you must change 
them for a clean pair. 
If the room does not appear clean or the appropriate items (curtains etc) have not been 
removed report this to the nurse in charge or contact the Infection Control Team. 
The swab remains and all gloves and aprons must go in a clinical waste bin.  If you have 
used a tray make sure it is thoroughly washed with soap and water. 
Make sure that you wash your hands thoroughly with soap and water. 
Fill in the form on the cubicle door to say that sampling has been carried out. 
Send the completed form and samples to bacteriology using the chute system. 
Tell the person in charge that the screening has been completed. 
Swab 
No. 
Site Area to be Swabbed 
1 Floor under sink 4 inch2/10cm2 
2 Bathroom door handle Entire handle 
3 Chair with arms Both arms (where hands sit) 
~4 inch2/10cm2 on each 
4 Oxygen outlet (above bed) Entire surface 
5 Telephone keypads Entire keypad 
6 Taps in Patient Bathroom Entirety of both taps 
7 Mattress top 4 inch2/10cm2 
8 Bed/Cot frame under bed 4 inch2/10cm2 
9 Trolley surface (in ante room if 
present) 
4 inch2/10cm2 
10 Side window sill (right hand side) 4 inch2/10cm2
11 Cubicle room exit door handle (cubicle 
side) 
Entire handle 
12 Corridor floor outside of cubicle/ante 
room entrance 
4 inch2/10cm2 
Additional sites should be swabbed (samples 13+) if there are any areas that look dusty or 
unclean.  This should be reported back to the Infection Control Team. 
Contact Numbers 
Infection Control: 5284 
Bacteriology lab 5280/8661  
Consultant Microbiologist: 7930/5237/8594 
Appendix 2: Screening Form 
Bacterial Environmental Screening Form 
Cubicle Tested:  ____________ Ward: ________
Patients ID: ____________ Patient discharge date:  ________
Date of Cleaning: ____________ Level of Cleaning: ________
Bacteria: ____________
Date:  Time: 
Laboratory 
No. 
Swab 
No. 
Site Swabbed Culture Results 
1 Floor under sink 
2 Bathroom door handle Entire handle 
3 Chair with arms 
4 Oxygen outlet (above bed) 
5 Telephone keypads 
6 Taps in Patient Bathroom 
7 Mattress top 
8 Bed/Cot frame under bed 
9 Trolley surface (in ante room if 
present) 
10 Side window sill (right hand 
side) 
11 Cubicle room exit door handle 
(cubicle side) 
12 Corridor floor outside of 
cubicle/ante room entrance 
Please inspect the room prior to screening.  If the room is visibly dirty do not screen and 
inform the infection control team on ext 5284/bleep 0640.  Out of hours inform the PEC 
on duty.  If any of the sites are not present select another site and list it on the form.  
Always screen 12 sites. 
Name: _____________________________ Signature:________________________ 
Sites to be Included In Environmental Swabbing 
Swab 
No. 
Site Area to be Swabbed 
1 Floor under sink 10cm2 
2 Bathroom door handle Entire handle 
3 Chair with arms Both arms (where hands sit) 
~5cm2 on each 
4 Oxygen outlet (above bed) Entire surface 
5 Telephone keypads Entire keypad 
6 Taps in Patient Bathroom Entirety of both taps 
7 Mattress top 4 inch2/10cm2
8 Bed/Cot frame under bed 4 inch2/10cm2
9 Trolley surface (in ante room if 
present) 
10cm2 
10 Side window sill (right hand side) 4 inch2/10cm2
11 Cubicle room exit door handle (cubicle 
side) 
Entire handle 
12 Corridor floor outside of cubicle/ante 
room entrance 
10cm2 
If any of the items on the above list are not there (i.e. mattress) or an 
anteroom is not present, please take at least 12 swabs.  Choose which extra 
places/items to swab from the suggested list below.  Please swab any areas 
which are visibly dirty and report them to the Infection Control Team.  Make 
a note of where each extra sample was taken from on the Bacterial 
Environmental Screening Form in the space provided. 
Suggested Additional Areas 
Angle poise lamps 
Television  
Monitoring equipment 
Bed lockers 
Radiator grills 
Contact Numbers 
Infection Control: 5284 
Bacteriology lab 5280/8661  
Consultant Microbiologist: 7930/5237/8594 
Appendix 3: Screening Protocol 
Enteric Viruses Environmental Screening Method (Noro 
and Adeno Viruses) 
Introduction 
Enteric viruses (e.g. Norovirus and Adenovirus) can be a source of contamination when a patient 
who is infected is present in a cubicle.  These viruses can also survive for long periods in the 
environment and so when a patient with Adeno or Norovirus is discharged or moves room, we 
need to know that the cubicle is free from virus before placing another patient inside.  The 
Infection Control team may ask that you sample (swab) a room after cleaning to make sure that 
all the virus particles have been removed. 
What you need 
Supplies needed on ward (call virology when running low on swabs or pens): 
• Permanent marker pen (to write on tubes)
• Sterile cotton wool swabs (kept in a clean dry location)
• Gloves
• Disposable aprons (white)
• Polythene specimen bag to put your samples in once taken
Supplies provided upon request by virology (phone virology each time): 
• Batches of  tubes of sterile water (12 per cubicle to be swabbed)
• Enteric Virus Environmental Screening Form (1 per cubicle - to be completed during
screening by the person swabbing) 
What you do
When you have been asked to screen a cubicle by the Infection Control team: 
Call virology and ask for the number Enteric Virus Environmental Screening Forms (1 
per cubicle) and tubes of sterile water (12 per cubicle) you need. 
If out of hours call bacteriology for tubes - see contact numbers at the bottom of the sheet 
Find out from the person in charge the information you need to fill out the Enteric Virus 
Environmental Screening Form and complete it.  
When you have everything from the what you need section including gloves and aprons 
(taken from the clean utility room) put everything in a clean suitable place outside of the 
cubicle i.e. a fold table, or use a clean plastic tray which you can take into the room. 
Wash your hands thoroughly with soap and water. 
Put on a disposable plastic apron and gloves. 
Write on the Enteric Virus Environmental Screening Form in the Swab No. column the 
number of the swab you are taking (i.e. 1 – 12) and write in the Site Swabbed column 
which area you are going to sample (use the sites to be included table on the back of the 
form).  Label the tube you are going to use with the swab number, label both the lid of the 
tube and the side of the tube.  Only label one tube at a time!  
Once your tube is labelled and the form written take a clean swab from the pack, being 
careful not to touch the cotton end.   
Enter the cubicle to be screened, open the tube and lightly moisten the swab in the water.  
Swab the area (use the Area to be Swabbed description in the table on the back of the 
form to help you) 
Put the cotton end of the swab back into the water in the tube and break off the wooded 
end so that you can do up the lid. 
Put the tube in the clean sample bag. 
Collect the broken wooden ends to be thrown in a sharps bin when you have finished taking 
all you swabs. 
Repeat steps 6 and 7 with each swab to be taken. 
If at any point you think you may have got something on your gloves (i.e. water) you must 
change them for a clean pair. 
Throw away the swab remains in the sharps bin and all gloves and aprons must go in a 
clinical waste bin.  If you have used a tray make sure it is thoroughly washed with soap and 
water. 
Make sure that you wash your hands thoroughly with soap and water. 
Fill in the form on the cubicle door to say that sampling has been carried out. 
Send the completed form and samples to virology using the chute system. 
Tell the person in charge that the screening has been completed. 
Swab 
No. 
Site Area to be Swabbed 
1 Floor under sink 4 inch2/10cm2 
2 Bedside Lamp controls 10cm2 
3 Chair with arms Both arms (where hands sit) 
~4 inch2/10cm2 on each 
4 Door handle into patient bathroom 
(cubicle side) 
Entire handle 
5 Telephone keypads Entire keypad 
6 Taps in Patient Bathroom Entirety of both taps 
7 Mattress top 4 inch2/10cm2 
8 Bed/Cot frame under bed 4 inch2/10cm2 
9 Trolley surface (in ante room if 
present) 
4 inch2/10cm2 
10 Side window sill (right hand side) 4 inch2/10cm2
11 Cubicle room exit door handle (cubicle 
side) 
Entire handle 
12 Corridor floor outside of cubicle/ante 
room entrance 
4 inch2/10cm2 
Contact Numbers 
Infection Control: 5284 
Virology Lab: 8507 
Bacteriology lab (out of hours only): 5280/8661 
Consultant Microbiologist: 7930/5237/8594 
Appendix 4: Screening form 
Enteric Viruses Environmental Screening Form 
(Noro/Adeno) 
Cubicle Tested:  ____________ Ward: ________
Patients ID: ____________ Patient discharge date:  ________
Date of Cleaning: ____________ Level of Cleaning: ________
Virus:   ____________
Date:  Time: 
Laboratory 
No. 
Swab 
No. 
Site Swabbed Culture Results 
1 Floor under sink 
2 Bedside Lamp controls 
3 Chair with arms 
4 Door handle into patient bathroom 
(cubicle side) 
5 Telephone keypads 
6 Taps in Patient Bathroom 
7 Mattress top 
8 Bed/Cot frame under bed 
9 Trolley surface (in ante room if 
present) 
10 Side window sill (right hand side) 
11 Cubicle room exit door handle 
(cubicle side) 
12 Corridor floor outside of 
cubicle/ante room entrance 
Please inspect the room prior to screening.  If the room is visibly dirty do not screen and 
inform the infection control team on ext 5284/bleep 0640.  Out of hours inform the PEC 
on duty.  If any of the sites are not present select another site and list it on the form.  
Always screen 12 sites. 
If the room is being screened for Adenovirus (BMT patients): 
• Any pillows should have been thrown away prior to the room being cleaned.  Please
indicate if this was the case _____________ 
• The clinical waste bin should have been sent to MEDU prior to the room being cleaned.
Please indicate if this was the case ________________ 
Name: _________________________  Signature: _________________________ 
Sites to be Included In Environmental Swabbing 
Swab 
No. 
Site Area to be Swabbed 
1 Floor under sink 10cm2 
2 Bedside Lamp controls 10cm2 
3 Chair with arms Both arms (where hands sit) 
~5cm2 on each 
4 Door handle into patient bathroom 
(cubicle side) 
Entire handle 
5 Telephone keypads 
6 Taps in Patient Bathroom Entirety of both taps 
7 Mattress top 
8 Bed/Cot frame under bed 
9 Trolley surface (in ante room if 
present) 
10cm2 
10 Side window sill (right hand side) 4 inch2/10cm2
11 Cubicle room exit door handle (cubicle 
side) 
Entire handle 
12 Corridor floor outside of cubicle/ante 
room entrance 
10cm2 
If any of the items on the above list are not there (i.e. mattress) or an 
anteroom is not present, please still take 12 swabs.  Choose which extra 
places/items to swab from either the suggested list below, or areas which 
are visibly dirty.  Make a note of where each extra sample was taken from 
on the Enteric Viruses Environmental Screening Form in the space 
provided. 
Suggested Additional Areas 
Angle poise lamps 
Television  
Monitoring equipment 
Bed lockers 
Contact Numbers 
Infection Control: 5284 
Virology Lab: 8507 
Bacteriology lab (out of hours only): 5280/8661 
Consultant Microbiologist: 7930/5237/8594 
Appendix 5: Environmental air screening protocol for critical ventilation 
systems supplying clinical areas  
Method for Environmental Air Screening of Critical 
Ventilated Clinical Areas
Introduction 
Microbiological air sampling of mechanically ventilated clinical areas designated ‘critical’ is 
required at commissioning and regular validation verification, as stipulated in the Ventilation 
policy.  
Each critically ventilated area will have a ‘schedule’ (currently under protection by Estates) 
describing the design and validation standards. 
Non - HEPA filter supplied areas will usually be designed to ‘Theatre standard’ (</= 10 or less 
cfu/m3 if commissioned against HTM 03,  </= 35 cfus if HTM 20:25), while those areas with 
HEPA filtration (protective isolation rooms, ward common areas, or HEPA filtered theatres) will 
be expected to provided standard theatre air plus additionally be free of detectable fungus.  
Test selection and number of samples: 
Routine theatre standard air testing - Routine air testing will be carried out with a validated air 
sampling device, (currently the Sampl’air air sampler is available to Infection Control), but other 
validated devices are suitable as long as they check minimum of 1m3. 
One 1m3 air test will be performed per room eg operating theatre, preparation room, patient 
bedroom, room antechamber; multiple tests in large areas eg one per bed space in open HEPA 
filtered unit. The device will be located in centre of area where patient usually sited. 
Additional fungal testing in HEPA filtered areas - Additional tests for bacterial and fungal 
growth will be performed by use of settle plates. 
4 plates per operating theatre or room; two per smaller areas e.g. prep or antechamber. 
Before testing ensure ventilation is to standard and area is clean 
Do not test a commissioned or validated area unless Estates (or designated company) have 
confirmed the mechanical ventilation if performing to standard volume, flow and pressure 
regimen. 
What you need: 
Supplies required: 
• Permanent marker pen (to write on agar plates)
• Gloves x 2
• Disposable overshoes x 2
• Disposable theatre cap x2
• Scrubs
• Surgical mask x 2
• Sterile/disposable gown x2
• Polythene specimen bag to put your samples in once taken
• Rubber bands (to band your plates together for safe transportation)
• Agar plates
• One blood agar plate for each air sample
• Four blood plates for each bedspace or theatre area sampled
• Two blood plates for each antechamber sampled
• Sterile filter heads for the air sampler
• Sampl’air Lite air sampler
• Tape (to tape up the room whilst settle plates are down)
• Notice (to say keep out sampling underway)
• Environmental Screening of Mechanically Ventilated Rooms Form (1 per area - to be
completed during screening by the person carrying out the screening)
• Smoke testing equipment pack
• Tray/autoclave bag to hold equipment
What you do:
1) Charge Sampl’air lite overnight and ensure that filter heads have been autoclaved
2) Before agreeing to sample ventilation performance should be confirmed as working to
specification with the measurement details sent to estates and to the IP&CT and a level 3
clean has been carried out (wait at least 60 minutes  after cleaning before sampling to let
the chlorine dry thoroughly)
3) Before sampling inform the microbiology lab that there will be environmental samples
collected for processing
4) Collect equipment into a tray or autoclave bag and change into scrubs
5) When you arrive at the room ensure there is a cleaning sign off sheet on the door indicating
that a level 3 clean has been carried out
6) Wash hands with soap and water (where available), alcohol if not
7) Don overshoes, cap, gown, mask and gloves in that order
8) Visually inspect the room for cleanliness and for breaches in the building fabric.  Ensure all
clinical equipment and fabric items such as curtains and pillows have been removed.  If
room has not been cleaned or there is anything that would affect sampling DO NOT
SAMPLE! Check with estates and IP&CT team
9) Undertake smoke testing of the room to ensure the direction of air flow is as expected.  If
not as expected DO NOT SAMPLE! Check with estates and IP&CT team
Break the smoke tube so that smoke is released being careful not to inhale
Attach the bulb and press to produce smoke along the door frames, plug sockets and other
sources of ingress/egress of air
10) Label blood agar plates using a permanent pen as written on the Environmental
Screening of Mechanically Ventilated Rooms Form
a) Include date and time of sampling, room sampled, air sample, initials of person sampling
11) Take a labeled blood agar plate and fit it to the Sampl’air lite
a) Remove the protective cover from the top of the air sampler
b) Remove the lid of the agar plate
c) Clip the base of the agar plate into place on the top of the air sampler
d) Place the lid of the agar plate onto the opened sterile filter pack (see step 12)
12) Attach the sterile filter head to the Sampl’air Lite:
a) Open the sterile pack without touching the inside of the pack
b) Lift the filter from the pack by its sides without touching the top filter section
c) Attach the filter head onto the top of the Sampl’air Lite, covering the attached agar plate
without touching it
13) Press the on button on the Sampl’air Lite this will bring up a screen saying SAMPLE
a) Press the green arrow button, this brings up a message saying 10Min
b) Press the right arrow button which changes the 10Min message to 1000L
c) Press the green arrow button again, this bring up a message saying START 01:00
(indicating the sampler will start with a 1 minute delay)
14) Enter the first room to sample (always start in the room with the cleanest air and work your
way backwards e.g. theatre prep, main theatre, anaesthetic room.  Place the sampler in the
centre of the room, if possible at waist height and press the green arrow button to start the
sampler.  You will then have 1 minute to vacate the space before the sampling starts. (you
can also start the sampler with a remote from the doorway if you can get a good angle to 
the sampler) 
15) You must remove yourself from the space that you are sampling completely and make sure
that all doors are closed.  Time roughly ten minutes.  When approaching the doorway to the
sampling space you should be able to hear the sampler beeping if it has finished.  If there is
an observation window the sampler has a bar that fills and a counter that clocks up as
sampling is completed
16) When the sampler has finished collect the sampler being sure not to touch the filter section
on the top.
17) Remove the filter section by holding the sides, ensuring you do not touch the top section.
Place the filter clean side down on the sterile wrapping (e.g. with the top filter section raised
above the paper) and place the lid of the agar plate onto the agar plate before removing it
and placing in a specimen bag
18) Repeat this process for each room to be sampled.  Change filter heads if you ever suspect
a contamination event might have occurred or after every 10 air samples taken
19) When all rooms have had an air sample taken label up settle plates for each room.  Settle
plates should be labelled as per the Environmental Screening of Mechanically Ventilated
Rooms Form
a) Labelling should include date and time of sampling, room sampled, position within the room
and initials of person sampling
20) Plates should be positioned in the room as follow:
a. Plates should be positioned with the lid of the plate balanced against the edge of the agar
plate itself (see picture below)
Antechamber, 
anaesthetics or 
prep room 
Bed Space or theatre 
Top Left
Top Right
Bottom Left
Bottom Right
Top Left
Bottom Right
Other ward areas should have 
plates proportional to size ie 
two per bed space. 
b. In a room with antechamber, settle plates should be placed in the room farthest from exit
first, being careful not to contaminate them via touch or aerosolized droplets.  Plates should
then be placed in the antechamber before exit. In a theatre plats should be placed in prep
room, then theatre.
21) When settle plates have been placed leave the sampling area and tape up the entrance to
prevent others accessing the sampling area, put up notice saying Infection Control
Sampling Underway.  Use an elastic band to collect together air sampling plates and
remove PPE
22) Give air sampling plates and form to bacteriology for processing (plates will be incubated at
37oC for 48 hours and will be read for total viable counts at 24 and 48 hours)
23) Settle plates must be left for a minimum of two hours before collection.  When collecting
settle plates appropriate PPE must again be worn, remove tape and signage.  Sign and
date the Mitie form to say sampling has been undertaken.
24) Give settle plates to bacteriology for processing (plates will be incubated at 37oC for 24 and
room temperature for a further 48 hours. Plates will be read for total viable counts and
fungal growth at 24, 48 and 72 hours.
25) Email the appropriate project team to say that sampling has been undertaken and with a
date that the expected results are due.
26) When microbiology results are available phone the projects team to let them know whether
the room has passed or failed and confirm by email (sent to the IP&CT, projects team and
estates and facilities)
Appendix 6: Screening Form 
Environmental Screening of critical ventilated clinical areas:  Form 
Area Tested: ________________________ Date of Cleaning: ___________
Level of Cleaning: ___________________ Smoke testing as expected (circle):    
Reason for screening: ___________________________________
Date:   Time:  
Laboratory 
No. 
Sample 
Type 
(air or settle 
plate)
Site Culture Results 
Please inspect the room prior to screening.  If the room is visibly dirty do not screen and 
inform the infection control team on ext 5284/bleep 0640.  Out of hours inform the floor 
manager. 
Name: _____________________________ Signature:________________________ 
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Introduction
Notable progress has been made in the last 15 years in
developing and implementing systems to reduce the risk of
healthcare associated infections (HCAI) but with only a
moderate reduction on the overall prevalence of HCAI in
England from 8.2% (2006) to 6.4% in 2011 [1]. In the same
period, HCAI has increased in patients in intensive care units
(ICU) (23.4% in 2011). Some infections, such as
Staphylococcus sp. and Enterobacteriaceae remain
problematic within England representing 21.3% of the reported
HCAI and 32.4% respectively [1]. Similar rates are seen
worldwide e.g. Brazil (12.6% [2]), or Estonia (26% [2]) clearly
demonstrating that HCAI rates are a continuing concern
internationally [3,4,5].
The reasons why HCAI remain high in the face of universal
infection control precautions may be because of the demanding
environments required for patients with severe and complex
pathologies, such as in ICUs and in facilities caring for high
densities of immunocompromised patients. It is becoming
increasingly apparent that the environment itself can be an
important intermediary reservoir for potentially pathogenic
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 September 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 9 | e76249
Appendix 8.2
microbes [6]. Surfaces, ward design, hand washing, staff
behaviours, and ward management all contribute to pathogen
behaviour [7] and the risk of HCAI [8]. How best to monitor and
manage these environments is, however, still controversial
[9,10].
If the spatial variability of microbiological contamination can
be effectively evaluated, it could facilitate targeted infection
control interventions to reduce the role of the environment as
an intermediary source of cross transmission. The objective of
this study was to develop a methodological approach to assess
the spatial and temporal variability of bacteriologic
contamination, both distant to and at bedsides in an ICU
setting. By investigating a dynamic hospital ward, such an
approach aimed to identify area of high levels of consistent
contamination.
Methods
Data Collection
The screening procedure included 24 different sampling
locations (five samples at each location), 8 in a four bedded
medical intensive care unit (MITU) and 16 in a nine bedded
surgical intensive care unit (SITU) (Figure 1) at the University
College London Hospital (UCLH). Ward sampling was carried
out with Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA) contact plates (5.5cm diameter
i.e. 24cm2) in order to provide a quantitative measure on a non-
selective growth medium, which would enable growth of skin
and environmental flora [11,12,13]. Surfaces were sampled at
these different locations in each bed space and distant to bed
(door pressure panels or handles, nursing station etc).
Samples were always taken from the same site on all locations
(e.g. the centre panels of doors, the centre of the floor space,
the centre of bed rails, centre of the bottom left bed wheel,
above the bed head). Sites varied slightly depending on what
furniture occupied the bed space at the time. Surface sampling
included surfaces at different heights, low (<0.6 m), medium
(0.6 to 1.2 m, including high touch surfaces) and high (>1.2 m).
Air samples were taken from MITU and SITU in each bed
space at the back right hand corner, around the nurse’s station
and at access points onto the units. Air sampling was
performed using a Sampl’air lite (Aes Chemunex), sampling
1m3 of air onto a blood agar plate [14]. Air sampling occurred at
similar times to the surface sampling, separated in time by at
least 1 hour to minimize user contamination. All plates were
read and colony forming units (CFU) were counted per plate
(5.5cm diameter, i.e. 24cm2) giving Total Viable Counts (TVC)
that was recorded at 48hrs after incubation at 37°C [11].
In order to evaluate changes through time, the screening
procedure (surface and air sampling) was replicated through
three cross-sectional surveys at different times over a period of
three months. The interval between each cross-sectional
survey was of 1 month: it allowed comparison between the
short stay SITU and the longer stay MITU as patient length of
stay in SITU was less than a month whereas patient length of
stay in MITU was over a month.
As many factors are involved in spatial distribution of
bacterial contamination, the screening procedure also took into
account some of these factors. Firstly, we recorded whether
the bed was occupied or unoccupied and if the bedridden
patient had been ascribed an infection control alert. Secondly,
in each sampling location, surface types were selected for a
different surface type and material at each location. Surface
types included bed rails, floor, alcohol hand gel pump, bedside
table, bed wheels, chair, clinical waste bin, storage trolley and
unit top and shelf, top of computer, and surface material
(porous and non-porous) are described in Table S1. Thirdly,
samples were taken at the same time at each cross-sectional
survey, without alteration to ventilation or cleaning regime, in
order to ensure data comparability. Cleaning procedure was
undertaken adhering to Department of Health Guidelines [15]:
at UCLH, routine cleaning was undertaken using water and
microfibre with no detergent, twice a day (8 am and 3 pm).
Samples were taken three hours after routine morning cleaning
in an attempt to standardize procedures. In addition, ITU
cleaning does take place throughout the day as nurses actively
wipe down surfaces with alcohol within bed spaces. The area
studied had windows that did not open and air conditioning.
Statistical analysis
Common specifications.  In order to compare the different
risk factors (type of surfaces, furniture, bedside, bed
occupancy, height level and locations) involved in HCAI, TVC
was analyzed using Generalized Additive Mixed Model
(GAMM) [16,17]. This regressive approach was allowed to
model the counts of micro-organisms growing on TSA plates,
with a Poisson distribution model (using the log canonical link),
adjusted on risk factors. The model selection was based on
analysis of covariance for nested models and the Un-Biased
Risk Estimator (UBRE) score. Diagnostic plots were examined
to assess the quality of the model fit, according to Augustin et
al. [18]. For each factor, incidence ratios (IRs) were calculated
as the exponential of retrieved parameter estimates, comparing
each class to the reference class. With an incidence ratio
significantly higher than 1, a surface type was considered to be
at risk of being more contaminated than the reference class,
with a higher TVC, whatever the TVC of the reference class. A
contrario, with an incidence ratio significantly lower than 1, a
surface type was considered to have a lower TVC than the
reference class. The statistical analysis was performed using
the software R 2.10.1 (The R Foundation for statistical
computing, Vienna, Austria), and the mgcv 1.7-22 package
developed by Simon Wood [19]. Maps were performed using
the geographic information system ArcGIS (Environmental
Systems Research Institute, Redlands, California). All p-values
were compared to the classical α-threshold of 0.05.
GAMM for surface types.  Associations between bacterial
counts and surface types were assessed using a GAMM model
including the following risk factors: 'Surface types' and 'Ward'
(MITU or SITU). The 'Surface types' variable had eleven
classes, which were bed rails (reference class), floor, alcohol
hand gel pump, bedside table, bed wheels, chair, clinical waste
bin, storage trolley and unit top and shelf, top of computer. For
the variable 'Ward', the reference class was MITU. The location
according to beds and bed occupancy (non-bedside,
unoccupied bedside, occupied bedside) and the cross-
sectional survey date were modelled as random effect. In
Spatial Variability of HCAI Risk
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addition, a comparison of TVC between porous and non-
porous materials and between different materials was provided
by using Kruskall-Wallis ranking test.
Spatial GAMM.  Spatial analysis was performed to assess
the spatial variability of micro-organisms in the air and on
surfaces using GAMM. Because numerous surface samples
were taken at each location, mean TVCs were used. The risk
factors, included in the regression model were: 'Bedside'
including occupancy of beds (non bedside, unoccupied
bedside, occupied bedside), 'Ward' (MITU and SITU), 'Height
level' (<0.6m, [0.6m-1.2m], >1.2m) and locations. The
reference classes were respectively non bedside, MITU, height
level <0.6m. The locations of each sample were referenced
using Cartesian coordinates, which where modelled using thin
plate splines [20]. The selected models were also used for
mapping the TVCs from the surface environment and from the
air environment, using gridded coordinates. Bedside was
specified according to the distance to a bed, and the
occupancy was specified according to the current occupancy
for each cross-sectional survey.
Results
TVCs were obtained for a total of 370 samples, i.e. between
120 and 130 samples for each cross-sectional survey. During
the first and second cross-sectional surveys, all of the bed
spaces on MITU (100%) and 5 of the 9 beds on SITU (55,6%)
were occupied. During the third cross-sectional survey, 3 of the
Figure 1.  Map of the studied units.  The red crosses represent the sampling locations. MITU: medical intensive care unit; SITU:
surgical intensive care unit; b: bed; w: clinical waste bin; n: nurse’s station.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0076249.g001
Spatial Variability of HCAI Risk
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4 beds on MITU (75%) and 6 of the 9 beds on SITU (66.7%)
were occupied. Organisms were identified to genus level, and
the predominant genus identified was Staphylococcus.
Crude counts are presented in Table 1 and Incidence Ratios
in Tables 2, 3, 4. The lower height level (<0.6m) was
consistently the most contaminated within the SITU (median
TVCs between the first, second and third cross-sectional
surveys were 182, 107 and 350 per 24cm2 respectively). In
contrast the pattern of contamination in MITU was more
variable between cross-sectional surveys. For example the
lower height level (<0.6m) was most contaminated for the
second cross-sectional survey (median TVC 350 per 24cm2),
but with the highest level (>1.2m) most contaminated for the
first and third cross-sectional surveys (median TVCs 200 and
350 per 24cm2 respectively). Mid-level surfaces sampled
(between 0.6 and 1.2m) did however demonstrate consistently
lower levels of contamination during all the three cross-
sectional surveys (median TVCs 34.4, 28.7, 55.4 per 24cm2
respectively).
To enable the impact of location and bed occupancy on
contamination to be assessed, TVCs were analysed in a
statistical model as described in the methods. As Tables 2-4
demonstrate, there was a highly significant variation in
contamination throughout the units analysed. When TVCs were
adjusted for ward (SITU or MITU), bed occupancy and sample
Table 1. Total viable counts (TVC) per 24cm2 plates (5.5cm
diameter).
Care unit Height level
First cross-
sectional survey
Second cross-
sectional survey
Third cross-
sectional
survey
SITU Level 0 182 (n=15) 107 (n=16) 350 (n=16)
(40-350) (17-350) (18-350)
Level 1 71.2 (n=33) 34.8 (n=36) 64.5 (n=36)
(2-269) (1.5-350) (3-350)
Level 2 79.2 (n=13) 29.5 (n=15) 14.5 (n=15)
(5-350) (2.5-197) (1-350)
Air 98.5 (n=12) 60 (n=11) 164 (n=11)
(60-167) (27-158) (39-419)
MITU Level 0 150.3 (n=7) 350 (n=9) 205 (n=9)
(6-623) (2-350) (4-350)
Level 1 34.4 (n=24) 28.7 (n=25) 55.4 (n=25)
(12.3-238.3) (2-126) (9.7-350)
Level 2 200 (n=5) 27 (n=5) 350 (n=5)
(27-350) (6-350) (22-350)
Air 103 (n=7) 88 (n=7) 182 (n=7)
(99-217) (50-167) (51-213)
Median, sample size (n) and (min, max), are presented for each cross-sectional
survey, at each height level and care unit.
Level 0: <0.6m; Level 1: [0.6m-1.2m]; Level 2: >1.2m
SITU: surgical intense care unit MITU: medical intensive care unit
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0076249.t001
location, mid and high-level surface samples were significantly
less contaminated than samples taken from locations under 0.6
m (Incidence Ratios -IR- respectively at 0.39, 95% Confidence
interval [0.37; 0.42], and 0.59 [0.56; 0.64] (first cross-sectional
survey), 0.39 [0.37; 0.42] and 0.31 [0.29; 0.33] (second cross-
sectional survey) and 0.47 [0.44; 0.49] and 0.6 [0.57; 0.64]
(third cross-sectional survey)).
Table 2. Spatial analysis of Air samples.
Cross-sectional
surveys Cofactors IR [CI95%] p-value
(% explained
deviance -n§)
First cross-
sectional survey
(81.5% - n=19) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 -
Non occupied
Bedside 0.74[0.58;0.93] 0.007
**
Occupied
Bedside 1.11[0.91;1.35] 0.26
Ward MITU* 1 -
SITU 0.33[0.2;0.57] <0.001**
Spatial
location*** - <0.001
**
Second cross-
sectional survey
(85.7% - n=19) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 -
Non occupied
Bedside 0.71 [0.52;0.97] 0.02
**
Occupied
Bedside 0.6[0.47;0.76] <0.001
**
Ward MITU* 1 -
SITU 14.34 [8.08;25.44] <0.001**
Spatial
location*** - <0.001
**
Third cross-
sectional survey
(49.6% - n=19) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 -
Non occupied
Bedside 1.92 [1.54;2.39] <0.001
**
Occupied
Bedside 1.96 [1.66; 2.31] <0.001
**
Ward MITU* 1 -
SITU 0.07 [0.04;0.11] <0.001**
Spatial
location*** - <0.001
**
Risk factors were assessed each day by using Generalized Additive Mixed Model,
adjusted on Bedside (occupied or not), Ward and location.
§. n: number of locations
*. reference class
**. p<0.05
***. spatial location was modelled by thin plate splines not providing unique IR.
IR: incidence ratio SITU: surgical intensive care unit MITU: medical intensive care
unit
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0076249.t002
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Levels of contamination on the surface types studied are
displayed in Table 4. Contamination is presented as adjusted
Table 3. Spatial analysis of Surface samples.
Cross-sectional
surveys Cofactors IR [CI95%] p-value
(% explained
deviance -n§)
First Cross-
sectional survey
(38% - n=49) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 -
Non occupied
Bedside 0.78 [0.67;0.89] 0.0002
**
Occupied Bedside 1.72 [1.54;1.91] <0.001**
Ward MITU* 1 -
SITU 0.77[0.59;1] 0.05**
Height Level 0 <0.6m 1 -
Level 1 [0.6-1.2m] 0.39 [0.37;0.42] <0.001**
Level 3 >1.2m 0.59 [0.56;0.64] <0.001**
Spatial
location*** - <0.001
**
Second cross-
sectional survey
(56% - n=57) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 -
Non occupied
Bedside 6.96 [5.54;8.73] <0.001
**
Occupied Bedside 3.14 [2.84;3.48] <0.001**
Ward MITU* 1 -
SITU 0.18 [0.13;0.24] <0.001**
Height Level 0 <0.6m * 1 -
Level 1 [0.6-1.2m] 0.39 [0.37;0.42] <0.001**
Level 3 >1.2m 0.31 [0.29;0.33] <0.001**
Spatial
location*** - <0.001
**
Third cross-
sectional survey
(27% - n=57) Bedside Non Bedside* 1 -
Non occupied
Bedside 2.24 [2.04;2.46] <0.001
**
Occupied Bedside 1.5 [1.39;1.61] <0.001**
Ward MITU* 1 -
SITU 0.09 [0.07;0.12] <0.001**
Height Level 0 <0.6m * 1 -
Level 1 [0.6-1.2m] 0.47 [0.44;0.49] <0.001**
Level 3 >1.2m 0.6 [0.57;0.64] <0.001**
Spatial
location*** - <0.001
**
Risk factors were assessed each day by using Generalized Additive Mixed Model,
adjusted on Bedside (occupied or not), Ward, height and location.
§. n: number of locations
*. reference class
**. p<0.05
***. spatial location was modelled by thin plate splines not providing unique IR.
IR: incidence ratio SITU: surgical intensive care unit MITU: medical intensive care
unit
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0076249.t003
incidence ratios (IR) related to TVC on the bed rails (reference
class). Bed wheels, bedside table, storage trolley, alcohol hand
gel pump, and top of the storage unit, were all more
contaminated than bed rails. Bed wheels were most
contaminated with a mean TVC 1.97 times higher than on the
bed rail (95% Confidence Interval 95%CI [1.12; 3.21]). Alcohol
hand gel (wall mounted) and alcohol hand gel pump (patient
bed side), (IR=0.27 [0.1; 0.79]), bedside table (IR=0.087 [0.01;
0.74]), storage trolley (IR=0.41 [0.18; 0.91]) and the top of the
storage unit (IR=0.62 [0.25; 0.89]) were all less contaminated
than bed rails. The comparison of TVC between porous and
non-porous materials and between different materials showed
no significant differences (p=0.53 and p=0.198, respectively).
Surfaces located at occupied bedsides were always more
contaminated than surfaces located away from bed spaces (IR
at 1.72, [1.54; 1.91] -first cross-sectional survey-, 3.14 [2.84;
3.48] -second cross-sectional survey- and 1.5 [1.39; 1.61] -third
cross-sectional survey). Apart from the first cross-sectional
survey, surfaces located at unoccupied bedsides were also
more contaminated (IR at 0.78, [0.87; 0.89] -first cross-
sectional survey-, 6.96 [5.54; 8.73] -second cross-sectional
survey- and 2.24 [2.04; 2.46] -third cross-sectional survey).
Surfaces sampled at SITU were always significantly less
contaminated than surfaces sampled at MITU (IR at 0.77 [0.59;
0.99] -first cross-sectional survey-, 0.18 [0.13; 0.24] -second
cross-sectional survey-, and 0.09 [0.07; 0.12] - third cross-
sectional survey).
Air contamination was variable, showing less contamination
at unoccupied bedsides during the first cross-sectional survey,
a cluster around the nurse’s station during the second cross-
sectional survey, and more contamination at bedsides during
the third cross-sectional survey (air samples IRs at unoccupied
and occupied bedsides were 0.74 [0.58; 0.93] and 1.11 [0.91;
Table 4. Effects on bacterial counts for the different surface
types sampled.
Cofactors IR [CI95%] p-value
Surface types Bed rails* 1 -
Floor 1.18 [0.76;1.83] 0.46
Alcohol hand gel pump 0.27 [0.1;0.79] 0.02**
Bed side table 0.087 [0.01;0.74] 0.03**
Bed wheels 1.97 [1.21;3.21] 0.01**
Chair (seat) 0.45 [0.09;2.24] 0.32
Clinical waste bin 0.61 [0.29;1.28] 0.19
Storage trolley 0.41 [0.18;0.91] 0.03**
Storage unit - shelf 0.62 [0.21;1.84] 0.39
Storage unit - top 0.48 [0.25;0.89] 0.02**
Top of computer 1.06 [0.61;1.84] 0.83
Ward MITU* 1 -
SITU 0.89 [0.64;1.24] 0.49
The adjusted incidence ratios (IR) are presented with their 95% confidence
intervals.
*. reference class
**. p<0.05
SITU: surgical intensive care unit MITU: medical intensive care unit
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0076249.t004
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1.35] respectively -first cross-sectional survey-, 0.71 [0.52;
0.97] and 0.6 [0.47; 0.76] respectively -second cross-sectional
survey-, and 1.92 [1.54; 2.39] and 1.96[1.66; 2.31] respectively
-third cross-sectional survey). Figure 2 shows clusters of
contamination predominantly around bed locations but, during
the second cross-sectional survey, in the air around the nurse’s
station.
The regression models developed for this study, which utilise
TVC data, location, and occupancy, were found to be accurate
at the first and second cross-sectional surveys (with
percentages of explained deviance at 81,5 and 85,7%
respectively). However these models were less accurate for the
third cross-sectional survey. Sample location remained a
significant factor in predicting colony counts (p<0.0001) for all
cross-sectional surveys.
Discussion
In this study we have analyzed the environmental variability
of micro-organisms within an ICU healthcare environment, by
measuring TVCs on surfaces and in air. We aimed to establish
an approach to facilitate monitoring and analysis of microbial
contamination, which could be applied to healthcare settings,
even if our approach did not evaluate precisely all the factors
involved in the contamination variability (such as healthcare
worker behaviour, patient status, modification of air-
conditioning, people-traffic). The results showed that, for this
particular environment, while contamination relationships were
complex, some patterns emerged that could be modelled and
used to estimate the distribution of microbial contamination. In
this particular setting hospital design per se could not be the
sole determinant of contamination. Staff behaviours, cleaning
procedures and the nature and severity of a patient’s condition
may also have been important contributors to levels of bacteria.
Such factors are amenable to mitigation by changes in ward
layout to influence staff behaviour, improving accessibility to
cleaning staff and by changes in healthcare components
design such as use of easy clean surfaces.
Occupation of bed spaces and illness severity appeared to
be consistent predictors of contamination. Air and surface
TVCs were generally higher in MITU where patients are usually
long stay and require care, such as feeding, in which there is
substantial interaction with their bedside environment and
particularly with relatives. These long-stay patients have more
of their own possessions within the bed space and visitation is
encouraged, tending to be regular and prolonged. SITU
Figure 2.  Estimation of the counts of micro-organisms.  Results were adjusted on bedside, bed occupancy, height level (for
surface analysis), Ward and location. Total Viable Count (TVC) estimations for the three cross-sectional surveys at the different
height levels including air sampling are presented at each location. The coloured scale showed the values of TVC.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0076249.g002
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patients are usually short-stay, ventilated and require high
intensity support from staff. Visitation is limited to 2 people per
bedside and is only allowed during certain hours. Visitors, due
to the severity of illness on this ward, have limited interaction
with patients and the bedside environment. Prolonged stay in
ICU has been shown to increase the risk of acquiring an HCAI
[21].
Colony counts in air and on surfaces varied between
locations, height, bedside location and bed occupancy. There
were differences between air and surface samples, indicating
that the source of microbes may differ. Air sampling provides
both a measure of transient aero-contamination and a snap
shot of more widespread microbial levels. Surface sampling is
affected by aero-contamination, as some particles will
eventually settle on surfaces. King et al. [22] showed that
bioaerosols can be deposited across a room at different
distances from a source, due to air movement, which can be
modified by furniture and people behaviour. Organisms that
have settled may then be transferred to other sites by touch,
and by air eddy currents generated by human traffic. Surface
samples are highly affected by human behaviours within the
ward environment, and particularly by touch. Our results show
that the air and surfaces within bed spaces were consistently
highly contaminated. In contrast, the aero-contamination at the
SITU nurse’s station during the second cross-sectional survey,
occurred in the context of low surface TVCs. We also observed
surfaces, which were heavily contaminated in areas of low
aero-contamination. Surfaces within the middle height range
were generally less contaminated. Even though the cleaning
regime wasn’t comprehensively assessed, cleaning was
probably also an important factor in determining microbial
levels.
Our results, in combination with other studies [6,23,24],
support continuous environmental monitoring and not only in
response to outbreaks. Continuous monitoring will permit the
establishment of baseline data for units that can be used to
target interventions. Sampling will also permit the identification
of surfaces that are linked with higher levels of contamination
where a design solution may be sought. It is important not only
to evaluate the hotspots within a ward, such as bed spaces and
nurses stations, but also to evaluate more globally what the
HCAI risks are of a 'functional unit'. Such data can be used to
inform benchmarking as a means of evaluating cleaning
regimes [25,26,27]. Numerous studies meticulously describe
surface cleanliness as these relate different cleaning
procedures, including detergent use, design, behaviour
[12,28,29,30,31], and production and distribution of aerosols
[13,32,33]. Our work did not evaluate cleaning procedures nor
the factors involved in distribution of aerosols. ITU cleaning
does take place throughout the day as nurses actively wipe
down surfaces with alcohol within bed spaces. Therefore we
cannot state with certainty what impact cleaning would have
had on our results. It was not our intention to ascertain the
quality of cleaning but to measure 'real life' microbial levels
within a hospital environment. Better cleaning protocols and
systems would doubtless have great impact at those sites
identified as high risk. Our work does however provide
information that could promote easier, more effective cleaning
for less effort by better design and use of space.
HCAI has not been eliminated despite increased
interventions [15,34,35] and it is not known which component
of the control process is most effective nor which to pursue
further. Levels of micro-organisms within the environment may
be related to healthcare design and/or processes. A scientific
approach to studying the relationship between healthcare
design and HCAI risk has been problematic due to the
multitude of factors that affect a patient’s interaction with both
people and environment. Healthcare environments, hospital
design and healthcare behaviours contribute to the risk of
HCAI, in addition to the health status of each patient. These
components include numerous variables including cleaning
regimes, ventilation, bed locations and occupancy, windows
and doors, material, staff and patient movements and height
level. The complex interactions that do and can occur within
the healthcare setting should be borne in mind when
monitoring contamination. In this study we assessed the spatial
variability of contamination, using a monitoring approach based
on surface and air sampling at different location, height and
time. Even when the main covariates were taken into account
(distance to bed, bed-occupancy, care unit, location, height
level, surface type), spatial variability still remained. This
indicates that other cofactors were influencing contamination.
This approach however can be used to assess the spatial
variability of contamination over the working day, or before and
after a specific intervention or event (e.g. an intervention in the
ventilation system or a major contamination). By identifying
areas of high levels of consistent contamination, the
methodology employed in this study will be useful to monitor
contamination variability within the healthcare environment and
should help to assist in the planning of interventions.
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Abstract
Objective: To determine whether microbial contamination of door handles in two busy intensive care units and one high
dependency unit was related to their design, location, and usage.
Design: Observational study of the number of viable bacteria on existing door handles of different design at defined entry/
exit points with simultaneous data collection of who used these doors and how often.
Setting: Two busy specialised intensive care units and one high dependency unit in a tertiary referral NHS neurological
hospital.
Main outcome measures: Surface bacterial density on door handles with reference to design, location, and intensity of use.
Results: We found a significant correlation between the frequency of movements through a door and the degree to which
it was contaminated (p =,0.01). We further found that the door’s location, design and mode of use all influenced
contamination. When compared to push plate designs, pull handles revealed on average a five fold higher level of
contamination; lever handles, however, displayed the highest levels of bacterial contamination when adjusted for frequency
of use. We also observed differences in contamination levels at doors between clinical areas, particularly between the
operating theatres and one of the ICUs.
Conclusions: Door handles in busy, ‘‘real life’’ high acuity clinical environments were variably contaminated with bacteria,
and the number of bacteria found related to design, location, mode and frequency of operation. Largely ignored issues of
handle and environmental design can support or undermine strategies designed to limit avoidable pathogen transmission,
especially in locations designed to define ‘‘thresholds’’ and impose physical barriers to pathogen transmission between
clinical areas. Developing a multidisciplinary approach beyond traditional boundaries for purposes of infection control may
release hitherto unappreciated options and beneficial outcomes for the control of at least some hospital acquired infections.
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Introduction
Healthcare Acquired Infections (HCAIs) continue to threaten
the quality of patient care. The human and financial cost to
individuals, healthcare organisations and society is considerable,
approximating to £1.5bn per annum in the UK alone [1].
Governments and healthcare providers have intervened with a
variety of measures, guidelines and regulations designed to control
HCAIs [2]. Accordingly, much progress has been achieved with
interventions relating to hand hygiene, strict infection control
monitoring and cleaning regimes. Further progress is likely to
follow from the identification of other potentially important
contributors to HCAI, such as the design of the hospital itself and
how this determines people’s movement and behaviour within it
[3]. There is increasing interest in the design of healthcare
establishments, driven by issues of efficiency in both primary and
secondary care facilities [4]. Hospital design is even more relevant
for maintaining care quality in the face of space constraints, higher
patient acuity, shorter lengths of inpatient stay and financial
pressures. The operational challenges set by these agendas are
substantial, and consideration should also be given to how these
design variables might present, or prevent, opportunities for
transmission of pathogenic organisms. Little data exist to inform
how hospital design might impact on the potential for HCAI
transmission [5]. With this in mind, built-environment experts,
clinicians, microbiologists, and statisticians came together to
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 October 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 10 | e40171
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examine possible relationships between defined elements of
hospital design, behaviour and environmental contamination.
Specifically, we sought to generate data relating to microbial
contamination on door handles and how this might be related to
factors relating to their design and use. We selected three high
acuity environments for study as these are known to act as hotspots
for HCAI transmission [6]. Finally, we suggest using relevant
findings as evidence to generate novel strategies for infection
control.
Methods
This was an observational study of a nine-bedded surgical
intensive therapy Unit (SITU), a newly refurbished four-bedded
medical intensive therapy unit (MITU) with a side room, and a
four-bedded high dependency unit (HDU), all located in close
proximity to each other on one floor of a busy urban hospital. We
obtained waivers from our ethics Committees for the work as the
study neither involved patient contact, nor was disruptive to
patient care. Studies were carried out in a six month period
between 2008 and 2009. We gathered information relating to
ward layout, which way the doors into, out from, and within the
units opened, how often they were used, by whom, the door
handle design, and finally contamination density by potentially
harmful microorganisms.
Figure 1 shows a plan of the units. Gates were defined as those
thresholds across which individuals travel. Gate numbers were not
consecutive, as some gates had no doors. Gates and doors (when
present) were numbered using the same numbering system. Gate 1
identified the door connecting the HDU to the operating theatres
zone; Gate 4 the main entrance to the SITU and HDU; Gate 5
the doorway to the main corridor separating SITU from MITU;
Gate 6 the second entrance into the SITU; Gate 7 the main
entrance to MITU, and Gate 10 one of the entrances to the only
side room of MITU which opens directly into the main corridor.
This side room could also be accessed through MITU.
Doors with push plates always had a fixed pull handle on the
other side. The direction of push or pull varied from door to door.
Gates 4 and 6 were furnished with a pull handle to enter the unit,
whereas Gates 5 and 7 used a pull handle to leave the unit. We
observed staff and visitors for at least three days for all six gates.
The doors at gates 1 and 10 had lever handles while the other four
(Gates 4, 5, 6 and 7) were double leaf doors designed to be pushed
on one side and pulled on the other. Accordingly, the doors we
studied had three different designs: flat rectangular metal plates on
the push side of the double doors, longitudinal fixed door handle
bars on the pull side of the double doors and a short horizontal
lever handle on both sides of gates 1 and 10. These different
designs are shown in figure 2.
Observing people’s movement
We watched where people moved to and from and recorded our
observations. We were careful to allow a ‘‘run-in’’ period of sham
observation of three weeks in order to minimise any bias which the
observation process itself might trigger. A single movement was
defined as one individual crossing the threshold of any gate as
defined above and the locations of which are illustrated in Figure 1.
We monitored all movements through all gates in the three units
on a daily basis from 10:30 to 13:00 and from 14:30 to 17:00.
Individuals were assigned to one of several groups, namely staff
local to the ward, other hospital staff, patients, and their visitors.
Microbiology
Microbiological surveillance data were collected at the same
time as handle usage using Tryptone Soy Agar (TSA) Rodac
impression plates with a surface area of 16.7 cm2. We chose
Rodac plates rather than a swabbing technique as it reduces
variation relating to swab material type and swabbing technique.
The plates were read after 48 hours’ incubation for Total Viable
Counts (TVCs). We sampled both door handles and door plates.
These were cleaned thoroughly with 70% isopropyl alcohol wipes
immediately before the start of the movement observations and
Figure 1. Plan of the units. Gates were defined as those thresholds across which individuals travel. Gate numbers were not consecutive, as some
gates had no doors. Gates and doors (when present) were numbered using the same numbering system.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040171.g001
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swabs taken to ensure the handles and plates were free from
bacteria. We repeated the sampling at the same sites following a
150 minute observation period. This was found to be sufficient for
observing substantial door usage whilst practical for continuous
observation by a single worker. We developed consistent sampling
techniques whereby we sampled a 100 cm2 area at the centre of
the door push plates, or a rotation of the Rodac impression plates
around the vertical centre of the fixed vertical door handles. This
was repeated twice a day to straddle both morning ward rounds
and afternoon visits by relatives, and for three days.
Statistical analysis
Data were analysed using SPSS 16.0 for Windows. Initial data
analysis demonstrated the data distribution to be non-Gaussian.
Accordingly, we used Spearman’s Rho Product Moment test to
determine the relationship, if any, between movements through
various doors and microbial densities. We used one way ANOVA
for least significant difference analysis to establish the significance
of any difference between means. After correction for extreme
values, we used the Pearson Product Moment test parametric
analysis. We expressed results as means 6 standard deviation.
Values were considered significant for p values of less than 0.05.
Results
Bed Occupancy and Movements
We observed ward traffic for periods of seven consecutive days,
during which there were no to four patients present in the four
bedded HDU; five to seven patients in the nine bedded SITU; and
three to four patients in the four bedded MITU. We recorded up
to 241 movements across a gate in 150 minutes at a time when
only six out of nine beds were occupied. Staff based on that ward
were responsible for 50% of all movements through this particular
gate. Accordingly, various staff members had to exit and/or enter
the unit about 120 times over a two and a half hour period. Table 1
displays the total number of movements according to category of
building user over a seven day observation period. These data
demonstrate large variations of traffic across doorways, which
were related to location and time, but not direction. Ward and
hospital staff generated the majority of these events. Movements
through the main entrances to the ITUs (Gates number 4 and 5),
constituted almost 47% of all movements.
Door Handle Design, Movement density and Microbial
Growth
Microbial growth from Gate 6 was on many occasions either
confluent, or too numerous to count, as was one sample from Gate
5. There was little effect of sample timing on TVCs apart from
Gate 6, where the afternoon samples were consistently found to be
greater than 300 or were confluent.
Figure 3 shows the considerable range of average TVCs
retrieved from both sides of each door. We occasionally detected
confluent or near confluent bacterial growth on door handles in
the context of low levels of traffic (Gates 1 and 10). These
exceptions can only be explained by less frequent contact with
highly contaminated hands. When these heavily contaminated
samples were excluded, a significant correlation between move-
ment density and TVCs emerged (,0.01). Low traffic density was
associated with low TVCs for Gates 1 and 10 and the more heavily
used doors at Gates 4, 5, 6 and 7 were more contaminated.
Further analysis of the pattern of contamination in the more
heavily used doors indicated that other factors were contributing
to microbial contamination.
Traffic density heading either in or out of the doors was
balanced and was not influenced by the door handle design.
Analysis of individual and average TVCs for each type of door
handle, however, revealed that bacterial load on pull handles was
consistently higher than that on the push plates located on the
other side of the door. This narrowly failed to reach statistical
significance (p= 0.053). Further analysis relating to handle type
revealed that lever handles had the highest ratio (6.38 TVCs/
movement), followed by Pull handles (2.24 TVCs/movement),
which were in turn nearly double that of the Push plates (1.20
TVCs/movement). Interestingly, the ratio of TVCs/movements
on the lever handles located on the inside of the doors used to exit
from the side room and HDU was much higher than the
corresponding handle on the other side of the door (Table 2). The
table also shows that pull handles had a higher ratio of TVC per
movement than the push handles.
Discussion
We found a relationship between how often and how many
people cross door thresholds and the number of bacteria deposited
on door handles. This finding supports the requirement for hand
hygiene whenever hospital thresholds are crossed [7]. These
critical moments in potential microbial transmission are increas-
Figure 2. Images of the door handle types.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040171.g002
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ingly recognised as targets for high impact interventions. We found
that much traffic arose from the need to access the sluice room,
offices, rest rooms, and separate equipment and storage areas.
Our results indicate that door location had an impact on
contamination. For example, the handle used to exit the HDU via
Gate 1, to access the operating theatres, was far more contam-
inated than the handle used the other way when adjusted for
frequency of movement. This may be an indicator of ward activity,
hand hygiene, or handle design. As expected, we observed a
consistently high level of hand hygiene in the operating theatres
and this may be the reason for the low level of contamination on
the handle used to enter the HDU. In contrast, staff entering the
theatre from the HDU (‘‘out’’ handle) will likely have come into
direct contact with high acuity patients in a less controlled
environment and may have found it more difficult to maintain
such high levels of hand hygiene compliance. This however may
not be the full story. The average contamination per movement
was highest at this gate and also at Gate 10, which connects a
MITU side room with the corridor. This may relate to door
handle design, as both gates were operated by lever handles.
Door handle design may also have contributed to the TVC/
movement results for Gates 4,5 and 6. While the hand hygiene
facilities were identical on both sides of these three gates, and the
activity within the SITU would clearly be greater than outside the
SITU, we always observed greater contamination on the ‘‘in’’ pull
handle than the ‘‘out’’ push plate. Accepting the variables relating
to activity, as discussed above, it is plausible that pull handles
‘‘capture’ more organisms than push plates. We suggest that this
relates to ‘‘skin to metal ratio’’ as illustrated in Figure 4. It would
seem logical that door handles that either ‘‘capture’’ a larger
proportion of whatever hand contamination is present, concen-
trate what is captured onto a smaller surface area or both, is a
reasonable explanation for our data. The pull handles require
grabbing at some point along the vertical bar of the fixed handle,
focusing the contact point on the handle and thus reducing the
area and concentrating contamination to a small surface. The
potential for concentrating microorganisms was even greater on
lever handles, where the length of the handle bar is less than one
quarter of that of the vertical fixed handle, thereby acting as a
smaller lens focussing the microorganisms left behind on contact.
Whilst a logical explanation for our findings, we cannot dismiss the
possibility that door handle design had no influence on contam-
ination and that sole determinants of contamination were ward
activity and hand hygiene.
The design of the healthcare environment is increasing
recognised for its impact on health care quality and outcomes
[8–9]. To our knowledge there is no coordinated study of how
people’s behaviour is influenced by the built environment and how
this relates to microbial spread [10]. We show here that a
multidisciplinary approach both reveals the true complexity of
microbial spread and the challenge this sets for effective strategies
for its control. In the absence of a more ‘intelligently designed’
built environment, recent focus on the near patient space [7] and
alcohol based gels has been of great benefit. The WHO
recommends undertaking hand hygiene when entering the patient
environment. However as staff compliance with hand hygiene is
routinely less than 100% [11], introduction of microbes into bed
spaces is still a risk. Accordingly, optimising ward design to limit
the risk of contamination, is still of value.
Optimising ward design to limit microbial spread is not
straightforward and will be determined by many factors such as
the existing building if not a new build, limitations on space, and
use. In the setting described in this manuscript, we observed that
closer, more accessible storage and supply rooms would have
resulted in less time spent fetching, carrying and performing
mandated handwashing. Closer storage would likely have limited
the opportunities for cross contamination and releasing time for
direct patient care. In some settings, closer storage of some ward
related items may facilitate contamination with patients’ flora and
this could be undesirable. Whatever the physical and financial
constraints and activity demands, we would advocate an informed
approach to ward design/modification, to at least consider the
implications for the potential for microbial spread. Of particular
importance is the area within and around the sluice. We noted
high contamination levels on Gate 6, which controlled access to
the sluice room. This study did not set out to identify the bacterial
species recovered from the door handles. We cannot therefore
Table 1. Various Types of Users Passing Through Each Gate.
Door No Ward Staff Other Staff Visitor Patient Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
1 41 66% 21 34% 0 0% 0 0% 62
4 381 50% 262 31% 146 18% 8 1% 797
5 249 36% 332 47% 109 16% 6 1% 696
6 296 51% 219 38% 58 10% 3 1% 576
7 580 57% 402 39% 37 4% 5 0% 1024
10 36 73% 13 27% 0 0% 0 0% 49
No. denotes the number of individuals moving through a gate. This is then expressed as a percentage broken down by their reason for being on the ward.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040171.t001
Figure 3. Average Total Viable Counts +/21 Standard deviation
retrieved from both sides of each door.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040171.g003
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state whether these organisms were skin commensals, such as
coagulase negative staphylococci, transiently carried S aureus/
MRSA, or faecal organisms such as E coli. If the latter were
predominant, it would indicate that the high levels of contamina-
tion emanated from the sluice. The sluice room represents a
potentially problematic area where a door is desirable to help limit
the spread of faecal organisms while also providing surfaces, such
as the handles, which could facilitate organism transmission.
There are very limited data on door handles and their potential
for microbial transmission. In a study looking at surrogate markers
of nosocomial pathogen transmission, door handles were high-
lighted as one site that rapidly became contaminated within the
context of a neonatal intensive care setting [12]. A recent study has
shown that it is possible to reduce bacteria on door handles
provided they are regularly cleaned. Even with regular cleaning,
bacteria were detected on more than 20% of handles [13].
Cleaning, both of hands and the environment, has been widely
accepted as an important factor in curbing the spread of pathogens
in hospitals [14]. Our data indicate that, while cleaning is
important, it is not always practical, as in some cases a single touch
by a contaminated hand was sufficient to result in a confluent
plate. A potentially innovative approach to limiting environmental
contamination is the use of spontaneously antimicrobial surfaces.
Of these, copper-based microfibre cleaning systems [15] or copper
furnishings look particularly promising, although the latter are
expensive and still in need of regular cleaning [16].
The layout of the units, variably and constantly contaminated
by the sick patients they contain, can therefore support or
undermine policies designed to limit the spread of infection as well
as enabling healthcare staff to work more effectively. The use of
automatic doors or the elimination of doors altogether could be a
solution to reducing the dissemination of microorganisms acquired
from door handles, although should be weighed up against the
potential for airborne transmission and the importance of visually
defined thresholds, themselves prompting hand hygiene. Our
findings offer a possible explanation for Cepeda et al’s surprising
findings that side room use in the context of ICUs failed to reduce
the rate of MRSA cross-infection [17]. This, however, is only one
of a number of healthcare design features that could be considered
Table 2. Ratio of TVC/Movement for Each Type of Handle.
Gate No. Going In TVC/Movement in Going out TVC/Movement out TVC/Movement
1 Handle 0.43 Handle 8.56 4.63
4 Pull 1.82 Push 0.49 1.18
5 Pull 2.63 Push 1.29 1.97
6 Pull 5.44 Push 0.99 3.27
7 Push 0.62 Pull 0.76 0.69
10 Handle 1.57 Handle 14.52 8.56
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040171.t002
Figure 4. Transmission potential in relation to door handle type.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040171.g004
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to optimise effective delivery of care and control of healthcare
associated infections.
Architects may not have the necessary information or knowl-
edge available to inform optimal healthcare design as regards the
spread of infection. Whilst door handle design may appear trivial
at the design stage and largely ignored, it is one of many ‘‘trivial’’
design features that might silently undermine microbial transmis-
sion control. Novel door handles are being developed and may
prove to be more ‘resistant’ to microbial contamination than
existing designs. The multidisciplinary approach taken in this
study could serve as a paradigm for future healthcare design. A
network of architects, engineers, microbiologists, nurses doctors
and hospital administrators working together at multiple stages of
the design process could achieve those efficiencies seen in car and
kitchen design and manufacturing. These synergies between
providers of healthcare and those responsible for the buildings in
which it is delivered would seem essential for better, evidence
based and optimal healthcare building design.
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Appendix 8.8RESEARCH ARTICLE Open AccessUse of UV-C radiation to disinfect non-critical
patient care items: a laboratory assessment of the
Nanoclave Cabinet
Ginny Moore1,4*, Shanom Ali1,4, Elaine A Cloutman-Green2, Christina R Bradley3, Martyn AC Wilkinson3,
John C Hartley2, Adam P Fraise3 and A Peter R Wilson1Abstract
Background: The near-patient environment is often heavily contaminated, yet the decontamination of near-patient
surfaces and equipment is often poor. The Nanoclave Cabinet produces large amounts of ultraviolet-C (UV-C)
radiation (53 W/m2) and is designed to rapidly disinfect individual items of clinical equipment. Controlled laboratory
studies were conducted to assess its ability to eradicate a range of potential pathogens including Clostridium difficile
spores and Adenovirus from different types of surface.
Methods: Each test surface was inoculated with known levels of vegetative bacteria (106 cfu/cm2), C. difficile spores
(102-106 cfu/cm2) or Adenovirus (109 viral genomes), placed in the Nanoclave Cabinet and exposed for up to 6
minutes to the UV-C light source. Survival of bacterial contaminants was determined via conventional cultivation
techniques. Degradation of viral DNA was determined via PCR. Results were compared to the number of colonies
or level of DNA recovered from non-exposed control surfaces. Experiments were repeated to incorporate organic
soils and to compare the efficacy of the Nanoclave Cabinet to that of antimicrobial wipes.
Results: After exposing 8 common non-critical patient care items to two 30-second UV-C irradiation cycles,
bacterial numbers on 40 of 51 target sites were consistently reduced to below detectable levels (≥ 4.7 log10
reduction). Bacterial load was reduced but still persisted on other sites. Objects that proved difficult to disinfect
using the Nanoclave Cabinet (e.g. blood pressure cuff) were also difficult to disinfect using antimicrobial wipes. The
efficacy of the Nanoclave Cabinet was not affected by the presence of organic soils. Clostridium difficile spores were
more resistant to UV-C irradiation than vegetative bacteria. However, two 60-second irradiation cycles were
sufficient to reduce the number of surface-associated spores from 103 cfu/cm2 to below detectable levels. A 3 log10
reduction in detectable Adenovirus DNA was achieved within 3 minutes; after 6 minutes, viral DNA was
undetectable.
Conclusion: The results of this study suggest that the Nanoclave Cabinet can provide rapid and effective
disinfection of some patient-related equipment. However, laboratory studies do not necessarily replicate ‘in-use’
conditions and further tests are required to assess the usability, acceptability and relative performance of the
Nanoclave Cabinet when used in situ.
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Figure 1 The Nanoclave Cabinet.
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Important nosocomial pathogens such as methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus, Clostridium difficile and
vancomycin-resistant enterococci are often present on in-
animate surfaces within the local environment of infected
patients [1-3]. Many of these surfaces (e.g. blood-pressure
cuffs, bed rails, bedside furniture) only come into contact
with a patient’s intact skin – a highly effective barrier
against microbes. Consequently, such surfaces are consid-
ered “non-critical” and rather than being returned to a
central sterilising services department for re-processing,
can be decontaminated in situ [4,5].
Routine cleaning of the near-patient environment has
been associated with a reduction in surface contamin-
ation [2]. However, cleaning of near-bedside equipment
and furniture is not always adequate, especially if it is a
nursing responsibility and they are busy [5,6]. Inad-
equate cleaning allows microbial contaminants to sur-
vive and persist on environmental surfaces and whilst
non-critical surfaces pose little direct risk to patients [4],
they can act as a source from which healthcare workers
can contaminate their hands and may serve as vectors
for cross-transmission.
Ultraviolet-C (UV-C) radiation has been used for many
years to disinfect water and its bactericidal effects, due
mainly to its inactivation of microbial DNA, have been
well documented [7]. More recently, UV-C has been
used to disinfect hospital rooms [8-10] and its ability to
reduce the number of healthcare–associated pathogens
within the near-patient environment has been demon-
strated [9-11]. However, for microorganisms to be
destroyed they must be directly exposed to UV-C irradi-
ation; any surface not in the direct path of the UV-C
rays will not be effectively disinfected [8].
The Nanoclave Cabinet (Nanoclave Technologies LLP,
London, UK) produces large amounts of UV-C light. Its
purpose is to rapidly disinfect clinical equipment, furni-
ture and electronic devices. Inside the Cabinet are 48
UV-C lamps (32 × 30 W and 16 × 25 W) mounted, in
banks of eight, to each of the six internal surfaces, includ-
ing the door. Angled mirrored reflectors help minimise
shadowing by directing and concentrating the UV-C rays
onto the item to be disinfected. This six-sided emission of
UV-C light means any item placed in the cabinet is sub-
jected to a dosage of 53 W/m2.
The aim of this study was to assess, under controlled
laboratory conditions, the ability of the Nanoclave Cabi-
net to effectively disinfect a range of artificially contami-
nated non-critical patient care items.
Methods
The Nanoclave Cabinet
The Nanoclave Cabinet is made from stainless steel and
can be manufactured in a range of different dimensions.The Cabinet supplied for use during this investigation
measured 129 cm× 94 cm× 89 cm (l ×w× h) and was
mounted on a base which raised the height of the unit
to 1.6 m (Figure 1). To ensure that all the UV-C lamps
were working correctly, a device controller measured the
power consumption of the lamps during operation. Any
significant drop in power resulted in the failure and ces-
sation of the cycle. The Nanoclave Cabinet also incorpo-
rates a data logging feature which, for additional safety,
is independent from the device controller. Current
meters monitor the current drawn by each bank of
lamps and UV-C sensors monitor the actual UV-C out-
put of the lamps. These data are collected onto an SD
card and can be printed using a thermal printer.
Effectiveness of the Nanoclave Cabinet against a range of
pathogenic bacteria
Test organisms
Testing involved a range of potential nosocomial patho-
gens: methicillin-sensitive Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA;
NCTC 10788), methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA; EMRSA-15 variant B1 (environmental isolate)),
Enterococcus hirae (NCTC 12367), vancomycin-resistant
Enterococcus faecalis (VRE; clinical isolate), Escherichia
coli (NCTC 10418), multi-resistant Acinetobacter bauman-
nii (MRAB; OXA-23 clone 1 (clinical isolate)), extended
spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) producing Klebsiella
pneumoniae (environmental isolate) and Pseudomonas
aeruginosa (NCTC 6749).
Clinical isolates were taken from clinical specimens
and stored in the microbiology laboratory. Only the iso-
lated microorganisms and not the specimens (e.g. urine;
sputum; faecal samples) were stored. Clinical isolates
were fully anonymised and testing was only to assess the
effectiveness of the Nanoclave Cabinet. The organisms
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there was no way to link them to individual patients.
Thus, ethics consideration was not deemed necessary by
UCLH Research and Development.
Ability of the Nanoclave Cabinet to disinfect non-critical
patient care items
Preparation of test items Eight items of near-bedside
equipment of the type and in the condition of those likely
to be found in the ward environment were included in
the study; a blood pressure gauge, a patient call button,
an infusion pump, a tympanic thermometer, an oximeter
base unit, a computer keyboard (and mouse), a TV re-
mote control and a blood pressure cuff. Each surface was
marked with up to nine individual sample points.
Prior to each experiment, each test surface was cleaned
using a (hand hot) damp microfibre cloth, left to air-dry
under ambient conditions and disinfected using 70% alco-
hol spray. The efficacy of this cleaning protocol was
assessed using agar contact plates and residual microbial
numbers were consistently reduced to below detectable
levels.
Exposure of test items to UV-C radiation A single col-
ony of MRSA, VRE, MRAB or Kleb pneumoniae was
aseptically transferred into 10 ml sterile nutrient broth
(Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK). A stationary-phase culture
(~108 cfu/ml) was obtained by incubating the bacteria at
37°C for 18 h. After incubation, the culture was trans-
ferred to a sterile universal container and centrifuged at
1500 × g for 10 min. The supernatant was discarded and
the pellet re-suspended in 10 ml sterile ¼-strength Ring-
er’s solution (an isotonic salt solution; Oxoid).
For each test item, 10 μl of bacterial suspension (con-
taining approximately 106 cfu) was inoculated onto each
sample point and, rather than being left as a droplet,
spread over a 1 cm2 test area. Immediately after inocula-
tion, the test item was placed in the Nanoclave Cabinet
on a stainless steel lattice rack and exposed for 30 sec to
the UV-C light source.
Although the base of the item (i.e. the surface facing
the rack) was exposed to UV-C light emitted from the
base of the cabinet, any sample point in direct contact
with the lattice bars remained protected from the rays.
Thus, after irradiation, to ensure the entire surface area
was exposed to a UV-C dose of at least 1,590 J/m2
(53 W/m2×30 sec exposure), the positioning of the ob-
ject within the Cabinet was altered and the irradiation
cycle repeated.
After exposure, a pre-moistened cotton-tipped swab
was used to sample each sample point. Each swab was
placed in 1 ml ¼-strength Ringer’s solution and vortexed
to release the bacteria. One hundred microlitres of theresulting suspension was plated onto a pre-poured blood
agar plate (Oxoid) and incubated at 37°C for 24 hours.
Non-exposed control samples Test items were inocu-
lated as previously described. Immediately after inocula-
tion, each test area was sampled using a pre-moistened
cotton-tipped swab. Each swab was placed in 9 ml ¼-
strength Ringer’s solution and vortexed to release the
bacteria. The resulting suspension was diluted 100-fold
and 100 μl of the diluted sample plated onto blood agar.
Plates were incubated at 37°C for 24 hours.
Comparative performance of antimicrobial wipes
To compare the efficacy of the Nanoclave Cabinet with
that of an antimicrobial wipe, three patient care items
(blood pressure cuff, tympanic thermometer, patient call
button) were inoculated with a representative organism
(Acinetobacter baumannii). Selected test areas were
cleaned ‘poorly’ (one wiping stroke), ‘moderately well’ (two
wipes) or ‘thoroughly’ (four wipes) using an antimicrobial
wipe (VWR International Disinfectant Wipes: active ingre-
dients: peroxides, benzalkonium chloride; VWR Inter-
national, Lutterworth, UK). Each test area was sampled
with a pre-moistened swab which, prior to plating, was
vortexed within 1 ml of neutralising solution (phosphate
buffered saline incorporating 3% Tween 80 (w/v), 0.3%
lecithin (w/v), 0.1% sodium thiosulphate (w/v)).
Effect of organic soiling on the efficacy of the Nanoclave
Cabinet
A stationary-phase culture of MSSA, E. hirae, E. coli or P.
aeruginosa was prepared as previously described. After
centrifugation, cell pellets were re-suspended in either
0.03% bovine serum albumin (BSA; w/v) sterilized by
membrane filtration or, to represent heavy soiling, 0.3%
BSA (w/v) and 0.3% “packed” sheep erythrocytes (v/v),
which were prepared as follows. Three millilitres of sterile
defribinated sheep blood (TCS Biosciences Ltd, Bucking-
ham, UK) was centrifuged at 800× g for 10 minutes. The
supernatant was discarded and the pellet re-suspended in
a balanced salt solution. This process was repeated until
the supernatant was colourless. The packed erythrocytes
were then re-suspended and added to a sterile solution of
BSA (3.0 g bovine albumin (fraction V), 0.1 g tryptone,
0.85 g sodium chloride, 97 ml distilled water). The result-
ing suspension was diluted 10-fold.
Sterile stainless steel discs (1 cm in diameter) were
inoculated with 20 μl bacterial suspension (~ 106 cfu)
and allowed to dry for 80 minutes at 30°C. Two discs
were then attached to each surface of a plastic cube,
placed in the Nanoclave Cabinet and exposed for 60 sec
to the UV-C light source. Thus, each of 12 discs was
positioned either vertically or horizontally and exposed
to a UV-C dose of 3,180 J/m2. After exposure, each disc
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containing sterile glass beads and vortexed for 1 min. The
resulting suspension was diluted 10-fold and 100 μl of the
diluted sample plated onto tryptone soya agar. Control
discs were inoculated and incubated as described but
were cultured without having been exposed to UV-C. All
plates were incubated at 37°C for 24 hours.
Analysis of results
For each test surface, the number of colonies recovered
from each irradiated or wiped test area was subtracted
from the number of colonies recovered from the corre-
sponding control sample. The results were used to cal-
culate the mean log reduction in microbial viability and,
thus, the efficacy of the Nanoclave Cabinet or antimicro-
bial wipes. Data analysis was performed using Microsoft
Excel 2007. Statistical significance was determined by
use of t tests and was at a level of P < 0.05.
Effectiveness of the Nanoclave Cabinet against
Clostridium difficile spores
Spore suspensions of Clostridium difficile were prepared
as previously described [12] and stored in a 1:1 solution
of alcohol (70%) and phosphate buffered saline.
A stainless steel sheet was cleaned using a (hand hot)
damp microfibre cloth, left to air-dry under ambient
conditions and disinfected using 70% alcohol spray. A
spore suspension of C. difficile 027 (clinical isolate) was
centrifuged at 1500 × g for 10 min and re-suspended in
10 ml sterile ¼-strength Ringer’s solution. A 10 μl ali-
quot (containing approximately 106 cfu) was inoculated
onto the steel surface and spread over a 1 cm2 test area.
Immediately after inoculation, the sheet was placed in
the Nanoclave Cabinet and exposed to two 60 sec UV-C
cycles. After exposure, the test surface was sampled
using a pre-moistened cotton-tipped swab which was
transferred to 1 ml ¼-strength Ringer’s solution and vor-
texed to release the spores. One hundred microlitres of
the resulting suspension was plated onto a pre-poured
Brazier’s agar plate (Oxoid) and incubated under anaer-
obic conditions at 37°C for 48 hours. ExperimentsTable 1 Ability of the Nanoclave Cabinet to disinfect non-crit
minimum and maximum log10 reductio
Blood pressure
gauge (n= 8)
Patient call
button (n = 8)
Infusion pump
(n= 5)
Tympanic
thermome
(n = 9)
Pathogen b min max min max min max min ma
MRSA 4.40 >5.29 >4.74 >5.17 >4.94 >5.08 2.16 >5.
VRE >5.11 >5.23 >5.05 >5.21 >4.93 >5.30 1.49 >5.
A. baumannii 3.44 >5.54 5.32 >5.59 >5.39 >5.56 2.29 >5.
Kleb. pneum 2.76 >5.19 >4.84 >5.25 4.04 5.07 1.02 >5.
ainitial inoculum: 106 cfu/cm2.
btest organism suspended in ¼-strength Ringer’s solution.comprised a minimum of three replicate samples and
were repeated to incorporate lower inoculum levels and
longer exposure times. The effect of organic soiling was
investigated by re-suspending spores of C. difficile
NCTC 11209 (ribotype 001) in 0.03% BSA and inoculat-
ing sterile stainless steel discs as described previously.
Effectiveness of the Nanoclave Cabinet against
Adenovirus
A stainless steel sheet and a ceramic tile were cleaned
and disinfected as previously described. Adenovirus spe-
cies (serotype 31) was grown in a Vero cell line. A 10 μl
aliquot (containing approximately 109 viral genomes) was
inoculated onto the test surface and spread over a 5 cm2
test area. After being allowed to air-dry (ambient condi-
tions) for 2 h, the sheet (or tile) was placed in the Nano-
clave Cabinet and exposed to two 30 sec UV-C cycles.
After exposure, the test surface was sampled using a pre-
moistened cotton-tipped swab which was transferred to
0.5 ml molecular grade water and vortexed to release the
virus particles. Viral nucleic acid was extracted from
200 μl of the resulting suspension using a DNA Miniprep
Kit (Qiagen, Crawley, UK) and eluted into 100 μl UV irra-
diated buffer. Ten microlitres of the extract was processed
using a semi-quantitative Adenovirus real time polymer-
ase chain reaction (PCR) [13]. All PCR’s were run with a
negative extraction, as well as negative and positive con-
trols; the latter to monitor assay performance across runs.
Experiments comprised four replicate samples and were
repeated to incorporate longer exposure times.
Results
Ability of the Nanoclave Cabinet to disinfect non-critical
patient care items
Effectiveness of the Nanoclave Cabinet against vegetative
bacteria
Fifty-one individual sample sites associated with eight
near-bedside items of clinical equipment and furniture
were inoculated with MRSA, VRE, MRAB and Klebsiella
pneumoniae. Loss in microbial viability varied depending
on surface type (Table 1) but exposing 40 of the 51ical patient care items
n after exposure to two 30-second UV-C cycles a
ter
Oximeter
(base unit)
(n = 7)
Computer
keyboard/mouse
(n= 4)
TV remote
control (n = 4)
Blood pressure
cuff (n = 6)
x min max min max min max min max
45 >5.25 >5.48 >4.97 >5.10 >5.05 >5.32 1.93 >5.13
44 >4.91 5.27 4.28 >5.03 4.93 >5.16 2.13 >5.00
64 >5.13 >5.48 4.90 >5.74 >5.33 >5.75 3.46 >5.39
11 >4.33 >5.08 >5.11 >5.21 >5.05 >5.12 3.24 >5.34
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cycles consistently reduced the number of contaminating
organisms by at least 4.7 log10 values and/or to below
detectable levels (10 cfu).
The Nanoclave Cabinet was less effective when used
to disinfect the tympanic thermometer and the blood
pressure cuff (Table 1). Although two 30-second UV-C
cycles reduced bacterial numbers on some sites to below
detectable levels, on others, bacterial numbers were
reduced by less than 2 log10 values.
Comparative performance of the Nanoclave Cabinet and
antimicrobial wipes
‘Thoroughly’ cleaning the tympanic thermometer with
an antimicrobial wipe (four wiping strokes) reduced the
number of bacteria on most sample points to below de-
tectable levels (Table 2). A single wiping motion (defined
as a ‘poor’ clean) was less effective than the Nanoclave
Cabinet in reducing contamination levels on the display
panel but more effective when used to disinfect the
probe receptor and earpiece holder. When used to disin-
fect the infra-red sensor neither antimicrobial wipes nor
the Nanoclave Cabinet were particularly effective in re-
ducing bacterial numbers. Whilst two 30-second UV-C
cycles achieved a 2.30 log10 reduction, cleaning with an
antimicrobial wipe only reduced bacterial numbers by
2.14 log10 values (Table 2).
When used to disinfect a blood pressure cuff, the
Nanoclave cabinet reduced the number of bacteria on
the pump and pump tubing by more than 5 log10 values
(Table 2). ‘Thorough’ cleaning using an antimicrobial
wipe achieved a similar log reduction but less effective
wiping reduced bacterial numbers by between 2.38 and
3.94 log10 values. Antimicrobial wipes were leastTable 2 Comparative performance of the Nanoclave Cabinet a
care items
Mea
Nanoclave
(2 × 30 sec) ‘poor’ wiping
Tympanic thermometer
display panel >5.49 4.45 ± 1.03
infra-red sensor 2.29 ± 0.93 1.94 ± 0.03
plastic lid >5.64 >5.40
probe receptor 4.55 ± 1.07 5.16 ± 0.17
earpiece holder 3.44 ± 0.13 5.25 ± 0.40
Blood pressure cuff
Velcro (hook) 3.60 ± 0.98 1.91 ± 0.07
Velcro (loop) 4.28 ± 0.96 1.50 ± 0.03
inner cuff surface 3.46 ± 1.47 1.73 ± 0.09
pump >5.39 2.38 ± 0.15
pump tubing >5.07 2.75 ± 0.40
a initial inoculum: 106 cfu/cm2.effective when used to disinfect the inner cuff surface
and either side of the velcro fastening. The Nanoclave
Cabinet was comparatively more effective and reduced
the number of bacteria contaminating these surfaces by
between 3.46 and 4.28 log10 values (Table 2).
When used to disinfect the patient call button, the
Nanoclave Cabinet reduced the number of bacteria on
all target sites to below detectable levels (> 5.3 log10
values). Cleaning using an antimicrobial wipe was
equally effective although a ‘poor’ wiping technique
allowed organisms to persist on the rear panel and rub-
ber grip.
Effect of organic soiling on the efficacy of the Nanoclave
Cabinet
In the presence of low level soiling (0.03% BSA), two 30-
second UV-C irradiation cycles reduced MSSA, Entero-
coccus hirae, Escherichia coli and Pseudomonas aeruginosa
numbers to below detectable levels and achieved at least a
5.8 log10 reduction in microbial viability. Increasing the or-
ganic challenge had little effect upon the efficacy of the
Nanoclave Cabinet which, in the presence of BSA (0.3%)
and red blood cells reduced MSSA and P. aeruginosa
numbers to below detectable levels (i.e. achieved a 6 log10
reduction) within 60 seconds (Table 3).
Effectiveness of the Nanoclave Cabinet against Clostridium
difficile spores
The Nanoclave Cabinet was less effective against C. difficile
spores, particularly those of the clinical strain. Two 30-
second cycles achieved a 3.55 log10 reduction in C. difficile
NCTC 11209 spore numbers (Table 3). In comparison, two
60-second cycles reduced the number of 027 spores by just
1.14 log10 values (Figure 2). A 2.18 log10 reduction wasnd antimicrobial wipes when used to disinfect patient
n (± SD) log10 reduction
a (n = 3)
Antimicrobial wipes
‘moderate' wiping ‘thorough’ wiping
5.04 ± 0.60 >5.39
1.96 ± 0.25 2.14 ± 0.14
>5.40 >5.40
>5.48 >5.48
5.28 ± 0.35 >5.49
2.42 ± 0.14 2.66 ± 0.09
2.26 ± 0.19 2.67 ± 0.06
2.65 ± 0.08 2.30 ± 0.08
2.90 ± 0.08 >5.60
3.94 ± 1.22 >5.33
Table 3 Effect of organic soiling on the efficacy of the
Nanoclave Cabinet
Mean (± SD) log10 reduction
Light soiling (n = 36)
0.03% BSA
Heavy soiling (n = 12)
0.3% BSA+0.3%
sheep erythrocytes
MSSA > 7.18 6.19 ± 0.76
P. aeruginosa > 6.12 >5.99
E. coli > 5.84 not tested
E. hirae > 6.15 not tested
C. difficile spores
(ribotype 001)
3.55 ± 0.47 not tested
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second cycles). Increasing the cycle time further had no sig-
nificant effect (P>0.05; Figure 2). However, when the initial
inoculum was≤ 104 cfu/cm2 two 60-second UV cycles were
sufficient to reduce the number of C. difficile 027 spores to
below detectable levels (Figure 3).
Effectiveness of the Nanoclave Cabinet against Adenovirus
species A
Viability assays were not available for Adenovirus, so
persistence of viral DNA following inoculation of viable
cell culture, detected by polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), was used as a surrogate marker. PCR may detect
both viable and non-viable virus, depending upon the in-
tegrity of the DNA present on the surface. UV-C
degrades DNA, so there will be loss of viability before
total loss of detectable DNA by PCR, but the point at
which all viable virus is lost is not known. The levels of
retrievable viral genomes are recorded as a function of
the PCR assay using the Cycle Threshold (CT) values.
The CT is the number of doubling cycles requiredFigure 2 The effect of cycle duration upon the mean number of Clost
(n = 5; error bars indicate the standard deviation).before the assay became positive. A small CT represents
a higher starting load and each 3.3 CT increase between
samples equates to a 1 log10 reduction in detectable viral
genome. A CT value of 45 is the assay end-point and
DNA considered ‘undetectable’.
The ability of the Nanoclave Cabinet to degrade
Adenovirus DNA was only tested on smooth metal or
ceramic surfaces. On these surfaces the UV-C is shown
to degrade Adenovirus DNA by the increase in CT value
following successive exposures (Table 4). Regardless of
test surface, six 30-second cycles (3 minutes) increased
the mean CT between 9 and 10 CT values. Thus, a total
exposure time of 3 minutes resulted in a 3 log10 reduc-
tion in detectable viral DNA. After an exposure time of
6 minutes, viral DNA was undetectable on both the
stainless steel and ceramic test surface (i.e. a 6 log10 re-
duction had been achieved).
Discussion
The routine cleaning and disinfection of the near-patient
environment is often inadequate and many items of
near-patient equipment and furniture have been identi-
fied as potential bacterial reservoirs [3,6,14-18]. The effi-
cacy of many traditionally used products and practices
has been questioned as has their human and ecological
safety [19]. Such concerns have prompted an increasing
interest in the use of additional or alternative surface
disinfectants, for example, self-disinfecting surfaces [20],
hydrogen peroxide vapour [21] and ultraviolet light.
Ultraviolet irradiation is considered an acceptable and
environmentally friendly means of disinfecting surfaces
in healthcare settings [10]. The Tru-D Rapid Room De-
contamination device (Lumalier Corporation) can elim-
inate vegetative bacteria and C. difficile spores fromridium difficile 027 spores recovered from a stainless steel surface
Figure 3 Efficacy of the Nanoclave Cabinet against the spores of Clostridium difficile ribotype 027: the effect of inoculum level (n = 3;
error bars indicate the standard deviation).
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spectively [9,10]. However, such UV-C devices cannot be
used when the room is occupied and a lengthy cycle
time is impractical if a rapid turn-over of beds is
required.
The Nanoclave Cabinet is used to disinfect individual
patient-care items. Any item placed in the Cabinet is
subjected to six-sided emission of UV-C light both dir-
ectly and via angled mirror reflectors. During the
current study, the Nanoclave Cabinet was used to disin-
fect a variety of non-critical patient care items and the
UV-C light caused no observable damage. However, the
range of surface materials tested was by no means ex-
haustive. Not all materials are suitable. The Medicines
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA)
has advised that the outer coating of flexible endoscopes
may be damaged by direct exposure to ultraviolet light
[22]. UV-C light is also injurious to soft contact lensTable 4 Effect of cycle duration upon the degradation of
Adenovirus DNA
Exposure time Mean Cycle Threshold (CT) value a (n = 4)
Stainless steel sheet Ceramic tile
0 min (control) 17 18
1 min 22 22
2 min 25 27
3 min 27 27
4 min 33 34
5 min 31 45
6 min 45 45
aA 3.3 CT increase equates to a 1 log reduction in detectable viral genome. A
CT value of 45 is the assay end-point and when DNA is considered
undetectable.polymers albeit at a dose much higher (250 mW/cm2)
than that generated by the Nanoclave Cabinet (5.3 mW/
cm2) [23].
Each patient-care item was irradiated for 30 sec. The
surface was rotated to expose those areas initially in
contact with the rack, and the irradiation cycle repeated.
Two irradiation cycles ensured the entire surface area
was exposed to a UV-C dose of 1,590 J/m2 (53 W/
m2 × 30 s exposure time) and that much of the surface
was subjected to twice this dose (3,180 J/m2; 53 W/
m2 × 60 s exposure time). This was sufficient to reduce
the number of vegetative contaminants on the majority
of sample points by at least 4.7 log10 values. However,
not all test points demonstrated the same reduction.
Poor penetration of the UV-C rays and/or significant
shadowing, enabled bacteria to persist on the tympanic
thermometer and the blood pressure cuff (Table 2). It
was possible to reach the deep recesses associated with
the thermometer (e.g. probe receptor; earpiece holder)
with an antimicrobial wipe and wiping reduced the
number of contaminating organisms to below detectable
levels. In contrast, although surface contamination
decreased as the thoroughness of wiping increased, anti-
microbial wipes were less effective than the Nanoclave
Cabinet in disinfecting the blood pressure cuff, particu-
larly the Velcro fastener.
The Nanoclave Cabinet was less effective on surfaces
contaminated with C. difficile spores. Previous studies
have also found C. difficile spores to be more resistant to
UV-C radiation than vegetative bacteria [9,10]. Exposing
a highly contaminated surface (106 cfu/cm2) to a total
dose of 6,360 J/m2, achieved a small (1.14) but signifi-
cant log10 reduction in C. difficile 027 spore numbers.
Exposing a less contaminated surface (105 cfu/cm2) to
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clumping of high numbers of spores may inhibit the
penetration of UV-C rays. Spores within a clump may be
shielded and protected by those directly exposed. None-
theless, when dried onto a surface, high numbers of
C. difficile NCTC 11209 spores (106 cfu/cm2) were
reduced by 3.55 log values within 60 seconds (i.e. after a
comparatively lower dose of 3,180 J/m2; Table 3). Spores
of wild type variants of C. difficile have also been shown
to be more resistant to chemical disinfectants than those
of laboratory strains [24]. Additionally, spore size can
vary both within and between strains [25] and an
increased spore diameter may reduce the ability of the
UV-C rays to penetrate the various spore layers [26].
There are no European Standard sporicidal surface
tests for the medical area; current standards are suspen-
sion tests which require a 3 or 4 log10 reduction within
30, 60 or 120 minutes [27]. When used to disinfect a
surface contaminated with C. difficile spores at levels
equating to 103 cfu/cm2, the Nanoclave Cabinet achieved
a 3 log10 reduction within 2 minutes – a shorter, more
relevant exposure time than those specified by current
standards. However, the manufacturers of the Nanoclave
stipulate that the Cabinet should only be loaded with
one item at a time (as illustrated in Figure 4). Thus, in
contrast to whole room decontamination devices, the
total time required to disinfect a number of items using
the Nanoclave Cabinet could be high, particularly if the
cabinet is used for viral disinfection.
Adenovirus is associated with respiratory, ocular and
gastrointestinal disease, especially in children. Once
excreted, it can survive and remain infectious within the
environment for up to 35 days. As a double stranded
DNA virus, Adenovirus is particularly resistant to UVFigure 4 Placing an item to be disinfected inside the Nanoclave
Cabinet.irradiation [28]. During the current study, the Nanoclave
Cabinet rendered high levels of Adenovirus DNA
(109 viral genomes), on flat stainless steel sheets or cer-
amic tiles, undetectable by a sensitive PCR. However, to
achieve this level of degradation (> 6 log10 reduction in
detected viral DNA) it was necessary to expose the test
surfaces to twelve 30-second UV cycles (i.e. a total dose
of 19,080 J/m2). A lower exposure time may be required
to achieve a 6 log10 reduction in viable virus as Adeno-
virus is likely to become non-viable before DNA
becomes non-detectable by PCR.
It is also stated, both in the technical specifications
document and the instructions for use of the Nanoclave
Cabinet, that “items to be disinfected must be physically
clean before irradiation”. Removal of visible soil is im-
portant both aesthetically and chemically. Organic soils
are known to react with disinfectant molecules reducing
their bioavailability. UV-C is also absorbed by organic
materials [8] and whilst the Nanoclave Cabinet is not
intended to be used to decontaminate heavily soiled in-
vasive items, some non-critical patient care items may
be difficult to manually clean. As with other UV-C ir-
radiation devices [9], the efficacy of the Nanoclave Cabi-
net was not reduced by bovine serum albumin or red
blood cells. However, it is acknowledged that the soiling
experiments were only carried out using flat stainless
steel discs and whilst the positioning of the discs within
the Cabinet did not influence the reductions obtained,
the presence of organic materials within recesses and/or
areas of significant shadowing may effect the ability of
the Nanoclave Cabinet to rapidly and effectively disinfect
patient-care items.
Conclusions
There are no standard test methods or acceptance
requirements for equipment such as the Nanoclave
Cabinet. During the current study, the test requirements
for chemical disinfectants were used as the basis for the
acceptance criteria. These stipulate that a bactericidal
and sporicidal product should achieve a 5 log10- and a 3
log10 reduction respectively. The Nanoclave Cabinet ef-
fectively reduced the numbers of a range of potential
pathogens including Clostridium difficile spores and
Adenovirus from most, but not all, test surfaces and
patient-care items. High level bacterial and viral disinfec-
tion (> 5 log10 reduction) was achieved within 1 and 6
minutes respectively suggesting that the Nanoclave Cabi-
net could be used to provide rapid and effective disinfec-
tion of patient-related equipment. However, bacteria did
persist on some test sites; these areas may have been ‘in
shadow’ due to individual item shape and other decon-
tamination methods may be required. Furthermore, the
Nanoclave Cabinet can only be loaded with one item at
a time and the real life practicability of such a system
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studies do not necessarily replicate ‘in-use’ conditions
and further studies are required to assess the acceptabil-
ity and usability of the Nanoclave Cabinet within the
clinical environment and its performance if Standard
Operating Procedures are not adhered to.
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